Engines of Order by Rieder, Bernhard
Ams terdam





A Mechanology   
of Algorithmic   
Techniques
Engines of Order
The book series RECURSIONS: THEORIES OF MEDIA, MATERIALITY, AND 
CULTURAL TECHNIQUES provides a platform for cuttingedge research in the 
f ield of media culture studies with a particular focus on the cultural impact of 
media technology and the materialities of communication. The series aims to 
be an internationally signif icant and exciting opening into emerging ideas in 
media theory ranging from media materialism and hardware-oriented studies 
to ecology, the post-human, the study of cultural techniques, and recent 
contributions to media archaeology. The series revolves around key themes:
– The material underpinning of media theory
– New advances in media archaeology and media philosophy
– Studies in cultural techniques
These themes resonate with some of the most interesting debates in international 
media studies, where non-representational thought, the technicity of knowledge 
formations and new materialities expressed through biological and technological 
developments are changing the vocabularies of cultural theory. The series is also 
interested in the mediatic conditions of such theoretical ideas and developing 
them as media theory.
Editorial Board
– Jussi Parikka (University of Southampton)
– Anna Tuschling (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
– Geoffrey Winthrop-Young (University of British Columbia)
Engines of Order
A Mechanology of Algorithmic Techniques
Bernhard Rieder
Amsterdam University Press
This publication is funded by the Dutch Research Council (NWO).
Chapter 1 contains passages from Rieder, B. (2016). Big Data and the Paradox of Diversity. 
Digital Culture & Society 2(2), 1-16 and Rieder, B. (2017). Beyond Surveillance: How Do Markets 
and Algorithms ‘Think’? Le Foucaldien 3(1), n.p.
Chapter 6 is a heavily reworked and extended version of Rieder, B. (2017). Scrutinizing an 
Algorithmic Technique: The Bayes Classif ier as Interested Reading of Reality. Information, 
Communication & Society 30(1), 100-117.
Chapter 7 is a reworked and extended version of Rieder, B. (2012). What Is in PageRank? A Histori-
cal and Conceptual Investigation of a Recursive Status Index. Computational Culture 2, n.p.
Cover illustration: The full text of this book, represented as a feature vector. © Bernhard Rieder
Cover design: Suzan Beijer
Lay-out: Crius Group, Hulshout
isbn 978 94 6298 619 0
e-isbn 978 90 4853 741 9
doi 10.5117/9789462986190
nur 670
Creative Commons License CC BY NC ND
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0)
 B. Rieder / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2020
Some rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, any part of 
this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, 
in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise).
Every effort has been made to obtain permission to use all copyrighted illustrations 
reproduced in this book. Nonetheless, whosoever believes to have rights to this material is 
advised to contact the publisher.




1. Engines of Order 25
2. Rethinking Software 51
3. Software-Making and Algorithmic Techniques 81
Part II
4. From Universal Classif ication to a Postcoordinated Universe 145
5. From Frequencies to Vectors 199
6. Interested Learning 235
7. Calculating Networks: From Sociometry to PageRank 265
Conclusion: Toward Technical Culture 305




This book has been long in the making and has benefited from many differ-
ent inputs. I would f irst like to thank the Recursions series editors – Anna 
Tuschling, Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, and, in particular, Jussi Parikka – for 
their many valuable remarks and suggestions. Maryse Elliott from Amster-
dam University Press has been an invaluable help in guiding me through 
the whole editorial process. Eduardo Navas’s constructive comments on the 
manuscript were much appreciated. I am also grateful to Carolin Gerlitz, 
Sonia de Jager, Janna Joceli Omena, Niels Kerssens, Emillie de Keulenaar, 
Thomas Poell, Gernot Rieder, Guillaume Sire, Michael Stevenson, and 
Fernando van der Vlist for reading drafts at various stages of completion 
and providing critical feedback.
I want to thank Thomas Brandstetter, Dominique Cardon, Mark Coté, 
Nick Couldry, José van Dijck, Nigel Dodd, Matthew Fuller, Paolo Gerbaudo, 
Paul Girard, Andrew Goffey, Olga Goriunova, Sanne Kraijenbosch, Camille 
Paloque-Berges, Jean-Christophe Plantin, Thomas Poell, Barbara Prainsack, 
Theo Röhle, Anton Tantner, Leon Wansleben, and Hartmut Winkler for 
conference and workshop invitations that allowed me to develop the ideas 
that run through this book. My thanks also go to my colleagues at the 
Mediastudies Department and the Digital Methods Initiative at the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam as well as my former colleagues at the Département 
Hypermedia and Laboratoire Paragraphe at Paris VIII University for the 
many stimulating conversations that shaped the following chapters.
Particular thanks are due to Richard Rogers and the Dutch Research 
Council (NWO) for making it possible to release this book through open 
access.
I dedicate this book to the memory of Frank Hartmann, whose passion 




The introduction chapter positions algorithmic information ordering as a 
central practice and technology in contemporary digital infrastructures, a 
set of techniques that serve as ‘levers on reality’ (Goody). While algorithms 
used in concrete systems may often be hard to scrutinize, they draw on 
widely available software modules and well-documented principles that 
make them amendable to humanistic analysis. The chapter introduces 
Gilbert Simondon’s mechanology and provides an overview of the structure 
and argument of the book.
Keywords: algorithmic information ordering, information search and 
retrieval, mechanology, software-making
Over the last decades, and in particular since the widespread adoption 
of the Internet, encounters with algorithmic procedures for ‘information 
retrieval’ – the activity of getting some piece of information out of a col-
lection or repository of some kind – have become everyday experiences for 
most people in large parts of the world. We search for all kinds of things on 
the open web, but also for products, prices, and customer reviews in the 
specialized databases of online retailers, for friends, family, and strangers 
in social networking services or dating sites, and for the next thing to read, 
watch, play, listen to, or experience in quickly growing repositories for 
media contents. There are at least three remarkable aspects to this spread 
of information seeking. First, computer-supported searching has sprawled 
beyond the libraries, archives, and specialized documentation systems it 
was largely confined to before the arrival of the web. Searching, that is, the 
act of putting a query into a form field, has become such a fundamental and 
ubiquitous gesture that a missing search box on a website becomes an almost 
disturbing experience. Second, what retrieval operates on – information – 
has come to stand for almost anything, from scraps of knowledge to things, 
people, ideas, or experiences. Digitization, dataf ication, and the capture of 
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always more activities in software are, in the words of Netscape founder 
and venture capitalist Marc Andreessen (2011), ‘eating the world’. Search has 
become a dominant means to access and order the masses of digital and 
datafied bits and pieces that clutter the environments we inhabit. Third, the 
deliberate and motivated act of formulating a query to f ind something is only 
one of the many forms in which information retrieval nowadays manifests 
itself. Automated personalization, localization, recommendation, f iltering, 
classif ication, evaluation, aggregation, synthetization, or ad hoc generation 
of information are similarly pervasive practices that do not require explicit 
user input to select, sequence, arrange, or modulate some set of digital 
items. And retrieval techniques are no longer limited to producing result 
lists: they generate scores, suggest items, discard or promote messages, set 
prices, arrange objects and people in relation to each other, assemble texts, 
forbid or grant access, fabricate interfaces and visualizations, and even steer 
objects in the physical world. In short, various activities or gestures this book 
addresses under the broad notion of ‘information ordering’ have become 
both pervasive and subtle in terms of how they operate in the thickening 
layers of digital mediation.
The proliferation of these algorithmic practices has been accompanied 
by considerable efforts in the humanities and social sciences to investigate 
techniques and applications in terms of power and social significance. Early 
analyses of search engines already highlighted their political dimension, 
claiming that ‘there is no such thing as algorithms without their own weight’ 
(Winkler, 1999, p. 36). This meant that one could examine ‘the wide-ranging 
factors that dictate systematic prominence for some sites, dictating sys-
tematic invisibility for others’ (Introna and Nissenbaum, 2000, p. 171) from 
a point of view concerned with social impact and public interest. Beyond 
search, authors have called attention to ‘moments of algorithmic judgement’ 
(Graham, 2005, p. 576) that abound when ‘code-based technologized environ-
ments continuously and invisibly classify, standardize, and demarcate rights, 
privileges, inclusions, exclusions, and mobilities’ (Graham, 2005, p. 563). 
Terms like ‘automated management’ (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011), ‘algorithmic 
ideology’ (Mager, 2012), ‘algorithmic governmentality’ (Berns and Rouvroy, 
2013), and, more recently, ‘algorithmic accountability’ (Diakopoulos, 2015) 
all subscribe to ‘the central premise that algorithms have the capacity to 
shape social and cultural formations and impact directly on individual lives’ 
(Beer, 2009, p. 994). This broad recognition of the ‘relevance of algorithms’ 
is not, however, a symptom of a sudden curiosity for the fundamentals of 
computational theory. It stems from a more specific interest in the particular 
instances where algorithms serve as ‘a means to know what there is to know 
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and how to know it, to participate in social and political discourse, and to 
familiarize ourselves with the publics in which we participate’ (Gillespie, 
2014, p. 167). Most of the techniques that sit at the center of these questions 
and concerns directly relate to the f ield of information ordering.
Search engines remain the most instructive illustration for the issues at 
hand since the tensions between their remarkable practical utility, their 
technical prowess, and their political relevance are so clearly visible. We 
intuitively understand that ranking web pages – and thus the services, 
contents, and viewpoints they stand for – is delicate business. But, as Grim-
melmann (2009) argues, search engines face the ‘dilemma’ that they must 
rank in order to be useful. This imperative collides with the uncomfortable 
observation that there is arguably no technical procedure that can lay serious 
claim to producing assessments concerning ambiguous and contested 
cultural matters in ways that could be broadly accepted as ‘objective’. In 
fact, whenever data are processed algorithmically, the transformation 
from input to output implies a perspective or evaluation that, through 
the coordination between data and what they stand for, is projected back 
into spheres of human life. Techniques for information retrieval become 
engines of order that actively intervene in the spaces they seek to represent 
(cf. Hacking, 1983).
The need to better understand the specificities of these processes becomes 
even clearer if we broaden the scope beyond everyday online experiences 
to activities where algorithms evaluate and inform decisions that can have 
dramatic effects, for example, in hiring, credit assessment, or criminal 
justice (cf. O’Neil, 2016; Christin, 2017; Eubanks, 2018). These emblematic 
and troubling applications point to a myriad of instances in business and 
government where procedures from the broad f ield of information ordering 
are used to inspire, choose, or impose a specif ic course of action.
The technical procedures involved are loaded, often implicitly, with 
specif ic ideas and attitudes concerning the domains they intervene in. 
Search engines evaluate the ‘relevance’ of information, news aggregators 
generate front pages according to various measures of ‘newsworthiness’, 
dating sites calculate ‘compatibility coeff icients’ between members and 
order them accordingly, social networking sites f ilter friends’ status updates 
based on quantif ied ideas of ‘interest’ or ‘closeness’, and microblogging 
services give prominence to ‘trending’ topics. In each of these cases, there is 
a framing of the application domain that implies various kinds of conceptual 
and normative commitments. This can involve a general allegiance to the 
broad epistemological ‘style’ (Hacking, 1985) of computation as a means 
of knowing; but it can also take more specif ic forms, for example, when 
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psychological research on partnership satisfaction flows into the design of 
a matching algorithm or when the optimization objectives for a machine 
learning system are being selected on the basis of business considerations.
At the same time, technical procedures are more than just a means to 
eff iciently enact values and ideas that are themselves nontechnical. Jack 
Goody (1977) argued that list-making, from the start an essential part of writ-
ing, ‘gives the mind a special kind of lever on “reality”’ (p. 109) by supporting 
mnemonics and, more importantly, by facilitating different operations of 
ordering and reordering pieces of text and, by extension, the things these 
pieces refer to. As Goody knew all too well, the advent of list-making meant 
not just a quantitative extension in cognitive capacity. More fundamentally, 
it stimulated the production and recording of knowledge, spurred modes 
of classif icatory and hierarchical thinking, and supported more complex 
forms of social organization. As Peters (2015) argues, ‘[i]n list writing, se-
rial order loosens its hold’ (p. 290), with wide-ranging consequences. The 
information ordering techniques that have become so pervasive today share 
the transversal character and broad applicability of list-making and may 
prove to have equally fundamental repercussions for how we construct and 
relate to the world around us.
Like list-making, algorithmic ordering comes with a genuine operational 
substance that rarely boils down to a simple transposition of a manual 
method into computational form. A web search engine, for example, orders 
documents through iterative processing of vast amounts of distributed 
signals and the specif ic way it produces an aggregate appreciation of these 
signals def ines an epistemic substance and character that has little to do 
with the knowledge practices that have defined libraries, encyclopedias, or 
archives over the last millennia. As Edsger Dijkstra, one of the central f igures 
in the history of software, remarked about computers over 40 years ago:
[T]he amount of information they can store and the amount of process-
ing that they can perform, in a reasonably short time, are both large 
beyond imagination. And as a result, what the computer can do for us 
has outgrown its basic triviality by several orders of magnitude. (Dijkstra, 
1974, p. 608)
Computers’ capacity to run billions of data points through billions of 
iterations of small calculative steps means that they ‘think’ (Burrell, 2016) 
in ways that are not only opaque, but potentially strange and hard to f it 
into established categories. Techniques like machine learning, network 
algorithms, or relational database management systems are not just powerful 
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means to produce and apply knowledge, to enact value preferences, or to 
control practice; they participate in the very definition of what knowledge, 
value, and practice mean and can mean, both through the conceptual 
resources they propose to think with and the actual interpretations and 
orderings they generate when applied in practice. We should consider the 
possibility that they challenge cultural modes and social institutions in 
more fundamental ways than the necessary discussions of algorithmic 
opacity or bias can lead us to believe.
The methods and procedures involved in actual practices are often hidden 
from our sight by technical and legal means, latched not even in black boxes 
but somewhere in the ‘black foam’ (Rieder, 2005) of systems whose contours 
are hard to delineate. But, paradoxically, they have also become highly 
accessible, in the sense that concrete implementations draw heavily on open 
reservoirs of technicity and knowledge that f ind their expression in scholarly 
publications, software libraries, and communities of practice gathering on 
websites like Stack Overflow. These reservoirs are neither hidden nor closed 
off and we are free to examine a steadily growing archive of techniques that 
enable computers to accomplish tasks that seem increasingly ‘cultural’ or 
‘intelligent’ in nature. This book is an expedition into this archive and more 
specif ically into the areas that deal with information ordering.
The actual makeup of Google’s search ranking may indeed be ‘unknow-
able’ for a number of practical, commercial, and legal reasons, but, as shown 
in Chapter 7, the content, history, and substance of its most famous algo-
rithm, PageRank, stands wide open. We may never get access to the concrete 
specif ications of the machine learning methods behind the personalized 
f iltering Facebook applies to its users’ News Feed, but we can ask, as in 
Chapter 6, where machine learning comes from, what concepts and ideas 
it builds on, and how it operates in general terms. The second part of this 
book is thus dedicated to a series of investigations into specif ic ‘algorithmic 
techniques’, that is, into the def ined-yet-malleable units of technicity and 
knowledge developers draw on when designing the function and behavior 
of computers acting in and on the world. Offering many different ways to 
order and organize information, they serve as levers on the ‘reality’ of a 
world eaten by software.
While this book draws heavily on work situated in the ‘cultural techniques’ 
tradition, an approach coming out of German media scholarship, there is at 
least one important difference. Unlike Young’s (2017) inspirational take on 
the list, which follows a particular cultural form through various societal 
settings, I examine a set of techniques as they traverse what is maybe not 
a single cultural domain but nonetheless a somewhat demarcated practice: 
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software-making. The broader theoretical perspective guiding these probes 
will be discussed at length in part one, but the particular focus on technical 
creation calls for some background and clarif ication.
Toward Mechanology
This book is largely motivated by the remarkable spread of algorithmic 
information ordering but also translates a feeling of hesitation or uneasi-
ness toward the way software is often presented and discussed in media 
studies and associated f ields, or, more specif ically, toward the emphasis 
on code as software’s quintessential technical quality or substance. To be 
clear, understanding how written instructions produce machine behavior 
is fundamental to understanding software, but it is also a comparatively 
small step into the massive world of technicity software constitutes. Code 
is neither trivial nor transparent, but for any experienced developer it is a 
familiar means to access a domain of function that is vastly more complex 
than the term is able to address. Building a program or system is to craft a 
composite technical object, ‘a being that functions’ in the words of French 
philosopher Gilbert Simondon, who plays a central role in what follows. 
This may entail, today more than ever, the assemblage of many preexisting 
chunks of software. Code serves as the means to draw on an archive, to 
‘build-with’, and to create in ways that are deeply relational and embedded. 
As I will argue over the following chapters, the world of software-making 
is structured around ‘techniques’, expressions of knowledge and technicity 
that enable developers to make computers do things that are more involved 
or complex than their ‘basic triviality’ suggests. This book does not presume 
any practical technical knowledge or experience, but it addresses algorithmic 
information ordering from the perspective of technical creation.
My own background plays an important role in this setup. While I have 
little formal training in any technical discipline, I have been developing 
software on a regular basis for a long time. I started to program when I was a 
still in high school, worked as a web developer during my university studies, 
and taught programming to students ranging from beginners to computer 
scientists at master’s level for about a decade. I continue not only to code 
but to make software, nowadays mostly in the domain of digital methods 
for Internet research (Rogers, 2013). The part of the software landscape 
under scrutiny in this book, algorithmic information ordering, is not only 
socially relevant but also closely connected to the technical practice I 
have been pursuing over the last 20 years. As a web developer, I worked 
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extensively with relational database management systems (Chapter 4) and I 
encountered advanced information retrieval techniques (Chapter 5) during 
my PhD in information and communication science at Paris 8 University 
when I was investigating the possibilities for ‘society-oriented design’ 
(Rieder, 2006). This work led to a system, procspace (Rieder, 2008), which 
used a variety of algorithmic methods to generate navigational pathways 
between documents to support a logic of connection, enrichment, and 
overview that breaks with the serial forms of order dominating search. The 
encounter with information retrieval, an established technical f ield that 
comes with a large body of well-documented methods, came as a shock: as 
an autodidact programmer I felt very comfortable when it came to writing 
code, but I was not fully aware how much I was missing. The techniques 
I discovered gave me a new sense of possibility and opened the door to 
forms of technical expression that have stimulated my imagination ever 
since. Although often more heavily mathematized than what I was used to, 
these techniques were relatively simple to implement and, like clay, could 
be modeled in countless ways. The entanglement between information 
ordering and the politically, culturally, and economically significant matters 
it is increasingly involved in became my principal research interest. This 
eventually led to work in digital methods, where I focused on studying 
online platforms that rely on algorithmic techniques in fundamental ways 
and, paradoxically, to a situation where I would apply similar techniques 
as analytical instruments to make sense of large sets of empirical data. 
The chapters about machine learning (Chapter 6) and network algorithms 
(Chapter 7) draw on this work.
The reason I mention these details is not to claim technical authority but 
to introduce and situate a perspective that has been fundamentally shaped 
by these experiences. This perspective is still uncommon in media studies 
and in the broader discussions of software or, to use the buzzwords of the day, 
of ‘algorithms’ or ‘artif icial intelligence’. Following Johanna Drucker’s (2013) 
suggestion to give ‘[m]ore attention to acts of producing and less emphasis 
on product’ (n.p.), my conceptual vantage point is software-making, a series 
of practices that increasingly revolve around the use of packaged function 
as a means to extend programmers’ capabilities. It takes hardly more than 
an hour to install and set up PyTorch or TensorFlow, powerful open-source 
libraries for machine learning, and to have a f irst classif ier trained. While 
some people will want to peek under the hood of these artifacts to make 
adaptations or simply out of intellectual curiosity, developers often draw 
on technicity and knowledge that they understand only in broad terms or 
not at all. What programming languages, software libraries, and similar 
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artifacts do is to enable software-makers to step further faster, not merely 
regarding resource eff iciency but in terms of what can be considered pos-
sible in the f irst place. Such packages widen the spaces of expressivity, 
broaden the scope of ambitions, but also structure, align, and standardize. 
Spelled out, stabilized, and ‘frozen’, algorithmic techniques spread through 
technical imaginaries and artifacts, and further into application logics and 
business models. They are means of production, not simply outpourings of 
computational principles or scientif ic ideas.
Algorithmic techniques are ways of making computers do things, of 
creating function, and their history is characterized to a greater extent 
by accumulation and sedimentation than by paradigm shifts or radical 
breaks. Certainly, methods and approaches are regularly superseded 
or fall out of fashion, but it is clear that the archives that inform and 
constitute software-making have grown vastly over time. While this book 
entertains a somewhat complicated relationship with the f ield of media 
archeology, another prominent approach coming out of German media 
theory, it indeed follows a selection of techniques into their historical 
trajectories to excavate some of the fundamental ideas that resonate 
through our technical present. But throughout these historical probes, I 
strive to keep an eye on the possibilities for variation, combination, and 
divergence that invariably emerge when a technique becomes part of a 
concrete technical object. The developer, in contrast to the computer 
scientist, philosopher of science, or science historian, neither looks at 
the reservoir of techniques from below, as an emanation of foundational 
mathematical principles, nor from above, as outpourings of scientif ic 
progress. The developer is right in-between, surrounded by technicity 
coming in all shapes and forms, and thus ‘among the machines that 
operate with him’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 18).
To interrogate technology both in terms of its fundamental nature 
and from the perspective of technical practice is the task Simondon 
laid out for ‘mechanology’, a discipline or mode of thinking that would 
serve as a ‘psychology’ or ‘sociology’ of machines (Simondon, 2017, p. 160), 
capturing their ‘interior life’ and ‘sociability’ in terms that do not reduce 
them to an exterior f inality or effect. As a general science of technology, 
mechanology would approach technical function as human gesture, 
examine technical creation as mediation between human beings and 
nature, and interrogate the values implied in mechanical operation 
itself. This book, suff ice to say, is an attempt to develop a mechanologi-
cal perspective on software and to apply it to the engines of order that 
increasingly adjudicate (digital) life.
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Organization and Overview
The book is divided into two parts. The f irst part is dedicated to the 
theoretical and methodological foundations that inform and support the 
examination of four clusters of algorithmic techniques for information 
ordering in the second part.
The f irst chapter discusses central terms like ‘information’ and ‘order’, 
and it proposes the concept of ‘engine’ to point toward the infrastructural 
embeddings that have allowed techniques initially conceived for document 
retrieval to become pervasive mediators in online environments. While this 
book constitutes a humanistic exploration of technical substances rather 
than their practical application, the chapter pays tribute to the fact that the 
techniques under scrutiny have become prevalent in a specif ic situation, 
in this world and not another.
The second chapter then formulates a conceptual perspective on software, 
starting from an attempt to situate the project in relation to existing takes on 
the subject. But it is mainly dedicated to the presentation and appropriation 
of Simondon’s philosophy of technology, which reserves a central place 
to technical creation and evolution. Here, we f ind an understanding of 
technicity as a domain of life that constitutes its own substance and regular-
ity, whilst remaining a fundamental form of human gesture. Simondon’s 
inductive view, which frames technology as multitude of technical objects 
rather than idealized techne, grounds the conceptual and analytical ap-
paratus I then bring to the analysis of algorithmic techniques.
Chapter 3 builds on central ideas from Simondon’s work, such as the 
distinction between invention and concretization and the delineation of 
technical elements, individuals, and ensembles, to conceptualize algorithmic 
techniques as the central carriers of technicity and technical knowledge 
in the domain of software. In dialogue with the cultural techniques tradi-
tion, it addresses them as methods or heuristics for creating operation and 
behavior in computing and discusses how they are invented and stabilized. 
Algorithmic techniques, in this perspective, are at the same time material 
blocks of technicity, units of knowledge, vocabularies for expression in the 
medium of function, and constitutive elements of developers’ technical 
imaginaries.
The second part of the book then launches a series of probes into the 
history of algorithmic information ordering. These probes do not follow a 
single lineage or logic and cover different periods of time, but they come 
together in staking out an ‘excavation ground’ (Parikka, 2012, p. 7) that marks 
the 1960s and 1970s as the period where the fundamentals of contemporary 
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information ordering were laid out. While Simondon’s understanding of 
technology as human gesture and my emphasis on adaptation and variation 
lead away from certain core tenets of media archeology, I seek ‘to investigate 
not only histories of technological processes but also the current “archaeol-
ogy” of what happens inside the machine’ (Parikka, 2012, p. 86). The goal is 
to excavate select roots of an increasingly technological present. The four 
clusters of algorithmic techniques examined share the characteristic that 
they are highly relevant to contemporary information ordering while remain-
ing fundamentally understudied, both in their historical and conceptual 
dimension. Looking at the inception and evolution of algorithmic techniques 
allows us to examine them in a state of relative ‘liquidity’, where they have 
not yet been fully stabilized or ‘frozen’ into the canon, remaining precarious 
propositions that have to be explained and justif ied in terms that are absent 
from contemporary publications in the computing disciplines.
Chapter 4 serves as a topic-focused introduction that situates contempo-
rary information ordering in a historical lineage that is largely absent from 
dominant narrations. Although the story starts off from standard takes on 
knowledge organization and classif ication in libraries and encyclopedias, it 
zeros in on the field of information retrieval, which develops in fundamental 
opposition to even the most visionary of library techniques, not merely in terms 
of technology and method, but regarding the idea of order itself. Coordinate 
indexing, the first and defining technique in this lineage, is explicitly designed 
to eliminate the influence of librarians and other ‘knowledge mediators’ by 
shifting expressive power from the classif ication system to the query and, 
by extension, to the information seeker. Order is no longer understood as a 
stable map to the universe of knowledge but increasingly as the outcome 
of a dynamic and purpose-driven process of ordering. Although equally 
foundational for the statistical tradition in information retrieval, the chapter 
closes by discussing coordinate indexing as a precursor of the relational model 
for database management, which underpins large swaths of contemporary 
information handling, from enterprise software to web platforms.
Chapter 5 investigates the early attempts in information retrieval to 
tackle the full text of document collections. Underpinning a large number of 
contemporary applications, from search to sentiment analysis, the concepts 
and techniques pioneered by Hans Peter Luhn, Gerard Salton, Karen Spärck 
Jones, and others involve not only particular framings of language, meaning, 
and knowledge, they also introduce some of the fundamental mathematical 
formalisms and methods running through information ordering, preparing 
the extension to digital objects other than text documents. The chapter 
specif ically seeks to capture the considerable technical expressivity that 
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comes out of the sprawling landscape of research and experimentation that 
characterizes the early decades of information retrieval. It also documents 
the emergence of a conceptual construct and ‘intermediate’ data structure 
that is fundamental to most algorithmic information ordering at work 
today: the feature vector.
Chapter 6 examines one of many areas where feature vectors play a 
central role. Machine learning is currently one of the most active domains 
in computer science and the wide availability of datasets and increasingly 
robust techniques have led to a proliferation of practical applications. The 
chapter uses the Bayes classifier as an entry point into the field, showing how 
a simple statistical technique introduced in the early 1960s is surprisingly 
instructive for understanding how machine learning operates more broadly. 
The goal is to shed light on the core principles at work and to explain how 
they are tweaked, adapted, and developed further into different directions. 
This chapter also develops the idea that contemporary information ordering 
represents an epistemological practice that can be described and analyzed 
as ‘interested reading of reality’, a particular kind of inductive empiricism.
Chapter 7 ventures into the f ield of network algorithms to discuss yet 
another way to think about information ordering. While Google’s PageRank 
algorithm has received considerable attention from critical commentators, 
the vast intellectual landscape it draws on and contributes to is less well 
known. Graph algorithms are used in many different settings, not least in 
the social sciences, yet the technical and epistemological commitments 
made by graph theoretical formulations of ‘real life’ phenomena are hardly 
a subject of discussion beyond specialist circles. The chapter shows how 
algorithmic ordering techniques exploit and integrate knowledge from areas 
other than information retrieval and demonstrates how the ‘politics’ of an 
algorithm can depend on small variations that lead to radically different 
outcomes. The context of web search means that the various techniques 
covered in the second part of the book can be brought together into a shared 
application space, allowing for a more concrete return to earlier discussions 
of variation and combination in software.
The conclusion, f inally, synthesizes algorithmic information ordering into 
a denser typology of ordering gestures, paying particular attention to the 
modes of disassembly and reassembly that inform the underlying techniques. 
The attempt to distill an operational epistemology from the cacophony of 
techniques begs the question whether we are witnessing the emergence 
of a new épistémè (Foucault, 2005), a far-reaching set of regularities that 
characterize how we understand and operationalize the very notion of 
order at a given time and place. Independently from how we answer this 
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question, it is clearly impossible to avoid the more immediately pressing 
need to understand how the capacity to arrange individuals, populations, 
and everything in-between in highly dynamic and goal-oriented ways relates 
to contemporary forms of capitalism. To face this challenge, I come back 
to Simondon’s mechanology and its broader cousin, technical culture, as a 
means to promote a ‘widening’ of technical imagination and appropriation. 
While certainly not enough to solve the many concrete issues surrounding 
advanced algorithmic techniques, an understanding of technicity as human 
gesture – albeit of a specif ic kind – can sharpen our view for the many 
instances where technology has become complicit in domination, for the 
reconfigurations of power relations that occur when new levers begin to 
operate in and on society, and for the increasing interdependence between 
technical critique and social critique.
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1. Engines of Order
Abstract
The chapter discusses central terms like ‘information’ and ‘order’, and 
it proposes the concept of ‘engine’ to point toward the infrastructural 
embeddings that have allowed techniques initially conceived for document 
retrieval to become pervasive mediators in online environments. While 
this book constitutes a humanistic exploration of technical substances 
rather than their practical application, the chapter pays tribute to the fact 
that the techniques under scrutiny have become prevalent in a specif ic 
situation, in this world and not another. To this end, the chapter discusses 
three critical trends: computerization, information overload, and social 
diversif ication.
Keywords: information ordering, computerization, information overload, 
social diversif ication, digital infrastructures
Although the various practices described as ‘information ordering’ have 
become ubiquitous parts of online experiences, the two notions making 
up the term are far from self-evident. Instead of providing strict def ini-
tions, however, I take ‘information’ and ‘order’ as starting points for an 
investigation into a domain of techniques that intervene in deeply cultural 
territory in ways that come with their specif ic framings and epistemologi-
cal perspectives. Instead of asking what information and order are, I am 
interested in the operational answers enacted by algorithmic techniques. 
This means remaining at a certain distance from common uses of the 
vocabulary and concepts that characterize the f ields associated with 
information ordering, itself already a somewhat uncommon term. Infor-
mation scientists and readers familiar with volumes such as Svenonius’s 
authoritative The Intellectual Foundation of Information Ordering (2000) 
or Glushko’s recent The Discipline of Organizing (2013) will notice that my 
interpretative lens can differ substantially, despite the shared subject 
matter. This begins to manifest in seemingly small gestures, for example, 
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when glossing over paradigmatic distinctions between classif ication and 
categorization or between data, information, and knowledge. Instead of 
committing to particular def initions of these and other terms, I am inter-
ested in understanding how they inform and coagulate around specif ic 
‘problematizations’ (Foucault, 1990, p. 10f.) of the domains they refer to and 
how they are strategically deployed in the construction and justif ication 
of techniques that produce epistemologically distinctive outputs. So far, I 
have used the term ‘information ordering’ very broadly, connecting it to 
tasks such as searching, f iltering, classifying, or recommending items in 
online systems. The following section discusses information and order in 
sequence to address – rather than resolve – their vagueness.
Information Ordering
The techniques and practices discussed in this book hinge to a great extent 
on the term ‘information’ and the key role it plays in and around computing. 
My concern, however, is not the ontological question of what information 
is, but rather its practical role in different discourses and ‘its apparent 
ability to unify questions about mind, language, culture, and technology’ 
(Peters, 1988, p. 21). In the already somewhat restrained domain I will be 
investigating, the term has become a central instrument in the endeavor 
to bridge the gap between human practice and the workings of computing 
machinery. Here, the fact that information has no shared definition,1 both 
in and across different epistemological sites, that it remains ‘a polymorphic 
phenomenon and a polysemantic concept’ (Floridi, 2015, n.p.), should not 
be seen as a failure or def icit but, on the contrary, as a strategic benef it 
when it comes to smoothening conceptual differences and bringing entire 
domains into the fold of computing.
As AI-researcher-turned-social-theorist Philip Agre has shown in great 
detail in his critique of artif icial intelligence, polysemy – or, rather, the 
strategic arrangement of precision and vagueness – plays a productive role 
in technical work because it helps in binding human affairs to the technical 
1 ‘Information is not just one thing. It means different things to those who expound its 
characteristics, properties, elements, techniques, functions, dimensions, and connections. 
Evidently, there should be something that all the things called information have in common, but 
it surely is not easy to f ind out whether it is much more than the name’ (Machlup and Mansf ield, 
1983, p. 4f.).
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world and the other way around. The following paragraph summarizes his 
pivotal argument:
It is frequently said that technical practice employs an especially precise 
and well-def ined form of language, but this is misleading. In fact, terms 
like ‘knowledge,’ ‘planning,’ and ‘reasoning’ are simultaneously precise 
and vague. Considered as computational structures and processes, these 
terms are as precise as mathematics itself. Considered as descriptions 
of human life, however, they are profoundly imprecise. AI continually 
tries to assimilate the whole of human life to a small vocabulary. (Agre, 
1997a, p. 48)
Agre’s analysis details how artif icial intelligence reduces the complex and 
ambiguous phenomenon of human ‘action’ to the much more contained 
notion of ‘execution of plans’, thereby opening up concrete pathways 
toward implementation in a working system, a fundamental requirement 
of the discipline (Agre, 1997a, p. 12). This involves conceptual work: plans 
are def ined as mental structures that consist of subplans, going down a 
compositional hierarchy to a set of basic operations. The decomposition 
into small steps prepares a proclamation of equivalence between plans 
and computer programs (Agre, 1997a, p. 5f.). What is essential, here, is that 
this reductive, operational understanding of planning is used in such a way 
that it keeps the initial starting point, the rich world of human action, as a 
referent. If plans are programs and action the execution of plans, one can 
now – by def inition – simulate human action. The gesture is supported by 
the idea that ‘the proof is in the programming’ (Agre, 1997b, p. 140), which 
leads to a form of tautological reasoning: a technical idea is true if one can 
build it, and if one cannot build it, it is not a technical idea and therefore 
has no merit in the f ield.
We can f ind comparable semantic operations in many areas of computer 
science, and the term ‘information’ often plays a pivotal role in connect-
ing the worlds of humans and machines in similar ways. A well-known 
example can be found in Warren Weaver’s introduction to Claude Shannon’s 
A Mathematical Theory of Communication, published as a joint book in 1948 
(Shannon and Weaver, 1964). Here, Weaver distinguishes ‘three levels of 
communication problems’, beginning with the technical problem (A), which 
is concerned with the f idelity of symbol transmission and thus the level 
where Shannon’s mathematical definition and measure of information are 
situated. But Weaver then also postulates a semantic problem (B) that refers 
to the transmission of meaning and an effectiveness problem (C) that asks 
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how conduct is affected by meaning. While he is somewhat prudent in this 
regard, he clearly wishes to extend Shannon’s model from level A to levels 
B and C, which should only require ‘minor additions, and no real revision’ 
(p. 26). The statistical framing of information on level A f inds its equivalence 
in ‘statistical semantic characteristics’ on level B, and the ‘engineering 
noise’ that troubles Shannon’s technical transmissions becomes ‘semantic 
noise’ (p. 26). The communication of meaning is framed in similar terms 
as an encoding/decoding type operation. The engineering communica-
tion theory ‘has so penetratingly cleared the air that one is now, perhaps 
for the f irst time, ready for a real theory of meaning’ (p. 27). If meaning 
‘behaves’ like information, it is to be investigated and conceptualized in 
similar terms, which, very concretely, suggests and requires ‘a study of the 
statistical structure of language’ (p. 27). What we end up with resembles the 
transformation Agre describes: a def inition of meaning that does not fully 
reduce it to Shannon’s notion of information but postulates a somewhat 
vague equivalence that enables and authorizes the transposition of the 
conceptual and analytical apparatus from one to the other. And, as an 
additional benefit, since that apparatus is mathematical in nature, there 
is now a clear path toward building a running system, for example, for the 
practical task of machine translation. The f ield of information retrieval 
broadly follows this program from the 1950s onward.
However, an important nuance has to be introduced at this point. The 
movement of ‘absorption’ or ‘incorporation’ of various aspects of human 
life into the space of computation is often discussed as formalization and 
critiqued as a reduction of an overflowing richness into the cold language 
of mathematical logic. Golumbia (2009), for instance, takes Chomsky’s 
attempts to model the fundamental rules of language as a f inite set of 
algorithms as his main example to show how ‘computationalism’ installs 
formal logic as both an analytical tool and a model for the workings of the 
mind itself. While Chomsky’s work does not seek to build working systems 
for machine translation but to understand the fundamental principles of 
cognition (Katz, 2012), such explicit instances of ‘high rationalism’ have 
indeed radiated throughout the f ield of computing. But in many domains, 
for instance in information retrieval, the conceptual apparatus driving 
formalization can be surprisingly unambitious, subscribing to the pragmatic 
mindset of statistics rather than the rationalistic purity of logic. In the paper 
that f irst laid out what is now known as a Bayes classif ier (Chapter 6), M. 
E. Maron (1961) programmatically states ‘that statistics on kind, frequency, 
location, order, etc., of selected words are adequate to make reasonably good 
predictions about the subject matter of documents containing those words’ 
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(p. 405), and this is basically all he has to say about the nature of language in 
that text. Although a logician himself, he considers the modeling of human 
language in mathematical logic to be an impasse and instead promotes 
Weaver’s probabilistic perspective.2
Information retrieval shares AI’s practical goal ‘to make computers do 
humanlike things’ (Swanson, 1988, p. 97), but it takes a different route to 
achieving it. The key referent on the ‘human side’ in tasks like document 
search is clearly something having to do with meaning and knowledge, 
but there is an almost comical desire to not develop any serious theory of 
these concepts and to stick to commonsense uses instead. Lancaster’s (1968) 
classic def inition of information retrieval creates even more distance by 
arguing that an ‘information retrieval system does not inform (i.e. change 
the knowledge of) the user on the subject of his inquiry [but merely] on 
the existence (or non-existence) and whereabouts of documents relat-
ing to his request’ (p. 1). Rather than commit to a theory of knowledge, 
information retrieval sits comfortably in a space where the relationship 
between knowledge and information is implied, but remains vague.3 In 
the end, information’s designated role is to be ‘the essential ingredient in 
decision making’ (Becker and Hayes, 1963, p. v) and this results-oriented 
epistemic ‘attitude’4 runs through the f ield to this day. For example, the 
famous Text REtrieval Conference (TREC) series, which has been organizing 
competitions in retrieval performance since 1992, is based on comparing 
participants’ systems to known ‘right answers’, that is, to classif ications or 
rankings that were manually compiled by experts. The primary goal is to 
attain or exceed human performance in situ rather than furthering deeper 
understanding of cognitive processes. Chomsky indeed argues that ‘Bayesian 
this and that’ may have arrived at some degree of practical proficiency, but 
‘you learn nothing about the language’ (Katz, 2012, n.p.). His deep disdain 
for the statistical approach to machine translation is an indicator that the 
f ield of computing is characterized by real epistemological variation and 
disagreement. As Cramer argues, ‘[c]omputation and its imaginary are 
rich with contradictions, and loaded with metaphysical and ontological 
speculation’ (Cramer, 2005, p. 125).
2 ‘Thus the goal of processing ordinary language by translating it (f irst) into a logical language 
brings with it more problems than prospects, and raises more questions than it answers’ (Maron, 
1963, p. 139).
3 ‘To impose a f ixed boundary line between the study of information and the study of 
knowledge is an unreasonable restriction on the progress of both’ (Machlup and Mansf ield, 
1983, p. 11).
4 I take this term from Desrosières (2001).
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When it comes to the concept of ‘order’, we could again pursue formal 
def initions, pitting it against notions like entropy, but keeping a loose 
understanding means remaining open to the practical propositions made 
in the f ield. The OED broadly suggests that order is ‘the arrangement or 
disposition of people or things in relation to each other according to a 
particular sequence, pattern, or method’. Order, in this definition, does not 
have the connotations of Cartesian regularity, uniformity, or immutability. 
And, indeed, the types of ‘ordering’ the techniques discussed in this book 
perform can be fuzzy, fragmented, and dynamic. They generally subscribe to 
probabilistic frameworks but also draw on other mathematical f ields to deal 
with complexity and variation. Indeed, computing has been instrumental in 
shifting the problem of ‘arrangement and disposition’ from static conceptions 
of order to dynamic processes of ordering.
One way to think about such changing conceptions leads through Michel 
Foucault’s The Order of Things (2005) and Deleuze’s reading of that text 
merits particular attention. Here, the central term to delineate historical 
formations, each carrying its own specif ic understanding of order, is that 
of épistémè. Deleuze (1988) reads the classic épistémè, situated roughly in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, through the notion of ‘unfold-
ing’ and couples it with what he refers to as the ‘forces that raise things to 
inf inity’ (p. 128). Epitomized by Linnaeus’s Systema Naturae (published in 
twelve editions between 1735 and 1767), divided in the kingdoms of animals, 
plants, and minerals, this épistémè is organized around categorization 
into a timeless system. Following the logic of representation, there is an 
incessant production of two-dimensional tables that establish the bounds 
of the order of things; concrete entities do not def ine this space, they are 
merely positioned on it through the attribution of identity and difference 
with other entities, in inf inite variation.
Around 1800, the modern épistémè f irst appears as a perturbation of 
the classic order. There are irreducible and contingent forces – life, work, 
language – that break through the preset representational grids ordering 
the entities these forces are entangled with. In Darwin’s work, for example, 
there is no predefined regnum animale (‘animal kingdom’) that covers all 
animals and their inf inite variations. On the contrary, the tree of life starts 
with a single organism and the way it evolves is contingent and dependent 
on interactions between individuals and their specif ic environments. There 
is no eternal plan or order: life sprawls and disperses in different direc-
tions through successions of abundant yet f inite variations. According to 
Deleuze (1988, p. 126f.), the modern épistémè is marked by an empiricism 
organized around the continuous ‘folding’ of the forces of life, work, and 
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language. History is not simply variation on a constant theme, but a process 
of becoming. The order of things is the result of that process and no longer 
the unfolding of an eternal blueprint.
Rather than stopping at this point, Deleuze attempts to address a question 
Foucault famously evokes at the end of The Order of Things, asking what 
comes beyond the modern épistémè. It makes sense to quote the central 
passage of Deleuze’s argument in full:
Biology had to take a leap into molecular biology, or dispersed life regroup 
in the genetic code. Dispersed work had to regroup in machines of the 
third kind that are cybernetic and informatic. What would be the forces in 
play, with which the forces within man would then enter into a relation? It 
would no longer involve raising to infinity or f initude but a f ini-unlimited, 
thereby evoking every situation of force in which a f inite number of 
components yields a practically unlimited diversity of combinations. 
(Deleuze, 1988, p. 131, translation amended)
This notion of the ‘f ini-unlimited’5 provides a compelling way to address 
the question of order – ‘the arrangement or disposition of people or things 
in relation to each other’ (OED) – and how it connects to the algorithmic 
techniques under scrutiny here. Foucault’s épistémès are not only connected 
to particular visual forms of arranging, such as the table or the tree, but 
they contain specif ic ideas about the nature of order itself. In the classic 
period, order is thought to be pregiven, a ‘God-form’ (Deleuze, 1988, p. 125) 
that runs through the things themselves, constantly unfolding according to 
eternal, unchanging principles. The scholar observes, designates, and takes 
inventory; and although words and things are considered to be distinct, a 
well-built analytical language or taxonomy keeps them from falling apart 
by producing a correct account of a world ‘offered to representation without 
interruption’ (Foucault, 2005, p. 224). In the modern period, however, order 
is an ‘outcome’, something that is produced by the processes of life, work, 
and language.
How does the notion of the f ini-unlimited incubate a third understanding 
of order? The crucial element, here, is the idea that a limited number of 
elements can yield an (almost) unlimited number of combinations or ar-
rangements. As shown throughout the second part of this book, permutative 
5 While the common translation of ‘f ini-illimité’ as ‘unlimited f inity’ may be more elegant 
than ‘f ini-unlimited’, this amounts to a rather drastic change in emphasis. For a discussion of 
the topic from a different angle, see Galloway (2012).
32 ENGINES OF ORDER
proclivity is indeed a central characteristic of algorithmic information 
ordering: for any suff iciently complex dataset, the idea that ‘the data speak 
for themselves’ is implausible; developers and analysts select from a wide 
variety of mathematical and visual methods to make the data speak, to f ilter, 
arrange, and summarize them from different angles, following questions 
that orient how they look at them. Rather than ideas of a natural order, there 
are guiding interests that drive how data are made meaningful.
This argument is indeed central to two popular books by David Wein-
berger, Everything Is Miscellaneous (2008) and Too Big to Know (2012), which 
are almost manifestos for a f ini-unlimited épistémè. Even if Weinberger’s 
epistemic attitude and historical trajectory differ substantially from my own, 
we share the fundamental diagnosis that information ordering increasingly 
revolves around gestures of disassembly and reassembly that follow specif ic 
interests and desires: ‘How we choose to slice it up depends of why we’re 
slicing it up’ (Weinberger, 2008, p. 82).
Indeed, it has become widely accepted that computers, whether we 
think of them as computing machinery or as digital media, encourage 
‘disaggregation and disassembly, but also reaggregation and reassembly’ 
(Chadwick, 2013, p. 41). The central idea informing the relational model for 
database management, for example, is to cut data into the smallest parts 
possible to allow for dynamic recombination at retrieval time with the help 
of a powerful query language that makes it possible to make selections, 
calculations, or ‘views’ on the data. Outputs are selected and ordered based 
on the ‘question’ asked. The machine learning techniques discussed in 
Chapter 6, to give another example, provide the means to create information 
sieves inductively. By ‘showing’ a spam f ilter which emails are considered 
undesirable, the classifier ‘learns’ to treat each word or feature as an indicator 
for ‘spamminess’. But no two users’ classifier profiles will be exactly the same, 
not only because they receive different emails but also because they will 
have different def initions of what constitutes an unwanted message. This 
book traces such instances of a f ini-unlimited in a manner that remains 
attentive to commonality yet refrains from singularizing a space of variation 
into a totalizing assessment.
My purpose, however, is not to postulate a new épistémè, a new under-
standing of order that would have emerged sometime after WWII, and then 
to show how this new formation has ‘found its expression’ in a range of 
algorithmic techniques. In line with the cultural techniques tradition, and in 
particular with Bernhard Siegert’s (2013) radical formulation, I consider that 
order, as a concept, does not exist independently from ordering techniques 
and that any broad shift would have to be considered, f irst and foremost, 
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as a consolidation in the network of ontic operations established by the 
techniques themselves. From a methodological perspective, this means 
that the concrete gestures of ordering and the technical, functional, and 
epistemological substance they carry are the necessary starting points.
Engines Ordering This World
While one can look at algorithmic information ordering techniques as a 
series of technical ideas, their role as ‘epistemological operators’ (Young, 
2017, p. 45) acting on the world in signif icant ways cannot be understood 
without consideration for their embedding in ever-expanding infrastructures 
that play fundamental roles in mediating and constituting lived reality 
(Burrows, 2009, p. 451). As Peters argues, ‘[m]edia are not only devices of 
information; they are also agencies of order’ (Peters, 2015, p. 1) in the sense 
that they support and organize social, political, and economic systems in 
specif ic ways. The functional substance of ordering techniques cannot be 
separated from their application to the bits and pieces of the ‘real’ world. They 
have become part of ‘the connective tissues and the circulatory systems of 
modernity’ (Edwards, 2003, p. 185) and their integration into larger ‘operative 
chains’ (Siegert, 2013, p. 11) binds their broad technical potential into more 
specif ic roles. My emphasis on technicity is therefore not in opposition to 
the perspective Peters (2015) calls ‘infrastructuralism’ (p. 33) but approaches 
the large systems that define and support modern life from the perspective 
of their smaller components.
The term ‘engine’ indeed serves to link the work done in particular 
locations or instances to its broader infrastructural embeddings. Donald 
MacKenzie’s An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets 
(2006) studies f inancial markets in these terms, connecting f ine-grained 
attention for the substance or content of calculation with an appreciation of 
its role and performativity in larger systems. Financial theory, understood 
as a series of conceptual and mathematical models, is analyzed as ‘an active 
force transforming its environment, not a camera passively recording it’ 
(MacKenzie, 2006, p. 12). How investment markets are framed conceptu-
ally and methodologically has concrete consequences for individual (e.g., 
investment decisions) and collective (e.g., regulation, market design) choices 
and behavior. The performative dimension of a f inancial model, method, 
or theory is strengthened further when it becomes reif ied in software that 
defines operative modes directly (MacKenzie, 2010). Both the ‘cognitive’ and 
the ‘mechanical’ understanding of performativity can be fruitfully applied 
34 ENGINES OF ORDER
to information ordering, but the latter calls increased attention to forms of 
operation and automation that are particularly relevant.
Following Adrian Mackenzie’s (2017a) take on machine learning, one 
could emphasize information ordering as a f ield of academic inquiry and 
an epistemic practice that is organized around mostly well-delineated steps, 
where a deliberately selected technique is applied to a contained dataset at 
a specif ic moment in time to generate a classif icatory output. While this 
is certainly a common setup, the infrastructural perspective emphasizes 
a scenario where large-scale platforms capture, support, and channel hu-
man practice continuously and information ordering becomes a pervasive 
arbiter of real-life possibilities. Indeed, the degree to which calculative 
processes have penetrated into the fabric of contemporary societies is 
striking, although historiographical work (Beniger, 1986; Yates, 1989; Gardey, 
2008) has clearly shown that data collection and analysis techniques have a 
long history, becoming steadily more central to organization, coordination, 
and control in business and government over the course of several centuries. 
Even modern-sounding approaches such as graph algorithms or machine 
learning have been around since at least the 1960s but were only widely 
taken up over the last two decades. The question why this has not happened 
earlier and why this is happening now on such a large scale can serve as an 
entry point into a deeper appreciation of the context algorithmic information 
ordering operates in. In the remainder of this chapter, I will thus establish 
a broader picture, beginning with an assessment of what has been called 
‘computerization’ and followed by a discussion of ‘information overload’, the 
problem most often put forward by early information retrieval specialists. 
Taking a more sociological angle, I will then single out social diversif ication 
as a contextual factor that cannot be ignored.
Computerization
One of the reasons for the somewhat delayed adoption of algorithmic 
information ordering could be that computers were simply not powerful 
enough before the turn of the century, making the exponential growth in 
speed and capacity the principal driver. In his acceptance speech6 delivered 
on receiving the Turing Award in 1972, Dijkstra (1972) noted that ‘as the 
power of available machines grew by a factor of more than a thousand, 
society’s ambition to apply these machines grew in proportion’ (p. 862) 
6 In computer science, award speeches are one of the few publication formats where broad 
‘discoursing’ is not only allowed but encouraged.
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and his argument cannot be easily dismissed: processing brawn is indeed 
a prerequisite for making certain applications of information ordering a 
feasible option. Another technical explanation could call attention to the 
growing availability of algorithmic techniques beyond university labs and 
specialized documentation centers. But instead of singling out individual 
‘causes’, it makes sense to think about these elements as parts of a larger, 
self-reinforcing process of ‘computerization’.
While the term has fallen out of fashion after its heyday in the 1970s 
and 1980s, speaking of computerization reminds us that digital media are 
not just sleek graphical interfaces for making and accessing various kinds 
of ‘content’ or ‘data’ or, but also machines that vary in shape and ability, 
offering a variable computational basis for the implementation of all kinds 
of forms, functions, and autonomous operation. The capacity to connect 
ever-expanding capabilities for storage, transmission, and processing to 
rich and sophisticated input and output interfaces connected to the world 
in myriad ways has allowed the computer to inf iltrate and to constitute a 
large number of practices. This can be understood as a process of progressive 
mediatization, a ‘deepening of technology-based interdependence’ (Couldry 
and Hepp, 2016, p. 53) that is not limited to consumer devices and includes 
countless activities in business or government. While the term ‘infrastruc-
ture’ is not reserved for technical systems, it is clear that fewer and fewer 
practices are not channeled through computing in one way or another.
The web still constitutes the prime example for a pervasive, general-
purpose infrastructure that affords access to media content and social 
interaction as well as myriad services that rely on its technical malleability 
to organize activities through end-user interfaces and backend coordination. 
The rapidly expanding entanglement of practices related to communication, 
coordination, consumption, and socialization with computing is realized 
through the design and adoption of ‘activity systems that are thoroughly 
integrated with distributed computational processes’ (Agre, 1994, p. 105). 
Facebook, for example, can be understood as a highly complex amalgamation 
of various layers and instances of hardware and software that, together, 
form a global infrastructure for ‘socializing online’ (Bucher, 2013). Agre 
(1994) argues that an activity is ‘captured’ in the technical and conceptual 
vocabularies computing provides when it is enabled and structured by 
software-def ined and computer-supported ‘grammars of action’. Since 
the way this happens is clearly not a mere transposition of previous forms 
of ‘socializing’ into a new environment, computerization must be seen as 
an ‘intervention in and reorganization of [human] activities’ (Agre, 1994, 
p. 107). Facebook is not a neutral or transparent means to make, maintain, 
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and enact social relationships, but, ‘by organizing heterogeneous relations 
in a specif ic way, constitutes a productive force’ (Bucher, 2013, p. 481) that 
operates and mediates through an arrangement of deliberately designed 
forms and functions. Information ordering techniques become engines 
of social order when they operate and intervene in such environments, 
where ‘[t]hey may change social relations, but […] also stabilize, naturalize, 
depoliticize, and translate these into other media’ (Akrich, 1992, p. 222).
To consider the evolution of computing hardware from the mainframe 
to personal computers and further to mobile, networked, and integrated 
devices would be one way to analyze the deep incursions into the frameworks 
of human life computers have made. Notions like computerization and 
grammatization, however, seek to address the many different ways broad 
technical possibilities have been connected to a large variety of practices. 
If we follow Turing (1948) and Manovich (2013c) in framing computers 
both as universal machines capable of simulating all other machines and 
as ‘metamedia’ uniting various media forms in a single screen, software 
stands out as the principal means to create the f ine-grained structures 
capable of capturing the components of highly complex activities such as 
online gaming or project management.
More recently, scholars have used the term ‘dataf ication’ to call atten-
tion to the process of ‘taking information about all things under the sun 
– including ones we never used to think of as information at all, such as a 
person’s location, the vibrations of an engine, or the stress on a bridge – and 
transforming it into a data format to make it quantified’ (Mayer-Schönberger 
and Cukier, 2013, p. 15). This is clearly an important aspect to consider. 
The result of dataf ication has been the rapidly increasing production and 
availability of very large datasets that often comprise transactions (logged 
events or behavior) or other forms of nontraditional data such as traces of 
movement in navigational or physical spaces, social interactions, indications 
of cultural tastes, or sensor readings. This, in turn, stimulates demand for 
analytical capabilities. The accumulation of complicated yet highly expres-
sive unstructured data in the form of textual communication, for example, 
has fueled interest in techniques like topic modeling or sentiment analysis 
that seek to make them intelligible and ‘actionable’, that is, applicable to 
decision-making.
However, speaking of computerization rather than dataf ication empha-
sizes that data accumulation enables forms of ‘immediate’ management that 
operate through interface modulation. The direct application of algorithmic 
ordering is made possible by the emergence of digital infrastructures and 
environments that allow for both data collection and output generation, 
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in the sense that the structure and content of what appears on a screen or 
some other interface can be compiled in real time on the basis of data that 
may have been collected over extended periods of time. Differential pricing 
on the web provides an elucidating example: a user’s location, software 
environment, browsing history, and many other elements can be situated 
against a horizon of millions of other users and their shopping behavior; this 
knowledge can then be used to estimate an ‘optimal’ sales price. The result of 
this calculation, made in the fraction of a second, can be directly integrated 
in the interface served to that user, showing an individualized7 price for an 
item. Content recommendation, targeted advertising, or automated credit 
assessment are variations of the same logic.
This instant applicability of data analysis is a crucial step beyond tradi-
tional uses of calculation or ‘mechanical reasoning’ because it integrates and 
automates the sequence of collecting data, making decisions, and applying 
results. Human discretion is relegated to the design and control stages and 
expressed in technical form. Instead of merely detecting or describing some 
pattern, the results of algorithmic information ordering are pushed back 
into the software-grammatized spaces the input data were initially taken 
from, creating new and particularly powerful forms of ‘an environmental 
type of intervention’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 260). Algorithms become engines of 
order that intervene in the processes they analyze, creating feedback loops 
that direct behavior to realize specif ic goals. Whether we consider that the 
various trajectories of computerization, dataf ication, or ‘platformization’ 
(Helmond, 2015) converge into an ‘accidental megastructure’, an encroaching 
‘planetary-scale computing system’ (Bratton, 2015, p. xviii) or not, it is clear 
that algorithmic information ordering can now rely on infrastructural 
conditions that constitute a favorable habitat.
Information Overload
Even today, however, algorithmic information ordering is most often not 
presented as a means to automate decision-making in integrated digital 
environments, but more modestly as a solution to the problem generally 
referred to as ‘information overload’. The idea holds that computer-based, 
networked infrastructures consistently confront users with too much 
7 A recent report by the White House summarizes: ‘Broadly speaking, big data seems likely to 
produce a shift from third-degree price discrimination based on broad demographic categories 
towards personalized pricing and individually targeted marketing campaigns’ (Executive Off ice 
of the President of the United States, 2015, p. 19).
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information – too many documents, too many contents, products, or people, 
too much ‘stuff’ than could possibly be handled by any individual. These 
are the circumstances where algorithmic information ordering becomes the 
preferred solution. As Andrejevic argues, ‘[d]ata mining […] comes to serve 
as a kind of “post-comprehension” strategy of information use that addresses 
the challenges posed by information overload’ (Andrejevic, 2013, p. 41). Of 
course, neither the assessment that too much information is hampering 
understanding, nor the call for technical solutions are recent phenomena.
In 1945, when Vannevar Bush described his Memex, an imaginary personal 
information machine (Buckland, 1992), he famously argued that ‘a growing 
mountain of research’ was ‘bogging down’ scientists (Bush, 1945, p. 112). 
The idea that the production of printed material had outpaced human 
capacities indeed became the foundational assessment and problem space 
for information retrieval. Popular historian James Gleick’s book Information 
does not mention the f ield by name but gives a concise description of what 
had become a universally accepted diagnosis around the middle of the 
twentieth century:
Deluge became a common metaphor for people describing information 
surfeit. There is a sensation of drowning: information as a rising, churning 
f lood. Or it calls to mind bombardment, data impinging in a series of 
blows, from all sides, too fast. (Gleick, 2011, p. 402)
The cognitive capacities of individuals, the assessment holds, are simply 
insuff icient to deal with the masses of items the ‘information society’8 is 
confronting them with. While early lamentations concerned the proliferation 
of printed material, computer systems quickly became the main object of 
speculation. When Herbert Simon (1971) declares in the early 1970s that ‘[f]
iltering by intelligent programs is the main part of the answer’ (p. 72) to the 
information overload problem, he can already look back at two decades of 
research and experimentation in that direction.
With the advent of networked computing and the web in particular, the 
question of information abundance and overload is posed with renewed 
vigor and often in terms that register the widening of applications beyond 
document search and information retrieval. Chris Anderson’s notion of 
‘inf inite shelf space’ (Anderson, 2006, p. 16), to name one take on the issue, 
initially refers to Amazon’s seemingly bottomless catalogue, but is quickly 
extended to other domains covered by the web. In the domain of social 
8 The popularization of the term is generally attributed to Machlup (1962).
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interaction, for example, the end of the ‘tyranny of locality’ (Anderson, 
2006, p. 16) has allowed burgeoning online communities and dating sites to 
overcome the limitations of physical distance, resulting in much larger pools 
of possible interlocutors. Here, as elsewhere, we f ind larger ‘marketplaces’ 
for all kinds of ‘goods’, not only larger archives of (text) documents. These 
developments indeed inform the remarkable expansion of the domain 
covered by information ordering. Although Beer (2016) rightfully argues 
that phenomena like ‘big data’ need to be seen ‘as part of the long series of 
developments in the measurement of people and populations’ (p. 9), many 
of the techniques involved have actually been adapted from technical 
lineages initially concerned with ordering text documents and not people. 
The crucial moment is the realization that any kind of entity or item can 
be handled in similar ways when f it into certain data representations. 
Once grammatized into an information system, ‘a human being is merely 
a document like any other’ (Ertzscheid, 2009, p. 33).
Contemporary Internet platforms certainly extend this logic significantly. 
Referring to online platforms as marketplaces emphasizes that there are 
units of exchange being made available in a way that each participant 
could, in theory, access every single one of them. The web makes documents 
available. Amazon makes consumer goods available. Spotify and Netflix, 
respectively, make music and audiovisual contents available. Uber makes 
units of transportation available, AirBnB of housing. Facebook, OkCupid, 
Meetup, and Monster all make people available, even if they do so quite 
differently. Since these services often dominate their specif ic niche and are 
generally much less limited in geographical and logistical terms than their 
offline equivalents, they can host large numbers of units and participants. 
The threshold for participating in online marketplaces is generally low: 
writing a message on Twitter, which could potentially reach millions of 
people, is almost effortless.
Building on Coase’s (1937) theorization of transaction cost, authors like 
Ciborra (1985) and Agre (1994) have convincingly argued that informa-
tion technology makes it easier to organize (economic) activities through 
markets rather than f irms, since it affects all three of the main diff iculties 
transactions have to overcome:
The costs of organizing, i.e. costs of coordination and control, are de-
creased by information technology which can streamline all or part of the 
information processing required in carrying out an exchange: information 
to search for partners, to develop a contract, to control the behavior of 
the parties during contract execution and so on. (Ciborra, 1985, p. 63)
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This reduction of transaction cost, which has also been recognized by popular 
authors like Clay Shirky (2008), has facilitated the emergence of the very 
large marketplaces for information, goods, and people we take increasingly 
for granted. And the prominent place the transaction cost approach gives to 
search clearly highlights the mediating role Simon’s ‘intelligent programs’ are 
set to play in areas that have little to do with text documents. Large online 
platforms indeed rely heavily on data collection and algorithmic information 
ordering to filter, recommend, or personalize, that is, to connect users with the 
units on offer. By modulating the distance between specific participants and 
specific items, techniques perform ‘navigational functions’ (Peters, 2015, p. 7) 
or forms of ‘programmed coordination’ (Bratton, 2015, p. 41) in otherwise flat 
networks or markets. Spam filtering is an interesting example in this context: 
while unwanted mail is certainly not a new phenomenon, the extraordinarily 
low cost of sending huge quantities of electronic mail has multiplied the 
practice by orders of magnitude. The ‘renaissance’ of the Bayes classif ier 
(Chapter 6) as a means to f ight spam can be seen as an attempt to solve the 
problem without locking down the open, marketlike structure of the email 
system. Filtering is one way to manage connectivity and mass interaction.
Unsurprisingly, information retrieval has developed in close relationship 
with statistics, the principal f ield concerned with applying ‘mechanical 
reasoning’ to matters where too many individual units hamper under-
standing. Statistical mechanics, for example, materialized when it became 
clear that a description of the empirical behavior of gases based on the 
measurement of individual molecules would be utterly impossible. Even 
if the behavior of every molecule in a gas were to be considered as fully 
deterministic – which quantum mechanics denies – it would be practically 
impossible to determine the position, direction, and velocity of all individual 
molecules and to calculate the myriad micro-interactions between them. 
Mechanical statistics proposed means to manage this disconnection and to 
conceive the emergent behavior of the whole in terms of statistical ensembles 
rather than individuals. Similarly, as Foucault (2009, p. 104) points out, the 
study of epidemics and economic dynamics in the nineteenth century 
undermined the dominance of the family as model for understanding and 
governing society. Instead, the ‘population’ – the term now used in statistics 
for sets of items of any kind – emerged as a proper conceptual entity seen 
as giving rise to phenomena and dynamics that could not be reduced to its 
constituent parts. Both molecules and people could no longer be described 
in deterministic terms when encountered as ‘living multiples’ (Mackenzie 
and McNally, 2013) too great in number to describe individual behavior and 
interaction. In both cases, statistics would resolve the supposed contradiction 
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between uncertainty and control by providing the concepts and techniques 
to reason with and about such multiples. Statistics both challenges secure 
descriptions of the world by ‘eroding determinism’ and furnishes a new 
language and methodology to ‘tame’ the resulting uncertainty (Hacking, 
1990). Notions such as regularity and variation, distribution and tendency, or 
dependence and correlation are means to move beyond cognitive overload 
by addressing ‘the many’ as statistical ensembles rather than individuals.
Information ordering turns statistical descriptions into engines that 
intervene in the processes they observe. Peters indeed reminds us that the 
history of statistics – etymologically the ‘science of the state’ – is not one 
of ‘pure’ mathematics but indeed always tied to practical applications and 
the realization of pragmatic goals:
[R]ulers don’t want to rule over an imaginary state: they need to make 
policy, control populations, tax incomes, raise armies. They need facts. 
And so, statistics arose as the study of something too large to be percep-
tible – states and their climates, their rates of birth, marriage, death, 
crime, their economies, and so on – and secondly, as a set of techniques 
for making those processes visible and interpretable. (Peters, 1988, p. 14)
Algorithmic information ordering relies heavily on statistical techniques 
to tame information abundance and largely subscribes to a pragmatic 
epistemology and ethos that seeks to make large quantities of informa-
tion not only visible and interpretable, but also navigable, actionable, and 
(economically) exploitable. This line of reasoning leads us further down 
the rabbit hole into properly sociological territory.
Social Diversification
The enormous production of all kinds of information and the reduction of 
transaction cost that fuels the ‘transition to market-based relationships’ 
(Agre, 1994, p. 120) sit in the midst of social transformations that further 
exacerbate the perception that ours is a time of complexity, chaos, and 
disorientation, which makes information ordering – as a mechanism for 
both description and management – particularly attractive. The schematic 
assessment that follows remains superficial but adds a layer of explanation 
that points to deeper transformations than the ‘information overload’ and 
‘transaction cost’ narratives can capture.
In Ulrich Beck’s formulation, modernity, and the period since WWII 
in particular, is characterized by ‘processes for the “diversif ication” and 
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individualization of lifestyles and ways of life’ (Beck, 1992, p. 91). The emergence 
of consumer capitalism has shifted the focus from production to consump-
tion and brings forth an ever more fine-grained variety of commodities and 
experiences in virtually all areas of human life, from food to cultural goods and 
vacations. Societies adopting liberal democracy have seen many traditional 
social segmentations and taboos erode, continuously extending individuals’ 
capacities to live lives that differ substantially from those lived by both previ-
ous generations and next-door neighbors. According to Giddens (1994), ours 
are decentered, nontraditional societies ‘where social bonds have effectively to 
be made, rather than inherited from the past’ (p. 107) and ‘choice has become 
obligatory’ (p. 76). One may rightfully wonder whether there is any ‘real’ 
difference between the many breakfast cereals available in supermarkets, 
but my objective is not to adjudicate whether these variations in patterns of 
consumption, in socioeconomic status, in geographical anchoring, in political 
and social values, in sexual preferences, in cultural identities and tastes, and so 
forth are meaningful or not. The argument I want to put forward is threefold: 
first, we live, at least on the surface, in societies characterized by high degrees 
of diversity in terms of lived lives; second, these lives increasingly unfold trough 
infrastructures that log and survey them in various ways, generating large 
amounts of data that reflect (some of) that diversity; third, these lived lives 
are patterned and not random. The last point requires particular attention.
The social sciences have spent the last 200 years trying to understand how 
individuals and society relate, how variation and commonality entwine to 
produce complex and dynamic arrangements that stabilize, form institu-
tions, and so forth. The most common term used to address stability in 
society is that of structure, whether it is understood descriptively to denote 
nonrandomness or analytically to refer to actual social forces. The notion 
of social structure is at least partially tied to group membership, either 
externally attributed or used by actors to demarcate themselves. Categories 
along the lines of estate, class, caste, profession, and so forth are the result of 
historically produced (socioeconomic) classif ication and stratif ication that 
resulted in more or less consistent groups that shared characteristics and 
social standing, which, in turn, differentiated them from other groups. These 
segmentations have – at least in part – lost their ‘binding force’ (Giddens, 
1994, p. 63) and structuring capacity, as well as their utility as descriptive 
concepts.9 Established arrangements have been disrupted and new ones 
9 In his introduction to the sociology of stratif ication, Saunders writes: ‘Compared with 
the nineteenth century, when Marx developed his theory, the class system has become highly 
complex and differentiated’ (1990, p. 85).
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are more complex, dynamic, and opaque, beginning with the organization 
of labor, ‘which has exploded into a multiplicity of activities and statuses, 
expressing subjectivities and expectations which cannot be reduced to the 
traditional concept of class’ (Lazzarato, 2006, p. 187).
One may wonder in how far attempts to think social structure from the 
bottom up as multiplicities are reactions to these transformations. Simmel’s 
(1908) ‘social geometry’ can already be seen as a way of conceptualizing 
Vergesellschaftung (‘societification’) from the individual, who, due to increas-
ing social differentiation, enters into complex relationships with various 
others and is less and less confined to a primary group. The recent interest 
in Tarde’s monadological understanding of society (Latour et al., 2012), as 
well as the continued popularity of other ‘inductive’ currents – including 
social exchange theory and social network analysis – can be seen as mere 
methodological trends or, more fundamentally, as attempts to grapple, 
conceptually and methodologically, with decentered societies that are 
grouping in more f lexible, transient, and diverse ways. Rodgers indeed 
calls the recent decades an ‘age of fracture’, where the ‘emergence of the 
market as the dominant social metaphor of the age’ (Rodgers, 2011, p. 44) 
reinforces a trend toward forms of social organization that revolve around 
mass interactions between atomized individuals. As I will show in Chapter 7, 
graph analytical algorithms like PageRank draw heavily on such atomistic 
conceptualizations of society, but information ordering on the whole thrives 
on gestures of disassembly and dynamic reassembly.
In a situation characterized by social differentiation on the one side and 
ambivalent forms of global and local integration on the other, data collection 
and analysis promise to make the social legible and actionable, to reinstall 
mastery over societies that continuously create differentiations that no 
longer conform to traditional groupings and categorizations. This is, at least 
in part, where the demand for computational data analysis and algorithmic 
information ordering comes from. As complexity and opacity grow, the 
epistemic and commercial value of techniques that promise to produce 
viable descriptions and effective decisions grows as well. This promise, 
however, still hinges on the ‘structuredness’ of society in the sense that 
elements are arranged in increasingly complicated ways without devolving 
into randomness. Forms of coherence, commonality, and stability continue 
to exist even if they can no longer be reduced to conceptual pivots such as 
class. The emergence of what Couldry and Hepp (2016) call ‘media-based’ 
or ‘mediatized collectivities’ (p. 175) – which may well be assembled and 
ordered algorithmically – represents one vector of coagulation even as ‘the 
spectrum of possible collectivities has increased fundamentally’ (p. 175). 
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The ‘fragmentation of audiences’ (Andrejevic, 2013, p. 12) resulting from 
the proliferation of channels and outlets becomes an opportunity for those 
capable of reassembling fragments into addressable groupings.
Most importantly, if it has become diff icult to speak of a ‘working class’ 
today, it is not because (economic) exploitation has disappeared, but because 
forms of exploitation have become too intricate and varied to summarize 
them easily into clear-cut sociological concepts. The transformations Wagner 
(2016) describes as a ‘dismantling of organized modernity’ (p. 109), where 
globalization and individualization have dissolved the binding forces of 
space and time (p. 120f.), yield a situation where ‘formal domination’ in 
terms of legal rights has given way to new kinds of domination that are often 
based on past formal privilege (p. 146f.), but also increasingly individual-
ized. As Giddens (1994) remarks, individuals’ capacity to make choices 
in virtually every sphere of life does not guarantee egalitarian pluralism 
since decision-making ‘is also a medium of power and of stratif ication’ 
(p. 76). And Bourdieu’s (1984) assessment that different forms of capital – 
economic, social, and cultural – are connected means that, for example, 
years of education, level of income, and cultural tastes correlate. Forms of 
analysis that make it possible to describe and act upon such multivariate 
relationships spanning different domains of life ‘tame’ social complexity. 
A much-discussed study in attribute prediction based on Facebook Likes 
makes a clear case in point:
Facebook Likes can be used to automatically and accurately predict a 
range of highly sensitive personal attributes including: sexual orientation, 
ethnicity, religious and political views, personality traits, intelligence, 
happiness, use of addictive substances, parental separation, age, and 
gender. (Kosinski et al., 2013, p. 5802)
One may rightfully interject that the researchers used contestable con-
cepts, for example, concerning gender. But this critique risks missing what 
makes these techniques so attractive in operational settings: when the 
task is to make distinctions in a seemingly amorphous mass of customers 
or other entities, the epistemic objective is not disinterested, conceptually 
rich knowledge and not even getting classif icatory predictions right 
every time; it is to make (quick) decisions that are more accurate than a 
coin toss,10 speculative inferences that produce advantageous outcomes 
10 There are, of course, many areas where higher precision is required, but this (slight) exag-
geration should serve to highlight differences between epistemic requirements.
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more often than not. And statistical techniques combined with rich 
data generally perform much better than that. The above-mentioned 
study was able to predict gender with an accuracy of 0.93 and sexual 
orientation with 0.88. In many commercial domains, a level of 0.51 would 
already be satisfactory. The targeting of advertisement, for example, 
does not have to be perfect to make it economically viable, merely better 
than purely random placement. There are many powerful techniques for 
producing such better-than-coin-toss performance at very little cost and 
these techniques have the additional benef it of providing an empiricist 
narrative that includes moments of testability and verif iability when 
effects, for example on click-through rates, can be directly observed. The 
integrated digital infrastructures or marketplaces discussed above reward 
economic actors capable of making even slightly better predictions than 
their competition.
For all intents and purposes, the technical environments we inhabit have 
become our ‘real’, and the data these environments generate so effortlessly 
reflect part of human reality. There would be many caveats to add at this 
point, but I still propose that we consider the possibility that the masses of 
collected data are not hallucinatory fever dreams, but somewhat spotty and 
skewed windows on complex societies that are increasingly grammatized 
and captured by the very technical structures that produce these data in 
the f irst place. Since Facebook is a dominant means for social interaction 
and organization, the data generated by the platform reveal our societies, 
at least particular aspects from particular vantage points. But Facebook’s 
capacity to modify user behavior through interface design and algorithmic 
processing reminds us that integrated infrastructures are more akin to 
social experiments, controlled environments that can be modif ied at will, 
than to settings where sociality is merely observed. In digital spaces, 
the difference between representation and intervention collapses into a 
continuous feedback loop. This is why Zuboff (2019) describes ‘surveillance 
capitalism’, which seeks to derive monetary surplus from the dataf ication 
of human experience, as ‘a market form that is unimaginable outside the 
digital milieu’ (p. 15).
Information ordering techniques acting as engines of order that actively 
modulate relationships between users and circulating units of various 
kind operate on existing patterns and fault lines in diversif ied yet unequal 
societies. They arrange atomized individuals into ad hoc groups, to the point 
where ‘the processes of social segmentation become flexible’ (Lazzarato, 
2006, p. 182) and follow the operational goals of the moment rather than 
a desire for stable, disinterested description. Large and small variations 
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between (dataf ied) individuals can be read from vantage points tied to 
specific performance targets, such as longer time on site, higher click-through 
rates, lower loan default ratios, more productive employees, and so forth, 
but also integrated into broader activities, such as market research, product 
development, or strategic planning. Zuboff’s (2019) extraction of ‘behavioral 
surplus’ is clearly not the only way algorithmic techniques can inform pro-
cesses of value production, but the combination of infrastructural capture, 
data collection, and information processing indeed provides distinctive 
means to know and to act on complex societies on the basis of an empiricism 
that is epistemically biased in a way that the opposition between ‘objective’ 
and ‘subjective’ does not apprehend. Algorithmic techniques, just like other 
forms of mechanical reasoning, provide seemingly impartial ways to pursue 
deeply partial objectives.
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2. Rethinking Software
Abstract
This chapter formulates a conceptual perspective on software, start-
ing from an attempt to situate the book in relation to existing takes 
on the subject. It then moves to a presentation and appropriation of 
Simondon’s philosophy of technology, which reserves a central place 
to technical creation and evolution. Here, we f ind an understanding 
of technicity as a domain of life that constitutes its own substance and 
regularity, whilst remaining a fundamental form of human gesture. 
Simondon’s inductive view, which frames technology as multitude of 
technical objects rather than idealized techne, grounds the conceptual 
and analytical apparatus then brought to the analysis of algorithmic 
techniques.
Keywords: software studies, theory of software, philosophy of technology, 
Gilbert Simondon
Taken together, computerization, information overload, and social diversi-
f ication help us explain how algorithmic information ordering techniques 
have come to play such prominent roles and call attention to at least some 
of the social, political, and economic matters they have become entangled 
with. But they do not provide a clear picture of the actual technical substance 
that lurks behind words like ‘processing’, ‘modulating’, or ‘ordering’. The 
rest of this book is thus dedicated to the technicities that give functional 
meaning to these terms, even if the shadow of their eventual application 
cannot be ignored. This requires an understanding of software, as it defines 
basic materialities and conditions of production. In this chapter, I begin 
to carve out my own perspective in conversation with a number of intel-
lectual signposts, in particular the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon, which 
provides valuable clues for an understanding of software as historically 
accumulated archive of technical possibilities and of software-making as 
technical creation.
Rieder, B., Engines of Order: A Mechanology of Algorithmic Techniques. Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2020
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Getting a Grip on Software
Philosophy, in particular in its Anglo-Saxon analytical tradition, has long 
been interested in the foundations, status, and fundamental possibilities 
and limitations of computing (cf. Colburn, 2000; Floridi, 1999). Subjects such 
as the distinction between hard- and software, the ontological character 
of computer programs, and the specif ic problems computation raises for 
logicians have been lively areas of study since at least the 1960s and 1970s. 
An important strand, in this context, is the discussion of the relationship 
between computing and the mind, famously epitomized by Dreyfus (1972) or 
Searle (1980), which asks whether computers could ever be capable of ‘real’ 
understanding and not just of performing clever tricks that succeed in fooling 
an observer. These thinkers work toward what I would call a foundational 
understanding of computing, which seeks to settle its ontological status in 
order to develop a clear, axiomatic basis that supports the deductive style 
of reasoning analytical philosophy favors.
Despite its very different grounding in what is often referred to as 
‘continental’ philosophy, the f ield of software studies, a subfield or spin-off 
from media studies, often employs similar strategies. Following the broad 
roads opened by McLuhan (1964) and Kittler (1997a), authors like Berry 
(2011), Chun (2011), Hayles (2004), or Mackenzie (2006) have sought to assess 
the fundamental properties of computing in ways that frequently circulate 
around the notion of ‘code’ as the center of gravity. If one could clarify the 
specif ic character of this strange creature – written like text yet operating 
like a machine – one would be able to build all other aspects on these 
intellectual foundations. While the f ield has produced a series of attempts 
(e.g., Fuller, 2003; Gehl and Bell, 2012; Manovich, 2013c) to broaden the focus 
from computational foundations and experimentation at the margin to 
the mainstream of widely used software packages, volumes such as the 
Software Studies Lexicon (Fuller, 2008) illustrate a perspective that engages 
the nitty-gritty of technicity mostly through the basic building blocks of 
software and eschews the more compound or higher-level techniques and 
artifacts that populate software-making. In-depth discussion is often limited 
to the level of (short) code examples1 and experiments, while the broader 
1 It is telling that Berry’s Philosophy of Software provides a complete implementation of Quicksort 
(2011, p. 48) in C, in order to discuss ‘code aesthetics’, but says nothing about what that code actually 
does or what kind of intellectual substance it carries. But without capturing the technicity of 
the method, there is simply no means to understand why this particular example is considered 
‘beautiful’. Incidentally, the code snippet, taken from Oram and Wilson (2007), would be an 
excellent example for discussing how Simondon’s notion of concretization applies to software.
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technical rationales driving the design and architecture of software artifacts 
and behavior remain in the background.
Using a somewhat clumsy analogy, one could say that most existing 
theorizations have approached software primarily through its manifesta-
tion as ‘language’, code, rather than as ‘literature’, that is, as the myriad 
of components and programs written in concrete settings for concrete 
purposes. Understanding how code operates is certainly crucial for getting 
a grip on software, but the actual landscape of existing objects does not 
follow teleologically from the mere existence of computing machinery and 
programmability. Similar to language, software allows for the expression of 
a wide range of ideas and aspirations, even if basic principles and histori-
cally sedimented trajectories of knowledge and technicity structure spaces 
of possibility. The basic principles of computation have indeed received 
considerable attention, but the vast pools of accumulated ideas, techniques, 
systems, or reservoirs of ready-made function have rarely been made matters 
of concern. Despite the many inspirations I take from strands of foundational 
reasoning, my goal is indeed to inquire into a small but highly signif icant 
portion of what has been expressed as software and what continues to be 
expressed when developers draw on available techniques to build programs.
If the notion of algorithm, which I will address in the next chapter, points 
toward a foundational definition of computation, the notion of algorithmic 
technique opens onto a vast, contingent, and heterogeneous landscape 
of words and things that clutter minds and solid-state drives. Because, 
ultimately, if our business is not with the very possibility of mechanical 
computation, but with software as a plethora of objects in-the-world, the 
question to ask becomes ‘What is in an algorithm?’, leading to an investiga-
tion into the methods and mechanisms that constitute and inform operation. 
The elegant concept of computation then quickly begins to bloat up with 
many different things: real computers, not just abstract Turing machines; 
real software, lodged in tight networks of other software, all written for a 
purpose; data that stand for something, outputs that have consequences. If 
software is indeed eating the world, then the world – culture, economics, 
politics, sociability, education, desire, and so forth – f ills up software in 
return. Much like Latour’s famous speed bump, we could argue that software 
‘is not made of matter, ultimately; it is full of engineers and chancellors 
and lawmakers, commingling their wills and their story lines with those 
of gravel, concrete, paint, and standard calculations’ (Latour, 1994, p. 41). At 
the same time, what is the gravel of computation? computers? bits? code? 
How is software made and what is if made out of? Software-making can 
be, and certainly has been (Bowker et al., 1997), studied through a social 
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scientif ic lens investigating work processes, social norms, situated learning, 
tacit knowledge, organizational structures, economic constraints, and so 
forth. But if there is no serious attention paid to the technical content of 
software, an approach limited to social or cultural embeddings risks treating 
technical objects as mere epiphenomena of social or cultural forces. If 
we consider that artifacts like Google’s search ranking mechanisms have 
political relevance, the question what they do and how they do it necessarily 
involves a technical specif icity that should not be ignored. An ethnographic 
workplace study of what used to be Amit Singhal’s team2 would probably 
yield highly interesting insights in its own right but would be hard pressed 
to understand how the mechanisms at work relate to the trajectories of 
technicity that enable and inform their actual operation. While important 
parts of software-making are indeed entangled with questions of process, 
convention, learning, and so forth, there is a properly technical substance 
that sits at the center of technical practice.
The scholarly traditions mentioned above have mostly attempted to 
describe this substance as a series of singular principles, but the last decades 
have certainly seen attempts to capture and theorize subdomains and 
their specif icities. The dominant cultural interpretations of the technical 
and intellectual content of software clearly come in the form of popular 
science books written by journalists or computer scientists, such as Mac-
Cormick’s Nine Algorithms That Changed the Future or Domingos’s The 
Master Algorithm. While these texts do an excellent job at relaying technical 
principles to a lay audience, their cultural analysis is mostly celebratory 
and based on what amounts to commonsense reasoning about society and 
culture. Agre’s (1997a) Computation and Human Experience, which describes 
itself as ‘a critical reconstruction of the fundamental ideas and methods of 
artif icial intelligence research’ (n.p.), remains a rare example for an attempt 
to produce a technically competent and theoretically informed appreciation 
of this particularly evocative part of computing. Works by scholars like 
Burrell (2016), Dourish (2017), and Mackenzie (2015, 2017a), however, have 
shown more recently that it is still possible to approach some of the most 
complex techniques in computing from a humanistic perspective with 
regard to their technicity and not just their social effects and entanglements. 
Their efforts to unpack, interpret, and critique the rationales informing 
actual technicities are invaluable and pioneering, raising the question why, 
2 Amit Singhal is mentioned here by name because he was one of the last PhD students of 
a central f igure in this book, Gerard Salton. Singhal left Google in 2016, allegedly over sexual 
misconduct, and the head of machine learning, John Giannandrea, took over the search division.
REthINkING SOFt waRE 55
despite the immense public interest, such works remain exceedingly rare. 
Mackenzie’s recent Machine Learners (2017a) constitutes a particularly 
involved attempt to work through the technical and intellectual content 
of a technical subdomain that sits at the very center of current debates. 
Although my theoretical perspective and approach deviate in important 
ways, our projects share not only some of their subject matter, but also a 
desire to discuss and situate software as a series of particular practices. 
While the anxieties formulated in popular volumes such as Pariser’s Filter 
Bubble (2011), Pasquale’s The Black Box Society (2015), O’Neil’s Weapons of 
Math Destruction (2016), or Eubanks’s Automating Inequality (2018) inevitably 
echo through humanistic work on software, the technicities involved and 
their specif ic operational and epistemological character merit attention 
in their own right.
In my own attempt to investigate the substance of information ordering, 
I broadly follow the perspective laid out by Lev Manovich, most clearly in 
Software Takes Command (2013c), which develops a historically informed 
analysis of what he calls ‘cultural software’ and, in particular, of specif ic 
techniques and application packages in the domain of media creation, such 
as Adobe’s After Effects and Photoshop. Although Manovich is certainly 
interested in the fundamentals of computation, his focus is squarely on 
what comes after computation, when software pioneers begin to turn the 
computer into a ‘metamedium’ and implement a staggering array of forms 
and functions into the inviting windows of graphical user interfaces. While 
my domain of study is a different one, I very much build on the idea that 
computing is marked by a continuous, cumulative, and contingent process 
of evolution that is in large part the result of software-making:
None of the new media authoring and editing techniques we associate 
with computers are simply a result of media ‘being digital’. […] ‘Digital 
media’ is a result of the gradual development and accumulation of a large 
number of software techniques, algorithms, data structures, and interface 
conventions and metaphors. (Manovich, 2013b, p. 34)
The computer may be ‘undergoing continuous transformation’ (Manovich, 
2001, p. 64), but this transformation rests on historical processes of ‘accu-
mulation’ that should not be seen as a singular stream, but as ‘sedimented 
and layered’, as ‘a fold of time and materiality’ (Parikka, 2012, p. 3) that 
produces complicated temporal patterns. This process concerns not only 
end-user functionality but runs through software-making itself. The 
constructive and cumulative ‘archives’ of technicity and knowledge shape 
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the paths of possibility for the making of technical objects and even if 
they imply no teleology, they constitute the foundation for any future 
advancements.
The next section therefore turns to the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon 
to frame software as technology – not to neutralize its specif icities, but 
to consider it as part of a fundamental mode of constructing and relating 
to the world, and to distill a number of conceptual and methodological 
resources for the analysis of concrete technical objects and their evolution. 
Certain distinctions, in particular between objective and objectal, between 
abstract and concrete, and between element, individual, and ensemble, 
make it possible to address algorithmic techniques for information ordering 
with regard to both their inner composition and their complex relational 
embeddings. These distinctions inform a perspective that understands 
the practice of software-making not primarily as ‘writing code’, but as the 
creation of technical objects, that is, of ‘beings that function’ (Simondon, 
2017, p. 151). The recognition that technical creation is both constructive and 
contingent is central to this argument.
Software as Technology
Simondon’s Du mode d’existence des objets techniques,3 published in 1958 
and translated as On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects (Simondon, 
2017), remains to this day one of the most striking attempts to make tech-
nology a matter of philosophical concern. What makes this text a timely 
read 60 years after its publication is the delineation of a technical mode 
and substance that are distinct – although not disconnected – from other 
domains of being. Technology is neither understood as a manifestation of 
3 All of the conceptual work in this book has been based on the French original (Simondon, 
1958). While I reference the English version (Simondon, 2017) for convenience, certain translations 
have been amended. Most importantly, I translate the French ‘la technique’, used as a categorical 
term, with ‘technology’ to make a clearer distinction with ‘une technique’ or ‘les techniques’, 
for which I use the term ‘technique’. Simondon thinks technology from the vantage point of 
advanced machinery and not from tools such as hammers. The English term ‘technology’ connotes 
this emphasis on ‘modern’ technical objects better than the specialist term ‘technics’ used in 
the recent English translation. In general, Simondon puts little emphasis on strong ontological 
def initions or demarcations. The term ‘techne’ does not appear once in Du mode d’existence des 
objets techniques and central conceptual distinctions, for example, between technical element, 
individual, and ensemble, stem from an analysis of concrete machinery. Much care is taken to 
not absorb these concepts into an understanding of technology that totalizes the variety of 
technical objects into a singular logic.
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a broad principle of thought such as instrumental rationality, nor as an 
outcome of social processes yielding functional responses to some needs or 
desires. But technology is also not framed as an external, autonomous force 
that stands separate from or even against human beings. On the contrary, 
is seen as one of the two fundamental ‘phases’4 – the other being religion 
– that characterize the mode of existence of the ensemble constituted by 
humans and the world after the breakdown of the original, integral mode 
that Simondon (2017) calls ‘magical’ (p. 169). Aesthetic thinking, ethics, and 
scientif ic knowledge rise from the tension between the two phases and 
serve to mediate between them (p. 174).
The details of Simondon’s (2017) broader metaphysics are less important 
here than the conceptual developments that follow from them. At the outset, 
we f ind the diagnosis of a culture marked by an imbalance (p. 16) caused by 
the ‘ignorance or resentment’ (p. 15) of the central manifestation of modern 
technology, the machine. The popular debates on the power of ‘algorithms’ or 
artif icial intelligence neatly illustrate what Simondon means: without robust 
technical understanding, our culture is condemned to oscillate between 
two contradictory attitudes: one that holds that technology is merely matter 
assembled to provide some utility and one that ascribes (hostile) intentional-
ity to it (p. 17). Both attitudes reveal a technical illiteracy that locks our 
societies in ‘alienation’, keeping them from accessing the specif ic way of 
relating to the world technical creation constitutes. Even broader than its 
Marxist understanding, the term denotes the profound misapprehension 
of an entire domain of existence. While there are fundamental differences 
between Simondon and Heidegger, there is an element of Seinsvergessenheit 
(‘oblivion of being’)5: we treat technical objects as meaningful only in relation 
to a use and utility, ignoring the human reality they express and constitute. 
Unlike esthetic objects, they are not given right of residence in the world of 
signif ication (Simondon, 2017, p. 16).
Simondon’s work is thus an attempt to fundamentally rethink (con-
temporary) technology as a proper domain of both being and meaning. In 
close contact with the technical and industrial world since his childhood, 
he seeks to ‘recover’ the signif icance of the material world, both mediated 
4 Simondon understands the concept of ‘phase’ not temporally but in reference to the phase 
difference between two curves, that is, between f(x) = sin(x) and f(x) = sin(x) + π/2. This means 
that they need to be understood in unison, even if they each has their specif icity (cf. Simondon, 
2017, p. 173).
5 Heidegger’s (1962) critique targets the ontological reductionism manifest in attempts to 
narrow being to a single aspect, for example, Plato’s designation of ideas as the domain of true 
existence.
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and constituted by technology, for human existence. Emphasizing this 
conceptual and normative readjustment, Chateau argues that for Simondon 
‘[t]echnicity is an essential mode in man’s relation to the world: it is an 
essential mode of existence for man’.
The concept of ‘technicity’, the term used to conceive and address a 
specif ically technical substance, undergirds this project, putting at its 
center the notion of ‘function’. According to Simondon, ‘[w]hat resides in the 
machines is human reality, human gesture f ixed and crystallized in working 
structures’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 18), that is, structures that perform technical 
operations. This quote, however, should not be read as a concession to social 
constructivism, where human ideas and desires that are not themselves 
technical in nature are imprinted onto technical objects. On the contrary, 
Simondon (2014) attempts to delineate a domain of ‘functional meaning’ 
(p. 28) that rests on itself, where machines signify not only through what do, 
but, crucially, through how they operate. There is not something properly 
human on the one side that is transposed or translated into technical form 
on the other. Technicity itself, understood as organized functioning, is an 
intrinsically human mode of existence and evolution (cf. Simondon, 2014, 
p. 321). Simondon thus joins thinkers like Leroi-Gourhan (1993), who see 
technology, like language, as a fundamental trait of our species. Indeed, 
when Simondon (2017) argues that ‘human beings communicate by what 
they invent’ (p. 252), he does not mean that there is some kind of message 
encoded in the technical object, but anticipates McLuhan’s (1964) famous 
one-liner: the object, its technical schema and functional makeup, is the 
message.
To be clear, Simondon postulates neither a cybernetic equivalence be-
tween human and machine through the notion of operation nor a confluence 
of technical and biological evolution (cf. Guchet, 2008). Rather, distinct orders 
of reality enter into contact through ‘transduction’: individuation, of both 
subjects and objects, happens when preindividual realities develop relations 
of mutual structuration (cf. Simondon, 1989, p. 24f.). Primacy is given to 
the relation over its parts, but heterogeneity is not erased. Identity, so to 
speak, can be seen as the metastable function of a dynamic system, as long 
as we understand that this does not mean that all relations are equivalent 
or that relations emerge spontaneously or ‘promiscuously’ (cf. Stiegler, 
1989). A technical individual is, f irst and foremost, characterized by strong 
and stable technical or causal relations between the constitutive elements 
that establish and maintain its functioning. These relations constitute the 
objective mode of existence of a technical object, in opposition to its objectal 
mode, which marks a detachment from its producer and ‘the beginning of a 
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free adventure’ (Simondon, 2014, p. 27) embedded in economic, social, and 
psychosocial relations.6
While Simondon concedes that social factors also affect the technical 
object during its evolution, he insists that the objective mode is already full 
of meaning and value, without considering use or f inality (Simondon, 2014, 
p. 321). His position, here, has a normative component: early manifesta-
tions of consumer capitalism’s tendency to package technical objects in 
endless variations of the same technicities clearly do not f ind Simondon’s 
approval (cf. 2014, p. 27f.). A technical object may have a ‘halo of sociality’ 
as a ‘psychosocial symbol’ (Simondon, 2014, p. 29), but it already – and even 
primarily – signif ies in its objective mode and thus constitutes a domain 
of expression in the form of operational structures.
Using the vocabulary of Actor-Network Theory, we could say that an 
object’s technicity realizes ‘its script, its “affordance”, its potential to take 
hold of passersby and force them to play roles in its story’ (Latour, 1999, 
p. 177). Simondon’s philosophy, however, cautions us to not move too quickly 
to the heterogeneous but flat assemblages Actor-Network Theory conceives. 
In fact, Latour’s more recent An Inquiry into Modes of Existence (2013) follows 
Simondon in arguing that such modes delineate their own substances in 
ways that are more profound than a mere incommensurability between 
language games, because they admit other beings than words into the fold 
of what makes a mode specific (Latour, 2013, p. 20). Being itself is marked by 
difference and, as Peters (2015) claims, ‘[o]ntology is not flat; it is wrinkly, 
cloudy, and bunched’ (p. 30).
When it comes to technology, this means that one should be attentive 
to the specif icity of an object’s functioning, and, on a broader level, to 
the question of how technology def ines its own forms of evolution and 
transmission. The latter, in particular, is essential for understanding soft-
ware and software-making as embedded in processes of accumulation and 
sedimentation.
Technical Evolution
For Simondon (2017), technology is characterized by a complex process 
of evolution. This process includes a moment of inception, an ‘absolute 
6 While the conceptual separation between ‘objective’ and ‘objectal’ runs through all of 
Simondon’s work on technology, he uses the latter term only in his lecture on the psychosociology 
of technicity (Simondon, 2014). My more explicit opposition between the two terms follows 
Chateau’s (2014) interpretation.
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beginning’ (p. 44) of what he calls a ‘schema’. He acknowledges that there 
is always a prehistory – my own rather meandering account of PageRank in 
Chapter 7 is a case in point – yet argues that the invention of the thermionic 
diode, for example, amounts to the creation of a new ‘technical essence’ that 
concerns, in this case, a particular way of producing asymmetric conduct-
ance. Fleming’s idea to heat one of the two electrodes in a vacuum tube to 
assure that current can only travel in one direction then constitutes the 
beginning of a technical lineage that dominates electronics from the early 
1900s to the arrival of semiconductor devices in the 1960s. Indeed, what 
constitutes the thermionic diode’s essence is not merely the technical task 
it performs (‘what it does’), since asymmetric conductance could already 
be produced by other means, but the specif ic technical principle it relies 
on (‘how it does it’). The technical principle takes primacy since ‘no f ixed 
structure corresponds to a def inite usage’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 25). And, 
indeed, vacuum tubes acquire a whole range of initially unintended uses 
over time. This means that categorizations of technical objects based on 
use or f inality cannot capture their objective dimension and that technical 
trajectories are not tied to single tasks but often run through many different 
applications and cultural segmentations. We will see this principle at work 
many times in the context of information ordering.
Putting the emphasis on technical schemas highlights the deep embed-
dedness and relationality of modern technology. Engines working with 
steam, combustion, or electricity, for example, may all perform the exact 
same work in certain conditions, but they are made out of different materials, 
have different sizes, weights, and operational properties, require different 
forms of maintenance and care, and depend on different energy infrastruc-
tures for their particular fuels. All of this means that each engine type is 
more compatible with certain modes of social and economic organization 
than with others. And these relational aspects are not static but change in 
conjunction with the specif ic evolutionary trajectories they trace over time. 
While it may be enough to describe an algorithm’s behavior to establish 
its ‘script’ and to analyze its role in the hic et nunc of a particular setting, 
a deeper appreciation of computing as a technical domain has to consider 
schemas as ‘units of becoming’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 26, translation amended) 
that evolve and change their potentiality. Yet the way a technical trajec-
tory unfolds is circumscribed by its technicity, even if there is no singular 
destination or telos (cf. Bontems, 2009). To speak with Wolfgang Ernst (2015), 
‘technical things form a self-referential subsystem that […] disconnects 
itself from the broad “historical” time’ (p. 186) and evolve according to their 
‘inner time’ (Eigenzeit), their own temporality.
REthINkING SOFt waRE 61
The notion of technical essence and the process of evolution are compli-
cated by the observation that technical ‘individuals’, the level of integration 
Simondon (2017) associates with machines (p. 77), are made of technical 
‘elements’ such as screws, springs, or diodes, which are the most immediate 
carriers of technicity (p. 73ff.). Individuals, which constitute operational 
units and are therefore closest to the human scale (p. 77), combine and 
arrange elements into functioning and integrated wholes, realizing techni-
cal schemata that evolve over time. As Chabot argues, for Simondon, ‘[t]
echnological invention consists of assembling a coherent system from 
disparate elements’ (Chabot, 2013, p. 14). Technical objects are made – and 
increasingly so – out of other technical objects.
The distinction between element and individual also allows for a lucid 
conceptualization of transmission or transversality between different 
trajectories, since elements are more ‘universal’ and can be put to use in very 
different individuals (Simondon, 2014, p. 327). Elements developed in one 
context often spread to others, further underscoring the task-independence 
of technicity, which will be particularly important when accounting for algo-
rithmic techniques. At the same time, Simondon (2017, p. 21) argues that the 
locus of technicity has steadily ‘moved up’, to the point where contemporary 
societies are organized around technical ‘ensembles’ that combine many 
individuals into coordinated systems reliant on an exchange of information 
rather than energy. These ensembles – laboratories, factories, industrial 
networks – ensure the production of both elements and individuals. The 
trifecta of element, individual, and ensemble allows for a nuanced analysis 
of technology not as techne but as sprawling ecosystems of objects and 
trajectories that require inductive conceptualization rather than idealistic 
totalization. For Simondon, technology does not exist as a singular, but as a 
multitude of concrete technical objects (cf. Carrozzini, 2008, p. 9).
Another reason why Simondon’s approach is attractive to students of 
contemporary technology is the attention paid to technical evolution after 
the invention of a technical schema or essence. Although common in studies 
of technology as economic and industrial endeavor, the matter is rarely 
tackled in philosophical accounts. Terms like ‘lineage’ or ‘trajectory’ indeed 
address how a schema evolves after its basic principles have been introduced 
and the particular pathway it follows relates to its technical specif icity (cf. 
Simondon, 2017, p. 26). Evolution implies moving from an abstract state, 
that Simondon (2017) also calls ‘analytical’ (p. 29) or ‘intellectual’ (p. 49), 
toward a concrete state, where the interplay between elements has become 
‘a system that is entirely coherent within itself and entirely unif ied’ (p. 29). 
‘Concretization’, then, does not denote a movement from idea to physical 
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artifact but the way technical objects shift their internal composition as they 
iterate from one version or instance of a schema to the next. The combustion 
engine can serve as an instructive example: early motors were characterized 
by strong functional separation between parts, each element having a 
single task in a functional chain (p. 27). Over many cycles of ref inement, 
motors became more integrated, synergetic, and thus concrete. Elements 
started to take on multiple roles, such as the cylinder block performing 
heat regulation to reduce material strain and to keep the electrodes of the 
spark plug at optimal working temperature. Instead of being largely separate 
steps in a chain, the elements in a concrete technical object support and 
sustain each other. If a technical object is a ‘theater of a certain number of 
reciprocal causal relations’ (p. 32) that assure its operational functioning, 
concretization is the movement toward synergy, toward an optimal state 
of interaction between elements.
A schema’s trajectory ends when this process has reached a point of 
saturation and no further optimizations can be made (p. 45f.). At that point, 
any improvement to task performance requires a new invention, a new 
essence or schema that, in turn, will begin its own march toward concretiza-
tion. The switch from steam to combustion engines clearly marks such a 
moment.7 Trajectories are defined by this process of evolution, not by tasks 
performed or by companies’ changing product portfolios. Contemporary 
machines can tie together many trajectories: in the case of computing, it 
is clear that the shift from vacuum tubes to semiconductors inaugurates 
a new technical schema for central processing units, but other crucial 
elements, such as storage or input and output devices def ine their own 
evolutionary pathways.
Crucial for my discussion of software is Simondon’s association of the 
abstract state of technical objects with artisanal modes of production and 
the concrete state with industrial modes. The former is ‘analytical’, closer to 
the world of ideas, and more open to deviation and new possibilities (p. 29). 
The latter is marked by functional closure and standardization. However, 
it is not standardization that drives concretization; it is concretization, 
as convergence toward an integrated state, that stabilizes the technical 
object internally and thereby makes it ready for industrial production. As a 
consequence of this stabilization, the concrete technical object determines 
its uses and ‘acquires the power to shape a civilization’ (p. 29), while the 
abstract, artisanal object is shaped by external needs and desires.
7 Simondon’s analysis is actually more f ine-grained and puts the diesel engine, which uses 
compression instead of spark plugs to ignite the fuel, in its own lineage.
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However, technical evolution is not exclusively driven by internal con-
cretization; it also involves adaptation to the geographical8 and technical 
milieux, for example, through better reaction to climatic conditions or 
a more eff icient use of production capacities. The technical object sits 
between the natural and the technical world and, through it, each world 
acts on the other (Simondon, 2017, p. 56). The idea that the natural world 
circumscribes the fundamental possibilities of technical functioning is 
certainly not uncommon. Wolfgang Ernst (2015), for example, argues that 
technologies can only be ‘discursively constructed within the confines of 
matter and mathematical logic’ (p. 196), which means that the ‘technological 
time proper to media stands closer to the acculturated laws of nature than 
to historiography and the humanities’ (p. 188). In Simondon’s relational 
ontology, however, the difference between these two worlds is pushed into 
the background to make room for technical evolution as a fundamentally 
‘constructive’ process (Simondon, 2017, p. 58).
Technical invention is different from internal concretization and 
adaptation to the environment. Invention means that technical objects 
realize or actualize their own ‘associated milieu’,9 composed of natural and 
technical elements and relations that enable and sustain their operation. 
The creation of this third, this ‘techno-geographic’ milieu, points to the 
fundamental contingency that undergirds the evolution of technical objects: 
there is no teleology, no law of necessity that drives evolution, only feats 
of human intelligence that, in a sense, generate new materialities out of 
existing materialities. This is what Simondon means when he says that 
technical evolution is constructive: much like biological life has formed 
highly complex ecosystems that are populated by organisms capable of 
maintaining and reproducing themselves yet deeply enmeshed in various 
relations and interdependencies, technology has a ‘fecundity’ (Simondon, 
2017, p. 45) to sprawl and to extend the possibilities of life itself. Terms like 
‘autopoiesis’ or even Herbert Simon’s (1996) analysis of complex systems as 
‘nearly decomposable’ hierarchies, where every level develops properties that 
cannot be reduced to the level below, capture certain aspects of Simondon’s 
8 The term ‘geographical’ underscores how, for Simondon, abstract principles such as ‘nature’ 
have little interest since materiality is always a set of concrete circumstances in time and space.
9 The mixed, relational, and self-referential character of the associated milieu becomes explicit 
in the following quote: ‘This simultaneously technical and natural milieu can be called an 
associated milieu. It is that through which the technical object conditions itself in its functioning. 
This milieu is not fabricated [ fabriqué], or at least not fabricated in its totality; it is a certain 
regime of natural elements surrounding the technical being, linked to a certain regime of 
elements that constitute the technical being’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 59).
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thinking here, even if they do not suff iciently account for heterogeneity and 
transduction. New schemas sit on top of old schemas in an endless process 
of constructive expansion.
While Simondon is hardly clear on this point, there may very well be a 
‘ground floor’ of irreducible physical structures, but since human beings 
exist as technical beings, we inhabit a world that is always already character-
ized by this relational state of overflow. Simondon’s (2017) rather cryptic 
assertion that ‘[t]he mediation between man and the world becomes itself 
a world, the structure of the world’ (p. 193) evokes the deeply constructive 
nature of technology and it is essential to emphasize that in this relational 
ontology, the normative force of structure, that is, the capacity of what is 
already given to make some things possible and others not, to make some 
things easy and others diff icult, is not seen as a conf inement, but as the 
very condition for an endless generation of new materialities, new schemas, 
new (technical) essences.
Because technology itself adds to the reservoirs of technicity, it is never 
just an application of science, even if its possibilities are subject to the laws 
of nature and concretization can be seen as a way to exploit these laws 
for the greatest eff iciency (cf. Simondon, 2017, p. 39). But it is also never 
just a playground of cultural imagination. An idea describing a particular 
use or application is not a technical idea. Gene Roddenberry thought of a 
‘transporter’ that can ‘beam’ things from one place to another, but he did not 
invent it and, therefore, his idea is not a technical idea and the transporter 
not a technical object. A technical object is a being that functions and a 
technical idea is one that assembles an associated milieu into a potential 
for operational functioning. And because the reservoir of what is given does 
not easily bend to our will, technical invention is hard.
Simondon’s perspective has been called ‘unbalanced’ (Mills, 2011, n.p.) 
for giving priority to the objective over the objectal, that is, to technicity 
over economic, social, and psychosocial dimensions. However, seen in the 
context of Simondon’s broader oeuvre, which dedicates much attention to 
psychosocial ‘transindividuation’, his work on technology can be seen as a 
normatively charged attempt to put culture and technicity on equal footing, 
framing both as ‘techniques for human handling’ (Simondon, 2014, p. 318) 
that imply their own ‘modes of analysis’ (p. 329). Actual technical objects, 
once they detach from their creators, connect technicity to specif ic tasks 
in specif ic settings and their contribution in this specif ic context is thus 
a shared product that can be analyzed along both lines. But technology 
and culture are ‘unbalanced’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 16) because we generally 
do not consider technicity as a genuine domain of meaning and a viable 
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avenue for the analysis of human existence. If philosophy has histori-
cally considered technology as either autonomous or def ined by its use, in 
Simondon’s perspective it is neither. It is an ‘expression of life’ (Simondon, 
2014, p. 321) that requires a mechanology, a mode of analysis that recognizes 
its specif icities.
The Technicity of Computing
My investigation into information ordering is largely inspired by the question 
of how algorithmic techniques can be understood and investigated as what 
Petersen (2015) calls ‘functional expressions’, human communication in 
the form of function that exercises ‘an action on man’ (Simondon, 2014, 
p. 318). This raises the question of how Simondon’s perspective, formulated 
in the 1950s, can be productively applied to the domain of computing. We 
may require some adaptation and additional nuance, but his thinking can 
certainly inspire a course toward an analysis of technicity that moves from 
totalizing accounts to the universe of technical objects, sprawling and in 
constant evolution. My objective, here, is not to ‘rectify’ Simondon’s account, 
but to continue what he set out to do, that is, to take technical objects 
seriously as carriers of meaning and to ask what they can tell us about the 
character of contemporary technology.
The distinction between element, individual, and ensemble can certainly 
be read as part of a metaphysics of technology, but it can also be used as 
a conceptual device orienting the analysis of specif ic technical domains. 
While technicity resides on all three levels, there are important differences. 
Elements can be seen as carriers of ‘pure’ or ‘free’ technicity (Simondon, 2017, 
p. 74), because they are not yet combined into systems that, so to speak, put 
certain demands on them. Individuals, on the other hand, are such stable 
systems of organized elements (p. 74) and they require ‘self-regulation’ 
(p. 73), that is, structural coherence capable of assuring their function 
and stability over time. As part of an individual or machine, the element 
is no longer an unconstrained potential, but part of a schema that def ines 
an associated milieu and, in turn, is def ined by its relationship with the 
regularities of existing natural and technical materialities. A good way to 
think about this nuance is to consider that an element has no real scenario 
of optimal function or failure, since it is not yet part of a context that defines 
what that would mean. Whether a screw fulf ills its role depends on the 
structural weight or pressure it has to withstand when becoming part of a 
specif ic object. We cannot say that a screw is too weak without knowing 
what it is supposed to hold.
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When considering computers as technical individuals, one can begin 
by pondering hardware as composed of various kinds of elements, from 
voltage regulators to semiconductor parts to cables and casing. But should 
we treat more stable and modular units such as processors, hard drives, and 
screens, which are themselves made of smaller parts, also as individuals? 
In Simondon’s perspective, they play the role of elements, since they cannot 
function on their own and are therefore not tied to a specif ic operational 
context or milieu that determines the specif ic conditions they have to 
perform in. But how does software f it into this equation?
Given Simondon’s impressive technical awareness, it is not surprising that 
computers already figure prominently in his work. They are discussed as part 
of a larger species of ‘open’ machines that possess a margin of indetermina-
tion and the capacity to receive information that is then used to set actual 
outcomes (Simondon, 2017, p. 154). Only living beings can give themselves 
information, but even a mechanical piano that plays a piece according to 
the holes in a paper roll has the capacity to actualize a potential in different 
ways (cf. p. 156). While the piano already comes with built-in ‘schemas 
of decisions’ (p. 154) that def ine the relationship between information 
and action, such schemas have to be programmed into the computer to 
tie incoming information to particular actions (p. 154). Software is thus 
fundamentally part of the machine, since it def ines how it functions. The 
hardware remains element without the software, pure technical potential 
that needs other elements to become a functioning whole. That also means 
that programming is not simply a form of adapting a machine, it is an 
integral part of making a machine and, consequently, a genuine domain of 
technical creation and invention. The reverse holds true as well: without 
the hardware, software is but a technical element.
This perspective resonates with Turing’s fundamental take on computa-
tion (1937), where any universal (Turing) machine can simulate any arbitrary 
(Turing) machine, the latter specifying the actual computational procedure 
to be executed. But for Simondon, only a physical computer can be a techni-
cal object that functions. As technical individual it is def ined both by the 
software procedures it executes and by its physical capabilities, such as 
processing speed, storage size, networking equipment, and input/output 
modalities. All of these elements form the associated milieu that make the 
individual a ‘networked object’ (Guchet, 2001, p. 229) that draws preexisting 
potential together into function. We end up with a perspective that moves 
away from strict ontological distinctions between hardware and software 
or between digital and analog and instead gives primacy to the question 
of how various heterogeneous elements come together to form a machine.
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This does not mean that we cannot treat software as a particular domain 
or type of element. What it does mean, however, is that we need to be 
cognizant that actual functioning is a relational outcome of elements 
assembled into working systems that are placed into particular objectal 
contexts. The constructive and relational character of technology quickly 
becomes evident when we look at actual objects and their trajectories.
As previously stated, a technical essence or schema has an absolute begin-
ning. If we consider algorithms to be potential carriers of such technical 
schemas, we can take something like Tony Hoare’s Quicksort and trace it back 
to roughly 1959, when Hoare was working on machine translation on visit at 
Moscow State University (Hoare, 2011). But Quicksort arrives at a point in time 
where computers not only exist, but exist at a certain stage of development, 
where the early programming language Autocode has been released, where 
other sorting algorithms have already been in use for years, and so forth. 
The availability of a programming language means that many of the basic 
elements needed to put Quicksort in place – a list-type data structure, looping 
functions, basic logical operators, string comparison features, etc. – were 
readily available and no longer had to be coded by each programmer herself 
in machine language. Against a somewhat naive reading of Kittler’s (1997a) 
‘There Is No Software’, where high-level programming languages represent 
a form of ‘obscuring’ or barring of access to the hardware (p. 150), Simondon 
would hold that the elements of technicity these languages provide constitute 
a ‘more’: more technicity, more possibilities, new techniques to integrate 
and ideas to draw on, trajectories of concretization in the form of highly 
optimized compilers, and so forth. Construction, not confinement. There is 
no base layer of technicity where the ‘real’ operations happen, only specif ic 
instances of natural and technical potentials that are being drawn together 
into a technical object. And this includes hardware: while we can reason about 
performance characteristics of sorting algorithms in abstract terms, Hoare 
(2011) himself argued that Quicksort responded to the particular challenges of 
sequential tape storage and the small working memory available at the time.
Quicksort may have been a genuinely new schema for sorting, but its 
invention occurred in an environment already full of technicity that forms 
a reservoir or archive for technical imagination to draw on:
We can consider the technical imagination as being defined by a particular 
sensitivity to the technicity of elements; it is this sensitivity to technicity, 
that enables the discovery of possible assemblages; the inventor does not 
proceed ex nihilo, starting from matter that he gives form to, but from 
elements that are already technical. (Simondon, 2017, p. 74)
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The compositional nature of technical invention is particularly obvious 
when considering computing’s highly layered and modular character, which 
I will address in more detail in the next chapter.
Crucially, elements are not dissolved when forming individuals and 
they constitute their own trajectories. The combustion engine forms a 
lineage because there are certain functional principles that run through 
all combustion engines and these principles are different from the those 
that animate the steam engine, for example. In the domain of software, the 
C-family of programming languages or the many Unixlike operating systems 
are evocative and tangible candidates for such ‘units of becoming’ that carry 
a set of functional principles through the course of an evolution. Application 
packages, programming libraries, or toolkits may well be pondered in similar 
terms as they carry schemas from one version number to the next.
When dealing with complex software artifacts like operating systems, the 
distinction between element, individual, and ensemble becomes unstable, 
but remains analytically useful. The point of view of the element points 
toward technicity as fundamental technical potential or force in the sense 
that elements have the ‘capacities for producing or undergoing an effect in 
a determinate manner’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 75). The notion of the individual 
addresses how these ‘pure’ technical forces are integrated, how an associated 
milieu is formed and stabilized, how continuous operation is realized. 
A car def ines such a mutually stabilized system of almost innumerable 
elements and a smartphone is no different in that regard. Hardware and 
software are assembled in a way that each element is adjusted to the others. 
The application software ‘f its’ the processor speed, memory capacities, 
screen dimensions, sensor arrays, and so forth. The battery size reflects 
the requirements of the hardware and the charging mechanism is designed 
to keep it from exploding by taking into account the chassis’s capacity to 
evacuate heat. The operating system manages the hardware resources 
within their limits and assures that the applications stay out of each other’s 
memory space. As part of an individual, each element binds and is bound 
at the same time.
Technical ensembles, on the other hand, constitute systems that are not 
characterized by the creation of an associated milieu, but rather by a form of 
coupling that merely connects outputs to inputs, while remaining separate in 
terms of actual functioning. There is no search for synergetic integration; on 
the contrary, each individual operates in its own milieu and interactions may 
produce unfavorable effects (Simondon, 2017, p. 66). In an artisan’s workshop, 
a laboratory, or a factory, phenomena like heat transfer or electromagnetic 
induction from one object may detrimentally affect another and shielding 
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or physical separation may be necessary, even if there is ‘cooperation’ in 
terms of overall operation. The relationship between individuals in an 
ensemble is therefore characterized by exchange of information rather 
than direct technical coupling (Simondon, 2017, p. 17). Simondon compares 
technical elements to organs, functional units that could not subsist on 
their own, and individuals to living bodies (Simondon, 2017, p. 62). In this 
analogy, ensembles appear as ‘societies’, characterized by more precarious or 
tumultuous dynamics of relation, stabilization, and perturbation. Computer 
networks connecting functionally separate machines are obvious candidates 
for technical ensembles, but the utility of the concept is broader. Simondon 
argues that technical and economic value are almost completely separate 
on the level of the element, while individuals and ensembles connect to 
broader realities such as social arrangements and practices. Ensembles, 
in particular, point to the fact that contemporary technology functions 
as a series of ‘industries’, highlighting the deep entanglement between 
technologies and economies, to the point where a whole ‘geology’ (Parikka, 
2015) of technology becomes visible: almost everything on this planet, 
above ground and below, has become part of networks of production and 
consumption. These networks are organized through flows of information 
that assure communication and control.10
In Simondon’s work, concretization is the march from a more abstract or 
modular state, where elements are arranged so that every part only fulf ills 
a single function without synergy with the others, to a state of integration 
where mutual adjustments yield optimal functioning. The process implies 
an arrangement of technicities in a way that the technical properties of an 
element, which may well pose problem to the functioning of the whole, are 
turned into a benefit. Structural integrity, weight and size, heat evacuation, 
favorable operational conditions, reduction in cost and resource use during 
both construction and operation, and even aspects such as the degree of 
diff iculty to produce or recycle an object: these are some of the lines the 
process of concretization travels along. While Simondon’s conceptualization 
of technology from the state of the art of his time is one of its greatest 
strengths, it also means that there is a marked focus on energy use and, 
in particular, on the problem of thermal buildup as the principal plague 
10 Simondon engages in a substantial dialogue with cybernetics, which he generally views 
favorably as a means to conceptualize and manage the dynamics of ensembles, but also considers 
as ‘insuff icient’, because it neither conceives technology in its entirety, nor gives adequate 
attention to the specif ic nature of technical schemas. But it is clear that he sees a systems 
perspective grounded in a theory of information as essential to the understanding of technical 
ensembles (cf. Simondon, 2017, p. 160).
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of industrial technology. Excess heat means energy loss, impediment to 
function, and, in fine, structural disintegration, all causing extra costs. 
Although Simondon never states this directly, the concrete technical object 
is, f irst and foremost, efficient when it comes to dealing with these problems.
Computers certainly face some of the same problems ‘normal’ machines 
do, since energy eff iciency and heat evacuation are two of the most press-
ing issues hardware engineers struggle with. Moore’s law, which holds 
that transistor density in integrated circuits doubles roughly every two 
years, can be seen as a metric for concretization that indicates eff iciency 
gains in terms of performance, energy consumption, size, and material 
cost per unit. While we usually venerate invention as the creation of the 
genuinely new, there are good reasons Simondon dedicates so much space 
to concretization: the emergence of modern technology as a truly pervasive 
force would be unthinkable without it. From a formal point of view, the f irst 
general-purpose microprocessors of the 1970s are (almost)11 identical to the 
chips powering today’s smartphones. But steady progress in manufacturing 
has sped up processors by many orders of magnitude, to the point where 
the supercomputers in our pockets have become capable of extraordinary 
feats. Similar arguments can be made for storage technology, network 
bandwidth, or display capabilities. Concretization thus remains essential 
for understanding contemporary computing, even before we include the fact 
that the mass manufacture of computing devices raises urgent questions 
about energy use and waste production (cf. Parikka, 2011). But when moving 
to the domain of software, the notion needs to be interrogated more carefully.
Certainly, eff iciency is far from irrelevant when it comes to software. 
But the material conditions of software introduce differences that can-
not be ignored. As Reeves (1992) notes, software is cheap to build, because 
what he calls the ‘design’ of a program, its source code, is automatically 
transformed (‘built’) into machine code by a compiler – no raw materials 
and elbow grease are required to turn the blueprint into an artifact. But 
since every detail needs to be specified and programs can get extraordinarily 
complex, software is expensive to design. While Reeves’s argument that a 
program’s source code constitutes its design is certainly debatable, it echoes 
Turing’s (1948) aff irmation that in computing, ‘[t]he engineering problem 
of producing various machines for various jobs is replaced by the off ice 
11 While all Turing-complete processors can calculate all computable functions, instruction 
sets have grown over time, often to address special-purpose logic blocks that accelerate certain 
calculations, for example, for video decoding, where f ixed-function hardware enables higher 
video resolutions and compression rates at lower energy costs.
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work of “programming” the universal machine to do these jobs’ (p. 4). This 
means that the notion of concretization requires a different understanding 
of eff iciency. This passage on the ‘imperfection’ of the abstract technical 
object highlights where Simondon’s perspective requires adaptation:
Because of its analytic character, [the abstract technical object] uses more 
material and requires more construction work; it is logically simpler, yet 
technically more complicated, because it is made up of a convergence of 
several complete systems. It is more fragile than the concrete technical 
object, because the relative isolation of each system […] threatens, in case 
of its malfunction, the preservation of the other systems (Simondon, 2017, 
p. 30, translation amended).
If we take a program that relies heavily on preexisting modules or libraries 
as an example for an abstract technical object, it is true that it may require 
more storage space, working memory, and processing power than purpose-
built code. But the construction time aspect is completely reversed: since 
the compiler builds the actual technical object and reproduction comes 
down to mere copying, a more abstract or modular construction will be 
much faster and cheaper to create than a more concrete, optimized, and 
integrated object. Fewer lines of code are specif ically written for a given 
program, even if the total number of lines grows.
The sharing of modular elements between projects also means that 
many different programs can benefit from the time invested in debugging, 
security, and performance tuning. Concretization in this broad sense of 
optimization therefore often focuses on the element, on transversal and 
reusable modules, packages, libraries, and frameworks, on operating systems 
that underpin all function, and on development tools such as programming 
languages and compilers that can greatly facilitate even complicated tasks 
such as parallelization. As I will argue in the next chapter, actual programs 
rely heavily on all of these things. One could go as far as to argue that much 
software is constructed like an ensemble in the sense that the collaborating 
units merely exchange information while remaining separate in most other 
aspects. Services like Facebook or Google Search, which rely on vast and 
distributed arrays of technicity, would be obvious examples, but even much 
more contained programs are designed around functional separation. These 
considerations further add to the fundamental ambiguity between element, 
individual, and ensemble when it comes to computing.
If software is easy to build but diff icult to design, the issues coming up 
in design prime over those relating to material fabrication: how can code 
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be organized in a way that it is easy to maintain, easy to debug or enhance, 
easy to reuse in other projects, or easy to transfer to other developers? 
How can complexity be contained or managed? In software, an abstract 
technical object that addresses these issues through a strategy of ‘divide 
and conquer’ (Dijkstra, 1974, p. 609) may well be more stable and ‘perfect’ 
than a concrete one. Crucially, the mass production of software is much less 
dependent on concretization since a less concrete program can be copied and 
distributed just as easily as a tightly integrated one. Even highly abstract or 
‘artisanal’ programs may thus end up having extremely high adoption rates 
and contribute to a global standardization of functional patterns. This helps 
explain how the software landscape, seen as the sum of available software 
artifacts, can group around a limited number of ‘superstar’ applications 
yet host a staggering amount of variation and novelty at the same time.
Technical evolution is indeed tied to the invention of new schemata and 
to their concretization, but the landscape of actually existing technical 
objects is the result of a much wider relational process. Drawing on the same 
elements or technicities, different technical individuals are designed to f it 
different social, economic, functional, or aesthetic circumstances. Here, we 
f ind another important relationship with the particularities of technical 
creation. Indeed, the dimensions of abstract (or analytic) and concrete (or 
synthetic) connect to two modes of making, artisanal and industrial. The 
former implies a certain ‘immaturity’ in the sense that the technical object 
is f irst and foremost an object of use, necessary for daily life (Simondon, 2017, 
p. 103) and drowned in the particularities of a here and now that dominates 
the sensible universe of the craftsman (Simondon, 2017, p. 105). The latter 
marks a stage of ‘maturity’ that entails scientif ic rationality (p. 103) and a 
higher degree of detachment from the natural milieu (p. 105), resulting in 
the production of an industrial associated milieu where nature is largely 
dominated. The engineer inhabits a world of technicity that is not primarily 
shaped by human needs or uses, but one where ‘needs mold themselves 
onto the industrial technical object, which in turn acquires the power to 
shape a civilization’ (p. 29).
This characterization of the industrial mode of production in more than 
one way elicits Heidegger’s (1998) portrayal of modern technology as Gestell, 
as a form of unveiling where science and mathematics ‘challenge’ nature with 
the sole purpose of extracting energy. While Heidegger promotes a return 
to the artisanal mode, Simondon suggests that we should pursue an outlook 
that incorporates both the artisanal and industrial modes and thereby 
achieves a relationship that is neither dominated nor dominating, but one 
of ‘equality’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 105f.). The level where this can be achieved 
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most easily is that of the technical ensemble, which integrates trajectories 
of concretization yet remains open to the natural and social milieux. Here, 
Simondon proposes cybernetics as a starting point for thinking and regulat-
ing the modalities for information exchange (p. 119). But ultimately, it is the 
role of philosophy to introduce a mode of thinking into ‘general’ culture that 
is capable of incorporating technicity as a fundamental mode of relating to 
the world, thereby installing human beings as coordinators and inventors 
of machines: ‘[Man] is among the machines that operate with him’ (p. 18). 
Simondon attributes to philosophy the role of fostering balance, homeostasis, 
and regulation through mediation between the theoretical and practical, 
the abstract and concrete, the idea and the concept, the ethical and the 
scientif ic, the technical and the religious (p. 221). To achieve this synthesis, 
technicity needs to be recognized as a means of human expression, which 
f irst requires a cultural sensitivity for technical objects as human creations. 
My emphasis on software-making is an attempt to respond to this challenge.
Software, in fact, is an area of technology where an intermingling between 
modes of creation is already a common phenomenon. The emphasis on 
abstraction and modularity on the one side and the ongoing movements of 
concretization on the level of tools and libraries on the other imply a constant 
copresence of artisanal and industrial modes. In fact, the abstract, artisanal 
character of software-making is strengthened by the ongoing concretization 
and optimization on the lower levels. The availability of robust operating 
systems that provide large amounts of baseline functionality, the spread of 
simpler and more expressive programming languages, and the proliferation 
of powerful code libraries for almost any purpose make complex capabilities 
such as 3D graphics or machine learning available to almost any programmer. 
The underlying trajectories of concretization support a high degree of liveli-
ness and experimentation by providing masses of elements for the assembly 
of individuals and ensembles. Concretization and industrialization on one 
level enable abstraction and artisanal production on another. One area 
where this becomes particularly visible is the domain of custom software 
written for the here and now of a particular situation. These applications 
are often assembled out of standardized building blocks and adapted as 
practices evolve. Actors working in this domain have certainly developed 
various strategies – from project management to automated testing – to 
make their production methods more industrial but, to paraphrase Reeves, 
software work is largely design work and therefore tends to remain abstract, 
intellectual, and open to context. Software, in this sense, is more immediately 
susceptible to objectal requirements than industrial products developed 
on assembly lines.
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Software as Technology
While Simondon’s thinking may seem overly complicated, it proposes a rare 
take on the old debates between social and technical determinism that does 
not propose a ‘middle ground’ but seeks to move beyond the dichotomy 
altogether. Other than the distinctions between element, individual, and 
ensemble and between artisanal and industrial modes of technical creation, 
which are particularly useful for the analysis of concrete objects and settings, 
there are three main considerations that inform and orient my analysis of 
information ordering.
First, while Simondon sees technicity as a means of expression, it is not 
simply a surface where social forces, cultural imagination, or economic 
dynamics manifest to shape technical objects and their trajectories. They 
certainly do play crucial roles in orienting the objectal use and adaptation 
of technology, but technicity itself is an irreducible domain of life that 
constitutes the objective ‘skeleton’ all technical creation draws on. Technical 
objects have their specif icity and, in Chateau’s formulation, ‘their technical 
mode of existence is not to be confused with their social or psychosocial 
mode of existence’ (Chateau, 2014, p. 5). In line with Ernst’s (2015) argument 
that ‘radio reception is not only a cultural agreement, but a scaffolding of 
electromagnetism’ (p. 194), the cumulatively constructed techno-geographic 
milieux Simondon describes are not merely projection spaces for imaginary 
applications or uses. It is out of the evolving space of technical potentiality 
that uses can emerge. The technical object becomes objectal on the basis 
of its technical objectivity: its psychosocial role as an object of everyday 
life is bounded by its technical or function capabilities. Certainly, there are 
questions regarding social adoption, the economics of production, and thick 
layers of symbolic understanding. The car has prodigious amounts of social 
meaning. But it only runs at the push of a pedal due to its technicity and 
without that capacity to propel, there would be no social role to play. To be 
clear, to consider the objectal mode of technical objects is not a ‘mistake’. 
The mistake is to take the objective development of the car as a given, to 
take the very existence of the car as a development that needs no further 
explanation or interpretation beyond mentioning some technical milestones. 
To appreciate the radical proposal Simondon makes, we have to understand 
that technology is neither socially determined, nor autonomously following 
some internal telos. Its evolution is contingent, constructive, and relational. 
But it constitutes a mode of existence that is specif ically technical, and it 
is as technicity that it constitutes an integral part of human life. The car 
is ‘crystallized human gesture’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 18) and more deeply 
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‘ours’ than a social constructivist position would admit. The problem, for 
Simondon, is that the dominant culture negates and ignores the possibilities 
afforded by technology to express life. Technology becomes Gestell, to 
speak with Heidegger, not because of its intrinsic character, but because it 
has been banished from the realm of ‘noble’ expressions to the domain of 
mere utility. A culture seeking to f ind an equilibrium would have to assign 
to technical objects a status similar to works of art or scientif ic theories, 
while recognizing that function is their principal mode of signif ication.
Second, Simondon’s philosophy pushes our attention toward operation 
rather than materiality. His thinking is certainly of materialist persuasion, 
but the description of technicity as the domain of function, understood as 
arrangement and unfolding of reciprocal causality, emphasizes notions 
like process, behavior, interaction, or system over more static terminology. 
Here, Simondon’s work shows strong aff inities with cybernetics (Simondon, 
2017, p. 160ff.). However, if cybernetics is dedicated to describing behavior in 
informational terms and seeks to subsume everything into a singular layer 
of analysis, Simondon’s ontology sees relations of various kinds between 
entities that keep their specif icities. How a particular behavior is produced 
makes a difference. A working system may be described as an informational 
process only at the price of missing the level of technicity, where materiality 
and function intersect. A computer is the sum of its hard- and software, 
the combination of various technicities that determine its capabilities and 
tie it to the history of technical invention. Where cybernetics abstracts 
away from the particularities of underlying mechanisms, Simondon moves 
them to the center of attention – not to engage in an exercise of ontological 
categorization, but to trace how different heterogeneous elements assemble 
into a coherent whole. Taking this perspective into the domain of computing 
means inquiring into the components and relationships that enable a system 
to do what it does, to generate its particular behavior. This is where we will 
encounter algorithmic techniques as instances of technicity that render 
particular functions possible. Following Simondon, we have to give up the 
search for a ‘base layer’ of computation and renounce modes of description 
that subsume everything into singular principles. Instead we marvel at all 
the technicity that has been brought into being, at the mass of things already 
‘sayable’ in the medium of function, at the ‘statements’ have been added to 
the archives of technicity. More than anything, Simondon’s understanding 
of technology installs operation as a lush domain of cumulative creation.
Third, and drawing on the two previous points, this means that there 
are genuinely technical forms of imagination. Creators may be driven by all 
kinds of motives, but the construction of a technical object or the invention 
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of a new schema require technical thinking and skill. The resulting artifact 
constitutes a transindividual relation that ‘communicates’ through the 
function it introduces into the world and this mode of expression requires 
an aptness that has to be acquired. The material reality of technicity is 
thus mirrored by a ‘mental and practical universe’ that humans come to 
know and draw on to create technical objects (Simondon, 2017, p. 252). Only 
afterwards does the technical expression become part of the lived realities 
of individuals and societies as it detaches from its creator to begin a ‘free 
adventure’ (Simondon, 2014, p. 27) as an object of use. As I will argue in 
detail in the next chapter, software-makers inhabit a knowledge domain 
that revolves around technicity, but also includes practical and normative 
notions concerning application, process, evaluation, and so forth. This 
domain cannot be subsumed into others.
These points together constitute a view of technology that emphasizes its 
internal substance and richness, without negating the myriad connections 
it forms and upholds. Such a perspective trades foundational arguments for 
inquiries into constructive accumulation. The reduction of computing to 
mechanical computation misses the technical substances and associated 
knowledge spheres that allow contemporary computers to do extraordinary 
things, including algorithmic information ordering. To inquire into these 
substances and to connect them back to other cultural domains is the task 
Simondon set for mechanology:
In order to restore to culture the truly general character it has lost, one 
must be capable of reintroducing an awareness of the nature of machines, 
of their mutual relations and of their relations with man, and of the 
values implied in these relations. This awareness requires the existence 
of a technologist or mechanologist, alongside the psychologist and the 
sociologist. (Simondon, 2017, p. 19)
This book indeed develops a mechanological probe that demarcates and 
investigates a slice of technicity bounded by computation at the bottom and 
by the world of social purposes at the top. While hardly independent from 
these two boundaries, it constitutes a coherent domain that must neither 
be absorbed, à la Kittler, into the basic principle of computation, nor too 
readily into the organizational, political, and economic logics that dominate 
contemporary applications of computing. Ultimately, I hope to show that 
the domain of software retains a degree of openness that constitutes an op-
portunity for the emergence of a ‘technical culture’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 257). 
As Mercedes Bunz (2014), a keen reader of Simondon, argues, ‘[d]igitalization 
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is happening, and instead of abdicating our responsibility, we must take 
our part more actively’ (p. 54). A deeper understanding of software and 
software-making is one of the conditions for living up to this challenge.
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3. Software-Making and Algorithmic 
Techniques
Abstract
The third chapter builds on central ideas from Simondon’s work, such as 
the distinction between invention and concretization and the delinea-
tion of technical elements, individuals, and ensembles, to conceptualize 
algorithmic techniques as the central carriers of technicity and technical 
knowledge in the domain of software. In dialogue with the cultural tech-
niques tradition, it addresses them as methods or heuristics for creating 
operation and behavior in computing and discusses how they are invented 
and stabilized. Algorithmic techniques, in this perspective, are at the 
same time material blocks of technicity, units of knowledge, vocabularies 
for expression in the medium of function, and constitutive elements of 
developers’ technical imaginaries.
Keywords: software-making, algorithmic techniques, cultural techniques, 
software and abstraction
There remains a stark contrast between the increasingly accepted diagnosis 
that ‘[s]oftware structures and makes possible much of the contemporary 
world’ (Fuller, 2008, p. 1) and the attention given to the actual technical 
and intellectual content mobilized by developers. If software has indeed 
become a technology of power, a means to ‘conduct conducts’ (Foucault, 
2008, p. 186), it is surprising that critical analyses of concrete technical 
procedures remain rare. We have recognized that computers and software 
have considerable impact on human life, and we invest great effort in making 
sense of the ways they have affected various societal domains, from the 
economy to politics, art, and intimacy. But beyond attributions of sometimes 
very broad properties to ‘the digital’ or, more recently, to ‘algorithms’, scholars 
in the humanities and social sciences still rarely venture more deeply into 
the intellectual and material domains of technicity that hardware and 
Rieder, B., Engines of Order: A Mechanology of Algorithmic Techniques. Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2020
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software developers invent and draw on to design the forms, functions, 
and behaviors that constitute technical objects and infrastructures. There 
is a clear preference for theorizing social, political, and cultural effects of 
software, often understood as a singular category, to the examination of the 
sprawling landscape of imagination and operation that informs technical 
enunciations in the f irst place.
Certainly, most people encounter software mainly in its running state, as 
fully formed interface, tool, or environment, and this level of experience is 
often enough to gain a suff icient sense of what the software does to assess 
its role in social and cultural practice. In the short run, we do not need to 
know anything about the architecture of Facebook’s data centers to study 
how users integrate the service into their daily lives. However, in specif ic 
cases, such as the News Feed f iltering mechanism, the way a particular task 
or function is performed may be indispensable for assessing its contributions 
and consequences. An apprehension of technical forms and, consequently, of 
technical possibilities can shed light on these cases. More importantly still, 
it can inform broader apprehensions of a world that increasingly constitutes 
and maintains itself technologically.
In this chapter, I venture deeper into the technical substance of computing 
and investigate how existing technicities form an infrastructure or a priori 
for software-makers. Beneath the inf inite variation of technical forms, 
technical trajectories evolve at their own speed, resulting in broad arrays 
of elements that, taken together, constitute computing in its current state. 
The concept of ‘algorithmic technique’ plays a pivotal role in capturing 
some of the central units of technicity and knowledge that def ine this 
space of possibility.
From Cultural Techniques to Algorithmic Techniques
So far, I have used the term ‘technique’ without much specif icity. The OED 
def ines it as ‘a way of carrying out a particular task’ and this certainly 
captures aspects that are central to my project, in particular the idea that a 
technique is not necessarily defined by its outcome but rather by the manner 
of getting there. This involves specif ic gestures and, potentially, specif ic 
tools and materials that are combined and arranged in specif ic ways, often 
taking the form of a sequence of steps. A technique must thus be assembled 
or acquired before it can be brought into service. Techniques therefore have 
an origin, even if the time, place, and scenario of their inception may be 
spread out and diff icult to reconstruct. If we follow Simondon’s assessment 
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that machines contain ‘human gesture f ixed and crystallized in working 
structures’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 18), we can consider that techniques can be 
‘implemented’ in technical form to carry out particular tasks in particular 
ways. As a technical individual, the machine takes over as the ‘executor’ 
of the technique, replacing human beings as ‘tool bearers’ (p. 78), leaving 
them the role of coordinator or ‘organizer’ (p. 80). However, the automatic 
loom neither ‘learns’ how to weave, nor does it carry out the task in the 
same way as a human being would, even if certain similarities remain. The 
loom weaves because someone arranged a series of technical elements into 
the specif ic ‘reciprocal causal relations’ (p. 32) that enable its operation. 
We can thus speak of mechanical techniques that are genuinely technical 
in the sense that they are carried out by a machine. They can implement 
nonanthropomorphic forms of operation but remain human creations as 
they are ‘invented, thought and willed, taken up [assumé] by a human 
subject’ (p. 252). The algorithmic techniques I will outline in more depth 
in this chapter are indeed of that kind: ways of carrying out tasks that are 
specified, designed, and materialized in software, but invented and arranged 
by human creators.
Cultural Techniques
The concept of technique, however, merits deeper conceptual appraisal 
before handing it over to concrete analytical application. The definition given 
so far supports a pragmatic use of the term but provides little when it comes 
to situating techniques in a wider conceptual space. The question I want to 
ask, therefore, is how ‘mechanical techniques’ can be understood ‘as escala-
tions of classical cultural techniques’ (Ernst, 2013, p. 135), a central concept 
in German media theory over the last three decades that has more recently 
received signif icant attention in English-language scholarship. As Parikka 
(2013) rightfully argues, the concept of cultural technique (Kulturtechnik) 
can evoke a certain familiarity, begging the question whether ‘(German) 
cultural techniques [are] just like (Anglo-American) cultural practices’ 
(p. 149) and asking how they relate to French traditions epitomized by 
authors like Mauss, Leroi-Gourhan, Bourdieu, or Latour. There are, however, 
several specif icities that make cultural techniques an essential means to 
deepen the ad hoc definition given above. Rather than provide a systematic 
introduction, I want to highlight f ive aspects that are particularly relevant 
for this inquiry.
First, the authors dedicated to developing the concept emphasize the 
etymological relationship between Kultur and the Latin colere, which means 
84 ENGINES OF ORDER
to tend a f ield or garden (Winthrop-Young, 2014, p. 380). This initial refer-
ence to agricultural practices already indicates a far-reaching conceptual 
ambition that includes the material and environmental conditions cultural 
techniques relate to. As Krämer and Bredekamp (2013) emphatically exclaim, 
‘[culture] is f irst and foremost the work with things – their cultivation – that 
surround us on a daily basis’ (p. 21). These ‘things’ evoke various materialities 
and draw attention to the richness and contingency of the milieux we 
inhabit. While signif icant attention has been given to cultural techniques 
that relate to cognitive operations and media use,1 the technical, broadly 
understood as material forms of operation, is always close. But rather than 
postulate equality between human and nonhuman agents, the cultural 
technique concept emphasizes connections, couplings, and shifts that 
span heterogenous domains, such as the material and the symbolic, linked 
together as ‘operative chains’ (Siegert, 2013, p. 11). This allows for a nuanced 
appraisal of things like calculation and computation, where the calculative 
capacities afforded by the Hindu-Arabic numeral system are not seen as 
mere anticipations of the computer but understood in terms of their own 
procedurality. There is a mechanical dimension that runs through and 
connects human cognition and skill to a symbolic system to enable ‘manual’ 
computation in complex and dynamic ways (Krämer, 1988). If the cultural 
technique tradition can, at times, appear as ‘cultural practices enriched 
with mathematics and a head-on engagement with technical and scientif ic 
cultural reality’ (Parikka, 2013, p. 6f.), this should not be understood as a mere 
widening of the f ield of attention but as a more fundamental attribution of 
substance to things like mathematical or technical procedures.
Second, although we f ind, particularly in more recent formulations 
(Siegert, 2013, p. 8), a clear repudiation of the programmatic and somewhat 
polemic assertion that ‘media determine our situation’ (Kittler, 1999, p. 
xxxix), the cultural techniques concept retains the idea of an a priori in the 
sense of both Foucault and McLuhan. Cultural techniques such as reading, 
writing, or arithmetic shape the very foundations of culture by transforming 
‘what “everybody” can do’ (Krämer and Bredekamp, 2013, p. 26). Echoing 
Goody’s (1977) assertion that writing ‘gives the mind a special kind of lever 
on “reality”’ (p. 109), there is a clear understanding that cultural techniques 
1 ‘Watching television, for instance, not only requires specif ic technological know-how but 
also an equally medium-specif ic set of mental and conceptual skills, such as understanding 
audiovisual referentiality structures, assessing the f ictionality status of different programs, 
interacting with media-specif ic narrative formats, or the ability to differentiate between 
intended and unintended messages’ (Winthrop-Young, 2014, p. 381).
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constitute the fundamental capacities and modes of operation of cultures 
organized around specif ic media. According to Vismann (2013), ‘[c]ultural 
techniques def ine the agency of media and things’ because they ‘describe 
what media do, what they produce, and what kinds of actions they prompt’ 
(p. 83). However, in contrast to McLuhan, cultural history is not written as a 
series of dominant media that would constitute and determine an archetype 
like ‘typographic man’ (McLuhan, 1962); in contrast to Foucault, there is no 
clear succession of épistémè that def ine regularities running through the 
different discursive formations of an era. Rather, we f ind a ‘historically given 
micro-network of technologies and techniques’ (Siegert, 2013, p. 11) that is 
pluralistic, dynamic, and marked by both continuities and discontinuities. 
Periodization is not impossible but needs to be aware of its contingent and 
analytical character.
Third, in Heidegger’s terms, the ontic is given privilege over the ontologi-
cal. More precisely, ontological concepts are seen as the products of the 
concrete operations of cultural techniques:
Humans as such do not exist independently of cultural techniques of 
hominization, time as such does not exist independently of cultural 
techniques of time measurement, and space as such does not exist inde-
pendently of cultural techniques of spatial control. (Siegert, 2013, p. 10)
This focus on the production of conceptual entities means that ‘the study 
of cultural techniques takes aim at the materialities of ontologization’ 
(Winthrop-Young, 2014, p. 387) in ways that eschew ‘philosophical idealiza-
tions’ (Siegert, 2013, p. 10), or, rather, tie the production of concepts to the 
ontic operations performed by cultural techniques. This idea is already 
present in Thomas Macho’s early assertion that ‘[c]ultural techniques – such 
as writing, reading, painting, calculating, making music – are always older 
than the concepts that are generated from them’ (Macho, 2003, p. 179). 
For Siegert (2007), who favors a particularly foundational interpretation, 
cultural techniques are ‘media that process the observation, displace-
ment, and differentiation of distinctions’ (p. 31). A door, for example, is 
not the result of a distinction between inside and outside, but a technique 
‘involved in operationalizing distinctions in the real’ (Siegert, 2013, p. 14) 
and thus instrumental to producing and processing the concepts of inside 
and outside. Such distinctions do not have to be binary and, if we inquire 
further, we f ind that doors, indeed, connect to a wider array of techniques 
for separating and shielding, such as walls, roofs, windows, and so forth. On 
the level of intellectual pragmatics, and in line with earlier tenets of German 
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media theory, this translates into an emphasis on ‘empirical historical 
objects’ (Siegert, 2013, p. 10) as analytical starting points. In the context of 
my own investigation, this means that notions like ‘information’, ‘order’, and 
‘knowledge’ are not to be treated as things that exist as such, but as shifting 
conceptual constructs that emerge in conjunction with the operation of 
techniques. Algorithmic information ordering, in this perspective, appears 
as a set of particular forms of ‘distinction-making’ that have the power to 
define broader cultural perceptions. I hesitate, however, to consider cultural 
techniques purely as ‘preconceptual operations that generate the very 
concepts that subsequently are used to conceptualize these operations’ 
(Winthrop-Young, 2014, p. 385). Operation, I would argue, may actually 
include concepts as operational agents and conceptualization itself can be 
seen as a specif ic cultural technique. In the second part of this book, we 
will encounter instances of conceptualization and formalization that affect 
techniques’ capacities to connect and to travel from one domain to another.
Fourth, my emphasis on operational chains or networks is meant to 
counteract a tendency still present in earlier literature on cultural techniques 
to idealize techniques into singular conceptual substantives, like ‘reading’, 
‘writing’, or ‘calculating’. Early work goes as far as describing the ‘use of 
computers’ as a cultural technique (Krämer and Bredekamp, 2013, p. 25). 
Siegert already points more explicitly to variation when he argues that 
‘[a]n abacus allows for different calculations than ten f ingers; a computer, 
in turn, allows for different calculations than an abacus’ (Siegert, 2013, 
p. 11). Additional differentiation is necessary, however, and I want to push 
further by arguing that the computer is not a singular technical object 
but, to use Manovich’s take on the work of Alan Kay and Adele Goldberg, a 
‘metamedium’ that is ‘simultaneously a set of different media and a system 
for generating new media tools and new types of media’ (Manovich, 2013c, 
p. 102). Computers – deliberately in plural – open onto a vast variety of 
objects, practices, and (cultural) techniques. Kittler’s polemical bon mot 
that ‘there is no software’ (1997a) indicates a lingering tendency in Ger-
man media theory toward a foundationalism that reduces computing to 
computation and thereby risks failing to adequately recognize the immense 
reservoirs of technicity and knowledge that have been formulated over the 
last 70 years. However, the focus on cultural techniques in its most recent 
formulation allows not only for a ‘resolutely anti- or counter-Platonic stance’ 
(Winthrop-Young, 2013, p. 8) when it comes to the relationship between 
the ontic and the ontological, but also for a ‘de-idealization’ of the ontic 
itself: instead of singular verbs like ‘writing’ or ‘processing’, there is room 
for substantial variation, and thus for a ‘variantology’ (Zielinski, 2006, p. 7) 
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that considers technology and its conceptual correlates from Simondon’s 
relational perspective and understands ‘the computer’ as ‘a complex of 
calculator, software, peripherals, and network connections’ (Coy, 2001, p. 18) 
def ined by myriad trajectories of technical evolution.
Fifth, and crucial for my own purpose, authors like Krämer and 
Bredekamp argue that the rise of cultural techniques drawing on calcula-
tion, computation, and – more generally – mechanical operation leads to 
a separation between the capacity to put a technique into practice and the 
comprehension of its inner workings and conceptual underpinnings:
There is a growing divide between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’; skill 
and knowledge are going their separate ways. The daily use of operative 
signs removes the burden and complexities of interpretation. Calculus is 
always already a kind of ‘mechanism of forgetting’. In order to calculate 
correctly, we don’t need to be able to provide an answer to the question, 
‘What is a zero?’ (Krämer and Bredekamp, 2013, p. 26)
This points toward an appreciation of computation as a form of ‘externaliza-
tion’ that pushes cognition out of the ‘invisible interiority’ of the minds of 
individuals and makes it a ‘distributive, and hence collective, phenomenon’ 
(Krämer and Bredekamp, 2013, p. 26f.). The specific ways of carrying out tasks 
I have described as ‘mechanical’ techniques at the beginning of the chapter 
constitute both components for the operational chains formed by cultural 
techniques and vectors of externalization that widen the gulf between 
competent performance and a deeper understanding of the technicities or 
‘mechanics’ involved. This dissociation characterizes the use of computers to 
a previously unseen degree. Graphical user interfaces and most user-facing 
functions are largely dissociated from underlying operational arrangements. 
The often lauded ‘digital natives’ are certainly competent users, but there 
is little reason to believe that this task-oriented competence translates into 
mechanological awareness. The cultural techniques concept, however, avoids 
dissolving the technical in a sociology of use and appropriation and, heeding 
the lessons of Kittler and others, keeps an eye on the reality of operation 
and on ‘the rules of selection, storage, and transmission that characterize 
a given system of mediation’ (Geoghegan, 2013, p. 4). The interface effects 
produced by algorithmic information ordering involve their own forms of 
dissociation and critical understanding therefore requires that we investigate 
the mechanisms at work below the surface.
Taking these five points together, cultural techniques provide an intellectual 
frame that allows for an integrated perspective on technical objects, practices, 
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skills, signs, and emergent conceptualizations, following Simondon in rejecting 
an externalist understanding of technology, where machines and tools become 
part of human life purely trough their uses. Instead, there are networks of 
operation that do not imply a strict ontological hierarchy or division of labor. 
What counts are specific operational arrangements and their stabilization/
destabilization over time; in that sense, even concepts can perform the role 
of elements that materialize, connect, and inform as part of larger chains.
Coming back to the initial question of this section, we can see that there 
are many different and historically contingent ways mechanical techniques 
and technical objects may enter into the equation, some of them in direct 
and continuous connection with human bodies, others through automation, 
autonomy, and delegation (Rieder, 2006). But even if the part technology 
plays in the unfolding of life does not follow a singular logic, technicity and 
technical evolution still f igure as means to coagulate diverse forces into more 
stable configurations. The analytical task is to ‘ask how, and under what 
conditions, cultural techniques strategically and temporarily consolidate 
these forces into coherent technologies’ (Geoghegan, 2013, p. 14).
However, there is no specif ic attempt in the cultural techniques tradition 
to carve out a domain of technicity that has its own evolutionary character 
and mode of development. Lacking a distinction between an objective and 
an objectal dimension, it frames both techniques and technical objects not 
in terms of evolutionary trajectories but as series of singularities that seem 
to manifest almost spontaneously. Despite its apparent interest in the ‘hard 
stuff’ – symbolic systems, mathematical functions, processor architecture 
– the German tradition has yet to fully recuperate from the tendency to 
narrate history as a sequence of foundational technological ‘plateaux’ in the 
sense that fundamental incisions, like the invention of ‘the digital computer’ 
or ‘computation’, mark the arrival of a new logic that largely explains and 
determines what follows. The incessant evocations of Turing, Shannon, and 
von Neumann we f ind not only in Kittler’s work compares unfavorably to 
the relative silence on anything that has happened in computer science 
and related disciplines in the last 70 years. Even the cultural techniques 
tradition, notwithstanding its willingness to engage seemingly banal objects 
like doors, remains uneasy when it comes to moving more closely into the 
meanderings of digital media that are not just Turing machines but almost 
intolerably full of ‘stuff ’ awaiting further scrutiny. Although this lack of 
interest in contemporary technology has been noted,2 the f ield remains 
2 ‘For all their apocalyptic poetry about Alan Turing’s universal machine and Claude Shannon’s 
schematic account of communication, Kittler and his most fervent disciples never had much to 
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wide open when it comes to applying the cultural techniques concepts to 
the technological material that f ields like software studies (Fuller, 2008) 
or web search studies (Zimmer, 2010) regularly deal with. Practically, this 
requires the recognition that computation is a starting point that fueled an 
explosion of techniques and technologies following their own evolutionary 
trajectories; it also requires a much more f ine-grained understanding of 
technical creation. The rest of this chapter is thus dedicated to discussing 
software-making in a way that brings Simondon’s sensitivity to technicity 
into dialogue with cultural techniques.
Software-Making
One way to approach cultural techniques in the context of computing is to 
come back to the earlier understanding of the concept as skill or compe-
tence. We have seen that authors like Krämer and Bredekamp describe the 
use of computers as a cultural technique. But what if we inquire into the 
making of digital artifacts? This is by no means a straightforward project. 
Various disciplines, from electrical engineering to interface design, are 
involved in producing the myriad objects and trajectories that populate 
computing. These specialties differ substantially in terms of methods, 
concepts, materialities, and everyday practices. Even if we focus on the 
academic f ield of computer science, we f ind both highly different subject 
areas and competing def initions concerning the epistemological status of 
the discipline. Arduous debates continue to this day, even if ‘since the 1970s, 
computing has typically been characterized as a combination of empirical, 
mathematical, and engineering traditions’ (Tedre, 2011, p. 363). Entering into 
dialog with the cultural techniques tradition, German computer scientist 
Wolfgang Coy boils this distinction further down to ‘construction and theory’ 
(Coy, 2001, p. 16) and describes Informatik (‘computer science’) accordingly 
as both Technik (‘technology’) and Wissenschaft (‘science’). He associates the 
former explicitly with Handwerk (‘craft’) and Kunstfertigkeit (‘skillfulness’) 
and assigns to the latter the task of gauging the fundamental possibilities 
and limitations of construction. While this characterization would be at 
least partially contested by computer scientists that frame their f ield as ‘a 
discipline of mathematical nature’ (Dijkstra, 1974) or as a natural science 
dedicated to ‘the study of natural and artif icial information processes’ 
(Denning, 2007, p. 15), it has the considerable advantage of capturing the 
say about media after the mid-1980s, when personal computers became a common presence in 
the domestic home’ (Geoghegan, 2013, p. 3).
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everyday realities encountered by the many graduates computer science 
courses churn out every year. That reality consists, as Coy argues elsewhere, 
in the programming of computers as a constructive gesture that results in 
making a machine perform a specif ic task:
At the beginning there is the implementation of rule-based thinking and 
acting into a machine, that is, the idea of the program and, in its theoretical 
comprehension, the idea of the algorithm. Processes of thinking and 
associated action can be analyzed, described in exact terms, and handed 
over to a machine or a system of machines. (Coy, 2007, p. 33)
Coy (2007, p. 33) consequently defines computer science as a cultural tech-
nique that both creates and acts in increasingly technical environments, 
where computers process all kinds of data (and not just numbers), have 
constantly growing technical capacities (in terms of speed and storage capac-
ity), are connected in networks (that span the globe), and serve a wide variety 
of purposes, in particular as ‘media machines’ and ‘media of communication’. 
‘Computer people’3 contribute to these environments mainly by making the 
machines and by formulating the ‘thinking and acting’ that goes into them 
in the form of software. In his acceptance speech for the Newell Award, 
Frederick P. Brooks, Jr., who oversaw the troubled development of IBM’s 
OS/360 and wrote about the experience in his seminal book The Mythical 
Man-Month (1975), similarly called the computer scientist a ‘toolsmith’ and 
declared that ‘[w]e are concerned with making things, be they computers, 
algorithms, or software systems’ (Brooks, 1996, p. 62). If we pass on the 
hardware aspect, somewhat improperly, to the field of electrical engineering, 
we can summarize that the central cultural technique computer science 
pragmatically concerns itself with is the making of computer programs, 
that is, of software.
If we further unpack this notion, we f ind programming proper, that is, 
the writing of the computer code that makes up a program. But there are 
clearly many other practices, skills, and, indeed, techniques that come into 
play, such as requirements analysis, software architecture, interface design, 
testing and debugging, deployment, maintenance, just to name a few. Some 
authors argue that running through all of these domains is something like 
3 While there are good reasons to differentiate between computer scientists, software 
engineers, software designers, programmers, coders, hackers, and so forth, this book focuses 
on what connects all of these professions, namely technical creation. Agre (1994, p. 120) simply 
talks about ‘computer people’ and I favor the equally underspecif ied term ‘software-makers’.
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‘computational thinking’ which consists in ‘reformulating a seemingly 
diff icult problem into one we know how to solve, perhaps by reduction, 
embedding, transformation, or simulation’ (Wing, 2006, p. 33). Connecting 
this idea with Coy’s notion of ‘description in exact terms’, we could argue 
that there is both an internal and external dimension to making programs 
that maps onto Simondon’s distinction between objective and objectal. 
Internal aspects are those concerned with technicities, with programming 
itself, with code, but also with questions of correctness, reliability, or easy 
maintenance. External aspects would be those that connect the program to 
the social world around it, which means not just inputs and outputs, but the 
specif ic forms of analysis that define and examine a ‘problem’ through the 
lens of the conceptual space computing brings with it. Agre (1994) uses the 
term ‘capture’ to explain how a process of description that relies on analytical 
techniques such as the entity-relationship model (Chen, 1976) or use-case 
diagrams4 becomes a form of prescription when software is deployed, as it 
inevitably reorganizes how the task is carried out. The work of consultants, 
analysts, modelers, optimizers, or rationalizers specialized in capturing 
practices into technical form should therefore not be underestimated. But, 
ultimately, there is a technical substance, an internal or objective technicity, 
that demarcates a space of possibilities and limitations that the methods and 
practices dedicated to external or objectal aspects are ultimately bound to. 
Only what can be programmed can f ind its way into the scenarios, models, 
and formalizations used to design software as applications to be used in 
concrete settings. And for the vast majority of software developers, the 
existing reservoirs of technicity def ine the potentiality, the vocabulary of 
possible function that can be used to capture the world.
The question whether there are some things that ‘computers can’t do’ 
(Dreyfus, 1972), that is, whether some behaviors cannot be programmed,5 
is certainly interesting, but there are also good reasons to ask instead what 
computers can do, that is, what can be programmed, here and now. The 
textbook answer that ‘any computation that is realizable can be realized 
by a universal machine, provided that it is specif ied’ (Newell and Simon, 
1976, p. 117) again points toward the fundamental limits of computation 
but does little to help us understand why, for example, the weekly sug-
gestions in Spotify are actually very good, at least in my own experience. 
4 Use case diagrams are part of the Universal Modeling Language (UML), a very common 
tool for designing computer systems.
5 To be clear: certain algorithms may ‘learn’ a particular behavior or decision model from 
data or interaction, but that learning behavior still had to be programmed.
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Apparently ‘making good recommendations’ is something that, as it stands, 
can indeed be programmed. The analytical philosopher and logician M. E. 
Maron (1963), whose Bayes classif ier I will examine in Chapter 6, addresses 
this difference through a distinction between logic on the one side and 
methodology or heuristic on the other: logic may provide the language for 
proving a theorem, but it does not tell us how to discover new ones. In the 
same way, the computer furnishes an environment for the execution of 
software, but in order for the machine to actually do something, we have 
to come up with the ‘methods, approaches, clues, tricks, heuristics’ (Maron, 
1963, p. 141) that allow us to formulate that behavior. And this capacity to 
‘make do’ is historically contingent. Would a recommender algorithm like 
GroupLens (Resnick et al., 1994) have run on the very f irst computer? If we 
disregard the obvious limitations concerning storage and execution speed, 
the answer would have to be ‘yes’. Yet it did not run on that f irst computer 
since nobody bothered to program it. Could somebody have programmed 
it? This question makes just about the same amount of sense as the question 
whether the Romans could have built a massage chair. To that we would 
reply that a whole series of technical and cultural elements would have to 
fall into place before anyone could begin to think about making a such a 
chair, elements that were apparently not present in Roman culture. With 
Foucault, we could say that the statement ‘massage chair’ was not ‘sayable’ 
in the Roman discursive formation. In our own discursive moment, however, 
both slavery and manual arithmetic have fallen largely out of the realm of 
the imaginable and acceptable. The invention of mechanical computation 
is the beginning of a constructive, contingent story, not its end point and 
the recommender system appears at moment when many other things have 
already fallen into place.
In their acceptance speech of the Turing Award, Allen Newell and Herbert 
Simon (1976) make the seemingly tautological argument that ‘[c]omputer sci-
ence is the study of the phenomena surrounding computers’ (p. 113), but they 
quickly add that these phenomena are, in fact, ‘deep and obscure’ (p. 114). 
What the work of Turing, Post, Church, and others amounts to, they argue, is 
the very mechanization of thought, which ‘seemed still to inhabit mainly the 
heaven of Platonic ideals, or the equally obscure spaces of the human mind, 
until computers taught us how symbols could be processed by machines’ 
(p. 125). Computer science, from this perspective, is the experimental and 
empirical study of symbol systems, which are seen as capable to the point 
of demonstrating ‘intelligent action’ (p. 118). While we may disagree with 
Newell and Simon’s equation of humans and computers as symbolic systems 
and their view of intelligence as symbol processing, they connect with the 
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‘tool-making’ perspective in the sense that the phenomena examined are 
designed and ‘artif icial’. Both the practice and epistemology of computing 
revolve around ‘knowledge about artif icial objects and phenomena’ (Simon, 
1996, p. 3), which means that in computer science, by and large, what we 
know is what we can build, and vice versa – ‘nothing is understood until it 
has been made into a working computer system’ (Agre, 1997a, p. 12). There 
may well be a difference in outlook when it comes to defining the discipline, 
but the notion of building remains central: ‘the scientist builds in order 
to study; the engineer studies in order to build’ (Brooks, 1996, p. 62). This 
difference in f inality may be a good way to distinguish (academic) theory 
from (commercial) practice, but both are entangled in the history and 
growth of constructive artif iciality that continuously extends what can be 
built and what there is to know.
When I ask whether some behavior can be programmed, I am thus not 
referring to the fundamental mathematical question of what can and cannot 
be computed, but to our state of knowledge and capacity concerning the 
construction of function in the computer medium. This state is constantly 
expanding through technical invention – that is, the production of new 
technical schemas – and it diffuses throughout the larger world of software-
making: today, any somewhat skillful computer programmer can go online 
and learn how to make a recommender system, or copy existing source 
code, or simply use one of the many existing modules.6 In short, there are 
algorithmic techniques available that give certain practical expressions to 
the somewhat vague idea of ‘making good recommendations’. If the goal 
of advanced information retrieval is ‘to make computers do humanlike 
things’ (Swanson, 1988, p. 97), the invention of algorithmic techniques is 
its principal vector of progress.
Algorithmic Techniques
When it comes to making software, programming takes a central place 
and we can certainly think of it as a cultural technique in the sense of a 
fundamental skill. Being able to read and write code, to work with constructs 
such as variables and basic data structures like lists, to arrange control flow 
via loops and conditional statements, to make use of different means for 
inputting and outputting data, and to master related aspects, for example, 
what it means to execute a program and how to do that, are things not too 
6 There is, for example, an open-source project that grew directly out of GroupLens (Resnick 
et al., 1994), LensKit (http://lenskit.org).
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dissimilar from language prof iciency or the mastery of basic arithmetic. 
However, while programming is (mostly) still a fundamental requirement, 
the much broader practice of making software draws on a wide array of 
concepts and techniques that cover the already mentioned areas like 
requirements analysis, process and data modeling, software architecture, 
interaction design, project management, testing, maintenance, DevOps,7 
and many others. These are by no means minor subjects: the famous 
‘software crisis’ of the late 1960s was prompted by the observation that 
‘[i]n many sensitive areas, software is late, expensive, unreliable and does 
not work to specif ication’ (Buxton, 1978, p. 23). The emergence of software 
‘engineering’ as the ‘systematic, disciplined, quantif iable approach to the 
development, operation, and maintenance of software’ (IEEE, 1990) was 
the direct outcome of that crisis. The engineering approach places heavy 
emphasis on analysis, planning, modeling, testing, and documenting, to 
the point where ‘[s]oftware engineers probably spend less than 10% of 
their time writing code’ (Laplante, 2007, p. 4). Over the years, there have 
been countless debates around the ‘organizational’ dimension of software 
development. In 1978 Buxton distinguished ‘three main lines of thought as to 
how software should be designed and built, […] the cottage industry, heavy 
engineering, and applied logic approaches’ (Buxton, 1978, p. 24); Raymond 
(1999) famously opposed a ‘cathedral’ to a ‘bazaar’ development model; and 
the many iterative or ‘agile’ methodologies that have garnered so much 
interest over the last decade can not only look back on a rich history, but 
explicitly link the design process of technical artifacts to questions of power 
and democracy (cf. Bjerknes et al., 1987). For example, as Gürses and Van 
Hoboken (2018) have convincingly shown, modes of software development 
directly intersect with the way user privacy is imagined and implemented. 
These are clearly important issues. The one-sided emphasis on code and 
programming in media studies and adjacent f ields is, in fact, quite limiting 
when it comes to painting a comprehensive picture of how software is made.
At the same time, the dense networks of technique and methodology that 
software development and engineering have woven over the last decades 
7 Dyck et al. (2015, p. 3) def ine DevOps, a concatenation of development and IT operations as 
‘an organizational approach that stresses empathy and cross-functional collaboration within 
and between teams – especially development and IT operations – in software development 
organizations’. I mention DevOps specif ically because it testif ies to the complex integration 
between organizational and technical strategies; it is not just a set of organizational practices, 
but often associated with technical innovations such as containerization, where an entire solution 
stack is packaged together and virtualized in a way that it can be easily and quickly transferred 
from one machine to another. Docker is probable the most well-known product in this context.
SOFt waRE-MakING aND alGORIthMIc tEchNIquES 95
necessarily tie back to software’s objective dimension, that is, to the rich 
environment of technicity I have begun to address in the last chapter. This 
environment is populated by technical elements that software developers 
can appropriate in different ways to write programs that carry out certain 
tasks, provide particular functions, or demonstrate specific behaviors. While 
we cannot easily distinguish the various management and design practices 
from a properly technical substance in concrete circumstances, there is a 
backdrop of technical evolution that def ines what computers can do at a 
given point in time. In the domain of software, I suggest that evolutionary 
trajectories form around what I have referred to as ‘algorithmic techniques’. 
So, what are they more precisely?
Answering that question requires a closer look at the notion of ‘algorithm’, 
which I have mostly avoided so far, since the short definitions that abound 
in nontechnical literature provide a false sense of conceptual security by 
suggesting that a ‘ground level’ apprehension of computation provides 
an adequate understanding of the technicities at hand. I hope to have 
suff iciently shaken this belief at this point, making it safe to proceed. 
Interestingly, Donald Knuth’s megaclassic The Art of Programming, which 
I will use as a guide into the question, initially also refrains from giving a 
def inition and starts by showing an algorithm, namely this one:
Algorithm E (Euclid’s algorithm). Given two positive integers m and n, 
f ind their greatest common divisor, that is, the largest positive integer 
that evenly divides both m and n.
E1. [Find remainder.] Divide m by n and let r be the remainder. (We will 
have 0 ≤ r < n.)
E2. [Is it zero?] If r = 0, the algorithm terminates; n is the answer.
E3. [Reduce.] Set m ← n, n ← r, and go back to step E1. (Knuth, 1997, p. 2)
Only afterwards do we learn that an algorithm is ‘a f inite set of rules 
that gives a sequence of operations for solving a specif ic type of problem’ 
(Knuth, 1997, p. 4) and thereby has a similar meaning ‘to that of recipe, 
process, method, technique, procedure, routine, rigmarole’ (Knuth, 1997, p. 4). 
Knuth specif ies f ive additional features, namely that an algorithm 1) has 
to terminate after a certain number of steps, 2) should be well def ined, 3) 
can have some input, 4) must have one or several outputs, and 5) should 
consist of operations ‘suff iciently basic that they can in principle be done 
exactly and in a f inite length of time by someone using pencil and paper’ 
(Knuth, 1997, p. 6). The last aspect actually makes a f iner point concerning 
the theory of computability, but it also indicates that we are talking about 
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abstract operations that can be carried out in different ways. Colburn’s 
def inition makes this difference more explicit:
Ordinarily conceived, an algorithm is not a program but an abstraction of 
a problem solution in the form of a terminating sequence of steps, which 
when implemented in a programming language issues a list of computer 
instructions which carry out the solution steps. (Colburn, 2000, p. 168)
This distinction between an ‘algorithm’, a sequence of actions that can be 
described in a formal or not-so-formal language, and a ‘program’, an imple-
mentation of that sequence in a language that a computer can ‘understand’ 
and execute, is important (cf. Dourish 2016). At this point, however, I consider 
the ontological aspect of the distinction to be less relevant than its relation 
to the question of how algorithms manifest and ‘travel’. The different ways 
algorithms are commonly presented are signif icant in that respect. An 
algorithm could be laid out in natural language, in mathematical notation, 
or as a f low chart – and, on a f irst level, a programming language is just 
another way of representing an algorithm. Here is my own description/
implementation of Euclid’s algorithm, written in JavaScript:
var m = prompt("enter number m")
var n = prompt("enter number n")
var r = 1
while(r !== 0) {
 r = m % n
 if(r === 0) {
  alert(n)
 } else {
  m = n
  n = r
 }
}
this code can be copied and pasted in the JavaScript console of your favorite web browser and 
will run there. Note that the script asks for an input in the beginning – for a concrete implementa-
tion to function, there has to be some data the algorithm can work on.
Knuth’s description and this small program are two representations of 
what most computer scientists would recognize to be the same algorithm. 
However, the JavaScript version has the specific characteristic that it can run 
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on a computer, even if any programmer could produce an implementation 
based on Knuth’s text, just like I did. The distinction between different 
forms of description and, in particular, between those that can be executed 
and those that cannot is certainly crucial to any ontological inquiry. But a 
perspective emphasizing the practice of software-making is less interested 
in pondering what an algorithm is than coming to a broader understanding 
what goes into concrete programs, written in concrete circumstances, which 
may end up performing the concrete operations that determine whether a 
post appears in a user’s Facebook News Feed or not. The ambiguity between 
algorithm-as-abstraction and algorithm-as-program – and similar discus-
sions8 – is therefore not something I seek to resolve but would rather use 
as an analytical dimension for addressing different forms of technicity and 
technical knowledge. Indeed, while my focus is on mechanical techniques, 
I would like to recall that the priority the cultural techniques concept gives 
to operation not only resonates well with Simondon’s understanding that 
machines are ‘human reality, human gesture f ixed and crystallized in 
working structures’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 18), but, more generally, promotes 
the analysis of cross-cutting ontic performance over ontological idealization. 
In that sense, I prefer talking about forms of materialization rather than 
identifying specif ic techniques strictly with specif ic materialities. This 
has the advantage that techniques can be traced through shifting material 
manifestations and configurations, materiality becoming one analytical 
category among several.
In practical terms, algorithms are sequences of operations that program-
mers formulate or specify in programming languages in order to make a 
computer do something. This level of appreciation is too often the point 
where the critical engagement with algorithms as technical subject matter 
stops. Too many authors still think that understanding what an algorithm 
is, in principle, allows for a suff icient understanding of what algorithms 
do – or could do – in practice. But we have barely arrived at page 6 of 
Knuth’s 2000+ page magnum opus! What is he writing about on the remain-
ing pages? As Knuth explicitly states, his business is not with a ‘theory of 
algorithms’, that is, with the fundamental theory of computation we associ-
ate with authors like Turing or Church. Instead, he proposes an ‘analysis 
of algorithms’ that articulates ‘the theory of the properties of particular 
computer algorithms’ (Knuth, 1997, p. vi). What follows over five monumental 
8 Another question that one could raise is whether a program is a single algorithm or a 
collection of algorithms. While I tend toward the latter, I am simply not convinced that the 
question is relevant for my analytical purposes.
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volumes are therefore presentations and discussions of existing algorithms: 
Fundamental Algorithms (volume 1), Seminumerical Algorithms (volume 2), 
Sorting and Searching (volume 3), Combinatorial Algorithms (volume 4), and 
Syntactical Algorithms (volume 5, work in progress).9 While the f irst volume 
does contain a chapter on what we would roughly call ‘learning how to 
program’, these passages do certainly not constitute anything close to the 
many beginner’s tutorials one can f ind online. But more advanced subjects 
such as software architecture or process management are treated sparingly 
as well. Clearly, for Knuth, the art of programming consists in knowing how 
to solve problems with algorithms, which means knowing algorithms. Lots 
of them. This is what he seems to say: ‘Programmer, you can invent your 
own solutions to problems, but you do not have to: for many problems there 
are existing solutions and here they are, this is how they work, these are 
their advantages, disadvantages and the most important things to consider 
when implementing them. Want to f ind the greatest common divisor of two 
integers? Here is Euclid’s algorithm. Want to sort a list? Here are 20 ways of 
doing that, each a little different from the others.’
Are algorithms techniques in the sense that they carry out a particular 
task in a particular way? Yes, they most certainly are. Algorithms can be 
described as techniques that have one set of material properties when 
written in natural language in a book and another set when written in a 
programming language for execution on a computer. From here, a path forks 
over to software studies or, more particularly, to critical code studies, a f ield 
situated in the humanities that proposes ‘that we can read and explicate 
code the way we might explicate a work of literature’ (Marino, 2006, n.p.). 
While this is certainly an interesting proposition, I seriously doubt that 
most humanities scholars can realistically arrive at a level of technical 
acculturation that allows for a meaningful and context-aware reading of any 
but the most trivial pieces of code. This may well suff ice in certain cases, 
but the f ield of information ordering, for example, relies on algorithms that 
require among other things a robust understanding of probability theory 
to decipher what is happening in a sequence of instructions. Knowing 
how to read code is rarely suff icient to understand the actual content of a 
program, at least not in domains where complex concepts and heuristics 
are articulated in the form of a program.
9 Another classic in computer science literature, Robert Sedgewick’s Algorithms (1983), provides 
its own segmentation, which can be summarized through its chapter headings: mathematical 
algorithms, sorting, searching, string processing, geometric algorithms, graph algorithms, and 
advanced topics.
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I will therefore use the term ‘algorithmic technique’ more specif ically to 
target a space that is somewhat abstracted from the level of concrete algo-
rithms, whether they are implemented in code or not. Going back to Knuth’s 
work once more, I want to draw attention to the almost 400-page-long 
section on sorting, which, here, means ‘marshaling things into ascending 
or descending order’ (Knuth, 1998, p. 1) following a numerical system or 
the sequence of the alphabet. In the f irst part of the section dedicated to 
internal searching, which concerns lists of data small enough to f it into 
main memory, Knuth begins by distinguishing seven different ‘types’. Since 
the given overview is particularly instructive for my purposes, I would like 
to quote it in full:
A. An insertion sort. The items are considered one at a time, and each new 
item is inserted into the appropriate position relative to the previously-
sorted items. (This is the way many bridge players sort their hands, picking 
up one card at a time.)
B. An exchange sort. If two items are found to be out of order, they are 
interchanged. This process is repeated until no more exchanges are 
necessary.
C. A selection sort. First the smallest (or perhaps the largest) item is located, 
and it is somehow separated from the rest; then the next smallest (or next 
largest) is selected, and so on.
D. An enumeration sort. Each item is compared with each of the others; an 
item’s f inal position is determined by the number of keys that it exceeds.
E. A special-purpose sort, which works nicely for sorting f ive elements as 
stated in the problem, but does not readily generalize to larger numbers 
of items.
F. A lazy attitude, with which you ignored the suggestion above and 
decided not to solve the problem at all. Sorry, by now you have read too 
far and you have lost your chance.
G. A new, super sorting technique that is a def inite improvement over 
known methods. (Please communicate this to the author at once.) (Knuth, 
1998, p. 73)
This quote is interesting for a number of reasons. First, type E is a jab at 
programmers who think that they do not need to consult the record of 
existing techniques and can just come up with a sorting method on the 
fly. Knuth thus restates programming as a practice and discipline that may 
allow for ‘wiggling through’ occasionally, but actually has a serious body 
of knowledge that any respectable programmer should know (of). Second, 
100 ENGINES OF ORDER
the last type acknowledges that there is no end to invention/discovery, 
even if the domain of sorting has been studied excessively already and new 
breakthroughs are unlikely. Third, and most importantly, this is not simply 
a list of algorithms, but an effort to distinguish general approaches to the 
problem of sorting, such as inserting or exchanging. Each of the f irst four 
types, in fact, leads to several specific algorithms, Hoare’s already mentioned 
Quicksort being one of four algorithms proceeding through exchange. These 
larger principles or strategies for solving a specif ic type of problem are what 
I think of as ‘algorithmic techniques’.
Starting from the observation that the making of nontrivial10 software 
draws on rich reservoirs of existing knowledge, I hope to use the concept 
to formulate an approach to the analysis of software that sits between 
broad theorizing and the empirical investigation of concrete applications 
of information ordering algorithms. This middle ground revolves around a 
large, constantly growing, yet f inite set of possibly well-known approaches 
to the ‘software problems’ that underpin running systems. In the domain 
of information ordering, this may concern, for example, how to sort a list, 
how to classify a text message, or how to make a ‘good’ recommendation. 
Algorithmic techniques can be seen as technical elements that are combined 
into technical individuals, that is, into working systems. As standardized yet 
plastic approaches or methods, they form the technical center of software 
development practice and an important part of computer science education. 
In fact, learning how to program, in the sense of mastering a program-
ming language, makes for only a small part of computer science training at 
university level. A much larger portion is dedicated to the many different 
and often math-heavy techniques that can be expressed in code and to the 
question of how to apply them to the famous ‘real-world problems’ students 
are set to encounter in concrete work settings. Wing’s (2006) notion of 
‘computational thinking’ is thus not only a broadly analytical outlook but 
includes the capacity to abstract from a concrete situation to a level where 
familiar techniques can be applied. To develop this specif ic ‘sensitivity’ may 
require years of training and practice. As Mackenzie (2017a) observes, much 
of the skill acquisition for practitioners of machine learning concerns ‘not 
so much implementation of particular techniques […] but rather navigating 
10 This term may seem strange to a humanities audience, but, according to ComputerLanguage.
com, ‘[n]ontrivial is a favorite word among programmers and computer people for describing any 
task that is not quick and easy to accomplish’ (Nontrivial, n.d.). While the meaning is certainly 
vague, it is important to understand that not all programming is inherently diff icult, and that 
many standard problems require little in terms of deep planning.
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the maze of methods and variations that might be relevant to a particular 
situation’ (p. 75f.). This brings software specialists in line with other ‘methods 
experts’ such as statisticians, operational researchers, or consultants who 
know and master a set of techniques that they can readily apply in diverse 
settings.
Indeed, actual algorithms are written in code to become (part of) pro-
grams that run in actual locations and with actual purposes. They will always 
imply an interpretation and contextualization of an algorithmic technique’s 
objective content according to objectal settings. Concrete programs are, in 
this sense, the heavily mediated outcomes of situated encounters between 
algorithmic techniques and local circumstances. But if we want to get 
a hold of the technical substance of software, we need to single out and 
address the question of how it has become possible to express and design 
functional behavior such as ‘ranking’, ‘learning’, or ‘recommending’. Many 
algorithmic techniques are suff iciently specif ic and remarkable to try and 
isolate their functional principles, even if we understand that they are 
eventually embedded in both larger technical systems and local application 
contexts.
For Simondon, technical thinking organizes around the knowledge of 
elements and builds up from there:
In technical thinking, it is the element that is more stable, better known 
and in a certain sense more perfect than the ensemble; it is truly an 
object, whereas the ensemble always stays inherent to the world to a 
certain extend. Religious thinking f inds the opposite balance: here, it 
is the ensemble that is more stable, stronger, and more valid than the 
element. (Simondon, 2017, p. 187)
In that sense, I take algorithmic techniques to be the technical elements 
that enable computers to perform compound or complex operation, made 
possible by computation but not reducible to it. This transcends common 
analytical grids, such as Simon’s (1996) distinction11 between state and 
process or Kittler’s (1997b) assessment that media transmit, store, and 
process information, and focuses on the question of how transversal and 
transductive technical arrangements are capable of producing certain 
behaviors. Lev Manovich, one of the few scholars in the humanities invested 
in approaching the landscape of techniques as a proper object of study, 
11 This distinction f inds a parallel in Wirth’s (1976) famous assessment ‘Algorithms + Data 
Structures = Programs’.
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makes a distinction between a ‘cultural layer’ and a ‘computer layer’, which 
helps clarify the issue:
The examples of categories on the cultural layer are encyclopedia and 
a short story; story and plot; composition and point of view; mimesis 
and catharsis, comedy and tragedy. The examples of categories on the 
computer layer are process and packet (as in data packets transmitted 
through the network); sorting and matching; function and variable; a 
computer language and a data structure. (Manovich, 2001, p. 46)
This distinction is useful, in particular if the cultural layer is understood 
to include categories that diverge from the traditional repertoire of media 
forms and involve elements that evoke Peters’s ‘logistical media’ (2015, 
p. 37). In the case of the subject matter addressed in the second part of 
this book, this concerns tasks such as retrieving information, grouping 
items, attributing relevance, assessing risk or aptitude, and recommending 
contents, products, or people. Although I am hesitant to oppose culture and 
computation, it is worthwhile to think about algorithmic techniques as the 
technical schemas at work in the computer layer that make it possible to 
actually perform such tasks on the cultural or interface layer.
Importantly, even for moderately complex operations, there is rarely an 
analogous relationship between the underlying technical schemas and the 
behavior on the interface. This fuels the dissociation between ‘knowing 
how’ and ‘knowing that’ Krämer and Bredekamp (2013, p. 26) refer to when 
they argue that ‘ability and knowledge split up’ under circumstances of 
increased mechanization. We can certainly see that a program like Google 
Lens is able to recognize objects in an image, but this does not help us in 
the slightest to understand how the currently most effective12 algorithmic 
technique for doing so, convolutional neural networks, actually work. This 
prompts the question of how to think of technical knowledge in the context 
of software-making.
Techniques and Technical Knowledge
Before launching into that question, I have to address an important 
ambiguity, namely the difference between an understanding of cultural 
techniques as ‘the skills and aptitudes involved in the use of modern media’ 
12 Such claims to leadership are generally made through competitions, such as the ImageNet 
Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge.
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(Winthrop-Young, 2014, p. 381) and the theoretically more sophisticated 
definition as ‘preconceptual operations that generate the very concepts that 
subsequently are used to conceptualize these operations’ (Winthrop-Young, 
2014, p. 385). This distinction raises the uncomfortable question of the 
subject, which cannot be avoided when talking about knowledge, skill, or 
experience. I will deal with this issue by embedding the former perspective 
into the latter, in the sense that I understand what is commonly described 
as learning a skill (e.g., programming) or as acquiring knowledge (e.g., how 
a compiler works) not as an activity where a sovereign subject obtains 
some kind of power that it can wield autonomously, but as a process of 
acculturation into a cultural technique that shapes and, in a certain sense, 
produces a ‘new’, composite subject that shares agency with the objects and 
concepts the technique implies (cf. Vismann, 2013). As Winthrop-Young 
argues (2013), ‘[i]f ideas, concepts, and in some cases the objects themselves 
emerge from basic operations, then it is only logical to assume that this also 
applies to the agent performing these operations’ (p. 9).
That said, I would argue that the most concrete manifestation of technicity 
and knowledge in computer science and related disciplines is, in fact, the 
ever-growing archive of algorithmic techniques, ready-to-hand for integra-
tion into concrete technical artifacts. Simondon’s philosophy emphasizes 
technical evolution to the point where ‘the individual technical object is 
not this or that thing, given hic et nunc, but that of which there is genesis’ 
(Simondon, 2017, p. 26). In this vein, I suggest that algorithmic techniques 
denote schemas that bind actual artifacts to the trajectories constituting 
technical evolution. Schemas run through stages of concretization and 
adaptation, and it is the schema, understood as technical essence, that 
gives identity to both the object and its trajectory, not the concrete physi-
cal manifestation at a given instance. From this perspective, we can see 
algorithmic techniques both as carriers of the technicity running through 
‘working structures’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 18) and as the object or content 
of the ‘sensitivity to technicity that allows for the discovery of possible 
assemblages’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 74). As constitutive elements in comput-
ing, they are apprehended by technical imagination and thereby become 
units of knowledge. Layton, building on Koyré’s work, sees ‘technology as 
a spectrum, with ideas at one end and techniques and things at the other’ 
(Layton, 1974, p. 37f.) and I conceive algorithmic techniques in similar terms, 
with the crucial provision that they are not on one side of a spectrum but 
rather spanning and connecting the domains of knowledge and operation.
In line with Simondon’s framing of technology as a fundamental relation-
ship with the world, I want to emphasize that technical knowledge, here, 
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should not be merely understood as a collection of recipes for production, 
but as a deeper category that connects directly to Heidegger’s interpretation 
of techne (τέχνη) as a form of knowing. In a lecture given to an assembly of 
vocational school teachers, ‘Überlieferte Sprache und technische Sprache’ 
(‘Traditional language and technological language’), Heidegger (1998) argues 
that techne means ‘to know one’s way in something [sichauskennen in 
etwas], namely in the fabrication [herstellen] of something’ (p. 135, transla-
tion amended), but that this ‘[k]nowing one’s way is a kind of knowing 
[erkennen], having known and knowledge’ (p. 135). Heidegger here describes 
‘technology’ (Technik) as fundamentally entangled in Erkennen, a term 
often translated as ‘perception’ or ‘recognition’, but which, in this context, 
denotes ‘knowing’ in its full sense as a verb, as ‘coming to know’ or, more 
abstractly, as ‘constituting knowledge’. Technology, in that sense, is not 
only something that can be known, but a means to know, a fundamental 
form of knowing. It is neither a simple application of science, nor a mere 
manifestation of social or economic forces, but a mode of revealing the 
world. Despite Heidegger’s (1977, p. 19) assessment that modern technology 
knows in the form of Gestell (‘enframing’), revealing or ‘challenging’ nature 
as mere resource, his notion of sichauskennen (‘knowing one’s way’) echoes 
Simondon’s ‘sensitivity to technicity’ and marks a space of knowing that 
has true epistemic substance, character, and content.
In his aptly named What Engineers Know and How They Know It, Vincenti 
(1990) also argues that engineering has a specif ic ‘intellectual content’ 
(p. vii) that cannot be adequately understood as applied science and needs 
to be treated as its own ‘epistemological species’, not least because of its 
status as ‘a means to a utilitarian end’ (p. 3). Although the OECD’s (2013) 
assessment that software ‘is essentially an expression of human expertise 
translated into code’ (p. 49) does not capture the important technical and 
infrastructural qualities at play, the term ‘expertise’ is another way to 
address the intellectual dimension of the specif ic knowing and revealing 
computational forms engage in. One could argue that the articulations 
of software-making as ‘realization of rule-based thinking’ (Coy, 2007) or 
applications of ‘computational thinking’ (Wing, 2006) constitute the broadest 
frame for such an endeavor. While these general characterizations are 
certainly not wrong, they do not capture how far any kind of ‘thinking’ is 
always already entangled in webs woven by more specif ic techniques. A 
short example should be instructive.
Media theorists have been very interested in the notion of ‘recursion’ 
(e.g., Krämer, 1988, p. 165ff.), often discussing it as a property of software. But 
what if we consider recursion ‘in action’, as a technique that is available as a 
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concrete means of functional expression? In the context of programming, 
recursion occurs when a subroutine – a series of instructions that can be 
addressed as a unit – calls itself, creating a potentially inf inite chain or 
loop. The fact that such a thing can exist has to do with how processors 
function and how programming languages arrange that function into more 
abstract constructs. But this does not tell us why and when recursion is 
a useful way to construct the computer behavior able to perform some 
task. Take the example of Netvizz, an extractor for Facebook data I used to 
build and maintain (Rieder, 2013). One of its modules was a Page network 
crawler, a small program that started with a user-specif ied Facebook Page, 
got the Pages liked by that Page, and so forth, until it had either retrieved 
the whole network or reached a chosen ‘depth’ or distance from the starting 
point. The main element of this module was a recursive loop, a subroutine 
that received a Page ID as input, got the IDs of liked Pages, and then called 
itself for each ‘discovered’ Page with that ID as the new input, and so forth. 
There was a global data structure that collected all Page references, to make 
sure that the recursive loop crawled each Page only once and to create an 
output f ile with all the collected data. The fact that we do not know how 
many Pages there are going to be when we start the crawl is the reason why 
recursion is such a useful way to produce the desired function or behavior 
in this case. While ‘normal’ loops work through set lists of items, a recursive 
loop can forage through a tree or network for which we have no prior map 
or overview. Recursion thus constitutes an instance of technicity made 
available to developers to build a program that has certain operational 
properties or capabilities. Situated at the level of the element, however, its 
technicity is still ‘pure’ or ‘unconstrained’ because it is not yet bound into a 
functional whole. At this level, we also encounter contingency, redundancy, 
and overlap: one could easy produce the same general behavior of Netvizz’s 
module without using recursion, for example, by creating a queue that Page 
IDs are added to and worked off one by one. This approach would draw 
on other technicities at hand and would have different characteristics, 
for example, in terms of memory use or performance. Making a program 
may be rule-based thinking, but it unfolds inside a technical domain that 
requires the sensitivity to technicity or sichauskennen that constitutes 
technical knowledge.
While algorithmic techniques are ultimately destined for implementa-
tion in a program, they often begin with ideas that have little to do with 
computation. For example, there is nothing intrinsically computational 
about the inkling that spam messages can be identif ied by inspecting their 
textual content (Chapter 6). But Paul Graham’s (2002) proposal to create a 
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statistical classif ier that treats every single word in a message as an indicator 
for ‘spamminess’ moves the initial intuition f irmly into computational 
territory, even if actual programs may enact the idea in a variety of ways. 
The term ‘statistical classif ier’ points not only to the larger space of prob-
ability theory but also to a list of commonly used and well-documented 
algorithmic techniques for performing statistical classif ication. These 
techniques revolve around a general rationale, a number of central ideas 
forming a conceptual core that can be laid out in (a combination of) natural 
language, diagrams, mathematical notation, or code. They constitute both 
technicity and technical knowledge, even if their implementation in a 
working system requires many decisions to be made concerning the units 
to take into account, the parameters to specify, the tweaks to apply, the 
outputs to produce, and so forth. Algorithmic techniques are, at the same 
time, analytical (they involve descriptions of the world), procedural (they 
establish heuristics and actual computational behavior), and even normative 
(they def ine right and wrong ways of doing).
Technical knowledge, then, consists in large part of knowing techniques 
and how to use them. And algorithmic techniques are indeed central as 
part of the “intellectual furniture” (Dourish, 2016, p.1) of software-making. 
As Vismann argues, ‘[r]eproducibility and learnability are among the key 
features of cultural techniques’ (Vismann, 2013, p. 87) and the question of 
both transmission and learning is thus unavoidable. My attempt to isolate the 
technical subject matter analytically is not meant to deny the social aspects 
involved in learning. If we consider learning new techniques as a process 
of acculturation rather than mere acquisition, it is important to emphasize 
‘that learners inevitably participate in communities of practitioners and that 
the mastery of knowledge and skill requires newcomers to move toward 
full participation in the sociocultural practices of a community’ (Lave and 
Wenger, 1991, p. 29). Computing is full of such ‘communities of practice’ and 
even if computer science and neighboring disciplines represent the most 
systematic effort to invent, study, stabilize, document, and disseminate 
techniques, it is clearly not the only one. There is a large offer of schools and 
classes outside of university that propose structured training, including 
online environments such as MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses) or 
step-by-step tutorials. But maybe more importantly, companies can and 
should be seen as hosting communities of practice that engage heavily in 
the production and circulation of technical knowledge. Open-source projects 
play a similar role. The enormous amounts of literature and documentation, 
coming in many shapes and forms, can also be seen as output from and 
input to communities of practice. Well-known algorithms like Quicksort or 
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PageRank (Chapter 7) have canonical formulations13 that can be found in 
textbooks or on Wikipedia. Social media play an exceedingly important role 
in this context (cf. Storey et al., 2014). The most impressive example in this 
regard is certainly the StackExchange Network, a series of Q&A-style websites 
that cover a range of technical topics. In late 2017, the flagship community, 
Stack Overflow, which describes itself as ‘Q&A for professional and enthusiast 
programmers’, hosted 14 million questions and 23 million answers that cover 
the problem space of software-making to an uncanny degree. The experience 
that a Google search for almost any programming problem will directly 
lead to a relevant answer on Stack Overflow has become almost proverbial. 
Similar arguments could be made for GitHub, the leading platform for hosting 
software repositories, and these examples indeed raise questions concerning 
not only the distribution and standardization of technical knowledge, but 
also forms of commodification and capitalization (Mackenzie, 2017b).
Going back to Simondon’s distinction between artisanal and industrial 
modes of producing technical objects, we can certainly see efforts in both 
academia and parts of the business sphere to put software-making on 
more structured, formalized, and scientif ic foundations. At the same time, 
movements like ‘software craftsmanship’ (Mancuso, 2015) explicitly focus 
on skill over process methodology and sites like Stack Overflow and GitHub 
represent and facilitate much more artisanal modes of learning and working 
with algorithmic techniques, where problem-solving is ad hoc, exploratory, 
and driven by the circumstances of time and place. The role of modularity 
is crucial in this context and needs to be addressed in more detail.
Abstraction, Infrastructure, Archive
A more robust and systematic analysis of the knowledge spheres evoked in 
the last section could follow McLure Wasko and Faraj (2000) in distinguishing 
between ‘knowledge as object, knowledge embedded in individuals, and 
knowledge embedded in a community’ (p. 157). While I have alluded to all 
three, I would like to start this section by expanding on the f irst perspective. 
The idea that knowledge can be ‘codif ied and separated from the minds of 
13 In this day and age, a good way to determine whether there is such a canonical formulation 
is to check an algorithm’s Wikipedia page. The pages for Quicksort and PageRank, for example, 
propose not only extensive descriptions in natural language and mathematical notation, but 
also actual implementations in code, since these algorithms only repeat a small number of 
operations over many iterations.
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people’ (p. 157), and therefore be stored, searched, and retrieved, is clearly a 
relevant way to address the heaps of literature and documentation available 
to programmers, even if one remains hesitant about full disembodiment 
or reif ication. Still, the ‘knowledge as object’ perspective opens a pathway 
toward an even more radical interrogation that pushes beyond the idea of 
symbolic encoding, for example, in the form of written material, and asks 
how we can understand technical objects themselves as carriers and not 
just products or manifestations of knowledge. Such an interrogation seems 
to be particularly appropriate in the context of software, with its highly 
layered and modular character. This section will therefore address the 
question of how techniques and technical knowledge spread in ways that 
are not fully addressed by common conceptualization of knowledge. This 
requires a discussion of abstraction.
Abstraction and Modularity
It is certainly no exaggeration to say that abstraction is absolutely fun-
damental to computing. Colburn’s acute account captures the notion in 
particularly vivid terms:
Indeed, the foundational concepts of computer science are described in 
the language of binary arithmetic and logic gates, but it is a fascinating 
aspect of the discipline that the levels of abstraction that one can lay upon 
this foundational layer are limitless, and provide the ability to model 
familiar objects and processes of every day life entirely within a digital 
world. (Colburn, 2000, p. 174)
Abstraction, in computing, thus refers to layering and to the idea that many 
‘worlds’ can be modeled upon computation in one way or another. The 
canonical example are high-level programming languages, such as C, Python, 
or the already mentioned JavaScript. The rationale behind these languages 
can be summarized in three steps:
1) The problem: Programming a computer by directly manipulating 
registers in binary code is really diff icult and cumbersome. Even the 
most basic operations require several commands, it is easy to make 
mistakes, and it is hard to write programs that exceed a basic level of 
structural or functional complexity. Furthermore, actual computers 
can have different instruction sets and transposing a program written 
for one microarchitecture to another means rewriting it.
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2) The observation: Despite these diff iculties, it seems that program-
ming consists of basic compound operations that are repeated over 
and over again. All programs seem to be made out of a relatively small 
number of such constantly recurring operations.
3) The solution: One can come up with a syntax that standardizes 
these common operations into a series of higher-level commands or 
functions and then write a program that translates them back into 
machine language. This makes programming easier and quicker, and 
we can focus on the broader functional aspects of the program. We 
can even translate our programs to different machines instead of 
rewriting them for every microarchitecture.
This somewhat cartoonish summary illustrates the rationale behind the 
development of high-level programming languages in the 1950s and 1960s. 
These languages were designed to capture computation in a syntax more 
adapted to humans and they rely on compilers – initially called ‘autoco-
ders’ – to translate that syntax back into machine language. In Colburn’s 
terms, a programming language represents a ‘modeled world’ that, in 
the case of general-purpose languages, has the same universal character 
as the underlying hardware,14 but structures access to that full space of 
computation in specif ic ways. When programmers say that they prefer one 
language to another, what they mean is that they prefer a particular way 
of abstracting computation behind a particular syntax. But why is this 
important from a perspective concerned with techniques and technical 
knowledge?
Programming languages represent a major instance of entanglement 
between abstraction and knowledge. They can be seen as ‘carriers’ of ‘objecti-
f ied’ knowledge because they are not simply transparent layers that make 
programming easier or more convenient; they already contain various 
functional building blocks, such as sorting mechanisms or generic data 
structures. Programming languages introduce concepts and techniques 
that imply ways of doing and, most importantly, they make complex or 
compound function available to their users. Contemporary programming 
languages do this in very comprehensive ways. While Dijkstra (1972) was 
critical of the ‘baroque monstrosities’ (p. 12) higher level programming 
languages had in his view become, he clearly recognized how abstraction 
14 A language is called Turing-complete if it can compute all computable functions. Microsoft’s 
Off ice programs, for example, are Turing-complete via their implementations of Visual Basic 
for Applications.
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facilitates and plays a role in widening the space of what can be considered 
programmable:
Programming will remain very diff icult, because once we have freed 
ourselves from the circumstantial cumbersomeness, we will f ind ourselves 
free to tackle the problems that are now well beyond our programming 
capacity. (Dijkstra, 1972, p. 12)
For Dijkstra, development tools both influence and enhance human capaci-
ties, and, in a sense, they represent a material form of knowledge that can 
be built on and that continuously expands what software can do. Another 
example should make this argument clearer.
We want to make a program that gets some data from a remote web 
server. This means dealing with the HTTP protocol and the specif ic ways it 
structures machine communication. This is not easy and would require us 
to learn not only how HTTP works, but also how the operating system we are 
targeting handles network connections and other things. But we are using 
the PHP programming language, because it already comes preinstalled on 
our system and is well-suited to web tasks. And PHP comes with a predefined 
function called file_get_contents() that takes a URL as input and returns the 
data stored at that location. A single line of code launches a large series of 
instructions specified in the PHP interpreter15 and in underlying procedures 
furnished by the operating system. Although using the PHP function does 
not imply any knowledge ‘transfer’, it grants the programmer the capacity 
to produce a particular operation, a complex behavior; there is thus an 
‘activation’ of knowledge stored as ‘f ixed and crystallized gesture’ (Simondon, 
2017, p. 18) that the programmer can call upon via the PHP programming 
language. This is how technical elements in software can be seen as both 
means of injecting existing technicity into a new program and carriers of 
objectif ied knowledge. The specif ics of how the URL’s content is retrieved 
are hidden behind an abstraction layer and it is safe to assume that most 
PHP programmers ignore the more detailed technical operations executed 
in the background. What the programmer needs to know, however, is that 
such a function exists, what it does, namely that it ‘reads entire f ile into 
a string’ according to the PHP documentation,16 and how it can be used, 
15 An increasing number of programming languages are not compiled, but interpreted, which 
means that they are parsed and executed one line at a time by a special program, an interpreter, 
rather than directly translated into machine code.
16 http://php.net/manual/en/function.f ile-get-contents.php, accessed 12 December 2019.
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that is, that it requires a parameter that is either a local f ile or an address 
on the web. Abstraction can generally be by-passed: if we require more 
control over the specif icities of the f ile transfer, there are other modules 
that provide just that.17
Since PHP is a programming language specialized in web development, 
reading f iles from the web is a common operation and apparently common 
enough to justify making it a part of the core language. Different languages 
organize such integration differently. Python, for example, has the Python 
Standard Library, a collection of modules that are not part of the core language 
but distributed with it by default. To get a f ile from the web, we could use the 
urllib.request module, which ‘defines functions and classes which help in 
opening URLs (mostly HTTP) in a complex world’.18 Or we could download 
Requests, an external library that describes itself as ‘HTTP for Humans’19 and 
abstracts HTTP operations to a level of simplicity similar to PHP, taming the 
‘complex world’ of Internet communication protocols into a small number 
of simple commands. Freed from the ‘circumstantial cumbersomeness’ of 
protocol management, we can move on to tackle other things. These different 
ways of providing packaged function constitute a vector next to learning 
in a more traditional sense for techniques to ‘travel’, for becoming parts of 
concrete programs and thereby of end-users’ everyday practices.
This logic holds not only for externally provided function. Programmers 
use subroutines and similar constructs to abstract their own code into more 
manageable units: when we program, ‘[w]e control complexity by building 
abstractions that hide details when appropriate’ (Abelson et al., 1996, p. xxii), 
which in practice means to ‘hide concerns about the representation of data as 
collections of bits and the representation of programs as sequences of primi-
tive instructions’ (Abelson et al., 1996, p. 489). Dijkstra (1974) remarked that 
‘a large sophisticated program can only be made by a careful application of 
the rule “Divide and Conquer”’ (p. 609) and there are different ways to design 
this kind of modularity. But how such functions are packaged, distributed, 
and rendered accessible to programmers is less important than to recognize 
that this allows for techniques of all levels of complexity and sophistication 
to become elements in larger systems of functioning, without actually having 
to be understood in any substantial way by the programmer integrating 
them. Rather than invest into a taxonomy of elements in software, we can 
17 PHP, like many other programming languages, comes with an interface to the very powerful 
libcurl/cURL package.
18 https://docs.python.org/3/library/urllib.request.html, accessed 12 December 2019.
19 http://docs.python-requests.org/en/master/, accessed 12 December 2019.
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appreciate the different means to delineate such units, both analytically and 
on the level of code. Contemporary programming languages indeed provide 
various means to make and stabilize elements by assembling instructions 
into larger building blocks such as subroutines, classes, or modules on a 
more elemental level and packages, libraries, or frameworks further up.
We again arrive at Krämer and Bredekamp’s (2013) assessment that ‘skill 
and knowledge are going their separate ways’ (p. 26), but this time the 
externalization does not concern the end-user, but the developer, who, 
in a sense, becomes a user of a programming language. Since integrating 
packaged function into one’s own program requires only comprehension 
of what an element does and how to address it though its API (application 
programming interface),20 the ‘mechanism of forgetting’ at work concerns 
the specific principles and procedures that make function happen. While the 
term ‘knowledge’ is maybe not fully appropriate here, we have to recognize 
that learning the actual details of an algorithmic technique is only one 
way to draw on its intellectual content and to integrate its technicity into 
an operational setting, where it may serve as a means of production that 
enables specif ic forms of value generation.
We can think about this reif ication of knowledge by extending Mokyr’s 
(2005) analysis of the ‘knowledge revolution’ that accompanied the Industrial 
Revolution, which involved not merely an increase in the production of knowl-
edge but also meant that a ‘great deal of knowledge that previously was tacit 
and oral was codified and described in scientif ic and technical writings and 
drawing’ (p. 56). Spurred by printing and the growth in learning institutions, 
the ‘Enlightenment began a process that dramatically lowered […] access 
costs’ (p. 73) to knowledge and stimulated forms of invention that relied on 
the variation and combination of elements, facilitating the emergence of 
technical schemas situated at higher levels of the constructive ladder, to speak 
with Simondon. Abstraction and modularity push this logic even further: 
if a developer seeks to integrate machine learning into an application, she 
can simply download a library like TensorFlow, follow one of many tutorials, 
consult the documentation, and modify the source code if needed. She can 
even move another step up and use the Keras package, which adds a layer 
of abstraction on top of TensorFlow, describing itself as ‘an API designed 
for human beings, not machines’ supporting ‘easy and fast prototyping’.21 
20 The term API is now often used more specif ically for web-based data interfaces. But it 
actually denotes, broadly speaking, any structured means for communication between software 
components.
21 https://keras.io, accessed 12 December 2019.
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Certainly, competent application to a specif ic problem requires experience 
and a significant investment of time, but the remarkable availability of such 
highly complex and concretized elements has important consequences for 
the spread of technicity and knowledge through the software landscape.
Looking at these different forms of transmission suggests the notion of 
‘stability’ as analytical category. I propose to distinguish between two ends 
of a spectrum. ‘Solid techniques’ take the form of libraries, modules, (web) 
services, and other types of packaged function. Here, ‘ways of carrying 
out a particular task’ (OED) are specif ied and materialized in ready-made 
code that can accelerate development overall but also make diff icult things 
easy, cumbersome things convenient, and boring things quick to get done 
with. This convenience may come at the price of performance or flexibility 
since packaged functionality implies an act of delegation to a technique 
already implemented as a technical element, which encapsulates a particular 
schema that may not be fully appropriate or optimized for the specif ic 
task at hand. There may be occasions where the sorting algorithm built 
into a programming language may not be the fastest or least memory-
intensive way to sort a list. In many cases, however, available elements 
actually have performance advantages if they went through numerous 
cycles of optimization or concretization. ‘Liquid techniques’ are closer to 
knowledge in its more traditional form, that is, schemas that can be found in 
textbooks, classrooms, or minds. But even liquid techniques are constantly 
stabilized through the standardization of practices resulting from converging 
educational standards, dominant publications, corporate best practices, 
or – increasingly – the voting system on Stack Overflow.
Algorithmic techniques are solidif ied or ‘frozen’ when they are modular-
ized, moved to a subroutine, or packaged in some other way. They may 
even ‘sink down’ into the bowels of computational infrastructure and 
become part of an operating system, programming language, or piece of 
hardware. As a case in point, the PHP programming language has gained 
many new functions over time, reducing standard operational chains in web 
programming to single lines of code. Instead of sorting lists by using one of 
the algorithms discussed by Knuth, programmers can simply select from 
the many preexisting functions, which actually rely on Hoare’s Quicksort 
method internally.22 One can, of course, still decide to implement another 
sorting technique oneself, but using the ‘native’ solution is the path of least 
22 At the time of writing, the off icial PHP documentation lists thirteen different ready-made 
functions for sorting arrays. According to http://php.net/sort (accessed 12 December 2019), most 
of them rely on the Quicksort algorithm.
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resistance. The language thus not only confers the capabilities of Quicksort 
to developers but elevates it to a de facto standard that becomes ‘completely 
embedded in everyday tools of use’ (Lampland and Star, 2009, p. 11), in this 
case in the specif ic functional reservoir provided by PHP. More advanced 
algorithmic techniques become ‘infrastructural’ in similar ways, making 
their use a realistic option for much larger groups of people and projects.
Another example for the way programming languages freeze specif ic 
concepts and techniques, thereby ‘transferring’ them to developers, concerns 
data structures. When Niklaus Wirth (1971) designed the Pascal program-
ming language at the end of the 1960s on the basis of the earlier ALGOL 
60, he argued that, compared to its predecessor, ‘its range of applicability is 
considerably increased due to a variety of data structuring facilities’ (p. 35). 
Certain conventions for structuring and addressing data in memory had 
already been emerging at the time and Wirth decided to solidify some of 
them as part of the language itself. In his classic Algorithms + Data Structures 
= Programs, he introduces what he calls the ‘fundamental structures’ already 
in the preface:
We therefore postulate a number of basic building principles of data 
structures, called the fundamental structures. It is most important that 
they are constructs that are known to be quite easily implementable on 
actual computers, for only in this case can they be considered the true 
elements of an actual data representation, as the molecules emerging 
from the f inal step of ref inements of the data description. They are the 
record, the array […], and the set. (Wirth, 1976, p. xiv)
These fundamental structures have indeed become integral parts of almost 
any programming language; in Python, for example, they are referred to 
as ‘dictionary’, ‘list’, and ‘set’. It is important to note that Wirth uses the 
terms ‘postulate’, highlighting the axiomatic and contingent nature of his 
design decision, and ‘molecule’, indicating that these constructs are, in fact, 
structures modeled from – or on top of – the ‘atoms’ of computation. While 
the specific designs of such abstractions are heatedly debated23 and certainly 
not arbitrary, they are, ultimately, contingent conventions that are solidif ied 
and circulated by freezing them into influential programming languages 
like Pascal, but also through widely read publications such as Wirth’s book, 
23 Brian W. Kernighan, a contributor to the C programming language, famously published 
a paper called ‘Why Pascal Is Not My Favorite Programming Language’ in 1981 (https://www.
lysator.liu.se/c/bwk-on-pascal.html, accessed 29 January 2020).
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through integration into teaching curricula, or through effective lobbying 
work in some standards board.
As molecules or elements that can be integrated into a wide variety of 
functional contexts, algorithmic techniques function as boundary objects 
that ‘are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the 
several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common 
identity across sites’ (Star and Griesemer, 1989, p. 393). The actual work they 
perform is defined by their role in a concrete program operating at a specific 
site; but they also form a transversal vocabulary of possible function that 
transcends individual sites. This functional potential can be extremely broad: 
in later chapters I will show how certain techniques require little more than 
adherence to a specif ic data format to order basically any digital object.
The stability of techniques clearly varies. Freezing a technical schema 
into a module or giving it a canonical formulation can create a particularly 
stable boundary object, an ‘immutable mobile’ that remains fully consistent 
between sites but continues to be highly ‘readable’ and ‘combinable’ (cf. 
Latour, 1986). The Natural Language Toolkit for Python, for instance, offers 
modules that implement various (advanced) techniques for text-mining that 
developers can integrate into their programs, which includes researchers 
using these techniques as methods to generate new insights. As modules, 
they are indeed highly combinable with other code and the excellent 
documentation and close relationship with standards and conventions 
makes them as readable as any sophisticated technique can ever be. But 
stability in software can easily be reversed. Techniques can be ‘liquefied’ or 
‘heated up’ when modules are reworked, optimized, extended, or replaced 
by custom code. Whereas freezing entails black-boxing and delegation, 
heating up can lead to concretization and adaptation, yielding enhancements 
or modif ications that are again cooled into stable forms, often marked 
by a new version number. In practice, software-making almost always 
means combining more solid elements with more liquid ones. Modules are 
tied together, custom programming sits on top of system functions, legacy 
code is kept unchanged over decades as a system evolves around it, and so 
forth. Technical creation, in software more than anywhere else, ‘consists of 
assembling a coherent system from disparate elements’ (Chabot, 2013, p. 14).
In this context, conceptualization plays an important role but as outcome 
or accompaniment rather than foundation or origin. Indeed, if we consider 
algorithmic techniques as a specif ic kind of cultural technique, we can 
observe that they are, more often than not, ‘older than the concepts that are 
generated from them’ (Macho, 2003, p. 179). In many of the examples I will 
discuss in the second part of this book, we stray close to what Ramsay calls 
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a ‘hermeneutics of screwing around’ (2010), where vaguely formulated ideas 
and practices follow meandering pathways of intuition and experimentation 
rather than straight lines of deductive reasoning. For example, Gerard 
Salton’s canonical Vector Space Model for Information Retrieval, discussed 
in Chapter 5, receives its fully formalized formulation at a time when lists of 
word frequencies had already been widely used to represent text documents 
for almost two decades (cf. Dubin, 2004). Wirth’s presentation of the Pascal 
language (1971) makes it amply clear that many of his ideas and decisions 
were developed in tight relationship with the practice of using, teaching, 
and extending ALGOL 60 and other languages. Likewise, his influential 
postulation of the three ‘fundamental structures’ for data representation 
was based on their extensive use as modules, testing and pushing them in 
concrete situations before making them part of the conceptual and technical 
infrastructure that is Pascal.
At the same time, we need to consider explicit conceptual formula-
tion not just as varnish painted onto an already fully formed technique: 
conceptualization and formalization themselves can be seen as types of 
technique that change the status of what they describe. In the domain of 
information ordering, this often involves mathematization, which facilitates 
intellectual transfer in two ways: on the one side, well-formalized techniques 
travel more readily from one domain to another; on the other side, when 
‘placing’ an idea into the conceptual space of mathematics, it becomes 
easier to import or connect to the wide range of existing mathematical 
techniques. The Vector Space Model provided not only a formal def inition 
but also facilitated the practical and intellectual transfer of concepts and 
techniques from geometry and arithmetic into information retrieval. I 
would therefore argue that concepts, models, and theories should be seen 
as tied to techniques in a mutually reinforcing relationship, to the point 
where they become part of the techniques themselves. How a technique is 
conceptualized, narrated, formalized, documented, and stabilized is part of 
its character. Techniques define spaces of possibility that are both technical, 
in the sense that they provide actual schemas for producing function, and 
cognitive, in the sense that developers approach any problem from the 
vantage point of what they know to be achievable. They imply particular 
perspectives on what constitutes a problem and how it is to be solved; 
they incorporate def initions of good work and best practices; they tie the 
software-making occurring at a specif ic place and time to larger spheres 
and technical trajectories.
All of this does not mean that techniques travel through completely 
open spaces of circulation. Most programmers or companies freeze some 
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of their own techniques into modules or libraries to code faster and to 
build more reliable programs but never share these elements. Copyright, 
patent law, and technical procedures such as compilation24 or obfuscation 
constitute some of the strategies for limiting the circulation of techniques. 
Considerable amounts of software are simply built for internal use in some 
organization. Many large web companies, for example, do not rely on existing 
(relational) database packages such as MySQL or Oracle RDBMS but build 
custom tools that reflect their specific needs. Google’s Bigtable, for example, 
only implements the database functions needed for the specif ic tasks the 
company primarily deals with and is heavily optimized for the load patterns 
these tasks produce. Bigtable is made available to external developers via 
the Google Cloud Platform, but not as a software package.
Infrastructure
Modules, libraries, and other forms of packaged function constitute an 
important part of the development infrastructures that serve as a base layer 
for concrete software projects. Although much more could be said about 
the deeply relational character of software-making, I want to briefly sketch 
two ways how development infrastructures could be analyzed further.
First, one could indeed venture deeper into the strata that sit below 
end-user applications. Here, one would f ind physical hardware coagulating 
around somewhat standardized device form factors (server, laptop, smart-
phone, embedded system, and so forth) that have particular computational 
capabilities, particular connections with the world, and a particular spec-
trum of common application types. One would also f ind operating systems 
that provide an increasingly large array of intermediary capabilities, ranging 
from graphical user interfaces to hardware abstraction layers and network 
stacks. Developers generally target combinations of device and operating 
system, for example, a smartphone running iOS or Android, but then also 
select a development environment and, if appropriate, a ‘solution stack’ 
that contains one or several programming languages, software that aids 
in the development process, such as code editors or versioning software, 
and components that provide some core functionality, such as database 
subsystems like MySQL. There are many possible combinations and concrete 
choices depend on numerous factors, from personal preference to task 
24 Even libraries or modules are sometimes distributed as ‘binary blobs’ that can be inte-
grated into other software but are not available as source code and therefore not amendable to 
adaptation.
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specificity and cost. Hardware, operating system, and development environ-
ment together create a base layer of capabilities and functions to draw on. 
They form what we could call with Wirth (1976) an ‘abstract computer’ (p. 3) 
that, in most cases, is already full of operational opportunities to build on 
and that can be expanded further through modules, libraries, and so forth. 
Rather than instructing the hardware directly, the developer addresses this 
composite environment and what it affords in order to build a program. 
Technologies like Docker make it possible to ‘freeze’ concrete environments 
into ‘containers’ that can be easily transferred from one physical machine 
to another, reducing or eliminating the need to replicate and configure the 
environment locally. A deeper mechanological investigation of the many 
possibilities on offer would require another book but suff ice to say that the 
information ordering techniques discussed in the second part have blended 
into the reservoirs of possible and easily accessible technicity.
Second, one could approach the question through the lens of control. In 
his astute discussion of the dichotomy between hardware and software, 
Moor (1978) suggests that we should move away from the problematic use 
of physicality as a criterion toward ‘a pragmatic distinction’, where ‘the 
software will be those programs […] which contain instructions the person 
can change, and the hardware will be that part of the computer system 
which is not software’ (p. 215). This leads to a relational distinction that 
revolves around the infrastructural moment:
For the systems programmer who programs the computer in machine 
language much of the circuitry will be hardware. For the average user 
who programs in an applications language, such as Fortran, Basic, or 
Algol, the machine language programs become hardware. For the person 
running an applications program an even larger portion of the computer 
is hardware. […] What is considered hardware by one person can be 
regarded as software by another. (Moor, 1978, p. 215f.)
For the programmer using a high-level programming language, the compiler 
and the language design it imposes become the ‘abstract computer’ that 
cannot be changed. A developer working with a particular development 
environment and solution stack accepts these elements as hardware. 
Certainly, one can always decide to use a different language, a different 
environment, or even machine language directly. But that argument extends 
down to hardware as well. It is not impossible to rewrite the f irmware 
configuring a piece of electronics, to use programmable logic arrays, or to 
manufacture one’s own electronics. According to folklore, Alan Kay once 
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said that ‘[p]eople who are really serious about software should make their 
own hardware’ (Hertzfeld, 1982) and for a company like Apple, everything is 
software. Instead of trying to draw an ontological line, Moor’s perspective 
highlights the moment when a software-maker herself draws that line for 
a given project, when she decides to use this or that device, language, or 
environment. At that moment, she decides – most likely bounded by her 
professional environment – on the specif ic layers of technology she will 
accept as hardware. Infrastructure, we are reminded, ‘is a fundamentally 
relational concept’ that needs to be thought ‘in relation to organized prac-
tices’ (Star and Ruhleder, 1996, p. 112).
How much leeway or control over the abstract computer developers 
have is not merely a question of available skills and resources, even if these 
elements are crucial. The environment a project targets may be imposed 
for various reasons, and the last years have seen clear tendencies toward 
a ‘platformization’ (Helmond, 2015) of software development. Cloud com-
puting services like Amazon’s AWS or Microsoft’s Azure are not simply 
web-hosting facilities, but top-to-bottom technology providers that offer 
advanced computational capacities in areas such as data management, 
dynamic scaling, or machine learning, which would be very diff icult to 
replicate without considerable investment. The reif ication of abstraction 
into tight, commodif ied infrastructures has maybe gone the furthest in 
the domain of mobile applications. Apple’s integrated platform consists 
not only of hardware devices, iOS’s many system functionalities, two 
programming languages (Objective-C and Swift), the XCode development 
environment, and a broad set25 of frameworks and libraries but also ties 
software-making to an exclusive deployment and monetization model, the 
App Store. Apple provides various means of production as well as market 
access to hundreds of millions of users, taking a 30 percent cut on revenues in 
return. For developers, complex tasks like transnational app distribution and 
payment processing disappear behind an abstraction layer that has technical 
specif icities as well as signif icant legal and commercial dimensions. Here, 
notions like abstraction and infrastructure fully intersect with economic 
platform models that ‘redefine industrial architectures’ (Gawer, 2010, p. 1).
In contrast, systems like GNU/Linux are attempts to prof it from the 
constructive accumulation and labor sharing that abstraction enables and 
facilitates, without losing autonomy, f lexibility, and control in a techni-
cal situation that necessarily requires dependence and delegation. One 
could argue that Apple radically extends what is hardware for its users and 
25 https://developer.apple.com/documentation/, accessed 12 December 2019.
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third-party developers, while GNU/Linux attempts to keep things soft and 
open to modif ication, at least for those with the desire, skill, and resources 
to shape their computational infrastructures. In both cases there remains 
a considerable space of plasticity when it comes to designing end-user 
functionality and one could argue that Apple’s unyielding hand-holding 
actually facilitates artisanal modes of development, since many logistical 
constraints are taken care of. But the fact that these perks can be taken 
away at any moment shows how far platform power has penetrated into 
software-making.
The many different infrastructural components and techniques that 
def ine software-making inform negotiations between technicity and the 
world of social purposes and circumstances. With reference to Simondon 
one could argue that developers designing functionality for real or imagined 
end-users seek to tie the objective to the objectal in specific ways, even if one 
does not dissolve into the other. Considering that software is increasingly 
deployed as online service, where a new ‘version’ can be released at any 
time, we realize that these negotiations can become continuous processes 
that are increasingly empirical as changes and their effects on user can be 
evaluated almost instantly. Computerization can be seen as the cumulative 
outcome of the many individual instances where practices are mediated, 
constituted, or ‘captured’ (Agre, 1994) in software. These processes advance 
on the basis of the technical possibilities available at a given time and 
place. These possibilities are the outcome of technical evolution and one 
of the central vectors of this process is the continuous accumulation of 
algorithmic techniques that def ine and extend what computers can (be 
made to) do. But if we take a step back from the sprawling landscape of 
objects, techniques, and practices, we need to ask how much variation or 
variability there really is. Could it be that the many things that have been 
happening in and around computing are merely variations on a constant 
theme? How to conceive of commonality and variation?
Epistemological Pluralism
Over recent decades, scholars have increasingly recognized the material, 
operational, and functional dimension of computing – what Simondon calls 
‘objective’ – but often in ways that boil technicity down to the computational 
operations performed by the logic gates in processors. This logical substrate 
is then regularly linked to forms of rationalism or instrumental reason. As 
already discussed, Golumbia (2009) identif ies a computational universalism 
that includes ‘a commitment to the view that a great deal, perhaps all, of 
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human and social experience can be, explained via computational processes’ 
(p. 8). This ‘computationalism’ is described as an expansive, invasive, and 
‘messianic’ (p. 8) ideology that frames everything it comes upon in terms de-
rived from computation. In this perspective, the possible variation between 
algorithmic techniques is epistemically and ideologically insignif icant. 
Indeed, it can hardly be contested that the last 70 years have seen their fair 
share of instances where ‘the computer boys take over’ (Ensmenger, 2010) 
and information retrieval can be seen as yet another example.
But I want to ask whether computationalism’s rationalist blueprint 
marks all of computing or, rather, a particular understanding of computing. 
The strong association Golumbia makes between computationalism and 
Chomsky’s computational cognitivism leads me to believe that his legitimate 
critique of the rationalist ideologies found in many corners of computing 
is based on a partial apprehension of the actual landscape of algorithmic 
techniques and the conceptual spaces they connect with. Drawing on 
Derrida, Golumbia (2009) argues that ‘[l]ogical rules allow for no substantive 
ambiguity; either a proposition follows or it does not’ (p. 194), an assessment 
that can be defended if one takes the immediate functioning of electronic 
logic gates to represent the essence of computing. But this view is clearly 
limited if one considers the many heuristics or techniques that implement, 
on top of the computational substrate, probabilistic, nonmonotonic, or fuzzy 
operations that can express and, indeed, calculate ideas such as partial 
truth, multivalued conclusions, tentative reasoning, or probabilistic class 
membership. This does not take away from Golumbia’s broader argument 
concerning the various ways computer zealots have come to play important 
and ideologically tinted cultural roles. It should, however, remind us that a 
simple inference from the workings of logical gates and digital encoding to 
the vast domain of computing is not sustainable if one engages technicity 
as constructive enterprise.
The question whether there is a singular, uniform ‘logic’ inherent to 
computing that undergirds and unif ies the sprawling mass of software 
has often been raised. Krämer (2006), for example, argues that for Kittler, 
‘the digital’ constitutes a unifying code and that ‘digitalization becomes 
the modern form of a universal language’ (p. 108). I would argue, however, 
that this perspective mistakes an alphabet for a language; alphabets can 
encode different languages, and bits can stand for a an even larger variety 
of things. In his pioneering La machine univers, Pierre Lévy (1987) indeed 
argues that ‘[f]ar from evolving toward the definition of a universal language, 
as some had believed in the 1960s, informatics has multiplied its software 
dialects’ (p. 33).
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The dynamic domain of programming languages is only one of the areas 
where balkanization reigns. Accumulation, sedimentation, variation, and 
contestation are present almost anywhere in computing. One of the central 
arguments developed in this book holds that practices such as quantification, 
mathematization, digitization, or computerization not only imply forms of 
standardization, homogenization, and ‘commensuration’ (Espeland and 
Stevens, 1998) but also produce their own vectors of differentiation. As 
Simondon (2017) says, ‘[technical objects] are not deducted from a single 
principle’ (p. 50) and this concerns computing specif ically since it has 
become so pervasive that it connects to almost all human desires and 
struggles, integrating forms and techniques from a large number of domains, 
including art and political theory. As a particular way of producing opera-
tion, of shaping practices, and of drawing things together, computing has 
obviously provoked fundamental shifts in the f ields it touches, but these 
shifts are much more complicated than a singular logic taking over.
It certainly makes sense to see capture and constitution of human practice 
in software as forms of reif ication that integrate technology ever more 
deeply into human practice. As Latour (1991) argues, ‘technology is society 
made durable’. But, if we consider, with Simondon (2017), that technology 
is constructive and inductive, built up from an ever-growing archive of 
technicity that encounters a large diversity of uses, we have to consider 
– and demand – that there is ‘technological pluralism’ (p. 226, translation 
amended). This extends beyond technicity into technical practice. Studies 
like Turkle and Papert’s (1990) classic observation of programmers in action 
points to forms of ‘epistemological pluralism’ that imply ‘distinctive and 
varied styles of use’ (p. 157) and signif icant variation in outlook, method, 
and practice. Similarly, Hjørland (2010) distinguishes between four sets of 
‘epistemological assumptions’ (p. 74) in information science, leading to the 
competition between rationalist, empirical, hermeneutical, and critical 
theories of indexing and, by extension, of knowledge. I will come back to 
these distinctions in the second part of the book but suff ice to say that 
computing can hardly be reduced to computationalism.
Does this mean that I consider every technical object to be a monad or 
every technical trajectory to form its own isolated path and set of rules? 
Most certainly not. First, I fully accept that the very fact of computation 
on the lowest mechanical level represents an a priori for software, even if I 
consider it to be broad enough to accommodate a large set of schemas and 
‘assumptions’ in its fold. If we can acknowledge that language structures 
both what we can see and what we can say, yet allows for a considerable 
range of possible expression, we can do so for software as well. Second, it 
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would be hard to argue that there are no sphere of commonality, dominant 
trends, or other instances of transversal consolidation. The various entangle-
ments with contemporary capitalism, for instance, mean that software has 
come to serve rather streamlined modes of value production. But variation 
and standardization are not mutually exclusive, and they can coexist and 
intermingle in various ways (cf. Star and Ruhleder, 1996, p. 112). Indeed, 
Simondon’s claim that the same technical elements are assembled into very 
different individuals and often travel from one trajectory to another opens 
interesting avenues for pondering how standardization, normalization, and 
other forms of commonality emerge over time. An analysis of algorithmic 
techniques must therefore proceed historically.
Historicizing Software
Historical work has, to a degree, come out of the computing disciplines 
themselves. But these accounts mostly list inventions on the path to the 
current state of the art and rarely attempt to address the contingent and 
embedded character of technical trajectories. Stonebraker and Heller-
stein’s introductory chapter in the fourth edition of Readings in Database 
Systems (2005), for example, provides a highly valuable historical account 
of the history of database systems, but refrains from any kind of cultural 
interpretation or positioning. The title of Astrachan’s (2003) short paper 
‘Bubble Sort: An Archaeological Algorithmic Analysis’ raises eyebrows, but 
despite tracing the algorithm’s origins through a series of publications, it 
essentially remains a technical evaluation, combined with a lamentation of 
bubble sort’s terrible performance, inexplicable popularity, and unfortunate 
persistence in educational materials (Astrachan, 2003, p. 4). Texts such 
as these provide excellent material for humanists to draw on, but they 
cannot be considered ‘historiographical’ in a more academic sense of the 
term, since they have little interest in understanding the past in its specif ic 
composition and coherence.
In contrast, the growing number of more traditional histories of com-
puting, some of which explicitly focus on information processing and 
management (e.g., Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, 1996; Abbate, 1999; Aspray 
and Hayes, 2011; Cortada, 2016), combine large numbers of elements into 
multilayered narratives including people, places, institutions, practices, 
machines, ideas, and money. These works provide excellent cultural and 
economic contextualization of technical inventions, but they also hold the 
technicity and intellectual content of technical objects at arm’s length and 
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rarely consider technologies’ impact on society at large. Their goal is to show 
how the objects emerged, developed, and became part of everyday life, not 
to theorize their status or role as media.
The growing body of theoretically ambitious historiographies of comput-
ing, such as works by Edwards (1996), Akera (2007), Ensmenger (2010), Abbate 
(2012), or Halpern (2014), dive even deeper into cultural imaginaries and ideo-
logical entanglements but reserve equally little space for the examination of 
the actual substances constituting computing as technical domain. Brunton’s 
(2013) discussion of the Bayesian approach to spam f iltering – which I will 
pick up in Chapter 6 – is a noticeable exception from the tendency to keep 
concrete techniques out of narrations that frame computing primarily as a 
cultural project. While such accounts have addressed broader political and 
ideological aspects, a dimension largely absent from traditional histories, 
they give us little insight into technical ideas and materialities, ignoring 
how they enable and def ine the actual behavior and work performed by 
computers. A clear apprehension of how cybernetic principles continue to 
inform ‘Silicon Valley thinking’, to use Internet critic Evgeny Morozov’s 
term (2013), can help us understand why systems are built as they are; a clear 
apprehension of the technicities involved, however, can push back against 
only seemingly inevitable associations between technology and ideology by 
making clear that technicity’s inner logics do not neatly align with cultural 
normativity and allow for the expression of a variety of aspirations.
One area where scholars have been able to integrate these dimensions is 
the history of statistics. The foundational work by Hacking (1990), Desrosières 
(1998), Porter (1995), and others (Gigerenzer et al., 1989) has shown how a 
complex mathematical subject matter can be embedded in a critical cultural 
reading that remains highly receptive to the technical details involved. The 
attention given to the entanglements between statistics and power has been 
particularly inspirational to my own project. At the same time, the f ield has 
not ventured too deeply into the various relationships between statistics 
and computing although algorithmic information ordering is one of several 
areas where probability theory and statistical methods have dominated 
since the early 1960s. Decades before a ‘revolution’ in artif icial intelligence 
embraced statistical techniques (Russell and Norvig, 2010, p. 25), information 
retrieval began to frame the computer as a ‘thinking machine’ performing 
cognitive tasks, even if the rhetoric remained much more subdued than 
what we f ind in more well-known f ields. Rather than situating information 
ordering merely in a longer history of statistics, however, my goal is to ‘start 
in the middle – from the entanglement of past and present’ (Parikka, 2012, 
p. 5) and to show how it forms a ‘trading zone’ (Galison, 1996) where various 
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trajectories commingle and culminate in concrete artifacts that perform 
and (re)define tasks like searching and classifying documents.
At least since Friedrich Kittler’s work (1990), which itself draws heavily on 
Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge (2002), media archeology has emerged 
as a f ield that narrates cultural history from the perspective of technical 
operations, to the point where ‘the model of history itself appears as a 
function of cultural (symbolic and signal-based) operations’ (Ernst, 2013, p. 3). 
But despite the German tradition’s often remarked interest in mathematical 
formalism and machinic operation, there has been relatively little interest 
in the substance of computing beyond Turing’s universal machine and 
Shannon’s theory of communication (cf. Geoghegan, 2013, p. 68). Kittler’s 
predilection for discretization techniques such as the Fourier transform (cf. 
Krämer, 2006) and his emphasis on hardware – ‘there is no software’ (Kittler 
1997a) – indicate an almost obsessive adherence to a type of foundationalism 
that ignores the vast spaces of accumulation and variation marking not only 
software but also the sprawling differentiation of hardware form factors 
and interfaces. Parikka (2012) thus rightfully observes that ‘the past f ifty 
years of emergence of software and hardware cultures is something that 
is still waiting for more thorough work’ (p. 37f.). This book indeed inquires 
into spaces where memories of analog times begin to fade, and digital 
operations are becoming the new real. If the Fourier transform and its most 
well-known application in the numerical representation of sound waves 
epitomizes a particular moment in media history, information ordering 
comes into its own when digitization has already occurred, and masses of 
digital material are channeled through mature digital infrastructures. This 
is a story of computerization and mathematization that sits downstream of 
the birth of computing. Because a lot has happened since.
My account of mathematization therefore eschews the philosophers 
and mathematicians dealing with universal languages and logic, leaving 
aside the well-known portrayals of computers as the outcome of historical 
trajectories leading from Aristotle to Leibniz and further to Gödel and 
Turing. In a sense, this book resonates with the question Alt asks in his 
inspiring take on object orientation in programming, namely ‘How did 
computers and computation come to be viewed as media in the f irst place?’ 
(Alt, 2011, p. 279). While I share his focus on software-making, the produced 
end-user ‘mediality’, in my case, is not the graphical user interface and its 
applications but the ‘logistical’ techniques for information ordering serving 
‘to organize and orient, to arrange people and property’ (Peters, 2015, p. 37).
Information ordering has certainly not been absent from what can be 
understood as broadly media historiographical work. Works by Rayward (1975), 
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Beniger (1986), Headrick (2000), Krajewski (2011), or Hartmann (2012) indeed 
deal with methods and mechanics head on and constitute important references 
for my own approach. But the historical and archeological work that delves 
into subjects like information processing or knowledge organization almost 
invariably stops at the invention of the computer or bridges the space between 
the card catalogue and web search engines with a quick reference to Vannevar 
Bush’s Memex. While graphical user interfaces and the web have received much 
attention, algorithmic information ordering remains understudied. Marcus 
Burkhardt’s Digitale Datenbanken (2015), a study of the relational model for 
database management currently only available in German, remains a rare 
example of historical media scholarship investigating an information ordering 
technique invented after WWII. Considering the pivotal place the relational 
model takes in contemporary computing, one could dedicate an entire subfield 
to its study and interpretation. But names like Hans Peter Luhn, Gerard Salton, 
Karen Spärck Jones, M. E. Maron, or Edgar F. Codd, to cite some of the pioneers 
of algorithmic information ordering, are almost entirely absent from media 
historical work. Certainly, the work of specialized historians26 such as Thomas 
Haigh (2006, 2009) and studies like Bruillard and Blondel’s (2007) history of 
the spreadsheet have begun to fill these large holes in scholarship from the 
bottom up, one subdomain at a time, but these examples are far too rare given 
the cultural importance and large variety of techniques and technologies that 
have come to define the substance of contemporary computing. My attempt 
to make sense of information ordering will indeed refer to library techniques 
and the great universalist projects of humanists like Melvil Dewey and Paul 
Otlet, broadly canonized ‘pioneers of the information age’, but only insofar as 
they form the backdrop algorithmic information ordering develops against. 
In that sense, it qualifies as an ‘alternative history’ (Parikka, 2012, p. 7), even 
if the widespread presence of the techniques I discuss makes this a somewhat 
alarming observation. The particular focus on technicity my inquiry espouses 
requires a last set of theoretical remarks concerning its historical dimension 
before diving into the subject matter head on.
Accumulation and Archive
The idea that technicity requires specif ic attention should not be seen 
as a concession to the totalizing tendencies in certain strands of media 
26 There are specialized sections in historiography that deal with more technical subject 
matters, such as the Academy of Accounting Historians, but these communities rarely f igure 
in more general accounts.
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archeology where digitization is seen as some kind of ‘end of media history’ 
(cf. Gitelman, 2006, p. 3). Technicity should also not be understood as a secret 
substructure that determines all cultural development. Instead, I want to 
highlight the ‘unconventional’ (Huhtamo and Parikka, 2011, p. 11) perspective 
of Siegfried Zielinski, who proposes the term ‘variantology’ for an analysis 
of media that ‘favors “local” explorations, refusing to develop them into 
overarching explanations’ (Huhtamo and Parikka, 2011, p. 12). Zielinski’s 
work draws heavily on Foucault but further emphasizes heterogeneity and 
variation:
The history of the media is not the product of a predictable and necessary 
advance from primitive to complex apparatus. […] Media are spaces of 
action for constructed attempts to connect what is separated. […] Instead 
of looking for obligatory trends, master media, or imperative vanishing 
points, one should be able to discover individual variations. Possibly, 
one will discover fractures or turning points in historical master plans 
that provide useful ideas for navigating the labyrinth of what is currently 
f irmly established. (Zielinski, 2006, p. 7)
Zielinski’s approach builds on a reading of Foucault that deemphasizes the 
formation of broad épistémè we f ind in The Order of Things (2005) and his 
attentiveness to small and local variations, improbable encounters, and 
dead ends resonates with Simondon’s view of technology as transversal 
and contingent. Foucault himself constructs the methodology laid out 
in The Archaeology of Knowledge (2002) around the notion of ‘discursive 
formation’, a term that addresses conceptual regularities in knowledge 
practices in ways that are more variable and open than the earlier épistémè. 
Discursive formations are composed of ‘statements’ (énoncés), units of 
expression that assemble into a ‘system of dispersion’ (Foucault, 2002, p. 41). 
The notion of statement certainly has to be stretched to accommodate 
technological forms of expression, but it is hardly against the spirit of what 
Foucault tries to achieve if one admits things such as blueprints, models, 
or methods and even programming languages, lines of code, modules, and 
executable binaries into the fold. But I want to suggest that algorithmic 
techniques make for better candidates for genuine technical statements, 
since they are not tied to a particular material support. For Foucault (2002), 
statements are the ‘specif ic forms of accumulation’ (p. 138) that make up 
and characterize what he calls the ‘positivity’ of a discursive formation. This 
positivity constitutes the substance of a knowledge practice: the entities to 
appear, the rules of transformation, the conceptual forms, the mechanisms 
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of validation, the modes of exclusion, and so forth. These elements are not 
defined on a singular plane of identity but constitute a transversal regularity 
that connects the objects under investigation, the concepts and methods, 
and the modes of expression making up a specif ic formation. Interested in 
both commonality and variation, Foucault’s goal is not to define a unifying 
principle:
The horizon of archaeology, therefore, is not a science, a rationality, a 
mentality, a culture; it is a tangle of interpositivities whose limits and 
points of intersection cannot be f ixed in a single operation. Archaeology 
is a comparative analysis that is not intended to reduce the diversity 
of discourses, and to outline the unity that must totalize them, but is 
intended to divide up their diversity into different f igures. Archaeological 
comparison does not have a unifying, but a multiplying, effect. (Foucault, 
2002, p. 177, translation amended)
Foucault’s perspective does allow for regularities to emerge, but the way 
these regularities are conceived is not akin to stricter notions like ‘structure’ 
or ‘paradigm’ in the sense of Kuhn (1962). Instead, the f irst underlying 
principle is that of rarity and I want to suggest that compared to the seem-
ingly endless proliferation of technical objects that assemble well-known 
elements in myriad ways, the emergence of genuinely new technical schemas 
is essentially rare, even if the marketing chorus professes otherwise. Much 
like the statements in Foucault’s (2002) Archaeology, algorithmic techniques 
are characterized by a ‘law of rarity’ (p. 134). The following passage applies 
with almost uncanny perfection:
This rarity of statements, the incomplete, fragmented form of the enuncia-
tive f ield, the fact that few things, in all, can be said, explain that state-
ments are not, like the air we breathe, an infinite transparency; but things 
that are transmitted and preserved, that have value, and which one tries 
to appropriate; that are repeated, reproduced, and transformed; to which 
pre-established networks are adapted, and to which a status is given in 
the institution; things that are duplicated not only by copy or translation, 
but by exegesis, commentary, and the internal proliferation of meaning. 
Because statements are rare, they are collected in unifying totalities, and 
the meanings to be found in them are multiplied. (Foucault, 2002, p. 135)
The quote evokes the enormous care algorithmic techniques receive in 
computer science and adjacent f ields, for example, when Knuth describes, 
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classif ies, discusses, and interprets each algorithm in his massive collection 
in meticulous detail. These attempts to ‘singularize’ or demarcate techniques 
while multiplying their domains of application defines their richness and 
allows them to be repeated thousands of times in thousands of programs, 
adapted, transformed, and embedded in myriad ways. Fundamental techni-
cal elements are rare compared to the seemingly endless series of objects 
they inform.
The evolution of computing is characterized by both pivotal incursions, 
such as the microprocessor and the graphical user interface, and a steady 
stream of smaller inventions that, in the domain of software, represent new 
ways of making machines behave in certain ways. But more often than not, 
the making of a technical object does not involve anything that could be 
qualif ied as technical ‘invention’, that is, the creation of a new schema. Most 
programming is an adaptation of existing objective capacities to objectal 
circumstances, which certainly has the potential to produce its own forms 
of novelty but does not constitute a new technical positivity. Since most 
pieces of software draw together many elements, there is always technical 
imagination, creativity, and plasticity at work. And programmers regularly 
invent schemas that are new to them, since they did not know of or chose to 
ignore existing techniques. But the inception of something like the relational 
model for database management (Chapter 4) – not only a genuinely new 
schema but an almost complete replacement for its antecedents – does not 
happen very often. The more recent emergence of deep learning with neural 
networks is another example that shows how techniques enabling new 
machine behaviors can ripple through many different application domains 
in relatively short time when the necessary conditions fall into place.
In media archeological accounts, media are often thought to provide 
certain grids of possibility to society as a whole. As Wolfgang Ernst (2015) 
argues, ‘the media-archeological index names the indispensable and invari-
able conditions of what can then become culturally effective as thinkable’ 
(p. 196). In line with my focus on software-making, I more modestly propose 
to consider how computing, as discursive formation, def ines an archive of 
statements that serves as an a priori for software developers, informing 
and orienting their technical practice. Connecting back to Simondon’s 
constructive understanding of technology, this a priori should not be seen as 
a f ilter that only lets certain statements through but as the nonteleological 
condition of possibility for statements that would not be ‘sayable’ otherwise. 
In 1972, Dijkstra (1972) himself explicitly recognized the influence of the 
software archive and of programming languages in particular, arguing ‘that 
the tools we are trying to use and the language or notation we are using to 
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express or record our thoughts, are the major factors determining what we 
can think or express at all’ (p. 11). While deeply caught up in questions of 
power, contemporary development infrastructures represent rich domains 
of knowledge and technicity to build on. Seen as an archive, both in the 
common sense as a collection of something and in Foucault’s understanding 
as ‘the law of what can be said’ (Foucault, 2002, p. 145), there are certainly 
vectors pointing toward restriction and control, but there is also a widening 
of possible function and programmable behavior.
Even if Foucault would probably protest the analogy, we could argue that 
techniques, understood as statements, form a langue (‘language’) that manifests 
through the boundless sprawling of parole (‘speaking’). In this sense I posit 
that a large, growing, but ultimately limited archive of technical schemas and 
techniques pervades the vast mass of software that exists in the world. Parikka’s 
(2012) assertion that ‘new technologies grow obsolete increasingly fast’ (p. 3) 
therefore applies to a parole perspective that captures objectal variations but 
needs to be nuanced if we consider a langue dimension focusing on objective 
evolution: the latter evolves in a ‘temporality of the technical’ that forms ‘its 
own genuine temporal f igures’ (Ernst, 2015, p. 190), which are often slower 
that the crest of concrete applications and artifacts. Despite the seemingly 
obvious velocity of technological change and renewal, many of the schemas and 
elements that make up the ‘skeleton’ of an archive of computing have proven 
to be remarkably persistent: Tony Hoare’s Quicksort from 1959 is executed 
every time a PHP programmer calls the sort() function; E. F. Codd’s relational 
model from 1970 still dominates most information handling practices; Dennis 
Ritchie’s C, developed between 1969 and 1973, continues to set the standard 
for how the syntax of a programming language is supposed to look like and 
variants of the Unix operating system he developed with Ken Thompson and 
others power virtually every smartphone in use. In fact, although Richard 
Stallman would probably not approve, his GNU Emacs text editor, developed 
since 1976, runs on Android without too much trouble. The release of Ap-
ple’s iPhone was a defining moment in the history of computing, but even a 
superficial look reveals how deeply caught up in historical trajectories this 
apparently revolutionary product necessarily is. iOS, Apple’s operating system 
for mobile phones and tablets, was released in 2007, but the system itself is 
based on Mac OS X (2001), which, in turn, is built on a BSD kernel (1978), a 
Unix (~1973) derivative. It runs on an ARM processor core (1985) and still relies 
to a large extent on the Objective-C programming language, which was first 
introduced in 1983 and makes heavy use of concepts imported from C (1971) 
and Smalltalk (1969). This list could be continued almost indefinitely, and any 
piece of software could be submitted to such a form of genealogical analysis.
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But this should not mean that there is ‘nothing new under the sun’, that 
all innovation has already happened, and that everything new is, in fact, old. 
This attitude would be similarly ahistorical as a perspective emphasizing 
novelty in every small variation of a known schema. While the historical 
‘overhead’ is never too far away, there is certainly an ongoing movement 
of innovation that builds on existing technicity and leads, at times, to real 
instances of discontinuity. Even if the objective dimension of technology 
determines the fundamental range of possible function and behavior, the 
objectal adventure adds layers of variation that are highly signif icant in 
terms of actual outcomes. Indeed, the parole of software should not be 
seen as merely derivative or inconsequential since techniques can only 
ever become part of actual circumstances by becoming parole, by being 
spoken in the form of a textbook, module, or concrete program. And the 
real-world effects these programs can have cannot be deductively derived 
from the langue they instantiate. On the contrary, the cumulative and 
modular character of software does not reduce its plasticity or ‘generativity’ 
(Zittrain, 2008), but constantly adds new possibilities to a space that allows 
for a wide range of expression.
We should also not downplay the signif icance of what Simondon calls 
concretization and adaptation. The application of known techniques to new 
domains can yield surprising results. The current revolution in machine learn-
ing, for example, can be seen as the result of both invention and optimization: 
without the demonstration by Raina, Madhavan, and Ng (2009) that some of 
the most powerful machine learning techniques can be distributed onto the 
massively parallel processors in consumer graphics cards, it would have been 
infeasible to apply them to any large-scale applications. The Unix of 1973 is 
not the Unix of 2019. Swift, the programming language Apple introduced in 
2014 as an eventual replacement for Objective-C, does certainly not mark a 
revolution, having ‘benefited from the experiences hard-won by many other 
languages in the f ield, drawing ideas from Objective-C, Rust, Haskell, Ruby, 
Python, C#, CLU, and far too many others to list’,27 but the way it simplif ies 
development for Apple devices may well have real consequences. Easier access 
for programmers used to similar object-oriented languages, for example, 
changes the resource equation and makes Apple’s platforms – including the 
restrictive App Store model – more attractive to developers. While I would 
argue that Swift should be seen as another chapter in a story of concretiza-
tion rather than brimming with genuine invention, it certainly is one more 
programming language, one further addition to the archive of computing. 
27 http://nondot.org/sabre/, accessed 12 December 2019.
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The proliferation and functional diversif ication of programming languages 
is indeed an area where the larger movement of accumulation becomes 
particularly visible: Bill Kinnersley’s Language List28 counts no less than 
2500 languages that appeared in the decades since Plankalkül – generally 
considered the f irst high-level programming language – was conceived by 
Konrad Zuse in the early 1940s. While most of these languages have never 
found a significant audience, they contribute to the continuous proliferation 
of technical forms that constitute the f ield and substance of computing.
The emphasis on the presence of long-standing trajectories must therefore 
be balanced with a perspective that recognizes how, at least on a certain 
temporal scale, even the most stable ‘arrangements are at best temporary 
consolidations until emergent practices and technologies displace and 
rearrange the constituent parts’ (Geoghegan, 2013, p. 6). This appreciation 
of technical evolution as complex and contingent raises the question of 
how to assess ‘true’ novelty in the cacophony of techniques and objects. Is 
blockchain technology a new schema or simply a specif ic orchestration of 
well-known cryptographic techniques? There is no way around nuanced and 
conceptually informed investigation when trying to answer such questions.
Path, Technical System, Épistémè
Computing needs to be analyzed through concepts that acknowledge its 
contingency and diversity, not as manifestation of instrumental rationality 
or cybernetic teleology, set in motion with Babbage’s analytical machine and 
bound to develop more or less the way it did. Technical evolution is never 
the unfolding of singular principles. And the processes of accumulation 
and sedimentation in software clearly go beyond Darwinian competition to 
include strange couplings, cross-fertilization, conceptual transfer, mono- or 
bidirectional inspiration, as well as rejection, stonewalling, sabotage, conflict, 
and mutual indifference. While many techniques can be generalized or 
transferred from one setting to another, some work well in one domain and 
badly in others; and some may be so specif ic that they only make sense in 
a single f ield of application. And even if the end goal is the formulation of a 
program that runs on a digital computer, software constantly invokes forms 
of reasoning that are inspired and justified by ideas that have little to do with 
logic or other f ields of mathematics. The current state of computing can thus 
be seen as the situated outcome of technical evolution, understood as the 
nonteleological and cumulative unfolding of myriad processes of invention, 
28 http://www.info.univ-angers.fr/~gh/hilapr/langlist/langlist.htm, accessed 12 December 2019.
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concretization, and adaptation. Thinking technology in such inductive terms, 
however, does not mean that there is no room for broader trends, tendencies, 
and shifts; variation and consolidation and not mutually exclusive.
One conceptual vehicle for conceptualizing the emergence of larger 
zones of stability is the notion of ‘path dependence’, which highlights how 
existing technologies can exert a gravitational pull that makes it hard to 
switch from one trajectory to another. This comes, for example, in the 
form of user resistance: having already invested considerable time into 
learning the QWERTY keyboard layout, people are reluctant to switch to 
the apparently more eff icient Dworak keyboard (David, 1985). But there is 
also a broad infrastructure of software and hardware in place that is organ-
ized around the incumbent design and moving from one path to another 
would thus mean changing much more than just user habits. Computing 
is full of similar examples and the remarkable persistence of programming 
languages like C and operating systems like Unix show how consolidation 
and standardization can occur in the absence of a singular, overarching 
logic or telos.
Bertrand Gille (1986) introduced the notion of ‘technical system’ (système 
technique) to think consolidation in similar, yet even broader terms. A 
technical system delineates a historical state of technological development 
and represents ‘a coherent ensemble of compatible structures’ (p. viii) defined 
by interoperability, common standards, mutual dependence, and synergies 
between technical elements, as well as a certain measure of coherence with 
forms of social organization. The technical system of the Renaissance, for 
example, is characterized by the systematic synergies between hydraulic 
power, the newly invented crankshaft, innovations in mining, and new 
metallurgic techniques, which enable early forms of mass production and 
lead to a social system that marks the end of feudal organization and the 
emergence of capitalism. Although the notion of technical system is much 
more general and less stringent than Kuhn’s (1962) ‘paradigm’, it has similar 
infrastructural effects: it stabilizes, orients research and development, and 
potentially blocks the exploration of alternative routes. Not by rendering 
them impossible, but by making it that much easier to follow or extend exist-
ing paths. The concept extends the notion of path dependence to the level 
of larger ensembles and, ultimately, to civilizational development but also 
allows for the possibility of real heterogeneity or ‘technological pluralism’ 
since variation remains possible and systemic closure is never absolute.
Path dependence and the emergence of technical systems of compat-
ibility are ways to think the emergence of larger zones of commonality 
from the bottom up and help us imagine how something like an épistémè 
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could develop inductively. The commitment to variation and contingency 
notwithstanding, one could speculate about a ‘f ini-unlimited’ épistémè, 
where ‘a f inite number of components yields a practically unlimited diversity 
of combinations’ (Deleuze, 1988, p. 131), along these lines. This would frame 
computerization more generally as the drive toward a technical system 
built around computing and make room for economic explanations in 
the emergence of commonalities, synergies, and zones of domination. 
Algorithmic information ordering, more specif ically, then appears as the 
preferred technique for ‘distinction-making’ in this environment, as a means 
to generate both knowledge and economic surplus.
Relying on concepts like discursive formation, technical system, and even 
épistémè safeguards against the temptation to conceive technical evolu-
tion as the simple embodiment or deployment of instrumental rationality. 
Foucault writes:
I think that the word ‘rationalization’ is dangerous. What we have to do 
is to analyze specif ic rationalities rather than forever invoke the progress 
of rationalization in general. (Foucault, 1982, p. 779f.)
As we will see in the next chapter, the two sides in what Bowles (1999) termed 
the ‘information wars’ – librarians and information scientists – represent 
such ‘specif ic rationalities’. They develop from substantially different 
‘problematizations’ and def ine their own specif ic ideas, techniques, and 
‘truth criteria’ (Foucault, 1990, p. 10f.). Their respective positivities yield 
different operational and epistemological practices. Algorithmic information 
ordering indeed develops from an opposition to library traditions and over 
the course of several decades, the ‘disruptive’ new techniques have become 
available to software-makers everywhere. The second part of this book 
dives deep into a set of technical trajectories that begin by putting text 
documents into sequence and end up ordering almost anything that can 
be brought into the fold of computing.
Bibliography
Abbate, J. (1999). Inventing the Internet. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Abbate, J. (2012). Recoding Gender: Women’s Changing Participation in Computing. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Abelson, H., Sussman, G. J., and Sussman, J. (1996). Structure and Interpretation of 
Computer Programs (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
SOFt waRE-MakING aND alGORIthMIc tEchNIquES 135
Agre, P. E. (1994). Surveillance and Capture: Two Models of Privacy. The Information 
Society 10(2), 101-127.
Agre, P. E. (1997a). Computation and Human Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Akera, A. (2007). Calculating a Natural World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Alt, C. (2011). Objects of Our Affection: How Object Orientation Made Computers a 
Medium. In J. Parikka and E. Huhtamo (eds.), Media Archaeology: Approaches, 
Applications, and Implications (pp. 278-301). Berkeley: University of California Press.
Aspray, W., and Hayes, B. M. (eds.). (2011). Everyday Information: The Evolution of 
Information Seeking in America. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Astrachan, O. (2003). Bubble Sort: An Archaeological Algorithmic Analysis. In S. 
Grissom (ed.), SIGCSE ’03 Proceedings of the 34th SIGCSE Technical Symposium 
on Computer Science Education (pp. 1-5). New York: ACM.
Beniger, J. (1986). The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the 
Information Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bjerknes, G., Ehn, P., and Kyng, M. (eds.). (1987). Computers and Democracy: A 
Scandinavian Challenge, Aldershot: Avebury.
Bowles, M. D. (1999). The Information Wars: Two Cultures and the Conflict in 
Information Retrieval, 1945-1999. In M. E. Bowden, T. Bellardo Hahn, and R. V. 
Williams (eds.), Proceedings of the 1998 Conference on the History and Heritage 
of Science Information Systems (pp. 156-166). Medford: Information Today.
Brooks, F. P., Jr. (1975). The Mythical Man-Month. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
Brooks, F. P., Jr. (1996). The Computer Scientist as Toolsmith II. Communications 
of the ACM 39, (3): 61-68.
Bruillard, E., and Blondel, F.-M. (2007). Histoire de la construction de l’objet tableur. 
Retrieved from https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00180912.
Brunton, F. (2013). Spam: A Shadow History of the Internet. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
Burkhardt, M. (2015). Digitale Datenbanken. Eine Medientheorie im Zeitalter von 
Big Data. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.
Buxton, J. N. (1978). Software Engineering. In D. Gries (ed.), Programming Methodol-
ogy: A Collection of Articles by Members of IFIP WG2.3 (pp. 23-28). New York: 
Springer.
Campbell-Kelly, M., and Aspray, W. (1996). Computer: History of an Information 
Machine. New York: Basic Books.
Chabot, P. (2013). The Philosophy of Simondon: Between Technology and Individuation 
(A. Krefetz, trans.). London: Bloomsbury.
Chen, P. P. (1976). The Entity-Relationship Model – Toward a Unif ied View of Data. 
ACM Transactions on Database Systems 1(1), 9-36.
Colburn, T. R. (2000). Philosophy and Computer Science. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.
136 ENGINES OF ORDER
Cortada, J. W. (2016). All the Facts: A History of Information in the United States since 
1870. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Coy, W. (2001). Was ist Informatik? In J. Desel (ed.), Das ist Informatik (pp. 1-22). 
Berlin: Springer.
Coy, W. (2007). Kulturen – Nicht Betreten? Anmerkungen zur ‘Kulturtechnik 
Informatik’. Informatik-Spektrum 31(1), 30-34.
David, P. A. (1985). Clio and the Economics of QWERTY. American Economic Review 
75(2), 332-337.
Deleuze, G. (1988). Foucault (S. Hand, trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press.
Denning, P. J. (2007). Computing Is a Natural Science. Communications of the ACM 
50(7), 13-18.
Desrosières, A. (1998). The Politics of Large Numbers: A History of Statistical Reasoning 
(C. Naish, trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dijkstra, E. W. (1972). The Humble Programmer. Communications of the ACM 15(10), 
859-866.
Dijkstra, E. W. (1974). Programming as a Discipline of Mathematical Nature. 
American Mathematical Monthly 81(6), 608-612.
Dourish, P. (2016). Algorithms and Their Others: Algorithmic Culture in Context. 
Big Data & Society 3(2), 1-11.
Dreyfus, H. (1972). What Computers Can’t Do. New York: Harper & Row.
Dubin, D. (2004). The Most Influential Paper Gerard Salton Never Wrote. Library 
Trends 52(4), 748-764.
Dyck, A., Penners, R., and Lichter, H. (2015). Towards Definitions for Release Engineer-
ing and DevOps. In Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE/ACM 3rd International Workshop on 
Release Engineering (pp. 3-3). Los Alamitos: IEEE Conference Publishing Service.
Edwards, P. N. (1996). The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in 
Cold War America. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ensmenger, N. L. (2010). The Computer Boys Take Over: Computers, Programmers, 
and the Politics of Technical Expertise. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ernst, W. (2013). From Media History to Zeitkritik. Theory, Culture & Society 30(6), 
132-146.
Ernst, W. (2015). Technophysikalische and Symbolische Medienoperationen als 
Herausforderung der Historischen Zeit. In S. Haas and C. Wischermann (eds.), 
Die Wirklichkeit der Geschichte (pp. 185-204). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
Espeland, W. N., and Stevens, M. L. (1998). Commensuration as a Social Process. 
Annual Review of Sociology 24, 313-343.
Foucault, M. (1982). The Subject and Power. Critical Inquiry 8(4), 777-795.
Foucault, M. (1990). The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of the History of Sexuality (R. 
Hurley, trans.). New York: Vintage Books.
SOFt waRE-MakING aND alGORIthMIc tEchNIquES 137
Foucault, M. (2002). Archaeology of Knowledge (A. M. Sheridan, trans.). London: 
Routledge.
Foucault, M. (2005). The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. 
London: Routledge.
Foucault, M. (2008). The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79 
(G. Burchell, trans.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Fuller, M. (ed.). (2008). Software Studies: A Lexicon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Galison, P. (1996). Computer Simulations and the Trading Zone. In P. Galison and 
D. J. Stump (eds.), The Disunity of Science: Boundaries, Contexts, and Power 
(pp. 118-157). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Gawer, A. (2010). Platforms, Markets and Innovation: An Introduction. In A. Gawer 
(ed.). Platforms, Markets and Innovation (pp. 1-16). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Geoghegan, B. D. (2013). After Kittler: On the Cultural Techniques of Recent German 
Media Theory. Theory, Culture & Society 30(6), 66-82.
Gigerenzer, G., Swijtnik, Z., Porter, T., Daston, L., Beatty, J., and Krüger, L. (1989). 
The Empire of Chance: How Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gille, B. (ed.). (1986). The History of Techniques, Volume 1: Techniques and Civilizations 
(P. Southgate and T. Williamson, trans.). Montreux: Gordon and Breach.
Gitelman, L. (2006). Always Already New: Media, History, and the Data of Culture. 
Cambridge, MIT Press.
Golumbia, D. (2009). The Cultural Logic of Computation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Goody, J. (1977). The Domestication of the Savage Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Graham, P. (2002). A Plan for Spam, August. Retrieved from http://www.paulgraham.
com/spam.html.
Gürses, S., and Van Hoboken, J. (2018). Privacy after the Agile Turn. In E. Selinger, 
J. Polonetsky, and O. Tene (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consumer Privacy 
(pp. 579-601). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1990). The Taming of Chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haigh, T. (2006). ‘A Veritable Bucket of Facts’: Origins of the Data Base Management 
System. ACM SIGMOD Record 35(2), 33-49.
Haigh, T. (2009). How Data Got Its Base: Information Storage Software in the 1950s 
and 1960s. IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 31(4), 6-25.
Halpern, O. (2014). Beautiful Data. Durham: Duke University Press.
Hartmann, F. (2012). Die Logik der Datenbank. In F. Hartmann (ed.), Vom Buch zur 
Datenbank. Paul Otlets Utopie der Wissensvisualisierung (pp. 11-61). Berlin: Avinus.
Headrick, D. R. (2000). When Information Came of Age. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
138 ENGINES OF ORDER
Heidegger, M. (1977). The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays (W. 
Lovitt, trans.). New York: Garland.
Heidegger, M. (1998). Traditional Language and Technological Language. Journal 
of Philosophical Research 23, 129-145.
Helmond, A. (2015). The Platformization of the Web: Making Web Data Platform 
Ready. Social Media + Society 1(2), 1-11.
Hertzfeld, A. (1982) Creative Think. Retrieved from https://www.folklore.org/
StoryView.py?project=Macintosh&story=Creative_Think.txt.
Hjørland, B. (2010). The Importance of Theories of Knowledge: Indexing and Informa-
tion Retrieval as an Example. Journal of the American Society for Information 
Science and Technology 62(1), 72-77.
Huhtamo, E., and Parikka, J. (2011). Introduction: An Archaeology of Media Ar-
chaeology. In J. Parikka and E. Huhtamo (eds.), Media Archaeology: Approaches, 
Applications, and Implications (pp. 1-24). Berkeley: University of California Press.
IEEE. (1999) IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology (Standard 
No. 610.12-1990). Retrieved from https://standards.ieee.org/standard/610_12-1990.
html.
Kittler, F. A. (1990). Discourse Networks, 1800/1900 (M. Metteer, trans.). Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.
Kittler, F. A. (1997a). There Is No Software. In J. Johnston (ed.), Literature, Media, Infor-
mation Systems: Essays (pp. 147-155). Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers Association.
Kittler, F. A. (1997b). The World of the Symbolic – A World of the Machine. In J. 
Johnston (ed.), Literature, Media, Information Systems: Essays (pp. 130-146). 
Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers Association.
Kittler, F. A. (1999). Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (G. Winthrop-Young and M. 
Wutz, trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Knuth, D. (1997). The Art of Computer Programming, Volume 1: Fundamental Algo-
rithms (3rd ed.). Reading: Addison-Wesley.
Knuth, D. (1998). The Art of Computer Programming, Volume 3: Sorting and Searching 
(2nd ed.). Reading: Addison-Wesley.
Krajewski, M. (2011). Paper Machines: About Cards & Catalogs, 1548-1929 (P. Krapp, 
trans.) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Krämer, S. (1988). Symbolische Maschinen. Die Idee der Formalisierung im Geschichtli-
chen Abriß. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Krämer, S. (2006). The Cultural Techniques of Time Axis Manipulation: On Friedrich 
Kittler’s Conception of Media. Theory, Culture & Society 23(7-8), 93-109.
Krämer, S., and Bredekamp H. (2013). Culture, Technology, Cultural Techniques 
– Moving beyond Text. Theory, Culture & Society 30(6), 20-29.
Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
SOFt waRE-MakING aND alGORIthMIc tEchNIquES 139
Lampland, M., and Star, S. L. (eds.). (2009). Standards and Their Stories. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press.
Laplante, P. A. (2007). What Every Engineer Should Know about Software Engineering. 
Boca Raton: CRC Press.
Latour, B. (1986). Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands. 
Knowledge and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Culture Past and Present 6, 1-40.
Latour, B. (1991). Technology Is Society Made Durable. In J. Law (ed.), A Sociology 
of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination (pp. 103-131). London: 
Routledge.
Lave, J., and Wenger, E. (1991). Situated Learning. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Layton, E. T., Jr. (1974). Technology as Knowledge. Technology and Culture 15(1), 31-41.
Lévy, P. (1987) La Machine univers. Création, cognition et culture informatique. 
Paris: La Découverte.
Macho, T. (2003). Zeit und Zahl: Kalender- und Zeitrechnung als Kulturtechniken. 
In S. Krämer and H. Bredekamp (eds.), Schrift, Zahl: Wider die Diskursivierung 
der Kultur (pp. 179-192). München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.
Mackenzie, A. (2017a). Machine Learners: Archaeology of a Data Practice. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
Mackenzie, A. (2017b). 48 Million Configurations and Counting: Platform Numbers 
and Their Capitalization. Journal of Cultural Economy 11(1), 36-53.
Mancuso, S. (2015). The Software Craftsman: Professionalism, Pragmatism, Pride. 
Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
Manovich, L. (2001). The Language of New Media. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Manovich, L. (2013c). Software Takes Command. New York: Bloomsbury.
Marino, M. C. (2006). Critical Code Studies. Electronic Book Review, 4 December. 
Retrieved from http://www.electronicbookreview.com.
Maron, M. E. (1963). A Logician’s View of Language-Data Processing. In P. L. Garvin 
(ed.), Natural Language and the Computer (pp. 128-151). New York: McGraw-Hill.
McLuhan, M. (1962). The Gutenberg Galaxy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
McLure Wasko, M., and Faraj, S. (2000). ‘It Is What One Does’: Why People Participate 
and Help Others in Electronic Communities of Practice. Journal of Strategic 
Information Systems 9(2-3), 155-173.
Mokyr, J. (2005). The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Moor, J. H. (1978). Three Myths of Computer Science. British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science 29(3), 213-222.
Morozov, E. (2013). To Save Everything, Click Here. New York: Public Affairs.
Newell, A., and Simon, H. A. (1976). Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols 
and Search. Communications of the ACM 19(3), 113-126.
140 ENGINES OF ORDER
Nontrivial. (n.d.). ComputerLanguage.com. Retrieved from https://www.compu-
terlanguage.com/results.php?def inition=nontrivial.
OECD. (2013). Supporting Investment in Knowledge Capital, Growth and In-
novation. OECD Publishing. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/
newsourcesofgrowthknowledge-basedcapital.htm.
Parikka, J. (2012). What Is Media Archaeology? Cambridge: Polity Press.
Parikka, J. (2013). Afterword: Cultural Techniques and Media Studies. Theory, 
Culture & Society 30(6), 147-159.
Peters, J. D. (2015). The Marvelous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Porter, T. (1995). Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public 
Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Raina, R., Madhavan, A., and Ng, A. Y. (2009). Large-Scale Deep Unsupervised 
Learning Using Graphics Processors. In A. Danyluk, L. Bottou, and M. Litt-
man (eds.), ICML ’09 Proceedings of the 26th Annual International Conference on 
Machine Learning (pp. 873-880). New York: ACM.
Ramsay, S. (2010). The Hermeneutics of Screwing Around; or What You Do with 
a Million Books. In K. Kee (ed.), Pastplay: Teaching and Learning History with 
Technology (pp. 111-120). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Raymond, E. (1999). The Cathedral and the Bazaar. Knowledge, Technology & 
Policy 12(3), 23-49.
Rayward, W. B. (1975). The Universe of Information: The Work of Paul Otlet for Docu-
mentation and International Organization. Moscow: VINITI for the International 
Federation for Documentation.
Resnick, P., Iacovou, N., Suchak, M., Bergstrom, P., and Riedl, J. (1994). GroupLens: 
An Open Architecture for Collaborative Filtering of Netnews. In J. B. Smith, F. 
D. Smith, and T. W. Malone (eds.), CSCW ‘94 Proceedings of the 1994 International 
ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work (pp. 175-186). New 
York: ACM.
Rieder, B. (2006). Métatechnologies et délégation: pour un design orienté-société dans 
l’ère du Web 2.0. PhD dissertation, Université Paris 8. Retrieved from https://tel.
archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00179980/.
Rieder, B. (2013) Studying Facebook via Data Extraction: The Netvizz Application. 
In H. Davis, H. Halpin, and A. Pentland (eds.), WebSci ’13 Proceedings of the 5th 
Annual ACM Web Science Conference (pp. 346-355). New York: ACM.
Russell, S., and Norvig, P. (2010). Artificial Intelligence (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River: 
Pearson Education.
Sedgewick, R. (1983). Algorithms. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
Siegert, B. (2007). Cacography or Communication? Cultural Techniques in German 
Media Studies. Grey Room 29, 26-47.
SOFt waRE-MakING aND alGORIthMIc tEchNIquES 141
Siegert, B. (2013). Cultural Techniques; or The End of the Intellectual Postwar Era 
in German Media Theory. Theory, Culture & Society 30(6), 48-65.
Simon, H. A. (1996). The Sciences of the Artificial (3rd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Simondon, G. (2017). On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects (C. Malaspina 
and J. Rogove, trans.). Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing.
Star, S. L., and Griesemer, J. R. (1989). Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Bound-
ary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate 
Zoology, 1907-39. Social Studies of Science 19(3), 387-420.
Star, S. L., and Ruhleder, K. (1996). Steps toward an Ecology of Infrastructure: Design 
and Access for Large Information Spaces. Information Systems Research 7(1), 111-134.
Stonebraker, M., and Hellerstein, J. M. (eds.). (2005). Readings in Database Systems 
(4th ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Storey, M.-A., Singer, L., Cleary, B., Figueira Filho, F., and Zagalsky, A. (2014). The (R)
Evolution of Social Media in Software Engineering. In J. Herbsleb (ed.), FOSE 2014 
Proceedings of the on Future of Software Engineering (pp. 100-116). New York: ACM.
Swanson, D. R. (1988). Historical Note: Information Retrieval and the Future of 
an Illusion. Journal of the American Society for Information Science 39(2), 92-98.
Tedre, M. (2011). Computing as a Science: A Survey of Competing Viewpoints. Minds 
and Machines 21(3), 361-387.
Turkle, S. and Papert, S. (1990). Epistemological Pluralism: Styles and Voices within 
the Computer Culture. Signs 16(1), 128-157.
Vincenti, W. G. (1990). What Engineers Know and How They Know It. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Vismann, C. (2013). Cultural Techniques and Sovereignty. Theory, Culture & Society 
30(6), 83-93.
Wing, J. M. (2006). Computational Thinking. Communications of the ACM 49(3), 
33-35.
Winthrop-Young, G. (2013). Cultural Techniques: Preliminary Remarks. Theory, 
Culture & Society 30(6), 3-19.
Winthrop-Young, G. (2014). The Kultur of Cultural Techniques: Conceptual Inertia 
and the Parasitic Materialities of Ontologization. Cultural Politics 10(3), 376-388.
Wirth, N. (1971). The Programming Language Pascal. Acta Informatica 1(1), 35-63.
Wirth, N. (1976). Algorithms + Data Structures = Programs. Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall.
Zielinski, S. (2006). Deep Time of the Media. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Zimmer, M. (2010). Web Search Studies: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Web 
Search Engines. In J. Hunsinger, L. Klastrup, and M. Allen (eds.), International 
Handbook of Internet Research (pp. 507-521). Dordrecht: Springer.





4. From Universal Classification to a 
Postcoordinated Universe
Abstract
This chapter starts off from standard takes on knowledge organization 
and classif ication in libraries and encyclopedias, but then zeros in on the 
f ield of information retrieval, which develops in fundamental opposition 
to even the most visionary of library techniques. Coordinate indexing, 
the f irst technique in this lineage, is explicitly designed to eliminate 
the influence of librarians and other knowledge mediators by shifting 
expressive power from the classif ication system to the query and, by 
extension, to the information seeker. Order is no longer understood as a 
stable map to the universe of knowledge but increasingly as the outcome 
of a dynamic and purpose-driven process of ordering. The chapter closes 
by discussing coordinate indexing as a precursor of the relational model 
for database management.
Keywords: bibliographic organization, coordinate indexing, information 
wars, relational model for database management
This chapter delves into the question of information order and ordering 
through an investigation that leads from the library, long the principal 
institution dedicated to the organization of knowledge, to the f irst widely 
used technique in information retrieval, coordinate indexing, and its much 
more elaborate cousin, the relational model for database management. 
The goal is not to establish a narrative of progress that inevitably leads to 
our contemporary situation, but to highlight certain fault lines emerging 
around the closely related issues of knowledge organization and access, and 
how they relate to specif ic techniques. A signif icant part of contemporary 
information ordering indeed develops from attempts to fundamentally 
restructure how text documents are to be cataloged and retrieved. While the 
library tradition sees organization as a prerequisite for access, information 
Rieder, B., Engines of Order: A Mechanology of Algorithmic Techniques. Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2020
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retrieval rejects this idea and turns the sequence around: organization is 
to follow the specif ic needs expressed when accessing information. The 
order of knowledge is no longer a universal map, but a pathway defined by 
a momentary purpose.
The concepts and techniques involved in this story rely on different forms 
of physical machinery, but my account will not be another story of punched 
card machines, or at least not primarily. What I am interested in are the 
specif ic schemas that combine disparate material and symbolic elements 
into coherent systems. Specif ic ways of doing are clearly more compatible 
with specif ic mechanical trajectories and may rely on the availability of 
certain operational capabilities. But coordinate indexing f inds expression 
in at least three material manifestations and there are good reasons to 
consider it more abstractly as an algorithmic technique that delineates its 
own technical specif icity across different implementations. The arrival 
of the computer marks a clear incision, but, as we will see, it becomes the 
‘stage’ (cf. Laurel, 1993) for a variety of techniques rather than being tied to 
a single operational logic or arrangement.
Following Siegert (2007), I consider these techniques as ‘media that process 
the observation, displacement, and differentiation of distinctions’ (p. 31) 
since ordering, here, usually means arranging documents in relation to 
each other, physically or in a catalog, in classes or as a sequence. Knowledge 
organization is a practice of ‘distinction-making’ where different traditions 
draw not only on different techniques but pursue different objectives and 
incorporate different ideas about the world. While my focus, in this chapter 
and beyond, is squarely on the lineages that form and develop in conjunction 
with the computer, a broader historical perspective allows me to articulate 
more clearly how this is a much more complex transformation than the 
move from ‘analog’ to ‘digital’ suggests.
The question of how words and things are to be organized is by no means 
a new one and since the dawn of writing as a form of material inscription, 
practical answers entail a tight connection between conceptual and material 
elements. Scholars of literacy like Jack Goody have long argued that writing 
itself is instrumental to the ‘process of dissection into abstract categories’ 
(Goody and Watt, 1963, p. 331) that dominates Western culture to this day. The 
earliest surviving texts, written in the fourth millennium BCE in Mesopota-
mia, were, indeed, mostly administrative documents in list form (Casson, 2001, 
p. 2), efforts to record – and thereby control – things by externalizing them 
onto a material surface. The list, Goody (1977) argues, is not just a memory 
aid, but a device that ‘enables [speech] to be inspected, manipulated and 
re-ordered in a variety of ways’ (p. 76) and thereby allows for the question 
FROM uNIvERSal claSSIFIcatION tO a POStcOORDINatED uNIvERSE 147
of how things should be arranged to become explicit. The list has no natural 
order, no authoritative narrative, but instead ‘encourages the ordering of the 
items, by number, by initial sound, by category’ (p. 81) or by other schemes, 
according to the specific purpose it would serve. But once the list is made, its 
material presence and cognitive substance, backed by the social authority of 
the writer, can produce effects that have far-reaching consequences for how 
the ‘listed’ domain is perceived and acted upon. The list facilitates both the 
process of ordering and the imposition of order onto the world (cf. Young, 2017).
In this chapter, I will not venture into the fundamental question of how 
human beings discern and distinguish the world they inhabit, how they 
make it cognitively and practically apprehensible through gestures like clas-
sif ication and hierarchization. Instead, I will trace a lineage dedicated to a 
highly explicit form of ordering, namely the arranging of written knowledge. 
My use of that term should certainly not be read as a commitment to a 
theory of knowledge that considers it to be something that can be fully 
externalized and stored in a scroll or a codex. Rather, the techniques I will 
discuss are themselves caught up in def ining how written material can be 
made to serve learning and knowing, how its value can be understood and 
exploited. Indeed, writings of all kinds were collected and preserved from 
the beginning, testifying to their perceived importance and raising the 
question of how these potential knowledge reservoirs should be arranged.
Libraries and Knowledge Ordering
The earliest way to impose a certain order on collections of clay tables 
probably did not involve written lists, but simply spatial arrangement by 
shelf or by room. And spatial arrangement remains a central element in 
various forms of ordering to this day – including in the list itself, which can 
be seen as a specif ic way of arranging items on a writing surface. As far as 
we know, lists of written works appeared roughly around 2000 BCE, when 
collections began to grow beyond a certain size. These early inventories 
did not follow any particular order, but the mere fact that there was an 
easy way to consult the holdings of a library should be considered a f irst 
step toward systematization (Casson, 2001, p. 4). The roughly 30,000 tablets 
in Assyrian king Ashurbanipal’s library, created in the seventh century 
BCE and archeologically preserved due to its destruction during the fall of 
Nineveh in 612 BCE, were arranged by subject matter, but the catalogs seem 
to have served mainly as inventories and vanguards against theft (Harris, 
1999, p. 19; Casson, 2001, p. 13f.).
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The most remarkable step toward a more deliberate approach to catalog-
ing happened at the Library of Alexandria in the third century BCE, where 
Callimachus’s famous bibliographic work Pinakes (Tables) employed different 
techniques to aid the f inding of individual texts, inaugurating an order of 
knowledge in the process. This monumental catalog of the library’s 490,000 
scrolls was divided into ten subject matters that contained further subcat-
egories. Authors were, for the first time in history, listed in alphabetical order 
to facilitate retrieval. The Pinakes has not survived, but we know that the 
catalog divided authors into poetry and prose, and the latter into subject 
domains such as philosophy, history, and medicine. Individual works could 
be retrieved with the help of a shelf list (Casson, 2001, p. 39ff.). Systematic 
organization and broad access had direct consequences for the use of the 
library as an institution of knowledge management and acquisition, making 
it ‘possible for the student to plan for himself a rational course of reading 
in whatever subject interested him, offering opportunities for independent 
learning’ (Lerner, 2009, p. 17). The arrangement in subject matters projected 
a specif ic division of knowledge domains onto the most important library 
of antiquity, and thus onto a large zone of influence, but the enumeration of 
authors following the letters of the Greek alphabet stands out even further. 
For Goody, this mode of arrangement is a particularly powerful feature of 
the combination between the list form and the phonetic alphabet:
[T]he value of alphabetic listings is that each word is automatically as-
signed a specif ic but logically arbitrary place in the system, a space that 
only that item can f ill. It is thus of immense value in retrieval systems 
dealing with masses of disordered information, such as subscriptions for 
the telephone or students in a class. (Goody, 1977, p. 110)
While the subject catalog requires considerable intellectual effort and can 
be considered a genuine work of metaphysics, the alphabetical list appears 
as the f irst ‘mechanical’ ordering device. Libraries had grouped works by 
‘objective’ properties such as type of support, size, or language before, but 
none of these allowed for the same precision, speed, and convenience. The 
technique only works because the (Greek) alphabet is itself an ordered list 
of letters and those who learn to read also learn the specif ic sequence of 
letters. This arbitrary ordering – there is no specif ic reason that α should 
come f irst – represents a resource for the mechanical sorting of any set 
of words, providing more granularity when moving from the f irst letter 
to the second and so forth. The alphabet assigns a place to every thing 
through its name and remains one of the most common ordering devices 
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in use – every programming language ‘knows’ the sequence of letters and 
PHP’s sort() function will readily apply that sequence when presented with 
a list of character strings.
After the partial destruction of the Library of Alexandria in 48 BCE, it 
took almost two millennia before any institution could match the catalog-
ing achievements of the Ptolemies. Roman libraries were much smaller 
in size, less systematically organized, and in large part privately owned 
(Casson, 2001, p. 80ff.). Libraries in the Islamic world, such as the ones in 
Baghdad, Cairo, or Cordoba, had book collections counting in the hundreds 
of thousands, but we know little about the exact details of cataloging (Harris, 
1999, p. 79f.) used in them other than that knowledge organization followed 
a logic of ‘nobility f irst’, evaluated in religious terms (Lerner, 2009, p. 62). 
This reminds us that classif ication often involves the attribution of value 
and signif icance to items.
Further to the east, the Chinese assigned great importance to well-ordered 
libraries and catalogs, dividing subjects into classics, histories, philosophers, 
and collected works following Chinese scholarly tradition (Lerner, 2009, 
p. 41f.). In the West, the monastic libraries of the Middle Ages were small, 
focused on theological texts, and were mainly driven by the concerns of 
education and preservation. Since collections were so small – the library 
of the Vatican held a mere 1209 volumes as late as 1455 (Lerner, 2009, 
p. 89) – catalogs were mostly inventories of highly valuable objects and 
not attempts to systematize knowledge (Svenonius, 2000, p. 29; Lerner, 
2009, p. 35). As monasteries prospered and expanded their educational role, 
ordering volumes by subject, generally following the trivium and quadrivium, 
became a common practice. Mostly implemented via spatial placing in 
library rooms, librarians ran into logistical problems as titles were added 
(Harris, 1999, p. 110; Lerner 2009, p. 70). Only at the end of the Middle Ages 
and in particular when printing started to signif icantly expand the number 
of books in circulation did catalogs become more methodical, again mostly 
by registering volumes alphabetically. However, as books collections grew 
and covered broader f ields, organizational principles multiplied (Murray, 
2009, p. 205), typically following the specif ic ideas of a head librarian who 
held almost exclusive power over cataloging.
Until the late eighteenth century, catalogs were themselves books that 
simply listed works according to one of several available ordering schemes. 
While librarians would leave some space between entries for new arrivals, 
these would eventually f ill up and require notes on the margins, the addition 
of new pages, supplementary volumes and, sooner or later, a full – and 
thus very costly – retranscription of the entire catalog. But the increase in 
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printed volumes in the late eighteenth century and the steady stream of 
innovations in mechanical printing during the nineteenth century set the 
stage for a new material substrate that solved many of the basic limitations 
of the book form and stimulated interest in more systematic organization: 
the card catalog.
The Card Catalog
Until the Enlightenment period, state-owned libraries in the West were 
assembled for the purpose of representation rather than the eff icient 
management of knowledge. The many problems cataloging and shelf ing 
encountered mattered less to the limited audiences that had access in the 
f irst place. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, this 
conception of the library came under attack from democratic reformers that 
requested public admission to what was increasingly perceived as a valuable 
resource for learning and social reform (Harris, 1999, p. 243f.). Librarians 
fully embraced the democratic ethos of the Enlightenment and began to 
see themselves as stewards of knowledge that should guide seekers through 
ever larger collections. The transformation of the library into an institution 
of public education and a ‘temple of reason’ def ines its mission to this day.1 
But making access for wider audiences a reality was not only a political 
but also a logistical struggle. As Mortimer Taube, one of the information 
retrieval pioneers of the 1940s and 1950s, argues, classif ication became an 
essential part of the solution:
The patron of the public library was the ‘common man,’ the citizen of 
the republic of letters to whom all knowledge was to be made available. 
To be sure, there have always been attempts to classify knowledge; but 
library classif ication became a major factor in bibliographic organization 
only when it became a specialized tool for the modern public library. 
(Taube, 1951, p. 64)
If the new patrons were to be served well, a uniform, systematic, and up-
to-date catalog was required, not only to help with orientation and book 
retrieval but also with management tasks such as inventory handling or 
lending. The card catalog greatly facilitated all of these functions.
1 As Carla Hayden, the current Librarian of Congress, writes in her welcome message: ‘The 
Library preserves and provides access to a rich, diverse and enduring source of knowledge to 
inform, inspire and engage you in your intellectual and creative endeavors’ (Hayden, n.d.).
FROM uNIvERSal claSSIFIcatION tO a POStcOORDINatED uNIvERSE 151
Although the Swiss naturalist and bibliographer Conrad Gessner had 
already used a complex system of paper slips to compile his Bibliotheca Uni-
versalis in the sixteenth century, the f irst real card catalog was introduced 
by diplomat, politician, and librarian Gottfried van Swieten in 1780 in the 
Hofbibliothek in Vienna (cf. Krajewski, 2011). In this quite revolutionary 
system, pioneered in parallel in revolutionary France, works were no longer 
listed in bound volumes, but each title received a card and these cards would 
be stored in adapted cabinets, ordered by alphabet or subject. The system 
greatly facilitated the creation, handling, and maintenance of catalogs, in 
particular for larger collections. When a new title arrived, the corresponding 
card could be lodged between two others; if space became scarce, the cards 
would simply be transferred to a larger cabinet. Leaving blank space for 
future additions or scribbling new titles on margins was no longer necessary. 
While the card catalog was not directly related to any specif ic ordering 
system, it transformed the very act of cataloguing from a special project 
that would take place at the initiative of a particularly ambitious librarian 
at a specif ic moment in time and then slowly deteriorate into an ongoing 
process that could inf iltrate much more deeply into library practices. The 
importance of the new approach is hard to overstate.
But the card catalog is not only a practical tool that facilitates the life 
of both librarian and library patron; it is a critical step toward mobility 
and abstraction, that is, toward ‘the process of considering something 
independently of its associations or attributes’ (OED). Catalogs in book 
form had already made it possible to move beyond the crucial limitation 
of ordering by physical placement on shelves, namely that there could 
only ever be a single arrangement. Creating lists of references pointing 
to physical locations allowed for alphabetical, subject-based, and other 
ordering rationales to coexist in the context of a single collection. Catalogs 
are essentially collections of metadata that decontextualize individual 
items and encourage experimentation with different forms or order. Even 
if card catalogs were still mostly ordered by author or subject (Harris, 1999, 
p. 147), the mobility of individual references further enhanced organizational 
possibilities. While physical books could always be rearranged but only 
into a single order at a time, written list could be easily multiplied but were 
hard to expand or adapt. Moving to cards, the reference entries themselves 
became movable and what held them together was no longer a list, but 
a cabinet. In a sense, the card catalog still follows the list form, but the 
drawer replaces the page and the sides of the cabinet the outer binding of 
the book. The major difference is that the items on the list become ‘atoms’ 
that are suddenly able to move, giving a boost to the reordering function 
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highlighted by Goody (1977, p. 76), even if the card catalog mostly served to 
uphold existing ordering schemes as the mass of items to manage grew at 
increasing speed and the mandate of the library had begun to transform.
Although Simondon’s work focuses on more industrial forms of technol-
ogy, I would argue that a card catalog is a technical individual that combines 
various elements – one of them being an ordering scheme – into a working 
system. The specif ic technicity of the card and cabinet had important 
consequences: the card catalog played a central role in transforming the 
library into a knowledge resource and learning tool open, at least in theory, 
to an entire population. The change in materiality from the book form to 
the card form contributed to a shift of attention from the cumbersome 
logistical work of cataloging to more conceptual aspects of organization 
and arrangement. The logistical ‘unburdening’ kept collection growth 
manageable and meant that ordering principles, seen as means to make 
collections more accessible, could come more strongly into view. Although 
the adoption of card catalogs was relatively slow and required the greater 
part of the nineteenth century, it is no surprise that their diffusion coincides 
with the period where the great knowledge systematizations that structure 
library collections to this day took form. These attempts to create stable 
and all-encompassing orders of knowledge were greatly inspired by the 
universalist outlook of Enlightenment philosophers, even if the realities of 
library management meant that concessions had to be made.
Toward Universalism
Next to serving as objects of prestige, state-owned libraries before the nine-
teenth century were (sometimes) to assist ‘persons of merit and knowledge’ 
(Lerner, 2009, p. 91) in their intellectual endeavors. Hiring a scholar of renown 
as the librarian could further both of these objectives. For someone like 
the philosopher and polymath Gottfried Leibniz, who served as librarian 
for many years, such an assignment was an excellent opportunity to think 
about and experiment with the organization of knowledge. His work on 
the catalog in Wolfenbüttel followed in large part the 21 subject categories 
laid out by Conrad Gessner and his own recommendations for library clas-
sif ication systems favored pragmatic schemes based on university faculties 
(cf. Schulte-Albert, 1971). He did, however, introduce a decimal extension 
to distinguish between the volumes of an ongoing series (Schulte-Albert, 
1971, p. 140). But Leibniz was not just interested in the systematization and 
accessibility of the works in the institutions he headed. The ambition to 
devise a more perfect form of reasoning than natural language with its 
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many ambiguities echoes though Leibniz’s designs for an ‘alphabet of human 
thought’ (alphabetum cogitationum humanarum), a system combining a 
universal language (characteristica universalis) and a universal framework 
for logical calculation (calculus ratiocinator). These elements amount to ‘not 
just a theory of classif ication […], nor just a general theory of philosophical 
method […], but a formalism for the representation and for the genera-
tion of all knowledge’ (Mittelstrass, 1979, p. 604). Here, we f ind the most 
explicit expression of the idea that calculation can be a means for producing 
(philosophical) knowledge (Krämer, 1988, p. 100f.). The attempt to develop 
not merely an inventory of knowledge, but a thorough formalization of both 
semantic representation and logical inference opens a direct lineage toward 
efforts in areas such as symbolic artif icial intelligence or the Semantic Web. 
We will come back to such intersections between calculation and meaning, 
but Leibniz’s work can already illustrate the interest in the organization and 
formalization of knowledge philosophers began to take in the seventeenth 
century. This interest funnels into a second lineage next to the library that 
was concerned with collecting and organizing human knowledge: the 
Encyclopedia.
Here, Francis Bacon’s Of the Proficience and Advancement of Learning from 
1605 is worth mentioning since its classif ication of all knowledge into a tree 
with three main branches – memory, imagination, and reason – became 
highly influential (Darnton, 1999). Among others, Diderot and D’Alembert’s 
Encyclopédie, a highly ambitious attempt to collect and systematize all avail-
able knowledge, drew on Bacon’s system for its own hierarchical taxonomy. 
While encyclopedias and libraries differ in fundamental ways, they follow 
a similar mission and their histories intersect frequently. The Discours 
préliminaraire from 1751 defines the task Diderot and D’Alembert set out for 
themselves, and it is worth quoting a particularly instructive passage in full:
[The encyclopedic arrangement of our knowledge] consists of collecting 
knowledge into the smallest area possible and of placing the philosopher 
at a vantage point, so to speak, high above this vast labyrinth, whence he 
can perceive the principal sciences and the arts simultaneously. From 
there he can see at a glance the objects of their speculations and the 
operations which can be made on these objects; he can discern the general 
branches of human knowledge, the points that separate or unite them; 
and sometimes he can even glimpse the secrets that relate them to one 
another. It is a kind of world map which is to show the principal countries, 
their position and their mutual dependence, the road that leads directly 
from one to the other. (D’Alembert, 1995, p. 47)
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For Diderot and D’Alembert, the tree of knowledge could be drawn in dif-
ferent ways, but the task of the philosophes was not to merely produce an 
arbitrary arrangement supporting the pragmatic goal of making the 70,000 
articles in the Encyclopédie accessible. In line with Foucault’s description 
of the classic épistémè, they were confident that rigorous analysis would be 
able to adequately and accurately account for a world ‘offered to representa-
tion without interruption’ (Foucault, 2005, p. 224). But as Darnton (1999, 
p. 191ff.) argues, the specif ic way categories were chosen was in itself a 
statement designed to promote secular and antiauthoritarian ideals. The 
universalism of the French Enlightenment is thus f irst a commitment 
to the universal values and natural rights2 that f ind their most widely 
disseminated expression in the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du 
citoyen of 1789. The adherence to these ideals, however, also had a ‘universal-
izing’ effect in epistemological terms, in the sense that those who reject 
the authoritarian impulses of religious or political despotism and allow 
themselves to be guided by their desire for truth would be able to come 
to a shared understanding concerning the systematization of knowledge, 
even if an element of arbitrariness remains. The argument the philosophes 
made was twofold: on the one side, nature itself possesses a structure, which 
we are able to perceive through our senses and to represent adequately; 
on the other side, the practical task of diffusing knowledge to everyone 
requires a certain coherence and unity. The Encyclopédie, a colossal effort 
that drew on the contributions of 140 individuals, should thus be seen as a 
socio-epistemological project that attempts to produce not only a collection 
of all human knowledge but also the adherence to a shared understanding 
concerning its systematization. Epistemological and political universalism 
go hand in hand in this endeavor.
Modern Library Classification Techniques
Although libraries had to deal with logistical problems that did not affect the 
creators of the Encyclopédie, the public library movement of the nineteenth 
century embraced a similar set of beliefs. The objective to cover all areas 
of knowledge and to provide access to everyone required enormous effort 
and provoked increased interest in systematization, commonality, and 
standardization. While the librarians of the Middle Ages and Renaissance 
2 For the encyclopedists, it is the ‘cry of Nature’ against injustice that compels an understanding 
of good and bad, creating the moral imperative to use knowledge as a means for emancipation 
(D’Alembert, 1995, p. 12).
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had begun to create union catalogs that covered more than one institu-
tion and wrote manuals for library organization that were instrumental 
for developing a set of shared ideas, these undertakings deepened in the 
nineteenth century. Anthony Panizzi’s 92 bibliographical rules for the 
British Museum (1841) and Charles Coff in Jewett’s 39 rules for the library at 
the Smithsonian Institution (1853) were not only much more detailed than 
earlier recommendations but were also taken up in many other locations 
(Lerner, 2009, p. 177). These efforts culminated in Charles Ammi Cutter’s 
Rules for a Printed Dictionary Catalog (1876), ‘likely the most cited text in 
the bibliographic literature’ (Svenonius, 2000, p. 16), which built its rules 
and recommendations on three explicitly stated objectives for catalogs: to 
help f ind a specif ic book; to show what a library has on offer, for example, 
on a specif ic subject; to ‘assist in the choice of a book’ (Cutter, 1876, p. 10).
Such attempts to formulate explicit rules and guidelines were part of 
a larger conversation that led to the emergence of library science as an 
academic discipline and to librarianship as a profession. A crucial ques-
tion was how to best realize the shared objectives Cutter synthesized into 
paradigmatic form and systematization was to play an important role. 
Other than basic author lists, the two central lines of development for 
cataloging were the structured subject heading list and the hierarchical 
classif ication scheme, both of which endure until today. Building on a long 
line of precursors, some of them already mentioned, they received their 
modern form in the second half of the nineteenth century.
The formulation and standardization of modern subject headings is gener-
ally attributed (Kilgour, 1969, p. 31; Wiegand and Davis, 1994, p. 605), at least 
in the American context, to Jewett, still working at Brown University in the 
early 1840s, and later to Cutter’s (1876) canonical formulation. The modern 
form generally contains three elements that are combined into a single, 
alphabetically ordered list: broad subjects, specif ic subjects, and so-called 
subject-word entries that take the word judged most important from a book’s 
title. The f irst two are taken from a controlled, uniform vocabulary and are 
the most important part of the system. Cutter’s version already contained 
the ‘see’ (for linking nonuniform terms to the corresponding uniform terms) 
and ‘see also’ (for linking to related or more specif ic headings) type refer-
ences that continue to exist, for example, in the Library of Congress Subject 
Headings (LCSH), prepared since 1898. LCSH entries are strictly controlled 
expressions containing a main heading and, possibly, a subdivision (e.g., 
‘Classif ication--Books’). As Svenonius (2000, p. 179) remarks, the LCSH is 
a largely enumerative language, where all allowable expressions are given 
in a centrally controlled list, even if more ‘synthetic’ features were added 
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after 1974, allowing ‘free-f loating’ subdivisions, for example, for time or 
geography (e.g., ‘Art--Censorship--Europe--Twentieth century’).
While the preparation of an actual catalog requires consistency and 
thus an authoritative thesaurus of subject headings, such thesauri are 
generally not based on a structured, philosophical vision concerning the 
order of knowledge (Wiegand and Davis, 1994, p. 606). Their specific brand of 
universalism is conventional rather than Hegelian. Despite continuous criti-
cism stemming from the extreme reluctance to adapt existing vocabulary 
(Wiegand and Davis, 1994, p. 606; Drabinski, 2013, p. 97), the ongoing use 
of the LCSH in the US, the Répertoire d’autorité-matière encyclopédique 
et alphabétique unif ié (RAMEAU) in France, or the Schlagwortnormdatei 
(SWD) in Germany shows that the adherence to a shared standard remains 
highly attractive to librarians committed to the practical unif ication of 
knowledge promoted by the philosophes. Subject headings also work very 
well with the logistics of the card catalog: subjects are written on the top of 
taller cards and individual titles are ranged alphabetically behind them. But 
they largely leave open another problem that the creators of the Encyclopédie 
did not have to deal with: the placement of titles in a library.
While systematic classif ications based on hierarchical category trees 
can be used for cataloging and indexing, their enduring success in libraries 
mostly concerns the physical arrangement of books. Despite the aff inity 
between Enlightenment thinking and the library movement, it was not the 
Bacon-Encyclopédie lineage that became dominant but a much more utilitar-
ian system that took some inspiration from Leibniz’s decimal numbering 
system. As its name implies, the Dewey Decimal Classif ication (DDC), f irst 
introduced by Melvil Dewey in 1876, is based on a nested tree structure 
where ten main categories are subdivided into ten subcategories, and so 
forth. Although the initial version only proposed a depth of three, there is 
no theoretical limit. Dewey, who insisted on copyrighting his invention, 
argued that ‘philosophical theory and accuracy have been made to yield to 
practical usefulness’ and conceded that ‘the division of every subject into 
just nine heads is absurd’ (Dewey, 1876, p. 4). But his invention allowed for 
a very convenient numbering scheme: Bacon’s work would be found in the 
main class ‘Philosophy’ (100) and the subclasses ‘Modern Philosophies’ (190) 
and ‘English’ (192). Although there was, from the beginning, an alphabetical 
index of all classes, the system’s decimal requirement introduced all kinds 
of conceptual diff iculties that made it less suitable for cataloguing than the 
‘f lat’ structure of subject headings. Its hierarchical organization was more 
useful for the physical placement of books, which was previously based on 
fixed rather than ‘logical’ locations. The decimal system provided a practical 
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means to organize and locate books in a way that titles treating a similar 
subject would be placed together on the shelf, encouraging browsing and 
discovery. The capacity to move from the more general to the more specif ic 
traded the greater flexibility of subject headings for easier navigation. Since 
both systems have their respective strengths and weaknesses, many libraries 
employ both in conjunction.
To complete this short overview of the backdrop against which algo-
rithmic ordering techniques develop, the work of two other pioneers is 
worth mentioning: Paul Otlet and Siyali Ranganathan. Although Paul 
Otlet’s contributions are often mentioned as precursors to contemporary 
forms of information access, his work can be seen as the culmination of the 
nineteenth century when it comes to knowledge organization. Working 
with international lawyer Henri La Fontaine in Belgium, Otlet founded 
the discipline of ‘documentation’ as a direct response to the proliferation 
of publications of all kind, ranging from scientif ic journals to audiovisual 
contents. The challenge to the book as the primary support of knowledge 
justif ied their highly systematic approach. In the 1890s, they founded the 
Office international de bibliographie and started to work on the Répertoire 
bibliographique universel, a ‘universal catalog’ (Otlet, 1934, p. 241) that 
would cover all document types. To give structure to this immense edi-
f ice, a modif ied version of the DDC was used. The Classif ication decimale 
universelle (CDU), still in use today, extended Dewey’s classes to account 
for certain particularities of the European context and introduced a syntax 
for cross-referencing between classes, similar to the ‘see also’ connections 
used in subject headings.
But Otlet was dissatisf ied with mere bibliography. While recorded knowl-
edge obviously had to have some kind of support, books and other documents 
contain many different ‘facts’ that are not easily accessible through a catalog. 
Otlet therefore also imagined an encyclopedia, a ‘universal book’, that would 
be based on a repertoire of facts, extracted and retranscribed on index cards 
and classed into the universal systematization of the UDC (Otlet, 1934, 
p. 7). The Mundaneum, which housed the different card collections and 
was to be at the heart of a network of information centers, could indeed be 
described as an ‘analog search engine’ (Wright, 2008) that responded to 1500 
information queries per year during its heyday. Otlet indeed combined the 
basic principles of the card catalog with the encyclopedic impulse inherited 
from the Enlightenment to produce a collection of knowledge closer to the 
‘logic of the database’ than the monographic form (Hartmann, 2015, n.p.). He 
also shared with many of his successors the idea that books were now only 
one support among many and that the sheer mass of publications required 
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creative solutions, including technical innovations such as microfilm and 
electronic data transmission (cf. Hartmann, 2012).
Where Otlet remains largely attached to the nineteenth century is the 
strong emphasis on systematization, standardization, synthesis, unity, 
and ‘universalism, that is, a system that would embrace all things’ (Otlet, 
1934, p. 430). Trained as a lawyer rather than a scientist or librarian, he 
espoused a deeply positivistic vision of science that, as Hartmann (2012, p. 56) 
remarks, tends toward an almost Hegelian totalization, where the stock of 
knowledge forms a coherent, unambiguous set of laws that can be captured 
in a singular structure. Knowledge, broken up into atoms collected on index 
cards, would be put together again, not by the king’s horses and men, but 
through universal classif ication ‘conform to the order intelligence discovers 
in things’ (Otlet, 1934, p. 41). Although Otlet showed a certain pragmatism 
when it came to logistical solutions, he shunned the alphabetical subject-
heading approach as ‘too empirical’ (Otlet, 1934, p. 381) and too scattered to 
capture the complex expressions of contemporary science. Ironically, Otlet 
was heavily criticized by one of his contemporaries, Henry E. Bliss (1935), for 
his decision to adopt a modif ied version of the DDC which, ‘disregarded, or 
ignored, the principles of logical classif ication and the systems of science 
and education’ (p. 100). For Bliss, the UDC was not positivistic enough: if 
‘[o]rganizations of knowledge […] become organizations for thought’ (p. 87) 
the microcosm of mental organization needs to correlate with the ‘intrinsic 
physical organization of the cosmos, the macrocosm’ (p. 102).
In fact, the philosophical structure of classif ication was not at the center 
of Otlet’s interests. Rayward (1994) rightly remarks that his objectives were 
ultimately more ambitious and classif ication ‘was simply the f irst step in 
a more general system of what might be called documentary processing’ 
(p. 237), a practice that would go deeply into the content of a document. 
His ideas concerning techniques for establishing connections between 
excavated facts are sometimes presented as precursors to hypertext and 
the web (Hartmann, 2006), but despite clear similarities, I would argue that 
his vision more accurately amounts to a centralized and fully systematized 
version of Wikipedia, a universally accessible, navigable repository of all 
‘factual’ knowledge.
In contrast, a system that focused explicitly on pushing the mechanisms of 
classif ication beyond their nineteenth-century formulations was introduced 
in 1933, a year before Otlet published his magnum opus, the Traité de la 
documentation. Invented by S. R. Ranganathan, a mathematician who 
somewhat accidentally became librarian at the University of Madras in 1923, 
the ‘colon classif ication’, named for the prominent use of the colon sign in its 
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syntax, was ‘designed to overcome the difficulty enumerative languages have 
in keeping pace with knowledge’ (Svenonius, 2000, p. 175). Enumerative lan-
guages, like the DDC or the LCSH, are based on the principle that all classes 
have to be listed in a main thesaurus; synthetic classif ications – of which the 
colon classif ication was the f irst fully developed example – instead define 
a syntax for combining ‘aspects’ into a classif icatory expression, ‘reducing 
the vast universe of knowledge to a set of atomic concepts and certain basic 
relations among them’ (Svenonius, 2000, p. 175). This meant that indexers 
did not have to wait for a central authority, like the Library of Congress, 
to update their category listings. Star argues that the colon classif ication 
thus frames ‘the universe(s) of knowledge as potentially inf inite, open, 
and evolving’ (Star, 1998, p. 226), even if the basic ordering into disciplines 
does not stray very far from the Baconian tradition. Ranganathan’s system 
is based on a list of main classes (e.g., B Mathematics, R Philosophy) that 
are complemented by f ive ‘facets’, each marked by a specif ic sign: ‘,’ for 
personality, ‘;’ for matter, ‘:’ for energy, ‘.’ for space, and ‘'’ for time. While 
both the DDC and the CDU have known facets in some sense from their 
inception, for example, to distinguish between types of publication or to 
indicate period and geography, the colon classif ication fully embraces 
the synthetic principle (Satija, 2002). Facets are independent from each 
other and can be combined into compound classif icatory expressions. The 
technique does not, however, define a singular abstracted system of semantic 
coordinates. For example, personality in the context of library science 
means the kind of library, while in the context of chemistry it describes 
elements or compounds. But the different components can form complex 
phrases, such as the commonly given example ‘research in the cure of the 
tuberculosis of lungs by x-ray conducted in India in 1950s’ (Chan, 1994, p. 39), 
which is noted as L,45;421:6;253:f.44'N5 and translates, from left to right, 
into ‘Medicine’ (main category), ‘,Lungs’ (personality, the specif ic subject), 
‘;Tuberculosis’ (matter, the property), ‘:Treatment’ (energy, the intend to cure 
the tuberculosis), ‘;X-ray’ (matter, the means to cure), ‘:research’ (energy, 
this concerns research into this specif ic treatment), ‘.India’ (space), and 
‘'1950’ (time). This system allows for extremely f ine-grained descriptions 
and makes it easy to add new elements to different facets, for example, 
a new treatment. In certain respects, Ranganathan’s system is closer to 
Leibniz’s characteristica universalis than to traditional classification systems. 
While the colon classif ication has remained in active use, in particular in 
the Indian context, its enormous complexity makes it hard to use beyond 
special cases. It does, however, point into the broad direction algorithmic 
information ordering was taking.
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Toward Computation: Documentation and Coordinate Indexing
At the eve of WWII, two techniques for organizing documents by subject 
dominated: subject headings, generally based on increasingly long lists of 
increasingly specif ic topics (e.g., ‘Classif ication--Dewey decimal’ in the 
LCSH), and classif ication trees, often used for physical placement, where 
each book is supposed to sit at a specif ic place in the hierarchy.3 This is the 
backdrop against which the f ield of information retrieval developed a set of 
ideas, concepts, and – most importantly – techniques that broke with the 
library tradition in fundamental ways. Often relying on statistical approaches, 
information retrieval became one of the fundamental ‘ancestral communities 
of probabilization’ (Mackenzie, 2017a, p. 118) and its contributions continue 
to define contemporary information ordering. The rest of this book can thus 
be understood as an attempt to ‘excavate the present’ (Parikka, 2011, p. 214) 
by following a series of inventions that sought to transform knowledge 
organization into a dynamic, machine-supported process of ordering.
Documentation Centers
Even though catalogs, classif ication schemes, and other aspects of library 
logistics had become quite elaborate in the first half of the twentieth century, 
the degree of mechanization remained low. Herman Hollerith had begun 
to commercialize his punched card tabulators in the 1890s, but as Williams 
(2002, p. 16) notes, the earliest reports of uses in libraries came in the mid-
1930s and concerned management tasks such as circulation control and the 
statistical analysis of book use to inform future buying decisions. Existing 
catalogs relied heavily on trained librarians as ‘knowledge mediators’, both 
for bibliographic control when new titles arrived and to guide visitor through 
standardized vocabularies and intricately organized f loor plans. Even 
university libraries, catering to more specialized audiences than their public 
cousins, were organized in similar ways and run by professional librarians 
rather than academics. Their broad outlook and public mandate meant 
that the mechanization of information ordering did not happen in these 
institutions, and neither did the upheaval of conventional ordering schemes.
The emergence of technical and intellectual innovations – or disruptions 
– in knowledge ordering are closely linked to so called ‘special libraries’ and 
‘documentation centers’ (Williams, 2002; Varlejs, 2004). Special libraries 
3 Some libraries had also begun to use alphabetical lists mixing authors, titles, and subjects 
into a single catalog.
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had existed at least since the early 1800s and they had generally been more 
concerned with matters of classif ication than their less specialized cousins 
(Shera, 1952, p. 189f.). But the emphasis on public education had marginalized 
these more focused institutions, with ‘the disastrous effect of diverting 
librarianship from its proper concern with the analysis and organization of 
recorded knowledge’ (Shera, 1952, p. 191). In the US, documentation services 
had not received the same amount of attention as in Europe, where Paul 
Otlet was promoting the idea of information centers, and were mostly 
concerned with new methods for photographic reproduction (Shera, 1952, 
p. 193). However, these traditions ‘received a new vitality when the Second 
World War brought into existence a need for greater and more eff icient 
access to information than traditional library methods were able to give’ 
(Shera, 1952, p. 195). Varlejs gives a concise summary of the background to 
the substantial change in perspective and approach about to happen:
Hundreds of thousands of reports generated by wartime and postwar 
scientif ic and technical research, together with several hundred tons of 
captured enemy documents, challenged traditional methods of information 
organization, dissemination, and retrieval. In the interests of maintaining 
military superiority and jump-starting the economy, U.S. government 
policy favored maximum declassif ication and speedy dissemination of 
information to business and industry. The urgent need to carry out this 
policy fostered new techniques and adaptations of old methods in the 1940s 
and 1950s, some of which have had a lasting impact. (Varlejs, 2004, p. 89)
Existing as well as newly founded centers quickly became the practical and 
intellectual locus of a movement of ‘modernization’ that would concern all 
aspects of handling documents and, by extension, of handling information 
and knowledge. While the tasks at hand were still often referred to as ‘library 
problems’ (Mooers, 1950, p. 2; Maron, 1963, p. 144; Rau, 2007, p. 159), their 
main object was not so much the traditional book, but rather technical and 
scientif ic literature, generally published in the form of research papers or 
reports; the real and imagined audience was not the ‘common man’, but 
scientists and engineers in academia, government, and business; and the 
political mandate was not public education, but scientif ic, economic, and 
military development4 in the context of the Cold War, which affected the 
development of computing more broadly (cf. Edwards, 1996).
4 In his foreword to the Weinberg Report, US president Johnson writes: ‘One of the major 
opportunities for enhancing the effectiveness of our national scientif ic and technical effort and 
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The already mentioned idea that there is a ‘problem of too much informa-
tion’ (Bowles, 1999, p. 156), a ‘growing mountain of research’ (Bush, 1945, 
p. 112) or simply a ‘scientif ic information crisis’ (Weinberg, 1963, p. 15) is 
virtually everywhere in the hundreds of papers and reports published in the 
wake of WWII that begin to flesh out a technical and conceptual domain 
that was initially referred to as ‘machine documentation’ (Wasserman, 1965, 
p. 19) but ultimately consolidated around the productively vague concept 
of ‘information’.5 The idea that too much information is detrimental to 
eff iciency and progress became the founding myth of what Calvin Mooers 
(1950), one of the central f igures of the emerging f ield, canonically named 
‘information retrieval’ in 1950. If the operational goals of libraries since the 
eighteenth century were closely tied to the ideals of the Enlightenment, 
the explicit objective of special libraries and documentation centers was 
to make knowledge productive and ‘actionable’ in a direct and measurable 
sense and as quickly as possible.6 In a climate of technological optimism, 
this inevitably meant that machines were to play a central role.
The centers and institutions dedicated to what a much-regarded presi-
dential report in 1963 called the ‘transfer of information’ (Weinberg, 1963) 
often collaborated with academics and with startups that developed in close 
physical, social, and intellectual proximity to universities and other research 
bodies. The initial conviction that solving the information crisis would be 
benef icial to development in just about all sectors of society meant that 
considerable amounts of money were made available through government 
agencies. And these funds were often distributed in the form of grants 
promoting experimentation and fundamental research. While the effects 
of the concerted governmental support on the emergence of computing 
post-WWII is generally well-known (cf. Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, 1996), 
backing from direct funders, such as the Off ice of Naval Research, and 
intragovernmental institutions for the promotion and coordination of 
research, such as the Research and Development Board, also benefited the 
the eff iciency of Government management of research and development lies in the improvement 
of our ability to communicate information about current research efforts and the results of past 
efforts’ (Weinberg, 1963, p. iii).
5 This shift is completed on an institutional level when the American Documentation Institute, 
founded in 1937, changed its name to American Society for Information Science in 1968. In 2000, 
it f inally became the American Society for Information Science & Technology.
6 ‘The true concern of the special library is the information that its clientele will need today 
and tomorrow. If the special library is doing its work effectively, its clients’ needs will change 
rapidly, in response to the ever-changing environment that it has helped to create’ (Lerner, 
2009, p. 156).
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wider f ield of documentation and information retrieval, whether it aimed 
directly at mechanization or not.
The role of Vannevar Bush merits specif ic mention in this context. Bush, 
a pioneer in analog computing, became a prominent science administrator 
during the war, heading the Office of Scientif ic Research and Development, 
which oversaw the Manhattan Project. Both his research in computing 
and his work in science management prompted an interest in the use of 
machines to support the organization of and access to knowledge, with the 
goal of facilitating the generation of new knowledge. In an often-cited article 
from 1945, he described a machine, the Memex, that would allow its users to 
retrieve and connect documents, stored on microfilm, via ‘associative trails’, 
networks of connections that evoke the subsequent notion of hypertext. 
While the Memex, a personal information device rather than a retrieval 
system, probably had little actual influence on concrete research in the 
f ield (cf. Buckland, 1992), Bush’s considerable clout, as both the ‘engineer 
of the American century’ (Zachary, 1999) and influential f igure in research 
funding, contributed to securing public interest, recognition, and f inancial 
support for everything having to do with mechanical information processing.
Taken together, these elements led to an environment where special 
libraries and documentation centers with higher budgets and smaller, 
more specialized audiences than their publicly minded counterparts were 
in a position to experiment with a variety of technical innovations (Wil-
liams, 2002, p. 16). These institutional differences were accompanied by a 
fundamental divergence in outlook that led to what Bowles (1999) termed the 
‘information wars’, a rift that can be traced up to the present. To understand 
this divergence within a broader historical frame, we have to examine the 
role calculation and mechanical reasoning have played in business and 
government long before digital computers were invented.
Mechanical Reasoning, Statistics, and Decision-Making
In the introduction to their seminal Computer: History of an Information 
Machine, Campbell-Kelly and Aspray argue that the ‘canonical’ story of the 
invention of the computer as a calculating device born out of the encounter 
between centuries of mathematical innovation and America’s WWII efforts 
is incomplete. They point out that ‘research scientists and atomic weapons 
designers still use computers extensively, but the vast majority of computers 
are employed for other purposes, such as word processing and keeping 
business records’ (Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, 1996, p. 2) and propose to 
incorporate the mechanization of off ice work and data processing into 
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the history of computing, for example, the famous application of Hollerith 
machines to the 1890 US census.
Although there are clear connections between information retrieval 
and tasks like data processing and document management, there are 
even broader traditions of applied mechanical reasoning situated at the 
intersection of calculation and decision-making that are largely absent 
from the (pre)history of computing. Editors Becker and Hayes (1963) indeed 
introduce their inf luential Information Sciences Series, published by 
Wiley & Sons from 1963 onwards, with the statement that ‘[i]nformation 
is the essential ingredient in decision making’ (p. v), connecting the newly 
established ‘resource’ directly to management practices in business and 
government.
Decision-making assisted by calculation has a long history, and the 
development of capitalism, in particular, is closely related to the use of 
arithmetic as a means to take on size, complexity, and uncertainty. The 
f ifteenth century is particularly rich in this respect: Luca Pacioli’s Summa 
de arithmetica, geometria, proportioni et proportionalità standardized and 
disseminated double-entry bookkeeping while popular algorismi, manuals 
for learning arithmetic, proposed practical methods that were both enabling 
and responding to the needs of increasingly complex forms of trade, such 
as dealing with logistics and planning, with diverse units and currencies, 
and with the distribution of risks and prof its. The requirements of long-
distance trade, the emergence of larger commercial entities, and a general 
rise in organizational complexity ‘elevated computation to the status of an 
empirical science’ (Swetz, 1987, p. 295). This science provided precise tools 
to control and to decide, which stabilized, standardized, and systematized 
how merchants managed their businesses and interacted with their peers. 
While these methods were not (yet) the scientif ic management that emerges 
in the late 1800s, the considerable risks that characterized early capitalism 
inspired new forms of control relying on data collection and calculation 
(cf. Beniger, 1986).
These techniques – listing and tabulating, applied arithmetic with 
Arabic numerals, bookkeeping – subsequently spread to other domains. 
William Petty’s Political Arithmetik, developed over the second half of the 
seventeenth century, is of particular interest as it systematically applied 
quantitative reasoning to matters of government and produced concrete 
recommendations concerning public investment and economic policy. 
Rather than (merely) appealing to moral principles, to the authority of great 
individuals, or to ‘evident’ truths, Petty’s mode of argumentation amounted 
to what we would nowadays call cost-benef it analysis. As the following 
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problem from one of Petty’s essays (1655, p. 63ff.) shows, the discussed topics 
ring eerily familiar, even if the details of the calculation certainly seem 
peculiar: given the worth of a human being, based on the price of a slave 
at the market in Algiers, would additional spending on certain Parisian 
hospitals to lower mortality rates represent a good investment for the king 
of France? Answer: yes.
It is symptomatic of our somewhat lopsided historical perspective, 
which puts abstract and seemingly disinterested pursuits over practical 
and profitable ones, that Charles Babbage is now mostly remembered for his 
work on mechanical calculation, although his considerable contributions 
to statistics, economics, insurance, and management – the foundations of 
the considerable fame he won during his lifetime – could be considered as 
equally important to the history of computing. After all, one of the main 
uses of his difference engine would have been the calculation of life expec-
tancy tables for the purpose of setting the price of life insurance annuities 
(cf. Babbage, 1864). Certainly, these f ields were not directly related to the 
mathematical theory of computation and its mechanization in modern 
computers, but they provided a space beyond science and engineering where 
such machines could f ind an objectal embedding through some form of 
practical or imaginary utility. This tension between the fundamental and 
the applied is characteristic and the history of statistics is of particular 
relevance in this context, since it arguably represents the most pervasive 
application of calculation to governance and decision-making.
To this day, the term ‘statistics’ has kept a double meaning. First, it refers 
to the collection of facts or data, which, in the nineteenth century, turned 
into a true ‘avalanche’ (Hacking, 1990, p. 2) or ‘deluge’ (Cohen, 2005, p. 113) 
of tabulated numbers covering every conceivable subject. This kind of 
description by numbers is what we mean when we talk about ‘accident 
statistics’ or ‘employment statistics’ and it directly connects to various 
technical inventions and organizational practices emerging after 1800 
(cf. Gardey, 2008). Second, ‘[b]y 1889, users of statistics […] had become 
discontent with the mere presentation of numerical facts, and were looking 
for more ref ined methods of analysis’ (Gigerenzer et al., 1989, p. 58), which 
led to the development of statistics as a series of mathematical concepts and 
techniques used to f ind and analyze patterns in collected data, for example, 
dependencies between variables. Both meanings refer to ‘epistemic practices’, 
that is, practices caught up in the production and definition of knowledge, 
but the second indeed mobilizes mechanical reasoning in its fullest sense, 
as a purely formal transformation of symbols that nonetheless produces 
an epistemic surplus. The detection of a signif icant level of correlation 
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between two variables is not simply a ‘presentation of numerical fact’; it 
must be considered a ‘cognitive’7 operation that generates an interpretation 
of the world behind the numbers, an interpretation that consistently lays 
claim to being both true and enlightening, and thus to a legitimate role in 
orienting ideas and actions. In the words of economist and engineer Jules 
Dupuit (1995), written in 1844, ‘mathematics […] are machines that, in a 
certain sense, can think for us’ (p. 92). Whether we fully accept this claim 
is secondary here; what counts is that ‘in the operations of government, the 
conduct of business and f inance, the activities of science and engineering, 
and even in some aspects of daily life’ (Cohen, 2005, p. 17), mechanical 
reasoning involving complex calculations has become an accepted form of 
relating to a world seen as complex, uncertain, and wrought with struggles 
for power. As Porter argues, ‘quantif ication is a social technology’ (Porter, 
1995, p. 48), a ‘technology of trust’ (Porter, 1995, p. 15), that purports to 
reduce subjectivity, individual discretion, and, ultimately, the arbitrariness 
of the powerful, by instating ‘rules of discourse so constraining that the 
desires and biases of individuals are screened out’ (Porter, 1995, p. 74). Even if 
associated techniques and practices have come to know widespread applica-
tion and acceptance, claims to objectivity and impartiality have certainly 
been contested. Tensions manifest particularly clearly in contemporary 
critiques of ‘big data’, where ‘trust in the objectivity of quantif ied methods 
as well as in the independence and integrity of institutions deploying these 
methods’ (p. 204) is embattled from different sides. Such manifestations 
of a much larger ‘legitimation crisis’ (Habermas, 1975) can be observed 
in many domains and ‘library problems’ are certainly one area where the 
question of how decisions are made and who makes them have been at the 
heart of arduous debates.
Independently from contestations of legitimacy, statistics constitutes 
the most pervasive example of machines ‘thinking for us’ that is not based 
on forms of logical inference, like Leibniz’s calculus ratiocinator, but on 
the collection and analysis of (quantitative) empirical data. The idea that 
diligent counting and mathematical examination of what is counted allow 
for a particularly performant coupling of knowing and managing is the 
point where statistics intersects with Foucault’s work on power. In the 
context of ‘bio-politics’, a ‘technology of power’ that concerns itself with 
the management of life and thus with birth and mortality rates, public 
hygiene, or urban living conditions, Foucault sees statistics as a ‘technique 
7 The term is used here in connection with its etymological root in the Latin cognoscere, ‘to 
know’, and should not be read as a commitment to any particular theory of (human) cognition.
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of observation’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 161) that plays a central role in the regula-
tion of a population. The objective of bio-politics is not merely to keep the 
population in a state of submissive docility, but rather to optimize output 
and to ‘turn society into a machine of production’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 194). 
Foucault frames statistics in line with the etymological origins of the term 
as ‘the state’s knowledge of the state’ (Foucault, 2009, p. 162) and puts it at 
the center of a ‘governmental rationality’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 56) that is no 
longer an art of government, but a ‘political science’ (Foucault, 2009, p. 106) 
intrinsically tied to political economy as its dominant way of thinking 
society. While these associations point beyond the subject matter treated 
in this book, they should remind us that information ordering techniques 
under conditions of pervasive computerization have come to serve similar 
governmental functions.
The application of statistics to decision-making provided a model when 
it came to framing the library problem and, by extension, the problem of 
knowledge organization and access as a technical problem that could be 
solved with the proper scientif ic attitude and methodology. WWII certainly 
played a crucial role in more than one respect, but it crucially ‘strengthened 
the decision theoretic approach to statistical problems, and accustomed 
people to the idea that reasonable decisions can be made on the basis of 
formal, mechanized reasoning combined with measurements’ (Gigerenzer et 
al., 1989, p. 120). Operations research, which developed a largely probabilistic 
approach to military decisions during the war,8 left deep impressions on 
the individuals and institutions that set out to transform the handling of 
published material into a science of information. This included a broad 
ethos carrying ‘a novel blend of pessimism about the scope and quality 
of human reason and optimism about the power of social and technical 
mechanisms for producing rational choices’ (Heyck, 2012, p. 100). As we 
shall see, the mission to remove or at least rearrange ‘human reason’ in 
information ordering did not sway toward the universalist classif ications of 
the nineteenth century. Espousing a probabilistic outlook that recognized 
uncertainty as a fundamental fact of life, it turned to statistics as a means 
to ‘tame chance’ (Hacking, 1990) in a way that combines the imperatives 
of rationalism and pragmatism.
Desrosières addresses what I mean by ‘pragmatism’ when he discusses how 
statistics allows for different attitudes toward the world it means to describe, 
‘metrological realism’, the correspondence or equivalence theory of truth, 
8 Operations research itself connects to a long prehistory in scientif ic management. See, for 
example, Chandler (1977) or Yates (1989).
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being just one of several ‘orchestrations of reality’ (Desrosières, 2001, p. 346). 
What we f ind in commerce and government is in fact ‘accounting realism’, 
where the ‘“equivalence space” is composed not of physical quantities (space 
and time), but of a general equivalent: money’ (Desrosières, 2001, p. 342). 
Here, the benchmark for validity is no longer disinterested correspondence 
between reality and representation but effectiveness when it comes to attain-
ing specif ic goals. The notion of accounting realism thus echoes Lyotard’s 
(1984) assessment that the contemporary knowledge regime seeks ‘no longer 
truth, but performativity – that is, the best possible input/output equation’ 
(p. 46). Subscribing neither to the ‘high rationalism’ epitomized by Chomsky’s 
computationalism, nor to the epistemological and political universalism 
that characterizes the public library, information retrieval evolves in an 
intellectual environment and institutional context that espouses accounting 
realism as its dominant epistemological attitude.
Information Wars
Coming back to the main thread of the story, we can indeed appreciate how 
the early literature on information retrieval frames the ‘library problem’ 
as the question of how to make recorded knowledge useful. At least in the 
1940s and 1950s, this debate still occurs in large parts around institutions, 
publications, and conferences that remain connected to a library science 
tradition marked by Enlightenment values such as public education and 
philosophical universalism. But what is underway is a full-frontal assault 
on this tradition. In the paper where Mooers f irst introduces the term 
‘information retrieval’, he makes a programmatic declaration that could 
hardly be any clearer:
In order to approach this slippery problem with any hope of success 
or eff iciency of thought, it will be necessary for us to put aside almost 
all the ideas, doctrines, and symbolic or metaphysical superstructure 
about libraries and library methods that we have learned or otherwise 
picked up in the past. It can be said – and demonstrated – that almost 
everything that librarians hold dear in classif ication is absolutely wrong 
for information retrieval. (Mooers, 1950, p. 4)
While these are not the f irst shots f ired in the ‘information wars’, ‘the profes-
sional battle between scientists (documentalists) and humanists (librarians) 
over information retrieval’ (Bowles, 1999, p. 156), Mooers himself epitomizes 
certain fault lines characterizing the dispute. Trained in mathematics and 
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physics rather than library science, he considered the library methods of the 
time to be positively archaic, ‘stalled for two millennia’ (Mooers, 1950, p. 17), 
and ‘incapable of information retrieval’ (Mooers, 1950, p. 4). He saw a need 
for a completely different approach ‘guided by the principles of engineering 
and the scientific method instead of the outworn metaphysics’ (Mooers, 1950, 
p. 17). To Mooers and his colleagues, the term ‘scientif ic method’ implied 
not just mathematization and measurement but included the commitment 
to ideas related to scientif ic management and, in particular, to operations 
research and applications of analytical methods to process optimization 
and decision-making (cf. Rau, 2013).
Even if Mooers was particularly vocal, the dismissive attitude toward 
traditional library ideas was widespread. Together with the ‘information 
overload’ hypothesis, the idea that there was preciously little to learn from 
cataloging principles and techniques like the DCC or the LCSH became the 
point of departure for the emergent discipline. Mortimer Taube, another 
central f igure in the f ield, indeed argued that ‘rebels’ like himself ‘invaded 
the holy of holies of sanctified library practice’ with radical new ideas (Taube, 
1952, p. 167). In an article published in 1982 in the influential Advances in 
Computing series, James E. Rush looks back at these early days with little 
modesty:
[T]he automation revolution has resulted in much greater technological 
innovation in libraries during the past 20 years than had been achieved 
during the entire history of librarianship up to about 1960. (Rush, 1982, 
p. 334)
Contrary to most libraries, the people staff ing documentation centers were 
indeed mostly scientists, not librarians (Williams, 2002, p. 20). And the ten-
sions between the two ‘sides’ were palpable.9 In his book The Librarian and 
the Machine, published in 1965, Paul Wasserman euphemistically remarked 
that ‘there seemed now to be a number of members of the academic com-
munity who were prepared to suggest that they knew a great deal more about 
the way in which the technology of modern times could be applied to library 
processes than did the librarians themselves’ (p. 10). Dismissive attitudes 
were reflected in the fact that almost none of the early retrieval systems 
attempted to support, mimic, or even acknowledge existing classif ication 
9 ‘Today we seem to be on the brink of startling new developments in the f ield of high-speed 
manipulation of large masses of bibliographic data, and already the emotional responses are 
becoming apparent’ (Shera, 1952, p. 15).
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systems, such as the DCC.10 The ideas of non-American thinkers like Otlet 
or Ranganathan were discussed even less.
Similar to the statisticians of the nineteenth and twentieth century and 
subsequent ‘method experts’, the ‘information scientists’ of the 1950s and 
1960s who pioneered many of the algorithmic ordering techniques at work 
today presented themselves as modernizers and rationalizers. Their story 
f its neatly into the picture drawn in Ensmenger’s (2010) The Computer Boys 
Take Over, which details the intricate connections between the nascent and 
expansive discipline of computer science on the one side and the ideologi-
cal and methodological nexus forming around business administration, 
operations research, systems analysis, cybernetics, eff iciency consulting, 
and associated techniques. The task information retrieval set for itself was 
not merely to introduce new machinery and techniques into an existing 
setting but to redesign the library on the whole as an information system.11 
And while much of the concrete work revolved around automation and 
mechanization, the systems perspective always lingered in the background, 
becoming particularly noticeable whenever new performance measurements 
sought to quantify the effectiveness of provided services.
These elements for a social history of the information wars can provide 
crucial context, but I am specif ically interested in the actual techniques 
transforming knowledge organization into information ordering. The in-
formation wars can indeed be narrated in terms of machinery (computers 
vs. manual methods) or socialization (scientists vs. humanists), but the 
actual ‘epistemological operators’ (Young, 2017, p. 45) put forward crystallize 
around a specif ic document retrieval technique that lays the foundations 
for many further developments: coordinate indexing.
Coordinate Indexing
As already mentioned, the objective of special libraries and documenta-
tion centers was not to support public education but to facilitate access 
10 This is what Mooers has to say about Dewey’s system: ‘The postulates of the Dewey system 
are incompatible among themselves, and the system can never be readjusted so as to perform 
the task set for it’ (Mooers 1950, p. 8).
11 A 1965 survey on the state of automation in libraries, porting the ominous subtitle A Study 
in Reluctant Leadership, criticizes the lack of systems thinking: ‘The preceding survey shows 
that none of the libraries which have adopted mechanization or automation to any extent has 
attempted seriously to consider a whole library as a total information system which is to be 
integrated so far as possible in its concepts, design, provision of equipment, and daily operations’ 
(Gull, 1965, p. 5).
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to relevant information for the ‘knowledge worker’: the research scientist 
pushing for new f indings and the engineer requiring a particular detail 
about a specif ic process, but also the manager having to make a quick 
decision and the public administrator planning the details of a specif ic 
policy. With Foucault, we should hesitate to see this shift as another step in 
a general movement of rationalization. As we have seen, traditional library 
methods were certainly not immune to rationalist universalism and if we 
‘analyze specif ic rationalities rather than forever invoke the progress of 
rationalization in general’ (Foucault, 1982, p. 779f.), we realize that this is 
indeed a matter of competing claims to rationality.
The most fundamental difference, in fact, concerns the framing of the 
library problem. The information specialists were not concerned with lofty 
ideals of emancipation through knowledge but saw themselves as contribu-
tors to professional environments where information was a central resource. 
Information retrieval’s purpose was thus to satisfy specif ic ‘information 
needs’, a concept that has remained at the heart of information retrieval 
ever since.12 These needs were seen as not being met by existing methods 
and techniques:
What is required is the recognition that the Library of Congress system, 
for all its complexity and detail, is not a tool for specialists but a general 
system for the non-specialist’s approach to knowledge as a whole. (Taube, 
1951, p. 63)
Specialists required specialized means to access specialized knowledge and 
coordinate indexing was one of the earliest techniques built on this very 
premise.13 It developed, at least indirectly, from earlier applications of docu-
ment processing techniques by scientists using edge-notched punched cards 
to analyze categorical research data in the 1930s. The McBee Keysort system 
was probably the most used commercial variant. These were ‘almost entirely 
“term on item” systems’ (Kilgour, 1997, p. 340) where a card would register 
various characteristics (terms) of a chemical compound, animal species, or 
plant (items). A notched card could encode as many binary variables as the 
12 The def inition of information retrieval given by one of the most well-known textbooks 
reads: ‘Information retrieval (IR) is f inding material (usually documents) of an unstructured 
nature (usually text) that satisfy an information need from within large collections (usually 
stored on computers)’ (Manning et al., 2008, p. 1).
13 This statement requires some qualif ication since special services like abstracting or ‘current 
awareness’ publications can be seen as fulf illing retrieval functions and such services had been 
around since the nineteenth century.
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space on the cards’ edges permitted. The card would ‘describe’ a particular 
entity by marking the value for each f ield with either a hole or a notch.
A card for ‘dog’, for example, would have a hole in the ‘carnivore’ f ield and 
a notch for ‘retractable claws’. The card for ‘cat’ would have a hole for both. 
When using a so-called sorting needle on a stack of cards along a particular 
characteristic, the cards with holes would get lifted while the cards with 
notches would stay put. If we were to apply the needle to the ‘carnivore’ f ield, 
both dog and cat would be pulled, but the needle would not get the dog card 
when f ishing for retractable claws. While actual implementations of this 
these photos show the use of the McBee keysort system in the context of the famous Experiments 
in art and technology, launched by engineers Billy klüver and Fred waldhauer and artists Robert 
Rauschenberg and Robert whitman in 1967. here, the coordinate indexing logic was applied to a 
contact database of collaborators, encoding their specific skills and interests. Photos courtesy of 
klüver/Martin archive.
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system could be entirely manual, the simple logic based on items (objects) 
and terms (properties) was well-suited to mechanization. And despite its 
simplicity, the system allowed for Boolean operators in queries: using two 
needles would constitute an OR; using a needle sequentially to f irst get items 
with characteristic A and then lift cards with characteristic B from those 
results would constitute an AND. The outcome would be a selection, following 
no particular order, of documents satisfying the specif ied logical condition. 
Even the NOT operator could be applied by removing cards with certain 
properties from the results (Kilgour, 1997, p. 341). Although the cats and dogs 
example may seem trivial, such a system was able to query thousands of 
items along up to around a hundred binary variables, the physical limit of 
the cards, which meant that it was capable of ‘operationalizing distinctions’ 
(Siegert, 2013, p. 14) dynamically in relatively large and complex datasets. 
This simple principle constitutes the operational schema in what was to 
become the f irst and, for a considerable time, the dominant framework for 
the computerization of document retrieval.
The technique was applied to bibliographic indexing in several places 
at roughly the same time, most prominently by Mortimer Taube, even if 
his approach favored a somewhat different implementation than the one 
just described. Taube’s system, for which he invented the term ‘coordinate 
indexing’, solved one of the problems related to a major limitation of notched 
cards, which could deal with fairly large collections of items but were only 
able to accommodate a relatively small number of terms, limiting the size 
of the indexing vocabulary. Taube thus decided to use cards not only for 
listing the documents to be searched but also for what he called ‘uniterms’, 
simple keywords describing catalogued works (Wasserman, 1965, p. 57f.; 
Kilgour, 1997). While the procedure for selecting and attributing uniterms to 
documents was a matter of debate, the general idea was to eschew complex 
categories or subject headings in favor of single words (Doyle, 1975, p. 174). 
Every uniterm received a card which listed the reference numbers for the 
works tagged with that term. A card could, in principle, list hundreds of 
titles and a title described by ten terms would therefore appear on ten 
cards. To make queries, searchers would combine or ‘coordinate’ the terms 
they were looking for and then search for the numbers appearing on all of 
the cards. Partial matches could be taken into account and counting the 
number of query terms a document would match constituted a simply 
ranking mechanism.
In the beginning, the system relied on manual use, facilitated only by the 
rather ingenious use of ordered columns for reference numbers to facilitate 
lookup. In this setting, the numbers of terms and items were mainly limited 
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by the searcher’s capacity (or willingness) to drudge through lists and lists 
of entries. What would appear completely impractical for the large stocks 
of public libraries, which covered many different areas of knowledge, was 
much more workable in the context of specialized collections. Coordinate 
indexing became a widespread and popular technique (Wasserman, 1965, 
p. 62; Salton, 1987, p. 376) and the introduction of Boolean operators continues 
to resonate through electronic catalogs and other search systems. Compared 
to traditional classif ications or subject headings, coordinate indexing had 
two perceived clusters of advantages that each connect to larger debates 
about knowledge organization and access.
First, compared to existing indexing practices, the attribution of uniterms 
or descriptors was seen as easier, faster, cheaper and more adapted to the 
needs of searchers. The mandate to serve the professional knowledge worker 
meant that special libraries and documentation centers were not limited to 
books but included the quickly growing mass of journal publications and 
reports. Together with the desire for fast distribution of the latest f indings, 
often termed ‘current awareness’ (Svenonius, 2000, p. 28), and thus for fast 
bibliographic attribution, this meant that the person tasked with indexing 
would have little time to spend on individual items. Much of the early litera-
ture on coordinate indexing thus builds its criticism of library techniques on 
the central role complex classif ication and subject heading systems confer 
to those who develop these controlled knowledge structures and those who 
assign records to specif ic places in the system. The ‘bibliographic power’ 
(Wilson, 1968) these knowledge mediators hold is not seen as a guarantor of 
neutrality but as a source of subjectivity, arbitrariness, and conservativism, 
which is particularly problematic in emerging and cutting-edge f ields of 
knowledge. Since standardization and continuity were considered essential 
by librarians, the structures and vocabularies of systems like the DDC 
or LCSH were somewhat extended but never substantially reorganized. 
While coordinate indexing did not necessarily do away with the idea of a 
predefined or controlled vocabulary, since institutions often developed their 
own thesaurus, it opened the door for thinking about ways to eliminate the 
expert indexer trained in the arcane details of the indexing system.
Explicitly framed as a technique for creating any number of bibliographic 
systems, coordinate indexing never had any universalist pretentions.14 
From the beginning, it embraced local perspectivism not only in the sense 
14 ‘I think that in this matter librarians have been misled by the universal acceptance of the 
elements of descriptive bibliography and have concluded erroneously that it is possible to create 
a universal system of subjects which will be satisfactory to all specialists’ (Taube, 1951, p. 61).
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that uniterm vocabularies were only meant to cover specif ic f ields but also 
by empowering the expert searcher. This was accomplished by moving 
from static and complex ‘precoordinated’ systems to a ‘postcoordinated’ 
perspective, where compound, multipart concepts were no longer attributed 
by a librarian at the moment of indexing, but constructed by the searcher 
at ‘retrieval time’ through the combination of simple terms using Boolean 
operators.15 The complex precoordinated entry ‘Spain--History--Civil 
War, 1936-1939--Literature and the war’ from the LCSH would become an 
unordered list of keywords such as ‘Spain, Civil War, Literature’ in the 
postcoordinated logic. Luhn summarizes the difference in particularly 
clear language:
The introduction of discriminating terms, such as key words, has brought 
about a new degree of freedom. Instead of applying a static set of categories 
or subject headings beforehand, such categories or subject headings may 
be formulated dynamically at the instant of inquiry by a tailor-made 
assembly of such key words. (Luhn, 1968a, p. 126)
Keywords or uniterms could be attributed much more easily, disregarding 
order and syntax. The already mentioned Weinberg report (1963), for exam-
ple, stressed the role of scientists in the process, asking them to ‘self-index’ 
their papers through relevant keywords. Providing well-written abstracts 
should help indexers with ‘emergent’ coding where keywords would be 
taken from the document itself. This, indeed, became the recommended 
method (Doyle, 1975, p. 176) and anyone who has ever submitted a paper to 
an academic journal should be familiar with these practices. Moving away 
from controlled vocabularies meant that librarians were not only besieged 
on the side of indexing but also on the side of searching, since users could 
employ terms they were familiar with rather than a predef ined syntax 
and semantics (Lerner, 2009, p. 190). Overall, the measured eff iciency of 
coordinate indexing was similar to more elaborate methods, while being 
faster and cheaper (Salton, 1987, p. 3).
Second, coordinate indexing was seen as ideally suited for mechanization 
and computerization. Since Alonzo Church and Alan Turing had shown ‘that 
numbers were an inessential aspect of computation – they were just one way 
15 ‘Pre and post reference the time at which terms are concatenated into large expressions. In a 
precoordinate language, this is done prior to retrieval by a professional in a manner def ined by 
the syntax rules of the language. In a postcoordinate language, it is done at the time of retrieval 
by a user using a Boolean-based syntax’ (Svenonius, 2000, p. 178).
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of interpreting the internal states of the machine’ (Barr and Feigenbaum, 1981, 
p. 4), the ‘digital handling of non-numerical information’ (Mooers, 1950) had 
become a plausible endeavor. While early computers were much too costly 
for practical use, Wasserman (1965) argues already in 1965 that ‘an almost 
morbid fascination with the latest form of technology’ (p. 9) had contributed 
to a climate where the computerization of library functions started to 
look like both an imperative and an inevitability.16 Coordinate indexing 
played a central role in this context, because ‘[i]t was the only system for 
retrieving bibliographic information that was compatible with computers 
of the mid-1950s’ (Segesta and Reid-Green, 2002, p. 28). The formulation 
‘compatible with’ highlights the fact that coordinate indexing is not bound 
to a particular material substrate. It plays the role of a technical element 
that needs to be articulated in conjunction with other elements to become 
a working system. While coordinate indexing represents a departure from 
the library tradition, its success relied on the straightforward compatibility 
with existing technical trajectories, including manual list comparison, 
punched cards, f ilm, and early computing hardware. This compatibility 
can be attributed to its practical and conceptual simplicity, especially 
compared to Ranganathan’s similarly flexible but much more complicated 
colon classif ication. In the early 1950s, information processing machinery 
was both an incipient reality and a future promise, but Taube and others 
fully invested this emerging technological space, arguing that ‘bibliographic 
coordination is designed for machine sorting and collating’ (Taube, 1951, 
p. 70), even if it was not clear which technical trajectory would eventually 
dominate.
The limited space for terms on edge-notched cards prompted Mortimer 
Taube to develop his list-based approach, which allowed for the creation of 
what we would today call ‘high-dimensional datasets’, where each item can 
have a large number of variables or properties. The very same limitation 
led Mooers to develop a system that was relying on similar principles but 
used a different implementation. At a time when Taube, a trained librarian, 
was promoting his manual technique using concepts and terms familiar 
to librarians, the mathematician Mooers was not only pondering similar 
ideas, but building actual machines.17 In a paper titled ‘Zatocoding Applied 
16 As Segesta and Reid-Green argue, asking ‘if the computer could help’ had become ‘a natural 
question’ (2002, p. 28) by 1953 already.
17 In an oral history interview, Mooers himself claims primacy for the general idea and argues 
that Taube’s success came because ‘[h]e was a great salesman and a smooth talker and he charmed 
the librarians’ (Mooers and Mooers, 1993, p. 13).
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to Mechanical Organization of Knowledge’ (Mooers, 1951), he described a 
system using punched cards and the postcoordination logic of independent 
‘descriptors’ that could be combined to create complex queries. Interestingly, 
Mooers’s presentation did not focus on the question of classif ication but on 
solving the limitations of punched card systems. Zatocoding was a form 
of superimposed coding that drew heavily on Shannon’s statistical theory 
of information to encode a much larger number of terms onto the limited 
number of f ields available on a card. This allowed him to build a system using 
the well-mastered and thus relatively cheap punched card technology, which 
became ‘the f irst broadly marketed system that did not use precoordinated 
(like Library of Congress subject headings) subject terms’ (Williams, 2002, 
p. 22). While Mooers’s implementation of coordinate indexing worked 
well with existing equipment, Taube’s combination of reference numbers 
and lists was almost perfectly suited for the operating principles of digital 
computers. Experiments with IBM’s f irst commercial scientif ic computer, 
the IBM 701, clearly showed the workability of the method in 1954 (Bracken 
and Tillitt, 1957; Segesta and Reid-Green, 2002). After all, comparing lists is 
something that computers do very well indeed.
Overall, coordinate indexing funneled into quite different working 
systems that could be demonstrated, evaluated, and experimented with. 
These systems, understood as technical individuals combining coordinate 
indexing principles with other elements, promised to deliver what Charles 
Baggage already identif ied as the machine’s ‘one great advantage’, namely 
‘the check which it affords against the inattention, the idleness, or the 
dishonesty of human agents’ (Babbage, 1832, p. 54). This both resonates 
with the ‘pessimism about the scope and quality of human reason’ (Heyck, 
2012, p. 100) underpinning the overt distrust in librarians and highlights 
the computer’s capacity to take over simple tasks like f inding the same 
numbers in long lists, which become infeasible for humans beyond a certain 
point due their repetitive nature and mind-numbing dullness. Coordinate 
indexing thus reveals how Peters’s (1988) assertion that ‘[t]he computer 
existed as a practice before it existed as a machine’ (p. 15) is both enlightening 
and insuff icient. The technique shows how older and more elementary 
principles can f ind expression in contemporary practices, traveling through 
different technical trajectories, in this case from notched cards to manual 
list comparison to digital computers. But coordinate indexing also sits at 
the precise point where these continuities begin to dissolve into a technical 
universe where a machine can perform a range of simple operations so 
quickly and competently that it ‘has outgrown its basic triviality by several 
orders of magnitude’ (Dijkstra, 1974, p. 608).
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A Postcoordinated Universe
The introduction of coordinate indexing is not a story of traditional analog 
approaches being swept away by the digital computer. The various applica-
tions built around it f ind a certain success, but even in 1975, Van Rijsbergen 
still emphasizes that ‘[m]any automatic information retrieval systems 
are experimental’ (Van Rijsbergen, 1975, p. 1). Public libraries have long 
remained unaffected by information retrieval: when they f inally begin 
computerization in the 1970s, they focus on digitizing existing card catalogs 
and on making them more easily available as OPACs (Online Public Access 
Catalogs) (cf. Husain and Ansari, 2006). Boolean operators have certainly 
found their way into more recent bibliographic systems and simple keyword 
indexing coexists with more elaborate techniques like subject headings 
and hierarchical classif ication. Computerization and digitization can lead 
to standardization and normalization, but they also provide margins of 
plasticity, with the effect that actual working systems are often hybrids 
fusing seemingly contradictory techniques into productive arrangements.
Rather than follow coordinate indexing through historical instances 
of adoption and adaptation, I want to develop two different lines of inter-
pretation. In Chapters 5 and 6, I will show how the basic ‘term on item’ 
setup becomes the starting point for a variety of statistical techniques that 
seek to deepen its empirical dimension, in particular regarding automated 
indexing and ranking. In the last section of this chapter, however, I want to 
dive further into the notion of postcoordination. This will lead me beyond 
coordinate indexing to one of the most inf luential techniques in all of 
computing, the relational model for database management.
Postcoordination
The question of how knowledge should be arranged has never been in-
nocent. Darnton (1999, p. 191ff.) explains how Diderot and D’Alembert’s 
seemingly minor modif ications to the tree of knowledge inherited from 
Francis Bacon was in fact a risky political move that reshuffled the place of 
secular and religious ideas, and, in doing so, installed the philosophers of 
the Enlightenment as the supreme guardians of knowledge. Scholars such 
as Sanford Berman (1980, 1989) have repeatedly argued that traditional 
but still heavily used classif ication systems such as the DDC have strong 
biases, sidelining not only non-Western cultures on the whole but also 
marginalized groups in Western societies. As Bowker and Star have shown 
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in their influential Sorting Things Out (1999), classif ication systems have 
infrastructural qualities that organize and orient important aspects of our 
lives. The epistemic character of particular knowledge ordering schemes is 
an imminently political issue, even without taking computers into account.
But the rejection of library principles by early information scientists 
is not so much a rejection of a particular classif ication or thesaurus. It 
is not a battle pitting one taxonomy against another but a fundamental 
contestation of two thousand years of knowledge organization en bloc. The 
pioneers mentioned in this chapter never pursued the mechanization of 
established practices and principles. What they developed and promoted 
was a new way of conceiving order as ‘ordering’, a dynamic process and 
practice that was fundamentally different from the creation and application 
of stable, universal systems. While the information wars have sometimes 
been framed as pitting ‘people’ against ‘machines’, this narrative obfuscates 
a more conceptual and indeed more political disagreement about where one 
should turn when looking for order and organization. What the information 
scientists propose – and this may sound familiar to readers versed in Silicon 
Valley disruption talk – is that knowledge ordering no longer needs stewards 
that guarantee the coherence and adequacy of a tree or ‘world map’. Diderot 
and D’Alembert’s philosopher, acting as cartographer of knowledge ‘at a 
vantage point, so to speak, high above this vast labyrinth’ (D’Alembert, 1995, 
p. 47), is no longer seen as the guarantor of impartiality, but as a problem: 
overreaching, slow, and subjective. The very ‘image of objectivity’, to speak 
with Daston and Galison (1992), is under attack.
On a very general level, we f ind the charge that traditional ordering 
schemes serve the needs of the library rather than its patrons (Lerner, 2009, 
p. 189), going back to Thomas Carlyle calling Anthony Panizzi’s catalog ‘a 
vanity of bibliographical display’ (Svenonius, 2000, p. 10). But the change 
in perspective is more concretely tied to the real and imagined audiences 
for catalogs and retrieval systems: the library traditionally adheres to an 
inclusive mandate emphasizing public education and universal access 
while the special libraries and documentation centers embrace the special-
ist looking for actionable answers rather than broad knowledge. If the 
librarians following the Enlightenment tradition emphasize the creation 
of a shared, systematic, and stable map of all knowledge that functions as 
an institutional gateway to a well-tended garden of knowledge, the early 
information scientists see a growing rift between the ‘f inished schemes of 
the nineteenth century’ (Taube, 1952, p. 167), such as the DDC and LCSH, 
and a twentieth-century witness to ‘the swirling rush of new literature 
and new forms of literature’ (Taube, 1952, p. 167). Where the former value 
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the universality of classif ication schemes as an asset, the latter see it as a 
liability that risks cementing outdated worldviews and missing the realities 
of modern science. Positivist universalists like Otlet and Bliss regarded 
science and knowledge as singular and unif ied whereas the actual sci-
entists involved in information retrieval saw a complex, dynamic, and 
highly specialized research landscape, where established knowledge is 
constantly questioned and disciplinary boundaries shift. While Otlet (1934) 
shunned even subject headings as ‘too empirical’ and ‘scattered’ (p. 381) to 
provide the synthetical and well-ordered perspective the CDU epitomizes, 
empiricism and fragmentation are precisely what information retrieval 
pioneers championed, at least to a certain degree. The ‘grand narrative’ of 
the Enlightenment, emancipation through universal education in a shared 
space of knowledge, had not so much lost its ‘credibility’ (Lyotard, 1984, p. 37) 
in this context, but rather its relevance to an application space that defined 
itself in more directly utilitarian terms. Most of the complicated details of 
bibliographic control were seen as neither necessary nor helpful to exploit 
information as a resource for knowledge creation and decision-making. 
On the contrary, debating whether two editions of a book constitute the 
same work, to name a common example from library theory, was deemed 
a frivolous waste of time.
Early information science literature thus brims with doubts about the 
capacity of librarians (or any other nonscientist) to adequately deal not only 
with the mass of material but also with the subject matter. The struggle 
for what Wilson (1968) calls ‘descriptive control’ – the ‘ability to line up a 
population of writings in any arbitrary order, to make the population march 
to one’s command’ (p. 25) – was real and (information) scientists sought to 
wrestle it away from human(ist) knowledge mediators. If we understand the 
bibliographic chain as composed of source material, ordering scheme (or 
simply ‘library system’), and searcher, traditional librarianship argued that 
a lot of expertise was required in the middle to assure the tasks of indexing, 
organizing, and guiding patrons. The new perspective, however, tried to 
‘disintermediate’ the process by buttressing expertise at the two ends of 
the chain: the specialists writing and self-indexing the material and the 
decision-makers querying the material were the actual experts and the mid-
dle suddenly appeared as a source of delay, incompetence, and subjectivity. 
Coordinate indexing achieved this goal by two means: on the one end, simple 
‘uniterms’ (Taube’s term) or ‘descriptors’ (Mooers’s term) were attributed 
without order or preconceived relationship (precoordination) and could even 
be taken directly from the text, eliminating dependence on the expertise 
of catalogers and indexers (Lerner, 2009, p. 189); and on the other end, 
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postcoordination allowed searchers to create elaborate queries by combining 
multiple words in Boolean sequences. The central element, here, is the shift 
of syntactic and semantic expressivity from the bibliographic language to 
the query language, meaning that ‘the vocabulary control hitherto deemed 
essential for indexing purposes could be replaced by additional controls 
introduced during the search formulation and retrieval processes’ (Salton, 
1987, p. 3). The map is replaced by a system laying dynamic pathways into a 
multidimensional information space. Knowledge organization is reframed 
as a function of knowledge access. Long before the term ‘disintermediation’ 
becomes a Silicon Valley favorite and ‘postmodern theorists and artists 
embrace hyperlinks as a way of freeing us from anonymous specialists 
organizing our databases and deciding for us what is relevant to what’ 
(Dreyfus, 2009, p. 12f.), information scientists developed coordinate indexing 
as a means to orchestrate knowledge organization around an algorithmic 
technique.
This technique indeed relies on highly queryable information grids that 
index atomized items with a vocabulary that is itself analytically disas-
sembled into singular terms. The use of Boolean operators already points to 
the role of calculation as a means for synthetical reassembly. The standard 
model uses set theory to capture these processes in mathematical terms but 
coordinate indexing can be conceptualized in more than one way. Although 
‘coordination’ refers to the combination of search terms (Varlejs, 2004, p. 96), 
it evokes a formal or conceptual understanding of a bibliographic system 
as a ‘coordinate system’, a geometric construct that assigns a place to each 
item in a multidimensional ‘document space’ lacking a clear navigational 
form like a list or tree structure (cf. Luhn, 1953). A coordinate index, that is, a 
space constituted and populated by items and associated terms, represents 
what I will call throughout the book an ‘intermediate form’,18 an abstract 
representation that results from a process of formalization into a normalized 
structure. Intermediate forms both enable and require calculation to gener-
ate specific outputs like result lists or visual diagrams. Creating such outputs 
represents an act of ordering that is distributed over two components: data 
adhering to an intermediate form, for example, a coordinate index covering a 
specif ic collection of documents, and a technique for algorithmic inference, 
for example, a system that implements Boolean querying.
18 I am generalizing this notion from Tan (1999), who argues that text mining has two broad 
components. The f irst, text ref inement, basically contains the transformations that yield a 
‘purif ied’ representation of a text, that the second step, knowledge distillation, will then process. 
This purif ied representation is referred to as intermediate form.
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Whether we think about the search process as intersecting sets of terms 
or already as a geometric operation is less important, at this point, than 
the idea that the query indeed def ines the category or conceptual ‘location’ 
of objects to be retrieved. A logical condition – keywords coordinated 
with the help of Boolean operators – is submitted into a document space 
def ined by an indexing vocabulary and the system returns a specif ic 
selection of items that meet the condition as the result. Order, here, is no 
longer a stable representation, but the momentary outcome of a calculative 
process that combines indexed items into ad hoc categories. While the 
card catalogue already introduced a form of mobility that, in practice, 
‘rescued’ the stable organization of knowledge by allowing the universalist 
systems of the nineteenth century to integrate new works into their 
folds without too much trouble, the mobility of the coordinate index 
is more fundamental. Unlike the knowledge maps of the DDC or CDU, 
coordinate indexing is no longer a system of order but a postuniversalist 
ordering technique that folds knowledge into a specif ic and temporary 
arrangement upon request.
This is a f irst step into a computational universe, even if the techni-
cal simplicity and widespread use of what boils down to a combination 
of tagging and Boolean search makes it diff icult to think of coordinate 
indexing as a particularly powerful algorithmic technique. But Mortimer 
Taube, although not a mathematician himself, already observed that the 
mechanical transformations at hand have the potential to provide a genuine 
epistemic surplus:
[T]he system of bibliographic coordination would, if properly set up, 
disclose to the searcher more information than had been put into the 
system. It has become fashionable to state that we can get nothing more 
out of machines than we put into them. This is like saying that since 
mathematics is tautological there is never any more in the conclusion 
than there is in the premises. It is certainly true that when we add a 
column of f igures with an adding machine we get an answer that we did 
not know even though the answer was implicit in the column of f igures. 
Similarly, in the system of bibliographic coordination, by combining 
various categories, we may get information which, although implicit in 
the system, was never explicitly recognized. (Taube, 1951, p. 71)
Although Taube mainly thought about the enhanced potential for informa-
tion retrieval afforded by Boolean operators, we can easily imagine forms 
of calculation that describe the document collection on the whole, for 
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example, in terms of ‘co-tagging’ patterns: if we consider two terms to be 
‘related’ if they are applied to the same item, we can generate a network 
that shows the relationships between all tags used in a collection, providing 
a conceptual map that could be used as overview or means of navigation. 
Much of algorithmic information ordering indeed relies on techniques that 
make ‘implicit’ information explicit in the way Taube describes, often by 
harvesting expressions of ‘latent human judgment’ (Kleinberg, 1999, p. 606), 
in this case patterns in term attribution.
The epistemic surplus an algorithmic ordering technique is able to 
deliver usually springs from the combination of many small instances of 
counting or calculation, that is, from ‘methods of buying originality with 
plodding’ that depend on the existence ‘of slaves which are […] persistent 
plodders’ (Wang, 1960, p. 3). Computerization has made such persistent 
plodders universally available and dataf ication has multiplied the ‘items’ 
available in digital form. Early uses in scientif ic data processing already 
indicate that Boolean operators can be applied to any set of entities that 
can be captured into the intermediate form of a coordinate index. If this 
requirement is met, the full set of algorithmic manipulations becomes 
readily available. The considerable possibilities for adaptation and extension 
become clearer if we consider, for example, the use of the basic ‘term on 
item’ principle in websites implementing collaborative indexing. While 
the word ‘folksonomy’, a portmanteau of ‘folk’ and ‘taxonomy’ (Vander 
Wal, 2007), no longer raises eyebrows, the proponents of free, user-driven 
keyword attribution, popularized by sites like Flickr or Delicious, not only 
reiterated many of the arguments19 made in favor of coordinate indexing in 
the 1950s but showed how multiuser tagging can be processed in multiple 
ways to produce rankings, recommendations, or semantic enrichment.
With an eye on Simondon’s theoretical apparatus, one could argue that 
information ordering has developed around trajectories that combine basic 
principles such as keyword tagging, intermediate forms promoting calcu-
lability, and algorithmic ordering techniques into working systems, each 
element providing ample opportunity for variation. Coordinate indexing 
constitutes such a sprawling lineage, even if the genealogical connections 
between contemporary variants and the fundamental propositions by 
pioneers like Mooers and Taube have largely faded.
But much like the complicated trajectories that constitute what I have 
called, somewhat callously, ‘traditional’ library techniques, this is not a 
19 Mathes (2004), for example, explicitly presents Folksonomies as an alternative to the DCC, 
LCSH, and other forms of controlled or hierarchical classif ication system.
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linear journey toward some real or imaginary telos. Interestingly, Taube 
himself tempered expectations concerning the mechanization of coordinate 
indexing and later became a vocal critic of mathematization, in particular 
regarding measures of relevance (Taube, 1965). But Taube’s version of coor-
dinate indexing became a (commercial) success20 and represents an early 
manifestation of the resolutely perspectivist direction the f ield had taken. 
Shera gives a particularly vivid depiction of that vision:
[T]he classif ication of knowledge will not be a f ixed and unalterable 
pattern, based on a priori assumptions regarding the most neatly logical 
arrangement of books on the shelves, but a series of quite widely varying 
schematisms, each constructed for a specif ic purpose, or purposes, in 
accordance with a particular point of view or philosophic orientation. 
(Shera, 1952, p. 17)
But does information retrieval really subscribe to epistemological 
pluralism? Is it a harbinger of a postmodern reservation toward ‘grand 
narratives’ (Lyotard, 1984)? I would suggest a somewhat different inter-
pretation. Taking Hjørland’s (2010) classif ication of indexing approaches 
based on ‘epistemological assumptions’ (p. 74) as reference, there is 
little reason to belief that the perspectivism manifest in coordinate 
indexing is based on serious hermeneutical or critical doubts about the 
very possibility of knowledge independent from interpretation. What we 
f ind, at this stage, is either a pragmatic empiricism that holds that the 
world is knowable, even if knowledge necessarily remains partial and 
guided by interest, or a form of rationalism that suggests ‘that subjects 
are constructed logically from a fundamental set of categories’ (Hjørland, 
2010, p. 74) that can be permutated at will. Even if the practice of keyword 
attribution relied mostly on empirical principles, controlled vocabular-
ies could tend in the direction of Ranganathan’s analytico-synthetic 
method which sought to reduce ‘the vast universe of knowledge to a set 
of atomic concepts and certain basic relations among them’ (Svenonius, 
2000, p. 175). While the historical conf iguration is more complicated, 
one could argue that coordinate indexing bifurcates into the largely 
empiricist tradition of information retrieval, which relies predominantly 
on statistical techniques, and a more rationalistic, logic-based trajectory 
that is most clearly epitomized by the relational model for database 
management.
20 Maybe unsurprisingly, Taube’s f irst customers were the US military and, later, NASA.
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The Relational Database Model
Although the relational model for database management, one of the most 
pervasive technical ideas in all of computing, would easily merit a full 
chapter or book, even a shorter discussion can help us understand how 
postcoordination principles have found their way into techniques that 
def ine contemporary information ordering more broadly. This is not so 
much a straightforward case of idea transfer from coordinate indexing to 
the world of databases but a parallel invention that highlights the contingent 
character of technical evolution.
The ‘library problems’ information retrieval set out to tackle were certainly 
seen as pressing issues, but questions concerning information organization 
were virulent in other areas of computing, in particular around the different 
bureaucratic tasks performed in companies and governmental organizations. 
In areas like accounting, inventory and employee management, payroll 
handling, or airline reservations, the problem was not to f ind some docu-
ment that would respond to a (possibly vague) information need but the 
precise creation, access, and manipulation of data entries and the generation 
of reports from the analysis of clearly def ined sets of records. Early f ile 
management systems placed a f irst abstraction layer for f ile manipulation 
on top of physical storage in the late 1940s and report generators created the 
kind of aggregate data overviews management decisions could be based on 
(cf. Haigh, 2006). In the 1960s, we see the emergence of the f irst Database 
Management Systems (DBMS) that were not designed for a single task but 
‘general-purpose’ in the sense that users could create their own data models, 
that is, the semantic structures that would define and organize the f iles in 
their databases. These DBMS implemented either a hierarchical (e.g., IBM’s 
Information Management System) or a networked (e.g., GE’s Integrated Data 
Store) database model that def ined how users could design their specif ic 
data models and interact with the data (cf. Haigh, 2009). Also referred to as 
‘navigational’ database systems, these systems relied on pointers linking one 
record to the next, making it possible to fast-forward to the correct location 
on magnetic tape and turning the programmer writing applications on 
top of a DBMS into a ‘mobile navigator who is able to probe and traverse a 
database at will’ (Bachman, 1973, p. 654). Navigational systems were designed 
to deal with some of the central problems DBMS were facing, namely the 
speed of data access and the assurance of integrity and coherence when 
data were modif ied. But although the pointer system constituted a layer 
of abstraction on top of the physical storage, the logical representation of 
data was still largely tied to its physical organization and programmers had 
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to f ind pathways through trees or networks of records to get to the desired 
information. This is precisely the problem that Edgar F. Codd’s famous 
introduction of the relational model starts off with:
Future users of large data banks must be protected from having to know 
how the data is organized in the machine (the internal representation). 
(Codd, 1970, p. 377)
To achieve a situation where only the ‘natural structure’ (p. 377) of data 
is visible, that is, the logical or informational structure as specif ied in 
the data model, ‘physical data independence’ was a f irst requirement. 
But decoupling the logical structure of the data from the idiosyncrasies 
of the underlying hardware was far from trivial. Coordinate indexing for 
bibliographic control was adequately served by early computing machinery 
because it implied little more than intersecting lists of reference numbers 
and hardly any data modif ication. Handling large sets of critical company 
f iles and frequent, possibly complex updates was an entirely different 
matter. The f irst commercially available Relational Database Management 
System (RDBMS), Oracle, thus only came to market in 1979, nine years 
after Codd’s initial proposal. Sequential storage such as magnetic tape was 
not well-suited for the level of detachment the relational model sought to 
realize and hard disk storage had to become more common to practically 
succeed in ‘hiding away’ (most) concerns with physical representation 
from users.
The considerable diff iculties in implementing the relational model are 
in stark contrast to its simplicity on the user side. All data are stored in an 
intermediate form called ‘relation’ – ‘basically just a mathematical term 
for table’ (Date, 2004, p. 26) – that has the familiar shape of rows of records 
sharing the same f ields or columns. As Dourish (2017) explains, what is 
being ‘related’ here are the data items or f ields in a row so that ‘one row 
expresses the relationship between the name “John Smith” and the social 
security number 123-45-6789’ (p. 117). Unlike coordinate indexing, where all 
items were covered by the same vocabulary, the relational model allows for 
the creation of many different tables, each defining its own variables. The 
requirement that row and column order in a table should be irrelevant (Date, 
2004, p. 148) reminds us that relations are again abstract data structures 
waiting to be queried rather than visual representations already carrying 
a particular sequence. In coordinate indexing, the terms attributed to an 
item constitute a set rather than a list, because their sequence carries no 
importance or meaning. The f irst indexing term is not more signif icant 
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than the last one. Likewise, in the relational model, the grid of rows and 
columns is a relation rather than a table because the order of rows should 
not carry any information.
Fields can have a number of predef ined types, such as INT (integer), 
TEXT, BOOLEAN, or DATETIME in the case of the popular MySQL RDBMS. 
Although the relational model is clearly much richer than a simple term on 
item system, critics still consider it ‘semantically impoverished’ (Stonebraker 
and Hellerstein, 2005, p. 19) because complex data structures, such as classes, 
are not native to the model and have to be (awkwardly) modeled out of tables. 
Indeed, to create more elaborate semantic constructs at the data-modeling 
stage, database designers use primary key/foreign key relationships to 
connect tables to each other.
Looking at the mock-up data model shown above, one can imagine that 
cities may appear in all kinds of contexts, for example, as capitals of countries 
or as locations for monuments. In this case, the table for countries stores 
two links (foreign keys) to another table, which holds the actual information 
about cities and attributes a unique identif ier (primary key) to each city. 
The table recording monuments links to both ‘countries’ and ‘cities’ in the 
a mock-up data model, visualized with MySql workbench, consisting of three relations (tables): 
‘countries’, ‘cities’, and ‘monuments’. Note that the city information is not stored directly in the two 
other tables: the fields ‘capital’ and ‘largestcity’ on the table ‘countries’ are foreign keys that link to 
the field ‘id_cities’, the primary key of the ‘cities’ table. the table ‘monuments’ is connected to both of 
the other tables in the same way. In a ‘real’ database, each table would be filled with actual records.
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same way. If some information about a city changes, it is not necessary to 
modify each table where city information appears, only the specif ic row in 
the ‘cities’ table. This avoids one of the cardinal sins in relational database 
design, redundancy, and makes data manipulation much less cumbersome. 
The process of chopping up the world into information atoms without 
redundancy is called ‘normalization’ and it is part of the data-modeling 
stage, where the application domain (e.g., cities and their monuments) is 
captured into a set of tables. Job titles like ‘database architect’ indicate that 
there is a real body of professional knowledge that informs these practices.
Normalization entails analytical disaggregation to make sure dependen-
cies between attributes are arranged in ways that database integrity and 
maximum expressivity at query time are guaranteed. Although the relational 
model provides a richer semantic vocabulary of data types and the possibility 
to specify precoordinated relationships between tables, modeling practices 
follow coordinate indexing in refraining, as much as possible, from using 
composite elements.21 All information should be distributed over separate 
and independent variables or ‘coordinates’. The more f ine-grained the 
decomposition, the greater the potential for recomposition at query time. 
If, for example, an address is properly decomposed into postal code, city, 
district, street name, and house number, each of these elements can become 
a means for making distinctions between informational items and, by 
extension, the things they stand for. One cannot easily list the inhabitants 
of a city in a database where city names in addresses have not been isolated 
into a separate f ield. Normalization is an ‘elimination procedure’ (Codd, 
1970, p. 381) that seeks to f ind and decompose all such instances.
It should thus come as no surprise that the second main ingredient of 
the relational model, next to the relation as universal intermediate form, 
is a powerful query language that incorporates further possibilities for 
postcoordinated selection of items, but also for aggregate description and 
different forms of ranking or grouping. Here, the main difference with 
earlier database models is that data is not retrieved by writing a program 
that forages through a tree or network of records (record-at-a-time principle) 
but by making a declarative statement (query) that demarcates a group or 
class of records f itting the statement (set-at-a-time principle), much like 
in coordinate indexing. Similar to the move from the elaborate structures 
of the LCSH and DDC to simple keyword combinations, we switch from 
navigating complex prearranged trees or networks to logical declarations 
21 ‘A relation is in first normal form if … none of its domains has elements which are themselves 
sets’ (Codd, cit. in Date, 2006, p. 109).
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using a grid of attributes. Based on more advanced predicate logic rather 
than the basic Boolean logic used in coordinate indexing, query languages 
such as SQL (Structured Query Language) have considerable ‘linguistic 
power’ (p. 381) in the sense that they make it possible to submit complex 
‘questions’ to a database. Here are some examples in MySQL syntax, the 
SQL dialect used by the MySQL RDBMS:
SELECT * FROM table_name WHERE condition ORDER BY f ield_name;
the basic schema of a MySql query. In natural language, it would read: select the records, 
showing all fields (‘*’), from the table ‘table_name’ that satisfy a certain condition and order the 
result table by the field ‘field_name’.
SELECT name FROM countries WHERE population > 1000000 ORDER 
BY population DESC;
here, we are using the basic query schema to select the names of countries with more than one 
million inhabitants, ordering the results from largest to smallest.
SELECT * FROM cities WHERE name LIKE "new%";
this query retrieves all cities with names beginning with ‘new’.
These examples show how different f ield types allow for modes of selec-
tion that go substantially beyond the binary presence/absence condition 
coordinate indexing is built on. Text search, numerical cutoffs, or, in more 
recent systems, geographical queries are some of the examples for the richer 
semantics and much more developed calculative expressivity RDBMS allow 
for. Since the result of a query is also a table, queries can be stacked on top 
of each other and stabilized into virtual tables, called ‘views’. Queries can 
also cover several tables at once, using for instance primary/foreign key 
relationships to draw data together.
There would be much more to say about the relational model, but I hope 
that my short presentation shows how the principles of atomization (disas-
sembly) and postcoordination (reassembly) have found expression in other 
areas of computing. While recent years have seen both extensions to the 
relational model and the proliferation of alternatives for certain task profiles, 
in particular in areas where retrieval speed primes over query power, it is 
hard to overstate the importance of RDBMS in the context of almost any 
bureaucratic process. In line with the postuniversalist perspective outlined 
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above, the relational model emphasizes a local approach to the modeling 
of databases and ‘gives no indication about the way in which the world is 
to be represented by a collection of relations’ (Schmid and Swenson, 1975, 
p. 212). As a general-purpose technique, it provides no classif ication systems 
itself, merely the building blocks for modeling data into atomized units 
with disassembled properties and the query engine as a means for flexible 
postcoordination. The goal is ‘application-independent design’ emphasizing 
decomposition into the smallest logical components in order to remain 
open for future uses: ‘we are primarily concerned with what the data is, 
rather than how it will be used’ (Date, 2004, p. 330). Data modeling with 
an RDBMS has indeed stronger aff inities with Ranganathan’s analytico-
synthetic and ‘rationalist’ (Hjørland, 2010, p. 74) technique, which seeks 
to disassemble the world into its smallest logical components, than with 
the more empirical, pragmatic, and purpose-oriented approach to uniterm 
selection in coordinate indexing. The difference in broad ‘philosophical’ 
outlook is one of the ways we can recognize how ‘each kind of information 
technology embeds its own definition of information’ (Haigh, 2009, p. 20).
From the start, the relational model emphasized combinatorial analysis, 
that is, the creation of new information through querying, over mere storage 
and access. Indeed, it explicitly carried the hope that hiding the technical 
complexities of data storage behind a simple, yet powerful model would 
turn managers and other nonprogrammers into direct users of database 
systems, allowing them to model and query the databases that support 
their daily practices themselves.22 Even if the SQL-fluent business executive 
probably remains an exception, the relational model has certainly facilitated 
the integration of databases into organizational processes, supporting 
informational control not only through much greater ease for storing and 
accessing information but also through the creation of knowledge layers 
that establish, examine, and process distinctions in various ways. While 
terms like ‘knowledge discovery’ or ‘data mining’ point toward processes of 
examination and ‘exploitation’ that are not necessarily limited to relational 
data pools, RDBMS have rapidly integrated various types of calculation and 
analysis, for example, statistical techniques.
SELECT AVG(population) FROM cities WHERE Y(location) < 0;
this example calculates the average population of cities in the southern hemisphere.
22 Driscoll (2012) even argues that RDBMS were central to a wider interest in personal databases 
and ‘database populism’ in the 1980s.
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This MySQL query shows how easily selection and statistical description 
can be combined, yielding rich and malleable analytical possibilities that 
allow for complex forms of interrogation and aggregate description that may 
not have been anticipated when the initial data model was created. These 
capabilities are particularly interesting in settings where databases store 
transactional data, for example, sales records or inventory movement. Here, 
the discovery of patterns or trends can directly inform managerial decisions. 
This opens onto the vast f ield of practices and techniques often addressed 
as ‘business intelligence’, which rely heavily on the exploitation of atomized 
data stored in RDBMS. An exploration of the various direct and indirect 
relationships between the relational model and a ‘new spirit of capitalism’ 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005) emphasizing f lexibility, autonomy, and 
the capacity to adapt to change is beyond the scope of this book, but it is 
hardly far-fetched to claim that there has been no technology more central 
in helping ‘giants learn to dance’ (Kanter, 1989).
This highlights a major difference between coordinate indexing and the 
relational model: the former was initially applied to ‘a population of writings’ 
(Wilson, 1968, p. 25), whereas the latter hoped to capture many different 
kinds of population from the beginning, most significantly populations of 
human beings. In this context, neither the standardizing and normalizing 
effects of database practices should be left unmentioned, nor their potential 
to impose ‘an impoverished, limited language, one that uses the norm to 
constitute individuals and define deviants’ (Poster, 1990, p. 94). But such forms 
of bureaucratic and informational control can be exerted with the help of 
almost any database system. What distinguishes the relational model is its 
flexibility, which makes it useful for totalitarian modes of power as well as 
supportive of Deleuzian models of control where real-time modulation primes 
over static attribution (Deleuze, 1992). It vividly reminds us that customization 
and standardization are not opposites but form complicated relationships (cf. 
Star and Ruhleder, 1996). If anything, the relational model makes if particularly 
easy to move from the individual to the population and back again, allowing 
for modes of grouping that are only limited by the granularity of the data. If 
a process of formalization is articulated around atomization, it increases the 
potential for subtle modes of differentiation and ‘soft’ bio-politics (Cheney-
Lippold, 2011, p. 165) where identity and difference are established dynamically 
and not as hard cuts along preestablished categories.
I will come back to these questions, but to build a broader perspective 
on the technicity of contemporary information ordering, I want to cau-
tion against a perspective that sees databases, and RDBMS in particular, 
exclusively through a bureaucratic or administrative lens. Their application 
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space has become much more general. Today, RDBMS form the information 
storage backends for many different programs and services. Running as 
server software that application programs can access for their own purposes 
or distributed in the form of programming modules ready for direct integra-
tion, they function as constitutive elements in myriad systems, forming a 
central core between interfaces for data collection and output facilities. 
The popular content management system WordPress, for example, has at 
its center a MySQL database that is fed through an administrative interface. 
An infinite number of navigable views on the stored contents can be gener-
ated with the help of a powerful and flexible template engine that draws 
directly on the combinatorial possibilities of the underlying database system. 
Many of the adaptive capacities of web interfaces I have highlighted in the 
introduction are made possible by the presence of an RDBMS running in the 
background. Information ordering algorithms, such as ranking or recom-
mendation engines, are performing calculations that decide which story to 
bring to the top or which video to play next, but this requires that data are 
ready-to-hand in the form of information atoms that can be accessed and 
grouped at will. Facebook, to name one of the most impressive examples, 
uses a complex and heavily optimized data infrastructure to handle the 
petabytes of information fragments it assembles into familiar interfaces. But 
this infrastructure still runs MySQL at its core, producing granular and highly 
queryable repositories of data that ranking and recommendation – including 
personalized advertisement – can then draw on (Matsunobu, 2016).
Following these operative chains, the next chapter turns to a second 
tradition building on the coordinate indexing model. Espousing an empiricist 
rather than rationalist perspective, this tradition makes heavy use of statisti-
cal techniques to count a world cut into pieces.
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5. From Frequencies to Vectors
Abstract
This chapter investigates early attempts in information retrieval to tackle 
the full text of document collections. Underpinning a large number of con-
temporary applications, from search to sentiment analysis, the concepts 
and techniques pioneered by Hans Peter Luhn, Gerard Salton, Karen Spärck 
Jones, and others involve particular framings of language, meaning, and 
knowledge. They also introduce some of the fundamental mathematical 
formalisms and methods running through information ordering, preparing 
the extension to digital objects other than text documents. The chapter 
discusses the considerable technical expressivity that comes out of the 
sprawling landscape of research and experimentation that characterizes 
the early decades of information retrieval. This includes the emergence 
of the conceptual construct and intermediate data structure that is 
fundamental to most algorithmic information ordering: the feature vector.
Keywords: information retrieval, text mining, vector space model, feature 
vector
While the potential of digital computers is recognized early on, the 1950s, 
1960s, and even 1970s were marked by physical hardware that was either 
forbiddingly expensive or limited in terms of its computational capacity – 
and often both. The computer plays the role of an omnipresent ‘evocative 
object’ (Turkle, 1985) that stimulates (technical) imagination, but often 
remains practically inadequate or f inancially out of reach. In the context 
of information retrieval, the 1950s were mainly dedicated to exploring 
the concrete possibilities of novel hardware for document search, while 
the conceptual side revolved in large parts around coordinate indexing 
(Salton, 1987, p. 375). But toward the end of the decade and more so in the 
1960s, there was a growing interest in more computational – including 
more heavily mathematized – approaches to information processing. While 
these attempts remain largely experimental, they yield new techniques 
Rieder, B., Engines of Order: A Mechanology of Algorithmic Techniques. Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
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that form empirical, statistics-driven trajectories setting off from the basic 
coordinate indexing setup. If the relational model for database management 
has become the main technique for storing and accessing large pools of 
structured data through logical manipulation, techniques revolving around 
the measurement of frequencies in various ‘real-world’ datasets underpin 
contemporary search applications as well as areas like machine learning, 
recommender systems, or personalization. These techniques remained 
largely confined to academic research and specialized task domains until 
the 1990s, when computer hardware became suff iciently powerful and the 
web pushed information ordering into the limelight in spectacular fashion.
The following two chapters investigate the inception of statistical 
information ordering by discussing early attempts to move from manual 
indexing to the automatic processing of text documents. While Chapter 6 
is mostly dedicated to M. E. Maron’s work in automatic classif ication based 
on Bayesian f iltering, a prototypical example for machine learning, this 
chapter explores the foundations for the statistical processing of text and, 
by extension, of any data that can be made to conform to the intermedi-
ate forms introduced in this context. After a short discussion of Roberto 
Busa’s attempt to create an index to the work of Thomas Aquinas, I focus 
on the work of two German-born pioneers: Hans Peter Luhn, who laid 
the groundwork for the application of statistical methods to automatic 
indexing, and Gerard Salton, one of the central f igures in the creation and 
development of the f ield of information retrieval. Salton was the director 
of the influential SMART project, where many fundamental techniques 
were developed and experimented with, and constitutes a direct link to 
the present: his work spans four decades and his doctoral students include 
influential f igures such as Amit Singhal, Google’s employee no. 176 and 
former Head of Search (Hardy, 2016). While I cannot fully account for the 
various technical trajectories leading from the 1960s to our current moment, 
I will show how certain technical schemas continue to underpin algorithmic 
information ordering today.
Text as Raw Material: Roberto Busa
The earliest use of information machinery to process the content of text 
documents can be attributed to a Jesuit monk from Italy, Roberto Busa, and 
his project of creating an index to the work of the scholastic philosopher and 
theologian Thomas Aquinas. At the center of this project was to be a f ile list-
ing every word used in Aquinas’s massive oeuvre (~11 million words), where it 
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appears, and the sentence it appears in. Specif ic indexes and concordances1 
would then be generated from that f ile (Winter, 1999, p. 6). Busa thought 
that these resources would be highly useful to Aquinas scholars like himself, 
since ‘[e]ach writer expresses his conceptual system in and through his verbal 
system’ (Busa, 1980, p. 83) and this system could be analyzed in great detail 
with the help of indexes. As part of his dissertation, defended in 1946, Busa 
had already made a manual but complete concordance index of the single 
word ‘in’, using 10,000 handwritten cards (Busa, 1980, p. 83). Producing a full 
Index Thomisticus with the same technique would have been unfeasible and 
Busa began looking for mechanical aides. An extensive visit in 1949 to 25 
universities in the US – ‘asking about any gadget that might help in producing 
the type of concordance I had in mind’ (Busa, 1980, p. 83) – ultimately led 
him to the off ice of Thomas Watson, Sr., the legendary head of IBM and, 
at the time, the world’s most powerful ‘information mechanizer’. Initially 
hesitant, Watson ultimately decided to assign an engineer, Paul Tasman, 
to the task and provided extensive support to Busa’s project through IBM’s 
off ices in Milan (Burton, 1981, p. 139).
Since IBM’s punched card systems were mainly built for accounting 
purposes, the processing of text for Busa’s project required the invention of 
a complex tool chain – or a technical ensemble in Simondon’s terminology – 
that combined several machines, beginning with a typewriter-like punching 
machine for digitizing the full text and ending with a card sorter (Winter, 
1999). With the support of IBM and the resources of the Catholic Church 
at his disposal, Busa constructed a hybrid technical schema or ‘program’, 
combining single-task data processing machinery with the manual labor 
of (female) typists and (male) clergy (Birnbaum et al., 2017; Busa, 1980). 
What is actually possible in technology depends, in no small part, on the 
available means and Busa could compensate for the technical limitations of 
the time with an early version of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. In 1951, a proof 
of concept using four of Aquinas’s hymns was published under the title S. 
Thomae Aquinatis Hymnorum Ritualium: Varia Specimina Concordantiarum: 
A First Example of a Word Index. Automatically Compiled and Printed by IBM 
Punched Card Machine. This work already demonstrated the considerable 
computational expressivity afforded by a digitized text corpus, even if the 
actual processing was performed through human/machine teamwork. The 
system was able to isolate individual words by running over the blanks on 
each sentence card, the basic data structure all text was transcribed into. 
1 A concordance lists all occurrences of a word in a corpus and provides some context, in 
most cases the immediately preceding and following words.
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Most contemporary programming languages contain functions to split 
character strings in this way and the one in Python, str.split(), even separates 
on white space by default. Cutting up longer documents or data sequences 
into chunks creates the discrete units further (statistical) processing com-
monly operates on. In this case, atomizing literary works into sentences and 
further into words allowed Busa’s program to create an alphabetical list of 
all words and their frequencies, a list sorted by occurrence count, and the 
concordance itself, which embedded each word in its immediate context 
and pointed to the hymn and verse number (Burton, 1981).
The project highlights the particular status high-quality manual labor has 
kept to this day: with the help of ten priests working over two years, Busa cre-
ated the Lexicon Electronicum Latinum that provided the linguistic knowledge 
for machine lemmatization, that is, for the grouping together of inflected 
word forms (‘badly’, ‘worse’) under a single dictionary form (‘bad’) (Busa, 1980, 
p. 86; Winter, 1999, p. 12). This allowed for the compilation of frequency lists of 
lemmas to supplement words lists and to link words to their lemmas in various 
ways. Since language is notoriously unruly, lemmatization can generally not be 
reduced to a set of simple rules and is therefore hard to perform automatically, 
as anyone working in text-mining knows all too well. For many tasks, manual 
work still sets the gold standard and the human workforce Busa had at his 
disposal makes certain parts of his project hard to emulate over 60 years 
later. The central role such ‘propositional’ or ‘declarative’ knowledge – facts, 
descriptions, or rules generated or at least verified by human agents – continues 
to play in many areas testifies to the value of manual labor in computational 
processes. The synonym database WordNet, the collection of location names 
GeoNames, or the eminently machine-readable knowledge repository that is 
Wikipedia are just three examples for heavily used knowledge repositories that, 
like Busa’s Lexicon, can be used to enrich algorithmic work. Indeed, Google’s 
capacity to create, compile, and verify propositional knowledge in various 
ways, from crowdsourcing to an internal labor force, is one of the main reasons 
why it is far from trivial to emulate the performance of the company’s search 
engine. Rather than seeing such manual labor in opposition to pure statistical 
processing, we have to appreciate how the former can inject (semantic) detail 
into the latter and vice versa. Computing is always an assembly of different 
techniques into a coherent system and output performance easily trumps 
epistemological purity in concrete application settings.
We have to understand, however, that Busa’s process remained painfully 
slow, even if the use of machinery certainly sped up the work. Punched 
card machines were overwhelmed by the colossal task at hand and even 
when computers began to replace the single-task data processing hardware, 
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editing and proofreading still had to be done manually. The f irst volumes of 
the full Index Thomisticus2 therefore only appeared in 1974 (Burton, 1981). 
And the computational component was rather modest: while the project 
introduced word frequency lists and lemmatization, two fundamental 
techniques in contemporary text processing, Busa’s goal was to produce 
practical tools for Aquinas scholars, not to ‘understand’ the text through 
deeper statistical analysis. He knew, from the beginning, which outputs he 
wanted to generate, and his use of information processing hardware was 
ultimately a largely logistical venture that drew little of its epistemological 
imagination from the new technicities at hand.
That being said, we need to be weary of a perspective that is merely 
looking for straight lines leading to the present. The process of technical 
accumulation is no stranger to continuity, dispersion, and divergence, 
but also riddled with parallelism, side-stepping, transfer, convergence, 
saturation, standardization, and a good number of dead ends. Simondon’s 
thinking indeed guides us to resist the temptation to apply rigid principles 
to the contingent trajectories technical objects delineate. These trajectories 
unfold in and contribute to the medium of technicity, where the capacity to 
arrange stable forms of causality is bounded by technicity itself; technical 
objects are not the visible result of some invisible law of technological 
progress, but the exact opposite: technological evolution is the result of the 
genesis of technical objects and schemas as they appear, evolve, and perish. 
If one favors ‘empirical historical objects’ over ‘philosophical idealization’ 
(Siegert, 2013, p. 10), the record is necessarily jagged and muddled.
Toward a Statistics of Text: Hans Peter Luhn
While Busa’s work remains well-known and is often singled out as the found-
ing moment of the digital humanities, the rest of this chapter is dedicated to 
a more ‘computationally involved’ lineage that can, remarkably, be traced to 
the same off ice of Thomas Watson, Sr., at IBM. In 1948, a year before Busa, 
James W. Perry and G. Malcolm Dyson, two chemists and leading advocates 
of punched cards, petitioned Watson to dedicate additional research and 
development efforts to f inding mechanical solutions for scientists’ specif ic 
information problems (Williams, 2002, p. 21; Schultz, 1968, p. 6). As a result 
of that meeting, IBM assigned Hans Peter Luhn, a prolif ic creator and one of 
2 The current version can be found at: http://www.corpusthomisticum.org, accessed 
12 December 2019.
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the company’s top engineers, to the task. Over the following f ifteen years, 
Luhn developed an impressive number of new techniques and ideas, some 
of them in the form of working systems, others far ahead of what could 
be considered practical at the time (cf. Moore, 1968). His off icial status as 
‘inventor’ inside of IBM gave him the freedom to pursue various directions 
with little regard to commercial viability (Moore, 1968, p. 16).
Initial contributions to mechanical documentation, such as the Luhn 
Scanner, were directly based on his substantial experience with the design 
of electronic relays and other information processing equipment. But as 
large electronic computers and magnetic tape became available in the 1950s, 
his work shifted toward techniques that could be implemented in digital 
machinery (Moore, 1968, p. 19). The 80 patents Luhn received over his career 
testify to his rich technical imagination and bind back to Simondon’s notion 
that ‘sensitivity to technicity […] allows for the discovery of possible assem-
blages’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 74), which holds particularly true at a time when 
the spaces of both formal conceptualization and mechanical realization were 
in a fundamental state of flux. The part of Luhn’s work I am most interested 
in clearly profited from his broad familiarity with various technical domains 
and his competence in applied mathematics: there was a wide reservoir of 
technicity to draw on. Salton summarizes Luhn’s work in a succinct passage:
Between 1957 and 1959, at a time when the documentation literature was 
still largely preoccupied with the use of punched card and film equipment, 
a remarkable series of papers appeared by H. P. Luhn that actually formed 
the beginning of the computer age in the text processing f ield. Before 
Luhn, most experts were convinced that the terms and keywords attached 
to the information items would have to be chosen by trained indexers, or 
by persons with special insight in the subject areas under consideration. 
Luhn was the f irst to propose that the computer could handle not only 
the keyword matching and sorting tasks, but also the intellectual work 
related to the content analysis of written texts. (Salton, 1987, p. 376)
Much like Mooers and Taube, Luhn’s work in information retrieval developed 
in directions that differed fundamentally and explicitly from traditional 
library techniques and set out from arguments that should sound familiar 
at this point:
The essential purpose of literature searching is to f ind those documents 
within a collection which have a bearing on a given topic. Many of the 
systems and devices, such as classif ications and subject-heading lists, that 
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have been developed in the past to solve the problems encountered in 
this searching process are proving inadequate. The need for new solutions 
is at present being intensif ied by the rapid growth of literature and the 
demand for higher levels of searching eff iciency. […] Rather than subtilize 
the artful classif icatory schemes now in use, new systems would replace 
them in large part by mechanical routines based on rather elementary 
reasoning. (Luhn, 1957, p. 309)
The focus on ‘rather elementary reasoning’ and simplicity is shared with 
coordinate indexing and these principles are clearly visible in Luhn’s most 
well-known invention, the Key Word in Context (KWIC) technique. Ad-
dressing the desire for quick processing and dissemination (Wasserman, 
1965, p. 63), often captured in the term ‘current awareness’, a KWIC index is 
simply a machine-generated concordance, generally applied to lists of titles 
taken from scientif ic journals. Luhn did not take credit for the much older 
idea of concordance indexing itself but proposed a fully automated system 
‘affording speed of compilation, accuracy and completeness’ (Luhn, cit. in 
Stevens, 1968, p. 28). To make this a reality, certain hardware requirements 
had to be met, but, more importantly, there had to be some heuristic to 
decide which words to use as index terms in the first place, which means that 
‘rules have to be established for differentiating between what is signif icant 
and nonsignif icant’ (Luhn, 1960, p. 289). Luhn proposed two approaches to 
the problem, which still play an imminently important role today. The f irst 
one simply specif ies lists of words to ignore, now often referred to as ‘stop 
words’ collected in so-called ‘droplists’. These manually created lists are 
another way of bringing explicit, propositional knowledge into algorithmic 
processing, not unlike Busa’s Lexicon Electronicum Latinum, even if the 
purpose is exclusion rather than lemmatization.3
The second approach requires some background: Human language had first 
become object of explicit statistical examination in the 1930s when American 
linguist George Kingsley Zipf and others discovered that word use frequencies 
followed a power law probability distribution, meaning that ‘there are a few 
very common words, a middling number of medium frequency words, and 
many low frequency words’ (Manning and Schütze, 1999, p. 24). For Luhn, and 
basically everyone else in information retrieval, this opened the door toward 
a statistical approach to keyword selection and exclusion. The argument holds 
3 ‘A list of nonsignif icant words would include articles, conjunctions, prepositions, auxiliary 
verbs, certain adjectives and words such as “report,” “analysis,” “theory,” and the like. It would 
become the task of an editor to extend this list as required’ (Luhn, 1960, p. 161).
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that the words that appear most frequently in the English language – articles, 
conjunctions, and so forth – are also the ones that carry the least amount of 
meaning and can therefore be eliminated (Luhn, 1968a, p. 127). The same could 
be done for the very rare words making up the long tail of the frequency curve. 
Luhn was reluctant, however, to give a strong answer to the heatedly debated 
question which precise statistical measures would identify the most significant 
terms (Fairthorne, 1968). For both the manual and the statistical approach to 
keyword exclusion, he took an explicitly empiricist and perspectivist stance 
that characterizes large parts of the information ordering f ield: concrete 
exclusion lists or cutoff points should be set by the users of a system in the 
context of their specific requirements and experiences.
Luhn’s work broadly resonates with the postuniversalist perspective I have 
described in the last chapter but ads a nuance to the distinction between 
precoordinated (a priori) and postcoordinated (a posteriori) bibliographic 
systems. He called systems like the DDC or LCSH ‘adopted’ (Luhn, 1968b, 
p. 167) since they are compiled by experts independently from any concrete 
site of application. But he further divided postcoordinated approaches into 
two separate categories: the ‘synthetic’ type, epitomized by coordinate 
indexing, is manually ‘created by reasoning, judgement and experience 
with regard to the f ield covered by a given document collection’ (Luhn, 
1968b, p. 168); the ‘native’ type, however, ‘is derived from the individual 
collection it is to serve by statistical analysis’ (Luhn, 1968b, p. 168). Both 
types are inductive and empirical, but the f irst type relies on specif ically 
human faculties while the second is the work not merely of a machine, but 
of a system that implements a particular technique or method to make the 
material ‘speak’. This technique serves as a means to ‘harvest’ the latent 
meaning present in the text and the resulting index is thus ‘born of the 
collection’ (Luhn, 1968b, p. 168). These formulations evoke contemporary 
tropes, for example, the idea that algorithmic techniques herald ways of 
‘listening to the world’ (Lynch, cit. in Silberman, 2000, n.p.), processes more 
akin to ‘farming’ (Domingos, 2012, p. 81) than to programming, or even an 
‘end of theory’ where we ‘view data mathematically f irst and establish a 
context for it later’ (Anderson, 2008, n.p.).
Luhn’s work in this and other areas can be described as a series of attempts 
to close the distance between information processing machinery, concrete 
scenarios of use, and applied mathematics. The KWIC system was the most 
successful outcome in terms of adoption, constituting a second pillar of 
computer use in information retrieval besides coordinate indexing (cf. Was-
serman, 1965, p. 49ff.), but Luhn’s desire to further mathematize a wide variety 
of ‘library problems’ is clearly visible from his very f irst paper (Luhn, 1953), 
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where he suggests seeing coordinate indexes as multidimensional geometric 
spaces. This idea, already alluded to in the last chapter, later becomes one of 
the fundamental paradigms in information retrieval though Salton’s canoni-
cal formulation. Luhn’s most far-reaching contribution, however, concerned 
the application of statistical reasoning to the full text of documents.
Much of the (early) work in information retrieval starts from the idea 
that the expertise required to classify a document is already present in the 
text itself, putting the question of how to extract it at the center. Authors 
suggesting their own keywords, emergent classif ication based on manual 
attribution, and automatic extraction from titles or abstracts were all but 
steps toward the holy grail of mechanical documentation, namely the 
processing of the full contents of documents. Concrete objectives were less 
ambitious than Otlet’s plan to extract atomic ‘facts’ from documents, but 
the direction was broadly similar. Even if information retrieval has come to 
use terms like ‘knowledge’ or ‘meaning’ quite prudently, Luhn leaves little 
doubt that this is what he wants to tackle. And, indeed, we should consider 
these efforts to mechanize a particular kind of ‘intellectual effort’ (Luhn, 
1957, p. 313) as a form of machine intelligence that extends the practical 
space of what computers can do. While the f ield of artif icial intelligence 
emerges at roughly the same time around attempts to use either logical 
inference or connectionist models to simulate ‘general’ intelligence, the 
work of Luhn and others epitomizes the ‘task-specif ic’ intelligence that has 
come to drive the resurgence of the f ield over the last two decades. Having 
developed in parallel for most of their history, there has been a ‘process of 
reintegration’ (Russell and Norvig, 2010, p. 26), fueled by the practical and 
commercial conditions created by computerization, where information 
retrieval, artif icial intelligence, and other areas now appear as a tightly 
connected disciplinary cluster. If Judea Pearl’s Probabilistic Reasoning in 
Intelligent Systems (1988) marks the f inal rehabilitation of probabilistic 
reasoning in artif icial intelligence, Luhn’s work should be seen as one of 
its beginnings.
What stands out from ‘A Statistical Approach to Mechanized Encoding 
and Searching of Literary Information’, the 1957 paper one could consider 
the founding document of the f ield now called ‘text mining’, is that Luhn 
embeds the application of statistical techniques to textual material in a 
theoretical frame that describes human communication as a probabilistic 
process relying on shared experience (Luhn, 1957, p. 310). Although the 
theory of symbolic interaction is not mentioned explicitly, Luhn’s conceptual 
starting point evokes the work of George Herbert Mead and, in particular, of 
Herbert Blumer, who holds that meaning is constructed through individual 
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and collective processes of interpretation and interaction (cf. Blumer, 1962). 
In Luhn’s perspective, shared experience and semantic ‘overlap’ receive 
a statistical interpretation, in the sense that ‘[t]he fewer experiences we 
have in common, the more words we must use’ (Luhn, 1957, p. 310). The 
understanding that text is not a self-contained encoding of meaning and 
that communication requires commonality thus renders propositional, 
logic-based approaches infeasible4 and also constitutes an important caveat 
for statistical text processing. Extracting notions or ideas from ‘free-style 
renderings of information’ (Luhn, 1957, p. 312) with any confidence would 
only be possible in areas that have a coherent ‘syntax of notions’ or ‘technese’ 
(Luhn, 1957, p. 312), such as technical or academic disciplines. A hierarchical 
mapping of such f ields, further divided into ‘age classes’ to account for 
changes in substance and vocabulary over time, would demarcate zones 
with suff icient internal coherence and would speed up the search process 
by targeting only specif ic sections of the index. These considerations testify 
both to Luhn’s prudent attitude and to the enormous technical limitations 
that characterized early experiments.
Interestingly, the idea that an index should be a syntax of notions rather 
than mere words is embedded in this rudimentary theory of communication 
and it becomes a central vehicle for arriving at a reduced vocabulary of ‘high 
quality’ index terms. Indeed, what Luhn proposes is not an index based on 
brute word frequencies, but a technique that uses not only the manual and 
statistical cutoff principles described above, but also a thesaurus, manually 
assembled by experts in the f ield, that normalizes the ‘words of similar or 
related meaning into “notional” families’ (Luhn, 1957, p. 314) identif ied by 
a single keyword. Just like Busa’s Lexicon reduces word forms into single 
lemmas, an idea that Luhn integrates as well (Luhn, 1968a), the thesaurus 
serves to connect the different words authors may use to describe an idea 
to the more standardized syntax of notions used for actual indexing.
The proposal is thus still quite close to coordinate indexing since notional 
descriptors are selected by human experts, even if automated concordances 
would help with vocabulary decisions. But there are two important devia-
tions or extensions. First, with the help of normalization and ‘data clean-
ing’, another contemporary term somewhat applicable here, the machine 
attributes the chosen set of notions/keywords automatically. This is what 
4 ‘The very nature of free-style renderings of information seems to preclude any system based 
on precise relationships and values, such as has been developed in the f ield of mathematics. 
Only by treatment of this problem as a statistical proposition is a systematic approach possible’ 
(Luhn, 1957, p. 312). Interestingly, the logician M. E. Maron (1963) makes a very similar argument.
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‘mechanized encoding’ refers to: the system runs through the full text of a 
document, eliminates ‘irrelevant words’, lemmatizes where possible, and 
uses the thesaurus to translate words to notions. That way, ‘[t]he ideas of an 
author would not be narrowed, biased, or distorted through the intervention 
of an interpreter’ (Luhn, 1957, p. 316). In one experiment, this resulted in 10 
to 24 keywords describing each document (Luhn, 1968a, p. 129). The process 
amounts to the f irst stage in what is generally considered to be a two-stage 
process in more contemporary formulations: ‘[t]ext refining that transforms 
unstructured text documents into an intermediate form; and knowledge 
distillation that deduces patterns or knowledge from the intermediate form’ 
(Tan, 1999, p. 65). The term ‘unstructured’, here, is misleading: text quite 
obviously has some kind of structure; what is happening is a projection 
of certain aspects of that structure into the intermediate data structure 
further processing will be based on. In most cases, at least in information 
retrieval, this involves atomization and reduction of syntactic salience, 
similar to what we have seen with coordinate indexing.
Second, the resulting intermediate form in Luhn’s experiment is not 
a binary coordinate index, where a descriptor either applies or not for a 
given document, but a ‘frequency list’ that records the occurrence counts 
for each keyword. This ‘weighting’ of keywords not only allows for a more 
differentiated appreciation of keyword signif icance (Luhn, 1968a, p. 127) 
but also opens up a space for search and retrieval that goes beyond Boolean 
queries and enables more f ine-grained matching through the pivotal notion 
of statistical similarity:
The more two representations agreed in given elements and their distribu-
tion, the higher would be the probability of their representing similar 
information. (Luhn, 1957, p. 313)
Mathematical notions of similarity, which I will discuss in more detail 
further down, are now regularly used for all kinds of tasks, from clustering to 
classif ication, but Luhn’s application setting is less far-reaching. His system 
would ask users to formulate a query ‘in the form of an essay describing rea-
sons for searching information, giving as many details as possible concerning 
the problem, objectives, assumed, speculated or planned approaches to 
solutions, references to other authors and subjects’ (Luhn, 1957, p. 315f.). The 
essay was then to be encoded using the same indexing technique in order to 
compare its statistical keyword profile to the profiles of the documents in 
the collection. The degree of similarity between the ‘query essay’ and each 
document is then used for both retrieving and ranking results.
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While I do not want to make a causal explanation here, an investigation 
concerned with technical objects as beings that function needs to consider 
that Luhn operates in a technical space where the limited speed and memory 
of computing machinery mean that anything beyond index search can 
hardly be imagined. The real-time searching of full text we have become so 
used to is at least 20 years away and the statistical approach Luhn proposes 
is still very much focused on the creation of an index that f its into existing 
coordinate indexing systems and remains useful for manual retrieval.
But Luhn nonetheless thinks about directions for further development. 
Long passages on ‘the special care taken by the author in wording titles, 
headings, and resumes’ (Luhn, 1957, p. 315) highlight possibilities for (se-
mantic) differentiation and enrichment we know well from search engines, 
where specif ic structural elements, for example, text appearing in titles or 
subheadings, are given higher weight in a document representation. This 
points beyond the common treatment of documents as mere ‘bags of words’, 
a common formulation that goes back to a 1954 paper by Zellig Harris (1954), 
who argued, somewhat ironically, that language should not be treated as 
an assembly of words without order or structure. Luhn’s attention to the 
structural properties of documents yields two other statistical techniques 
that have become part of the canon. While I only want to allude to the f irst, 
a method for text summarization referred to as ‘automatic generation of 
literature abstracts’ (Luhn, 1958), the second concerns an analytical technique 
that was taken up in the f ield of science studies in the early 1980s as ‘co-word 
analysis’ (Callon et al., 1983) and has since become a common method for the 
study of textual contents (Danowski, 1993). If we do not discard all structural 
features of documents, we f ind that words do not randomly appear in the 
vicinity of other words, but show a ‘degree of association’ (Luhn, 1968a, p. 129) 
that carries meaning.5 Luhn uses the physical proximity of words in a text to 
establish a network of branching structures where links are created when two 
words co-occur at least twice (Luhn, 1968a, p. 130). Setting such explicit cutoff 
points manually is a common practice in the implementation of algorithmic 
techniques and a major moment of discretion. But Luhn also uses frequency 
to make distinctions between f irst and second order ‘signif icant words’. His 
graphical representation makes the analytical principle particularly clear.
5 The same intuition has prompted many different approaches and techniques, maybe most 
prominently ‘topic modeling’ through Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), f irst introduced in 
Blei, Ng, and Jordan (2003). This (Bayesian) technique frames a dataset as a series of ‘topics’ and 
attempts to f ind groups of units (e.g., words) that characterize these topics in an optimal way. 
In early 2018, the paper had almost 22,500 citations on Google Scholar.
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The diagram relies on the thesaurus approach and the network is arranged 
manually and not by a layout algorithm, but the selection of terms and their 
co-occurrence is based on the automated processes I have just described. 
Until this point, a manual ‘simulation’ of algorithmic processing has never 
been too far removed, but Luhn breaks from his exceptionally sober style 
to make clear that this is no longer the case here:
It is only due to the speeds and logical capabilities of electronic machines 
that such methods become practical in the f irst place and no sane person 
would recommend that such extensive operations be applied manually. 
(Luhn, 1968a, p. 131)
luhn’s representation of a medical text discussing heart attacks. Nodes are differentiated as first 
and second order significant words and link thickness indicates frequency of co-occurrence. 
Reprinted from luhn, h. P. (1959) auto-Encoding of Documents for Information Retrieval Systems. 
In M. Boaz (ed.), Modern Trends in Documentation (pp. 45-58). New York: Pergamon Press.
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This has in part to do with the number of documents and index terms 
he hoped to cover, but also with the type of processing required for the 
identif ication of word-pairs. Even a relatively small number n of index 
terms gives rise to n*(n-1)/2 possible word combinations if we discount the 
order of their association, removing manual compilation from the realm 
of possibility. This procedure thus fleshes out what I mean by terms such 
as ‘nonanthropomorphic’ information ordering or ‘compound behavior’. 
Individual gestures remain traceable but repeating them over and over 
again produces an effect of ‘buying originality with plodding’ (Wang, 
1960, p. 3). If, as Swanson (1988) argues, ‘the goal of much advanced IR is 
to make computers do humanlike things’ (p. 97), this does not happen in 
ways that neatly emulate human practice. Although the ‘rather elementary 
reasoning’ (Luhn, 1957, p. 309) each processing step is based on remains 
clearly accessible to human understanding, its epistemic surplus emerges, 
progressively, over many cycles of iteration and aggregation. The computer 
produces an appreciation of the texts it parses that is not a simulation 
of human understanding but a different breed of cognition that enables 
different ordering practices. While pondering whether machines could 
ever think like humans remains riveting, we may indeed want to invest 
greater effort in making sense of techniques that produce genuine forms 
of machine intelligence.
I will come back to these issues at the end of the chapter but to throw a 
larger net into the f ield, I now turn to a body of work that develops Luhn’s 
statistical experiments further into a canonical model for information 
retrieval and introduces the notion of statistical normalization. To better 
understand the significance of these developments, however, we need to pay 
at least some attention to information retrieval’s formation as a discipline.
Evaluation and Epistemology
Even if Luhn is certainly not the only person experimenting with statistical 
measures in the 1950s, his work becomes a reference and starting point for 
a coagulation of the emerging f ield around statistical principles. During 
the 1960s, researchers like Cyril W. Cleverdon, Lauren B. Doyle, Gerard 
Salton, Karen Spärck Jones, H. Edmund Stiles, Don R. Swanson, and others 
transform information retrieval into an identif iable discipline distinct from 
both library and computer science through the elaboration of a theoretical 
apparatus, a set of common techniques, and the continuous construction, 
experimentation, and evaluation of concrete systems.
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Evaluation, which generally meant comparing systems to each other and 
to attributions of topic relevance by human experts, became a particularly 
important pillar of the f ield’s epistemological makeup: the system that 
retrieves the largest number of documents manually tagged as relevant 
for a series of questions wins. Such competitions continue to structure 
information retrieval and adjacent f ields like machine learning, where 
algorithms compete on already tagged data sets. One would have to make 
a different argument for the history of ‘traditional’ or ‘good old-fashioned’ 
artif icial intelligence (Haugeland, 1985), which pursues and builds on a 
true theory of reasoning, but even here, one should not underestimate the 
enormous evocative power and persuasiveness of a working system. The 
ability to show that a technique can produce a certain output or behavior 
has a similar effect to the ‘matters of fact’ Shapin and Schaffer locate 
in the history of experimental science: because the program works, the 
underlying ideas and assumptions appear as self-evident. The process rests 
‘upon the acceptance of certain social and discursive conventions’ (Shapin 
and Schaffer, 2011, p. 22) that involve, among other things, ‘a multiplication 
of the witnessing experience’ (Shapin and Schaffer, 2011, p. 25). As Peter 
Norvig (2015), one of the central f igures in artif icial intelligence, states, 
‘engineering success shows that something is working right, and so is 
evidence (but not proof) of a scientif ically successful model’ (n.p.). The 
standardized corpora for testing, the elaborate evaluation setups, and 
the regular competitions we f ind in information retrieval and beyond 
indeed serve to establish that ‘something is working right’ in a public 
arena, and they are of particular importance for disciplines and practices 
that regularly venture into domains that are ambiguous and contested. If 
the logical rationalism that marks ‘computationalism’ (Golumbia, 2009) 
attempts to fully model the inner laws of thought or language, f ields like 
information retrieval radically reduce their ambition to understand the 
application domain in any substantive way and move the def inition of 
scientif ic success to a form of ‘epistemological audit’. Proof is replaced by 
benchmark.
This overly simplistic opposition is problematic in more than one way, but 
it explains, to a certain degree, why the application of algorithmic techniques 
to governmental or commercial ends generally goes over smoothly and 
why the leading academics can move in and out of the commercial sector 
without losing their scientific credentials: surprisingly little actually changes. 
Engineering success is defined by an evaluative apparatus in both cases and 
the very purpose of the technique, namely, to order information according 
to a user-def ined (information) need or desire, remains unchanged. Both 
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configurations favor a pragmatic, empiricist ethos and epistemology that 
profit from the aura of mathematization and the respectability of quantita-
tive evaluation.
The Cranfield experiments (Cleverdon, 1967), conducted by Cyril Clever-
don at Cranfield University in the UK, were the most famous of a long series 
of experimental assessments that animated not only the continuing rivalry 
with traditional library techniques but also the more theoretical question 
what it means to evaluate contested and context-dependent notions such as 
‘relevance’ in the f irst place (cf. Swanson, 1988; Spärck Jones, 1981). The f irst 
large-scale competition, which pitted Mortimer Taube’s coordinate indexing 
against the Armed Services Technical Information Agency (ASTIA) subject 
heading system in 1953, already brought the fundamental conundrum to 
the front: out of the 15,000 documents under consideration, the two teams 
could agree that 1390 documents were relevant to at least one of the 98 
questions, but a full 1577 documents were considered relevant by only 
one of the groups (Swanson, 1988, p. 92). Why would this be any different 
for the much more diverse population of actual searchers working in a 
wide variety of settings? Even if the discipline developed concepts such 
as ‘recall’ (which percentage of relevant documents are retrieved?) and 
‘precision’ (which percentage of the retrieved documents are relevant?) to 
reason about relevance in quantitative terms (Kent et al., 1955), none of the 
attempts to def ine fully formal criteria for retrieval performance became 
widely accepted.
Systems that retrieve and rank documents in response to a query are, 
fundamentally, engines of order that govern the visibility of ideas, per-
spectives, and associated actors. This observation indeed undergirds the 
contemporary debates concerning algorithmic work in domains such as 
web search ranking or social media message f iltering. In the context of 
information retrieval, which remains committed to its postuniversalist roots, 
this ‘dilemma’ (Grimmelmann, 2009) has not been resolved through a shared 
normative theory but is most commonly tackled in one of two directions: 
on the one side, there are techniques for automated personalization and 
interfaces allowing searchers to either express their interests more explicitly 
or to navigate through result sets; on the other side, we f ind the empirical 
evaluations just discussed as well as user studies6 and similar efforts to 
gain a better understanding of the ‘human factors’ involved. This second 
direction, in particular, constitutes a bridge to more traditional library 
studies and the public education perspective.
6 One of the central texts in this area is Wilson (1981).
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Together, these elements constitute a broad epistemological context for 
the emerging discipline of information retrieval. The focus on empirical 
evaluation serves as a means to lower the requirements for theory-building 
and opens a space for technical experimentation that is relatively unbur-
dened by the fundamental interrogations we f ind in f ields like artif icial 
intelligence. This does not mean that information retrieval has no conceptual 
core, but that its core is built around the accumulation of techniques rather 
than the formulation of theory. Indeed, while coordinate indexing with 
Boolean queries becomes the de facto standard for computer-supported 
literature search, the statistical work pioneered by Luhn constitutes the 
beginning of a broad cluster of technical trajectories that def ine much of 
information retrieval and inform algorithmic information ordering to this 
day. They represent a vector for computerization that complements the 
machine’s capabilities as calculator, f iling cabinet, and communication 
medium with the capacity to differentiate on a semantic level and to act 
based on these interpretations. The forms of appreciation that emerge follow 
specif ic ‘styles of reasoning’ (Hacking, 1985, 1992) and produce ‘statements’ 
about the world that have real-world consequences, in particular if they 
become part of infrastructural modulations.
To better understand how the operational epistemology of information 
retrieval proceeds, we need to consider different levels and forms of expres-
sion. What we can observe, throughout the history of the broader f ield, are 
quite different manifestations of thought that include intuitions, ideas, 
and experiments, as well as more explicit frameworks and well-def ined 
formal models. They all constitute forms of technical imagination that 
capture some aspect of technicity, but they do so quite differently. There 
is also real divergence concerning the penetration of computation into the 
epistemological horizon. Roberto Busa’s project, for example, mobilized the 
available hardware to its fullest to speed up a rather traditional indexing 
project that never attempted to view the corpus through the lens of statistics 
as a ‘population of words’. As information retrieval moves toward math-
ematization, however, it begins to develop a more ref ined epistemological 
substance that involves new commitments and decisions.
The term ‘frequency list’, which Luhn uses to describe his ‘encoding’ of a 
document into a set of notions, is an example for a seemingly straightforward 
idea that unveils considerable depth when probed further. On a f irst level, 
it points to a rudimentary theory of language and, in particular, a theory 
of the relationship between word frequency and meaning, even if things 
remain fairly vague. But the idea that word frequencies capture some part 
of the content of a document is suff iciently intuitive that it authorizes, 
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on a second level, a formalization into an intermediate form, namely the 
representation of a document as a list of keywords (or notions) and how 
often they occur. This formalization has not only a technical component but 
institutes a model that frames the frequency list as a frequency distribution, 
thereby linking it to probability theory. On a third level, this association 
authorizes the application of common techniques from the f ield of statistics, 
which may have been developed at very different times and places but can 
easily be imported once the formalization as frequency distribution has 
been realized. These techniques can produce various kinds of outputs that, 
if all goes well, will capture and manipulate some aspect of the meaning of 
a document, however skewed or partial.
Each of the three levels allows for variation affecting the other two. 
First, the move from a ‘bag of words’ representation of language to an 
appreciation of document structure and word distance can yield new 
possibilities for formalization that open onto other forms of processing. 
Second, a probabilistic model is not the only mathematical way to look 
at words in documents. Luhn himself points, at least implicitly, toward 
set-theoretical and geometric interpretations and scholars like Chomsky 
(1975) have favored perspectives grounded in logic. These models open 
onto their own sets of associated techniques. Third, the available toolkit 
for distilling ‘patterns or knowledge from the intermediate form’ (Tan, 
1999, p. 65) is constantly growing, both through internal development of 
proper information retrieval techniques and through import from other 
areas. Techniques, understood as elements, move from one trajectory to 
another if the formal compatibility requirement, that is, the adherence to 
an intermediate form, are met.
Each broad articulation of the three level affords and requires many 
specif ic commitments. For example, the notion of ‘collocation’ that we 
f ind in Luhn’s map of notions connects to ongoing debates about what 
co-occurrences of two words (can) mean and which statistical techniques 
and parameters are best suited to establish and rank such co-occurrences.7 
When it comes to the construction of actual working systems, these 
technique-specif ic considerations are, of course, confronted with a whole 
range of other issues, such as task particularities, hardware limitations, 
costs, social norms and values, and so forth. Mathematization multiplies 
moments of discretion and choice during the development of an information 
system, even if the system serves to reduce discretion and choice when 
in use.
7 See Manning and Schütze (1999), Chapter 5.
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From Lists to Vectors and Beyond
While information retrieval is often hesitant to elaborate or commit to f irm 
theoretical formulations concerning language, meaning, or knowledge, there 
are certainly attempts at stabilization, often through formal models that are 
already detached from domain specif icities. One of the most well-known 
examples is the so-called ‘vector space model’ (VSM), which develops from 
Luhn’s work on word frequencies and allows for a more concrete discussion 
of both technical and epistemological substance. The VSM is generally 
attributed to Gerald Salton, a trained mathematician, (early) computer 
scientist, and preeminent f igure in information retrieval. Born Gerhard 
Anton Sahlmann in 1927 in Nuremberg, he fled Germany during WWII and 
ultimately received his PhD in 1958 as one of the last doctoral students of 
Howard Aiken, the designer of the Harvard Mark I and important pioneer 
in the history of computing (Stout, 1995). Salton himself developed and 
tested most of his ideas in the context of a concrete technical prototype, 
the SMART Automatic Document Retrieval System,8 which his research 
group worked on continuously, f irst at Harvard and later at Cornell, where 
he cofounded the computer science department.9 SMART was designed as 
a series of modules that could be combined to assure that ‘several hundred 
different methods are available to analyze documents and search requests’ 
(Salton and Lesk, 1965, p. 391), producing its own practical variantology of 
technical elements. But even if Salton shared Luhn’s experimental outlook, 
his formal education meant that information retrieval was approached, 
from the beginning, through an even more focused mathematical lens. 
This becomes evident in 1963, when Salton published one of his central 
contributions. The paper added little to Luhn’s lay theory of language but 
proposed to think of word frequency lists not as probability distributions 
but as ‘document vectors’, opening a different pathway for mathematical 
imagination and technique.
A vector is a mathematical construct used, for example, in Euclidian 
geometry, where it has a magnitude (or length) and a direction. In a two-
dimensional Cartesian coordinate system, a vector may, for example, start 
at point (0,0) and go to point (2,5). This basic setup then allows for the 
8 ‘More than just an IR system, SMART was the working expression of Salton’s theories and the 
experimental environment in which those theories were evaluated and tested’ (Dubin, 2004, p. 752).
9 While Salton published a paper in American Documentation early on, most of his work 
appears in journals published by the Association of Computing Machinery (ACM). He anchors 
information retrieval as a subf ield of computer science, which implies a transfer of concepts, 
techniques, and perspectives – but also application domains – in both directions.
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application of linear algebra to geometry. Salton decides to represent a 
document as a vector of ‘terms’, which, at this point, means that words 
and their frequencies are treated like spatial coordinates. We end up with 
something along these lines: {word1: 5, word2: 8, word3: 3, …}. This may seem 
no different from a frequency distribution, but now, each word is considered 
to constitute a ‘dimension’ and the n words appearing in a document collec-
tion form a vector space that has n dimensions. In a later publication (Salton, 
Wong, and Yang, 1975), the authors explicitly use an image of a Cartesian 
coordinate system to illustrate the analogy, which we can further simplify:
Taking a set of documents as a series of document vectors, Salton then 
represents the entire collection as a term-document matrix that indexes 
the relationship between each word and each document:
word 1 word 2 word 3 …
document 1 5 8 3
document 2 2 5 0
…
a generic term-document matrix using numerical values for word frequencies. In many cases, only 
binary values are used, similar to the coordinate indexing logic.
a simple illustration of the geometric principles at work in the vector space model.
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It is important to understand that these are not just visual representations of 
documents, but conceptual models that authorize and enable, much like in 
geometry, the application of linear algebra. The computational possibilities 
are immense, and Salton proposes three techniques that are based on the 
capacity to calculate the similarity between two vectors using, in this 
case, the cosine of their angle (Salton, 1963, p. 443). First, following Luhn, 
he specif ies a system for search ranking based on the similarity between 
a query and the documents in a collection, where documents with high 
frequencies for the searched terms are ranked higher. This becomes the 
basis for a formal def inition – not a domain theory – of relevance. Second, 
he suggests an alternative to Luhn’s thesaurus of notions to compensate 
for authors’ diverging vocabularies. From the term-document matrix, one 
can calculate the ‘association’ between terms, based on the idea that terms 
coappearing in the same documents are similar in meaning. This allows 
for ‘associative searching’ where similar terms are added automatically to a 
query in order to retrieve a larger number of documents. Third, he proposes 
a comparable procedure to widen the result set with documents that are 
similar to the ones initially retrieved. This opens the door for broader at-
tempts to process collections in terms of relationships between documents 
and not merely in response to a query.
Today, information retrieval systems can choose from a series of computa-
tions to generate similarity coefficients (Salton, 1979) and vector similarities 
are used for various purposes, such as document classification or clustering.10 
A rather basic technique is again the starting point of almost endless techni-
cal permutation. Two lines of interpretation are particularly important for 
my overall argument and the two following section discuss them in turn.
Computation and Generalization
First, the early work by Salton and others (e.g., Switzer, 1965) on vector 
models shows how the broader f ield of computing – including information 
retrieval – discovers possibilities to connect spheres previously considered 
to be the exclusive domain of humans to established mathematical concepts 
and techniques. Seemingly straightforward quantif ications of language 
make it possible to draw on reservoirs of existing knowledge and technique 
that can be used to create an entirely new domain of technicity. Formaliza-
tion involves a movement of analysis that implies reduction or atomization 
when it comes to representing the ‘real world’, for example, language 
10 See Salton (1989), Chapter 10.
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and meaning, but it also affords considerable expressivity, plasticity, and 
capacity for synthesis on the level of algorithmic transformation. This 
brings us back to the syntactic reduction we have seen in the shifts from 
subject headings to coordinate indexing and from navigational databases 
to the relational model. Each time, disassembly prepares the terrain for 
algorithmic reassembly. This also holds for the VSM and the other major 
models in the f ield.11 These models do not require stif ling commitments 
to paradigmatic purity but can be mixed and matched, often providing 
different roads to similar destinations. Probabilistic models, for example, 
offer calculations of similarity that resemble those proposed by the VSM. 
Borko in fact uses Pearson’s correlation coeff icient in 1962 for his ‘method 
for developing an empirically based, computer derived classif ication system’ 
(Borko, 1962, p. 279). The specif ic way different computations actually 
differ is a subject of debate and, more importantly, an object of study, 
since effects on outcomes are often not straightforward and may heavily 
depend on context. This is why algorithmic techniques constitute a domain 
of research after their inception; they introduce complex mechanisms 
into already complex settings, and even fully deterministic principles 
can yield results that are not easily accounted for. As statements in the 
discursive formations of information retrieval, they become subject to 
‘exegesis, commentary, and the internal proliferation of meaning’ (Foucault, 
2002, p. 135). When Allen Newell and Herbert Simon (1976) argue that ‘the 
phenomena surrounding computers are deep and obscure’ (p. 114), this is 
what they mean.
The calculative power afforded by the possibility to freely apply math-
ematical techniques to both numerical and nonnumerical information 
creates a space of experimentation where even highly simplistic representa-
tions of language such as word frequency counts can yield spectacular 
results, at least in well-controlled experimental settings. And the potential 
for generalizability seems almost limitless. In his 1963 paper, Salton proposes 
to use citations between papers as another type of ‘content indicator’ 
(Salton, 1963, p. 446) that can be formalized in the familiar way as lists or 
vectors, using cited papers instead of words as properties or dimensions, 
to be then submitted to the same similarity calculations. Since citations 
constitute networks, the resulting frequency lists can be enriched further 
using citation chains and not only direct mentions. Here, Salton connects 
11 Amit Singhal (2001), Google’s former Chief of Search and one of Salton’s doctoral students, 
distinguishes three main groups: The VSM, probabilistic models, and the Inference Network 
Model. One could add the set-theoretic/Boolean model used in coordinate indexing to that list.
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to the graph theoretical approaches discussed in Chapter 7 and feeds them, 
without little hesitation, into his own model. In 1975, he generalizes even 
further:
Although we speak of documents and index terms, the present develop-
ment applies to any set of entities identif ied by weighted property vectors. 
(Salton, Wong, and Yang, 1975, p. 613)
This means, concretely, that the techniques for ranking, f iltering, clustering, 
and so forth, that stem from the VSM and other models, can be applied to any 
domain that can be formalized into the basic intermediate form of a ‘feature 
vector’, to use the term most commonly used today. If we consider user 
profiles on Facebook as documents and liked items as features or properties, 
we can use similarity calculations and other methods to operate on people 
in myriad ways. In the context of contemporary online environments, 
user prof iles are indeed a common type of feature vector. As Ertzscheid 
(2009) provocatively quips, social networking sites turn human beings into 
‘documents like any other’.
In a more recent paper, Karen Spärck Jones, another pioneer of informa-
tion retrieval, discusses the relationship between her own f ield and AI, 
suggesting that the willingness to work with unsophisticated formalizations 
may well be the best strategy to approach domains that are, by def inition, 
imprecise:
Weak, but model-based, methods have demonstrated their value for 
one form of information management, namely document retrieval, and 
have begun to be explored, in promising directions, for others. The claim 
here is that they work because, in situations where information demand, 
and hence supply, is underspecif ied, the right strategy is to be broadly 
indicative, rather than aggressively analytic […]; and, further, that the 
appropriate way of being indicative is to allow many small and individually 
ambiguous clues to combine and interact within whatever match of 
document to query is found. […] [T]here are important tasks that can 
be labelled ‘information management’ – f inding, recovering, remind-
ing, sorting, grouping, tagging, etc., arising in very different contexts, 
that are quite crude and can often be done in mode because they are 
fundamentally inexact. (Spärck Jones, 1999, p. 227f.)
This passage, initially published in 1989, is highly prescient both of the ‘sta-
tistical turn’ in AI and of the widespread application of ordering techniques 
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in domains where large numbers of entities or participants yield such ‘many 
small and individually ambiguous clues’ in ways that algorithmic distinctions 
can yield considerable (economic) benefits. If we think of user interfaces, 
tracking techniques, and – increasingly – sensors as devices that channel 
aspects of human practice into data structures that serve as intermediate 
forms, it is no wonder that many of the techniques pioneered in information 
retrieval from the 1950s on have seen a second spring in recent years. The 
more we do with digital appliances involved, the greater the number of 
entities and phenomena that can be formalized as feature vectors, that is, 
as sets of objects described by their properties. The ensuing proliferation of 
problems that mirror the ‘information overload’ diagnosis makes algorithmic 
solutions highly attractive and seemingly inevitable.
Technicity and Concept
Second, one can use the concrete example of the VSM to declare with Macho 
(2003) that cultural techniques are indeed ‘always older than the concepts 
that are generated from them’ (p. 179). Even if it is diff icult to substantiate 
such a broad claim in a space that, even in the 1960s, is already overflow-
ing with both concepts and techniques, it is clear that many of the early 
formalizations one f inds in the works of authors like Luhn and Salton are 
conceptually underdeveloped and either not justif ied at all or through vague 
intuitions. As I have argued earlier, this vagueness is not resolved through 
a more stringent conceptual corset, for example, a Chomskyan theory of 
language, but merely bounded through the deference to empirical evalua-
tions. This does not mean that there is no progression toward formalization, 
but rather that formalization limits its ambitions, glosses over application 
domains, and emphasizes the description of algorithmic techniques, trying 
to avoid as much as possible to venture too deeply into hazardous concepts 
like ‘meaning’ and ‘relevance’. Experimentation and evaluation remain the 
focus and conceptual construction is slow. As Dubin argues, the VSM is not 
‘invented’ in 1963, but develops over several decades:
What began as a growing comfort in using vector spaces to explain 
computations led to the use of language that suggested the VSM was a 
retrieval model in its own right. (Dubin, 2004, p. 761)
Dubin (2004) indeed argues that the VSM only receives a fully explicit 
formulation in 1989 (Salton, 1989), after being used heavily in practice and 
as a conceptual reference point for 25 years. I nonetheless want to break 
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out of the temporal order Macho suggest. Conceptualization may indeed 
follow the technique, but there is clearly a bootstrapping relationship: as 
the VSM progressively becomes more explicit as a substantial model and 
not only a series of ad hoc computations, it begins to lay the ground both 
for further innovation in its core domain and for a ‘detachment’ into new 
f ields, an ‘open adventure’ in the sense of Simondon. Through progressive 
formalization, experimentation, and critical commentary, the VSM gains 
paradigmatic status. It becomes not only more teachable to newcomers but 
stabilizes into an immutable mobile that sheds the complicated story of its 
inception and the memories of incongruence and ambiguity, to become 
applicable as technique to any information ordering tasks that f its the 
canonical intermediary form. However, what we see over the history of 
information retrieval is not a coagulation around a single approach but the 
development of clearly identif iable trajectories that stabilize and continue 
to branch out at the same time, forming the rich reservoirs of knowledge 
and technicity I have theorized in Chapter 3. A variantology of only the 
VSM could easily f ill another volume.
Before closing this chapter, I want to discuss a specif ic extension to 
the VSM that exemplif ies another fundamental principle in algorithmic 
information ordering and again demonstrates how plasticity is a def ining 
characteristic of technicity in computing.
Specificity
When attempting to understand how even largely stabilized techniques 
can afford signif icant discretion and variation, one can point to ref ining or 
cleaning operations such as elimination lists, cutoffs, or word transforma-
tions, but also to decisions regarding what to count and how to count. For 
example, are pure frequency counts of word occurrences workable indicators 
for subject matter? Such interrogations have prompted semantic strategies 
like the thesaurus approaches discussed above, where words are linked 
to a reduced set of notions or concepts in order to capture and structure 
meaning more explicitly. These efforts establish direct connections with 
the f ield of knowledge representation, which plays an important role in 
areas like expert systems or the Semantic Web. But there have also been 
many statistical approaches that use keyword ‘weighting’ as a quantitative 
means to enhance semantic salience.
Certainly, frequency counts themselves are already a way to differentiate 
between terms, but there are various ways to think about this question 
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from a more involved statistical perspective, following at least three broad 
directions. The first direction concerns the level of the document itself, where 
the variable length of texts raised doubts about pure frequency counts early 
on. If one ranks documents by the number of times a query term appears in 
them, it seems obvious that longer documents would be privileged. In the 
early days of the web, spammers would indeed f ill pages with invisible text 
to trick frequency counting search engines. One way to deal with this is a 
form of normalization that uses percentages rather than absolute numbers. 
The cosine similarity coeff icient that Salton uses in 1963 already includes 
such an operation. Second, at the other end of the spectrum, one could use 
information about the frequency of word occurrences in overall language use, 
based on some corpus, and calculate for each word in a document whether 
it is used more or less frequently than expected. There are many word 
frequency lists available online, one of the most well-known coming from 
Google’s Ngram Viewer project. Third, and most interesting in the context of 
information retrieval, one can situate words – or any other feature for that 
matter – within the context of the document collection under scrutiny. The 
early literature on information retrieval contains many attempts taking that 
direction. M. E. Maron, whose work on the Bayes classif ier I will discuss in 
the next chapter, already noted in 1961 that a good ‘clue word’ or indicator 
for a subject category should not simply be a word appearing frequently in 
that category, but one that ‘peaked’ for it, in the sense that it appears more 
rarely in other categories (Maron, 1961, p. 408). Building on this idea, one 
could use the distribution of keywords over a document collection to define 
and calculate the specificity of each term.
In her often-referenced paper from 1972, Spärck Jones (2004) argued 
that almost any ‘real’ document collection will have to deal with the fact 
that some keywords have low specif icity in the sense that they apply to a 
large percentage of documents and are therefore not very good for retrieval 
purposes. If a search query and a document have a very frequent word in 
common in a basic coordinate indexing setup, this match would count as 
much as a match of an infrequent word, even if the latter is likely to be more 
‘semantically focussed’ (Manning and Schütze, 1999, p. 542). Since throw-
ing out frequent terms would create problems for searchers using broad 
queries, one should rather ‘exploit the good features of very frequent and 
non-frequent terms, while minimizing their bad ones’ (Spärck Jones, 2004, 
p. 498). This could be achieved through a weighting scheme that captures 
the signif icance and specif icity of individual keywords by situating them 
within the overall collection. Spärck Jones discusses two strategies: one 
could adjust the weight given to a term by counting how often it appears 
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in the overall collection (collection frequency), but since this may not 
be feasible for many indexing situations where full frequency numbers 
are not available, one could simply consider the number of documents 
(document frequency) a term appears in at least once. The following passage 
argues that choosing between these two strategies is not merely a matter 
of feasibility and shows how a simply counting decision can raise deeper 
epistemological concerns:
Weighting by collection frequency as opposed to document frequency 
is quite different. It places greater emphasis on the value of a term as a 
means of distinguishing one document from another than on its value as 
an indication of the content of the document itself. The relation between 
the two forms of weighting is not obvious. In some cases a term may be 
common in a document and rare in the collection, so that it would be 
heavily weighted in both schemes. But the reverse may also apply. It 
is really that the emphasis is on different properties of terms. (Spärck 
Jones, 2004, p. 499)
While Spärck Jones certainly makes claims about the general thrust of 
each counting method, she quickly adds that the semantic and pragmatic 
performativity of each measure will, in fine, depend on the specific collection 
and task it is applied to. Since collection frequency required considerably 
greater logistical effort, her experiments focused on document frequency 
as a means to attribute higher weight to less common search terms. This 
work lays the foundation for the notion of ‘inverse document frequency’, 
where the specif icity of a term is understood as a function of its rarity in 
a collection. If each keyword is adjusted accordingly,12 matches for more 
rare or ‘specif ic’ keywords will thus receive a higher value in the ranking 
of search results. Salton later expands the idea, creating what is certainly 
the most well-known term-weighting scheme in information retrieval and 
beyond, tf-idf (term frequency-inverse document frequency), where both 
the frequency of a term in a document and its rarity in the collection are 
used to calculate its weight (Salton, Wong, and Yang, 1975, p. 616). Once 
the weighting scheme is applied, all other calculations – for example, to 
establish similarity – can proceed as they did before.
12 Inverse document frequency is normally calculated by dividing the overall number of 
documents by the number of documents a term appears in and taking the logarithm of the 
result. If a collection has 100 documents and a term appears in 5, its weight will be 1.3. If a term 
appears in 50 documents, its weight is 0.3.
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Compared to the above-mentioned frequency cutoffs and dictionary 
transformations, tf-idf and similar weighting schemes represent genuinely 
statistical attempts to differentiate between the individual properties present 
in a feature vector. These processes of ‘distinction-making’ revolve around 
articulations between local and global properties or between individual and 
population. Instead of singling out this or that property of an item as more 
or less signif icant, based on a theory or a hunch, the statistical tradition 
in information retrieval seeks to attribute signif icance to the signal that 
has the highest capacity to discern or to differentiate. The construction of 
overall distributions, here, does not serve to establish a norm to follow, a 
homme moyen (‘average man’) to speak with Quetelet (1835) but constitutes a 
horizon that makes the individual item stand out and identif ies the features 
that make it different.
Algorithmic Plasticity
The operations discussed in this chapter were generally based on some 
form of counting, but their goal was not to create aggregate assessments of 
datasets or populations. Unlike many other quantitative techniques, such 
as averages, the objective was to order, not merely to describe. Similarity 
calculations between a query and each item in a collection were, at least 
initially, mainly used to rank a list of search results. A high value means 
that the semantic ‘distance’ is small, and documents can be put in sequence 
accordingly. But Salton (1963) showed early on that such distances can also 
be established between the documents themselves. In the f irst case, which 
reflects the standard setup of information retrieval, statistical or geometric 
similarity takes a concrete reference point and orders the data pool from 
that perspective, resulting in a navigational form such as a ranked result list, 
a recommendation, or a f iltered stream. The second case, however, opens 
onto a set of techniques that perform something more akin to aggregate 
description, at least if we consider that ordering items into clusters or classes 
without query or other reference points can be called a description.
Given a collection of documents stored in VSM-type intermediary 
forms, one may not want to f ind the answer to a particular question but 
gain an overview of the collection itself or divide it into distinct groups. 
Techniques from the f ield of ‘unsupervised’ machine learning use similarity 
calculations between items to create groups without having to learn a 
model from ‘supervision’, that is, from already classif ied data. The popular 
k-means clustering technique, for example, requires users to select the 
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desired number of clusters (k), assigns entities randomly to clusters, and 
then modif ies cluster composition until some optimal distribution is found 
or a specif ied number of iterations is reached.13 While the underlying 
math problem is far from trivial, the goal is basically to distribute items 
in such a way that the combined distances inside of each cluster are as 
small as possible. Clustering not only stands for a set of techniques that 
connect directly with the VSM but also demonstrates how information 
ordering articulates the relationships between individual and population 
and between individuals themselves to manipulate ‘scale’ in various ways. 
Clusters or classes are means to differentiate and – potentially – to act 
differently on ad hoc groups that sit between individual and population. 
This capacity may or may not be ‘useful’ depending on operational context, 
but it adds another lever to the arsenal of possibilities for projecting and 
manipulating digital items and what they represent. The notion of ‘plastic-
ity’ should thus include both the fundamental malleability of software 
and the continuous accumulation of algorithmic techniques that add 
expressive capabilities.
Depending on the actual collection and the specif ic way language has 
been formalized, transformed, and f iltered (Single word frequencies? Co-
occurrences? Lemmatization? Dictionary enrichment? Frequency cutoffs? 
Term weighting?), clusters of items may or may not reflect cultural categories 
such as topics, and ‘f iddling around’ with parameters is a common practice 
in areas where the constitution of outputs can be hard to anticipate and even 
harder to explain. This is one of the many instances where copious amounts 
of judgment flow into the domain of calculation, turning these processes 
into forms of ‘qualculation’ (Cochoy, 2008), where quantitative measures 
combine with situated qualif ication, technical experience, reasoning by 
plausibility, and empirical evaluation.
How underlying computations are expressed at the interface level, 
however, is yet another question. While the difference between these two 
broad uses of similarity calculations, ranking and clustering, does not map 
fully onto the common distinction between searching and browsing in 
information retrieval (cf. Chu, 2003, p. 81ff.), information ordering techniques 
inform the range of possible navigational outputs. The possibilities for 
design and variable ‘orchestration’, that is, the arrangement of forms and 
functions, are multiplied as the archive of techniques grows. A model like 
the VSM catapults developers into a space where many different techniques 
are ready-to-hand for implementation and creative combination.
13 The basic idea goes back to the work of Polish mathematician Hugo Steinhaus (1956).
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The broad uptake the VSM and weighting schemes like tf-idf have found 
beyond the ‘classic’ information retrieval setup – keyword index, search 
query, ranked result list – supports these arguments. Whenever we hear 
about ‘algorithms’ making decisions with socially relevant repercussions, 
there is a good chance that items are represented as weighted feature vec-
tors and arranged according to some computational appreciation of their 
differences and similarities. In a recent survey of 200 research articles 
about recommender systems, for example, Beel et al., (2015) found that 
64 percent used VSM feature vectors to store item representations and user 
models, and 70 percent relied on tf-idf as weighting scheme. While the two 
techniques certainly do have canonical, frozen formulations, they also point 
toward a space of variation that covers parametrization, implementation 
in concrete systems, and derivation into similar-but-not-identical models 
and metrics. Indeed, tf-idf is often used as part of the VSM, replacing pure 
frequency counts with weighted numbers, both to achieve better semantic 
differentiation between documents and to reduce the number of features 
and dimensions to make calculations less ‘expensive’ in computational 
terms. These kinds of decisions and their consequences are a subject of 
research in computing disciplines and often lead to much experimentation 
and optimization in concrete application settings, where the specif ics of 
the domain will affect how different techniques and parameters perform. 
As Agre points out:
Technical methods do not simply ‘work’ or ‘fail to work.’ The picture 
is always mixed. Every method has its strengths and weaknesses, its 
elegance and its clumsiness, its subtle patterns of success and failure. 
(Agre, 1997a, p. 14)
Software-makers implementing techniques into concrete systems sit 
precisely at the point where objective capacities and objectal embeddings 
enter into negotiation to define what success or failure would actually mean, 
creating the relationships and dependencies that bind the ‘free’ technicity 
of the element into operational commitments. The creation of a technical 
object, with Simondon, is not the declination of a singular principle or ‘logic’ 
but the assembly of a functioning whole out of heterogeneous elements 
that enter into relations of reciprocal causality. The plasticity and artisanal 
character of software-making means that local forces may have strong 
effects on actual arrangements.
When it comes to the particularities of information ordering, the tech-
niques discussed so far demonstrate the variety of approaches to similar 
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problems, or rather, to problems that can be framed and formalized in similar 
ways. Requiring little more than compliance with a basic intermediate form 
or data structure, they have introduced a number of broad principles that 
resonate through the f ield and its many applications. Coordinate indexing 
establishes the idea of an information space constituted by (manually) 
assigned, binary index terms that either apply to an item or not, a space 
that can then be manipulated with the help of a query language based 
on set theory and Boolean operators. The relational model for database 
management builds on this basic idea but introduces much richer means 
for semantic differentiation and expressivity, on the level of both the data 
model and the query language. These two frameworks envision information 
ordering as the deliberate construction of a multidimensional address 
space that lays a disjointed semantic grid over an atomized world, making 
it queryable in endless combinations of a f inite vocabulary.
The frequency-driven explorations of Luhn, Salton, and Spärck Jones, 
however, take a more dynamic approach to the material under considera-
tion. Documents and many other items one ‘f inds’ in the world seem to 
have structural properties that appear as straightforward enough to do 
something with them. Texts themselves are full of words that stand out as 
identif iable units, they have a frequency, they are arranged in a sequence, 
they are distributed over different documents, and so forth. One can count 
these atoms in various ways, either to funnel them back into a stable vo-
cabulary of notions, as Luhn did, or to deal with them more or less directly, 
as most full-text search engines do. This is not a binary choice, but rather a 
continuum that includes operations like data cleaning, lemmatization, or 
term weighting. The outcome is always a specif ic form of mediation, even 
if the process of funneling the world into intermediary forms can be ad hoc 
and driven by experimentation rather than theorization.
While one could argue that coordinate indexing and the relational model 
epitomize a rationalistic, deductive, and logic-based route to information 
ordering and the techniques discussed in this chapter an empiricist, induc-
tive, and statistical direction, their opposition should not be exaggerated. 
Statistical techniques forage through relational databases and declarative 
knowledge enhances statistical techniques’ capacity to differentiate. There 
have certainly been many debates, in academia and beyond, about the 
best ways to handle information and what it stands for, but technical and 
conceptual trajectories are brought together, on the one side, by the medium 
of technicity, which only knows the promiscuity of function, and, on the 
other, by the medium of human purposes, where outcomes matter more 
than intellectual and methodological purity.
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This chapter examines one of the most active areas where feature vectors 
play a central role: machine learning. The Bayes classif ier is used as an 
entry point into the f ield, showing how a simple statistical technique 
introduced in the early 1960s is surprisingly instructive for understanding 
how machine learning operates more broadly. The goal is to shed light 
on the core principles at work and to explain how they are tweaked, 
adapted, and developed further into different directions. This chapter also 
develops the idea that contemporary information ordering represents an 
epistemological practice that can be described and analyzed as ‘interested 
reading of reality’, a particular kind of inductive empiricism.
Keywords: machine learning, Bayes classif ier, optimization, interested 
readings of reality
Coordinate indexing and its relational database cousin constitute a technique 
for laying a disjoint, atomized, and therefore highly queryable grid over the 
world. Ordering becomes a particular operationalization of disassembly and 
reassembly in a multidimensional coordinate system that affords purpose-
driven grouping and ordering through logical declaration. The query specifies 
the coordinates or properties one is interested in and matching items are 
retrieved. The statistical techniques discussed in the last chapter, which often 
describe their work as automatic encoding or indexing, can be seen as attempts 
to build such a grid from the world itself, not necessarily by grammatization, 
‘the process whereby the currents and continuities shaping our lives become 
discrete elements’ (Stiegler, 2010, p. 70), but by counting what already appears 
as discrete units. In the case of information retrieval, this mainly concerned 
the words appearing in a text document, but one could easily imagine users 
as items and elements like posts, songs, or products they interacted with in 
some way as properties to begin clustering or recommending on the base of 
similarity calculations. The various techniques grouping around the VSM 
Rieder, B., Engines of Order: A Mechanology of Algorithmic Techniques. Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2020
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measure similarity or distance, rank, cluster, or otherwise arrange items 
in the already discretized environments computerization multiplies. The 
notion of specif icity, as it appears, for example, in tf-idf, shows how these 
processes can draw on the relationships between individuals and populations 
in (high-dimensional) data spaces to glean additional semantic salience.
The space of investigation, experimentation, and steady accumulation of 
concepts and techniques opened up by Luhn and others quickly develops 
in a number of directions. One of them points toward an epistemological 
posture emblematically expressed in an interview with Michael Richard 
Lynch, the cofounder of Autonomy Corporation, a company now owned by 
HP that specializes in mining large amounts of ‘unstructured’ data:
‘Rules-based, Boolean computing assumes that we know best how to 
solve a problem,’ he says. ‘My background comes completely the other 
way. The problem tells you how to solve the problem. That’s what the 
next generation of computing is going to be about: listening to the world.’1
In a sense, ‘listening to the world’ is what statistical techniques broadly 
set out to do, but this process can be enacted and orchestrated in different 
ways. With the exception of a short excursion into unsupervised machine 
learning used for clustering, the techniques discussed in the last chapter 
were either used for document indexing or created with the expectation 
that actual searching and ranking of items would be performed in relation 
to a query, for example, by measuring the similarity between a search vector 
and any number of document vectors. A contemporary adaptation of the 
same principle for purposes of personalization or recommendation would 
be to treat a user prof ile as an ‘indirect’ query – there is still an individual 
reference point that serves to line up the population.
In this chapter, however, I want to explore a technical lineage, again 
incepted in the 1960s in the context of information retrieval, which uses 
similar principles to order information not in response to some explicitly 
formulated need or desire for information, but to orchestrate a more implicit 
and potentially autonomous classif icatory process that enacts a form of 
continuous and adaptive observation to derive decision-making principles. 
No less ambiguous than notions like meaning or relevance, this highlights 
the question of how techniques can make machines ‘learn’.
In this context, the Bayes classif ier constitutes an ideal example. First, 
it connects directly to the nexus of techniques already discussed, both 
1 Lynch, cit. in Silberman (2000, n.p.).
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historically and conceptually. The Bayes classif ier builds on principles 
already familiar from previous chapters and can be understood without 
a deeper dive into probability mathematics. Second, since it constitutes 
a technique that is probabilistic (classif ications are not binary but with 
degrees of certainty), adaptive (it ‘learns’ from experience), and well suited 
for personalization, it allows for a discussion of broader aspects of machine 
learning and its role in contemporary information ordering. Even if many 
new and much more complex techniques have appeared in recent decades, 
the Bayes classif ier is still one of the ‘most eff icient and effective inductive 
learning algorithms for machine learning and data mining’ (Zhang, 2004, 
p. 1) and has ‘remained popular over the years’ (Hastie, Tibshirani, and 
Friedman, 2009, p. 211). In very general terms, it provides a specif ic method 
for making use of statistical inference to sort a new element, for example, 
an incoming email, on the basis of a decision model derived from previously 
categorized elements, for example, messages already marked as spam. 
This canonical example can provide a guiding rationale through the more 
detailed historical and technical presentation that follows.
From Probabilistic Coordinate Indexing to the Bayes Classifier
The story begins in the late 1950s when M. E. Maron,2 a physicist turned 
analytical philosopher and cybernetician working at the Ramo-Wooldridge 
Corporation and the Rand Corporation before becoming a full professor 
at Berkeley’s School of Information in 1966, ‘was thinking hard about the 
problem of information retrieval’ (Maron, 2008, p. 971). He was particularly 
unsatisf ied with a fundamental aspect of coordinate indexing, namely that 
assigning a tag (or keyword, uniterm, descriptor, etc.) to an item in order to 
describe its subject was ‘a two-valued affair’ (Maron, 2008, p. 971): a term is 
either attributed or not, nothing in between. In Maron’s view, this makes 
the system too ‘primitive’ since it cannot express ‘degrees of aboutness’ 
(Maron, 2008, p. 971), an obvious limitation for the representation of docu-
ment content itself and a problem for retrieval and ranking. Pure Boolean 
2 This presentation focuses on the work of M. E. Maron, although a fuller account of the use of 
Bayes’s theorem for classif ication and learning would have to include Solomonoff’s experiments 
on ‘a machine which is designed to learn to work problems in mathematics’ (1957, p. 56), but this 
would stray too much from the focus on document classif ication. Another interesting addition 
would be the work of Borko (1962) and, in particular, Borko and Bernick (1963). The latter repeats 
Maron’s earlier experiments, but uses factor analysis instead of Bayes’s theorem, with similar 
results.
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matching certainly constitutes a powerful way to manipulate an informa-
tion space through postcoordination, but it lacks nuance and provides no 
means to weight keywords or index terms. This becomes problematic as 
collections grow and queries return large numbers of documents, without 
much possibility for additional differentiation other than the number of 
search terms matched.
The f irst improvement Maron and colleague J. L. Kuhns proposed was 
not to count word occurrences in documents like Luhn did but for indexers 
to specify a value somewhere between 0 and 1 to indicate the relevance of 
a tag for a document. This method, named ‘probabilistic indexing’, made 
it possible, through inverse statistical inference via Bayes’s theorem, to 
generate a probabilistically ranked result list for a subject query instead of 
merely an unordered set of documents (Maron and Kuhns, 1960). Leaving 
aside its complicated history (Stigler, 1983) and various interpretations, 
Bayes’s theorem basically provides a simple method for calculating the 
probability of a hypothesis being true (or an event occurring) based on 
existing knowledge. For example, if we know the percentage of women in 
a population and the a priori percentages of women and men with long 
hair, we can calculate the probability of the hypothesis that a person with 
long hair we see only from behind is a woman.3 If we add other variables 
to the equation, such as height or clothing style, the assessment becomes 
increasingly specif ic. Bayes’s theorem thus provides a means to reason in 
a space of uncertainty where we have some prior knowledge that can be 
used to assess a particular case. My example already shows that this kind of 
reasoning implies not only potentially problematic forms of categorization, 
such as the division of people into women and men, but also raises the 
question of how ‘prior knowledge’ is constructed and operationalized.
In the case of information retrieval, the ‘hypothesis’ under investiga-
tion concerns the probability that a document (tagged with a number 
of weighted terms) is relevant for a query (represented by a number of 
search terms that could also be weighted). The indexers provide ‘prior 
knowledge’ by establishing probability relationships between keywords 
and documents. Interestingly, Maron proposed from the outset to replace 
the a priori probability of a document (the equivalent of the ‘percentage 
3 To calculate this example, let us consider that half of the population is female and that 75% 
of all women have long hair and 15% of all men. The probability that a person with long hair is 
a woman would then be calculated as:
P (F |L) =
0.75 ∗ 0.50
0.75 ∗ 0.50 + 0.15 ∗ 0.50
= 0.83333
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of women in a population’), which would normally be one divided by the 
number of documents in the collection, with statistics on document use. In 
the end, Maron’s formula for relevance looked like this, using a dot product4 
to calculate the ‘closeness’ between query terms (‘WordsQuery’) and the 
document terms (‘WordsDoc’):
P (DocumentIsRelevant) = (WordsQuery·WordsDoc)∗P (DocumentUse)
a simplified version of Maron’s relevance formula, which would be calculated for each document 
that has at least one term in common with the query.
We again encounter the familiar representation of documents and queries 
as term frequency lists or feature vectors and the closeness calculation 
between the two is comparable to the similarity coeff icients discussed 
in the last chapter. When searching for [hydraulics], a document tagged 
with 0.7 for that term would thus have a higher ‘relevance number’ than a 
document tagged with a value of 0.3. Documents accessed more often would 
also receive a higher value. Results were then ranked according to their 
relevance number. Term combinations and weighted search terms were 
possible as well. The method was still based on manual indexing and manual 
weighting but represented nonetheless ‘a theoretical attack which replaced 
traditional two-valued indexing and matching with a statistical approach 
[…] to make predictions about the relevance of documents in the collection’ 
(Thompson, 2008, p. 964). While indexing with manual term weighting 
never became a common practice, the idea explicitly framed information 
retrieval as an operation under uncertainty and thus not suff iciently well 
served by Boolean logic.
The indexing and ranking technique I just outlined is not a Bayes clas-
sif ier, however. It introduced Bayes’s theorem into information retrieval, 
but the actual classif ier emerged only through a second experiment, which 
attempted to do away with the human indexer, who Maron described, 
in line with other information scientists of the time, as slow, unreliable, 
and biased (Maron, 1961). Although he did not reference Luhn’s work, the 
chosen strategy was to tackle the full text of the document itself. Based 
on the assertion that ‘statistics on kind, frequency, location, order, etc., of 
4 A dot product is the sum of the products of two sequences of numbers. For example, the dot 
product between the query { hydraulics: 0.7, car: 0.5 } and the document terms { hydraulics: 0.6, 
car: 0.8 } would be 0.7 * 0.6 + 0.5 * 0.8, thus 0.82. The more terms overlap between a query and 
a document and the higher the weight of the terms, the more ‘relevant’ the document.
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selected words are adequate to make reasonably good predictions about the 
subject matter of documents containing those words’ (Maron, 1961, p. 405), 
Maron devised a technique for the automatic classif ication of documents. 
His approach to meaning remained prudent yet pragmatic: considering 
words as isolated atoms – the only practically feasible formalization at 
the time – was certainly not ideal but said at least something about the 
subject matter a document discusses, ‘reasonably good’ for the task at hand. 
The technique thus again conceived text documents as ‘objects’ (or items) 
having certain ‘properties’ (or terms, features, etc.), but this time Maron 
decided to represent each text by the words it actually contained rather 
than sets of manually chosen descriptors (Maron 1961, p. 406). We end up 
with a feature vector in both cases, but the former implies a higher degree 
of automation and echoes Luhn’s (1968b) empiricist notion of a ‘native’ 
thesaurus or classif ication that is ‘born of the collection’ (p. 168).
Classif ication, in terms of the probabilistic approach proposed by Maron, 
meant that text documents were to be sorted into user-specif ied subject 
categories: ‘[b]ased on some more or less clear notion of the category, we 
must decide whether or not an arbitrary document should be assigned to 
it’ (Maron 1961, p. 404). A simple contemporary example is indeed spam 
f iltering: emails are documents and categories are ‘spam’ and ‘not-spam’ 
(or ‘legitimate’). The task is to sort incoming emails into these categories. 
As Rish (2001) summarizes, ‘Bayesian classif iers assign the most likely class 
to a given example described by its feature vector’ (p. 41).
The f irst step in Maron’s setup, which used a collection of 405 scientif ic 
abstracts in digital form, was to select a number of characteristic ‘training’ 
documents for each one of the subject categories. Human intervention was 
thus rearranged, not eliminated: while ‘prior knowledge’ in probabilistic 
indexing came from the explicit attribution of terms, it now shifted to the 
less explicit act of labeling or sorting example documents into categories. 
A combined word list for each category was generated from the initially 
classif ied documents. Not all words were retained. Just like in Luhn’s experi-
ments and based on the same intuitions, very frequent words and very rare 
words were discarded. The resulting selection was submitted to a technique 
similar in spirit to the tf-idf metric introduced by Spärck Jones and Salton: 
words that were evenly distributed over all categories and did not ‘peak’ 
anywhere were considered inadequate ‘clues’ and thus rejected (Maron, 
1961, p. 408). The statistical horizon was again used to single out the most 
specif ic signals.
An index where each retained word received a relevance value for each 
category was then generated, determining ‘certain probability relationships 
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between individual content-bearing words and subject categories’ (Maron, 
1961, p. 405). In a nutshell: if a word appears very often in the training docu-
ments assigned to a certain category but rarely in others, it becomes a strong 
clue or indicator for that category. Once the training phase was complete, 
human intervention was no longer required: based on the general idea that 
a document should be attributed to a category if it contains many good 
indicators for that category and few for others, new documents could be 
automatically classif ied in the same way as documents were matched with 
queries in the earlier experiment. In fact, there were now as many ‘queries’ as 
categories, and the task was to decide for each document which query it was 
‘closest’ to. The method was therefore very similar to the ranking procedure 
in Maron and Kuhn’s f irst experiment, but instead of determining the f it 
between query terms and document terms, the f it between the word list for 
each category and the word list for each incoming document was calculated 
by adding up the probability relationships for all of the ‘clue words’. The 
technique again follows the logic that Spärck Jones advocates as the most 
appropriate for many tasks that are ‘underspecif ied’ or ‘fundamentally 
inexact’, namely ‘to allow many small and individually ambiguous clues 
to combine and interact’ (Spärck Jones, 1999, p. 414).
Since many words5 were taken into account, every document was likely to 
receive a relevance number (or ‘posterior probability’) for several categories, 
for example, document n is 0.4 relevant for category i, 0.2 for category j, and 
so forth, resulting in probabilistic rather than binary classif ication. In the 
case of Maron’s experiment, the categories would actually represent subject 
descriptors and the f inal output of the system would be an automatically 
generated probabilistic index that could be used to search and rank in the 
same way as the manually created index used in the f irst experiment. The 
basic coordinate indexing setup remains the reference point. Unlike a 
manually generated index, however, the system was dynamic by design in the 
sense that it incorporated a pathway for learning beyond the initial training 
phase: if new documents were classif ied or a user decided to reclassify a 
document, the word lists for each category could be recalculated, adding 
new ‘knowledge’ to the statistical model.
This is the basic outline of a Bayes classif ier and a surprisingly repre-
sentative illustration of the larger f ield of supervised machine learning, 
where techniques require classif ied or ‘labeled’ data from which a model 
5 Although Maron’s f irst experiment used only 90 ‘clue words’ to cover 405 research paper 
abstracts (including both the training set and the documents to classify), his method was 
explicitly aimed at much larger sets (cf. Maron, 1961 p. 414).
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representing relationships between inputs (feature vectors) and outputs 
(class attributions) can be derived. This model can then be applied to new 
inputs. There are a number of important aspects to consider.
The Technicity of Learning
Bayes classif iers connect back to the previous chapters in various ways, 
but they also raise specif ic questions that are crucial for an appreciation 
of the larger space of contemporary information ordering. In this section, I 
want to address some of these questions from the angle of technicity before 
addressing the epistemological dimension in more depth in the following 
section. Five points stand out.
Understanding Choice
First, I want to stress that the outlined procedure constitutes precisely 
what the term ‘algorithmic technique’ attempts to thematize. What I have 
laid out in plain English and some basic formulas is not yet an algorithm 
in a more restrictive understanding of the term, but it outlines a method 
for classif ication that entails a way of both looking at and acting on the 
world. It frames and formalizes text documents as word frequency lists, 
formulates a sequence of stages from training to classif ication to adjustment, 
and specif ies a number of proto-mathematical functions for weighting 
and calculating. Any software developer would be able to create a working 
program from my description, but every implementation would be different 
since many details remain underspecif ied and require decisions. Should 
words be reduced to their lemmas or stems? Where to cut off frequent and 
infrequent words? How to calculate word specif icity? How to calculate 
closeness? Should document use become part of relevancy assessments? 
How to embed all of this in interface and activity f lows? These and other 
questions need to be answered when an algorithmic technique is brought 
to bear on a specif ic task in a specif ic operating environment.
The consequences of these decisions are hard to estimate beforehand, 
due to the potentially large number of items, properties, and iterations. And 
there are not only technical reasons why the design process should not be 
understood as a selection from straightforward options: a working system is 
the outcome of a complex process of negotiation that can have far-reaching, 
unanticipated consequences when becoming part of concrete practices. 
Maron’s decision to integrate document use statistics, for example, may 
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indeed improve some empirical measure of retrieval performance or user 
satisfaction, but it also introduces the principle of cumulative advantage or 
‘Matthew effect’ (Merton, 1968) into ranking dynamics, since documents 
with greater use will end up further up on the result list, leading to even 
higher use as a consequence.
This again highlights that the study of algorithmic techniques is not 
enough to make sense of actual systems, their behavior, the many specif ic 
commitments they imply, and the actual connections and dynamics they 
enter into. But a robust apprehension of common techniques can both embed 
more general forms of theorizing in a better understanding of software-
making and inform more concrete forms of empirical analysis. It can lay the 
groundwork for comparison between different implementations by proving 
analytical categories, for example, selected units and features, intermediate 
forms, training and feedback setup, decision modalities, and so forth. The 
notion of algorithmic technique describes a pathway for asking ‘how the 
machine “thinks”’ (Burrell, 2016) and, by extension, how software-makers 
embedded in concrete circumstances think through or with the machine, 
in the sense that instances of technicity provide means of expression in the 
form of function that reflect both technical trajectories and local purposes 
and specif icities.
Dramaturgy
Second, Maron follows Luhn’s path in framing meaning as ‘aboutness’ 
and relies on the same reduction to word frequencies as language model. 
Although techniques using more involved formalizations of language both 
can and do exist, any running system requires and relies in some way on 
formalization, selection, and reduction. This more often than not implies 
the already familiar distillation into a common intermediate form, a gesture 
that enables and explains the wide applicability of algorithmic techniques. 
Bayes classif iers, much like other classif ication techniques, can be used to 
produce groupings of any class of objects represented by feature lists, that 
is, of ‘any set of entities identif ied by weighted property vectors’ (Salton, 
Wong, and Yang, 1975, p. 613).
What is being introduced into the arsenal of information ordering, 
however, is not so much the capacity to group, which is already realized 
through queries in the coordinate indexing setup or through some optimal 
arrangement of similarities and differences in unsupervised learning, 
but the idea that we can ‘show’ the machine how to group. Whereas 
Boolean or SQL queries specify logical selection criteria and unsupervised 
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techniques look for ‘natural’ zones of density, the supervised approach 
implies a different orchestration: the ‘correct’ interpretation of the data 
is provided for a set of training items, the machine derives a model (or 
function) that maps inputs (feature vectors) to outputs (‘target variables’, 
i.e., classes), and that model is then applied to data that has not yet been 
classif ied. Based on the same underlying intermediate form, the ordering 
process thus follows a different dramaturgy. Crucially, the setup revolves 
around forms of supervision or ‘labeling’ and the move to integrated online 
environments, which I have addressed as ‘computerization’ in Chapter 1, 
provides not only the opportunity to normalize almost anything to the 
common form of the feature vector but also constant streams of feedback 
that function as signals for continuous supervision and training. Schäfer 
(2011, p. 51) refers to situations where ‘users are actually not aware that 
they contribute to an application simply through using it’ as ‘implicit 
participation’, a value-generating mechanism that is sunk into the design 
of the system. Voting, rating, or liking are only the most obvious ways to 
train the Bayesian engines: every click, every interaction, every emoji, every 
act of paying attention to something can be formalized as an instance of 
labeling and flow into the classif ier. These techniques thus ‘feed’ on digital 
media environments on both ends: they receive both masses of data to 
classify and constant feedback regarding how well they did and how they 
can further improve. Optimization for specif ic classif icatory goals becomes 
part of adaptive infrastructures as it is ‘“sunk” into’ (Star and Ruhleder, 
1996, p. 115) technological base layers.
Statistics
Third, evoking the name of Thomas Bayes points toward long-standing 
debates in statistics6 concerning the interpretation of probability itself. Are 
we dealing with actual properties of nature or varying degrees of certainty? 
These epistemological debates are certainly important, but both beyond 
the ambitions of this book and hardly acknowledged7 when statistics is 
used in computer and information science. If a technique can be shown 
to perform well, allegiances to frequentist or Bayesian interpretations 
of statistics are rarely considered relevant and, in line with the previous 
6 See Russell and Norvig (2010, p. 491) for a pedagogical overview and Hacking (1990) or Stigler 
(1999) for a historical perspective.
7 Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman’s influential The Elements of Statistical Learning (2009), 
for example, is completely silent on the matter.
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examples of variability, one can actually develop Bayes classif iers that do 
not rely on Bayesian methods.8
It should be noted, however, that a Bayesian outlook that thinks in terms 
of degrees of certainty is ideally suited for situations where one might want 
to begin calculating probabilities for different hypotheses (e.g., concerning 
class membership) even if very few observations are available, continuously 
updating and refining prior probabilities as more evidence comes in. A spam 
filter starts building its model from the very f irst classif ied email and every 
additional act of labeling will produce an imprint while leaving room for 
future adaptation. The outlook also suggests and justif ies ‘greediness’ when 
it comes to evidence: the more features, the better. Does an email contain 
images? How many? Does the image contain text? Does the email use HTML 
formatting? What kind of HTML features are used and how many times? 
What about the sender? The sending route? The time of day the message was 
sent? All of these elements – and many others – can become part of always 
larger feature vectors and develop their own probability relationships with 
the output categories.
This example also highlights another aspect that differentiates the use of 
statistics in information retrieval from more traditional settings. Whereas 
‘standard’ datasets, for example, data on human individuals, generally 
contain potentially large populations characterized by a limited and stable 
number of variables or dimensions, the number of documents in a collection 
(or similar data) may easily be smaller than the number of properties in a 
feature vector based on word statistics. As a consequence, much research in 
computational statistics has been dedicated to techniques for dimensionality 
reduction. The various differences in application context and data charac-
teristics, in combination with an engineering ethos that privileges output 
performance and (computational) cost over scientif ic purity, means that 
contemporary uses of statistics in the context of information ordering have 
spawned processes of ‘disciplinarization’ into academic and industry f ields 
that have developed their own character and epistemological substance, even 
if they remain in conversation with traditional techniques and concepts.
Beyond the Basics
Fourth, the technique that Maron laid out in the 1960s is generally referred 
to as a ‘naive’ Bayes classif ier, because it treats features as statistically 
8 Russell and Norvig (2010, p. 499) argue that the naive Bayes model need not be considered 
Bayesian at all. For a deeper discussion of the issue, see Hand and Yu (2001).
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independent from each other. Most commentators consider this to be a 
‘poor’ or ‘unrealistic’ assumption (Rish, 2001, p. 41), since features such 
as word frequencies taken from text documents tend to correlate. Taking 
correlation patterns into account could be potentially useful for improving 
classification performance because the fact that, for example, two words tend 
to co-occur could help sieve another dose of meaning from the documents 
under scrutiny. It is certainly not diff icult to explain why Maron chose to 
assume independence: its simplicity made naive Bayes the obvious starting 
point from a conceptual perspective and well-suited to the computational 
capacities of available hardware. One could also argue that the larger context 
of information retrieval, very much dominated by coordinate indexing, 
provided a setting that suggested and valued the compositional capacities 
independence between atomized dimensions affords. Still, few commen-
tators fail to mention the ‘surprisingly good classif ication performance’ 
(Zhang, 2004, p. 2) demonstrated by the fact that ‘the Bayesian classif ier 
outperforms several more sophisticated approaches on a large number of 
data sets’ (Domingos and Pazzani, 1997, p. 105) in empirical studies.
It may seem strange that ‘the reasons for the Bayesian classif ier’s good 
performance were not clearly understood’ (Domingos and Pazzani, 1997, 
p. 105) in settings were all the used data, the full specif ications, and even 
the source code of used algorithms are available, but there are at least two 
good reasons for this. On the one side, there is an increasingly well-known 
opacity stemming from the ‘mismatch’ between algorithms that process large 
collections of high-dimensional data inductively through many cycles of 
iteration and ‘the demands of human-scale reasoning and styles of semantic 
interpretation’ (Burrell, 2016, p. 2). On the other side, there are simply no 
means to appreciate the actual statistical relationships latent in specif ic 
data other than statistical techniques themselves, which means that there 
is no privileged, a priori knowledge of the territory the algorithm maps, 
other than the initial classif ication of training documents. This leads to 
the curious situation that algorithmic techniques in machine learning and 
other domains become objects of study in ways evoking the observation of 
natural phenomena in the laboratory or ‘in the wild’. As Mackenzie stresses, 
machine learning involves a constant stream of measures that communicate 
the internal states of the classif ier, such as levels of precision or error rates, as 
well as a whole array of observational devices, including ‘a striking mixture of 
network diagrams, scatterplots, barcharts, histograms, heatmaps, boxplots, 
maps, contour plots, dendrograms, and 3D plots’ (Mackenzie, 2017a, p. 86) 
that attempt to make operation observable and more clearly understandable. 
This also involves efforts ‘to understand the data characteristics which 
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affect the performance of naïve Bayes’ (Rish, 2001, p. 41) in order to be 
able to def ine the ‘complete set of necessary and suff icient conditions for 
the optimality of the Bayesian classif ier’ (Domingos and Pazzani, 1997, 
p. 127). The capacity of algorithmic techniques to move between application 
domains, which I have emphasized a number of times, is indeed bounded: 
there are ‘habitats’ – data sets and classif ication characteristics – where 
one set of technique thrives and another withers.
And invention and adaptation of techniques continue. In fact, the seem-
ingly obvious insuff iciency of the independence assumption has led to 
the development of techniques that seek to model dependencies. Bayesian 
networks,9 for example, provide a broader framework for reasoning with 
probabilities and powerful – but computationally demanding – means ‘for 
augmenting the Naive Bayes classif ier with limited interactions between 
the feature variables’ (Koller and Sahami, 1997, p. 173). There are also many 
nonprobabilistic learning techniques, such as logistic regression or support-
vector machines, that handle dependency differently. Deep neural networks’ 
very raison d’être is to model complex nonlinear relationships between 
input variables and output classes. From here, branches lead off in various 
directions, many of them boasting ever more complex mathematics. The 
problem with many of these techniques is not just their conceptual and 
technical complexity, which widely available modules hide behind layers of 
abstraction, but their quickly increasing computational cost as the number 
of features grows. There are many tricks and techniques for dimensional-
ity reduction (e.g., using weighting with tf-idf to select the most salient 
features) and considerable research goes into f inding more eff icient ways 
of implementing specif ic techniques. These investments in concretization 
can have enormous consequences in terms of real-world applicability. The 
recent rise of convolutional neural networks for deep learning, which has 
transformed task domains like image recognition, cannot be imagined 
without forms of implementation that distribute calculations over the 
massively parallel hardware of graphics processors (Raina, Madhavan, 
and Ng, 2009).
But a deeper appreciation of the substance present in many datasets can 
begin, much more modestly, at the level of the atoms turned into features. 
In the context of human language, I have already discussed dictionary- or 
9 Bayesian networks are acyclical, directed graphs, where nodes are connected through 
probabilities. The canonical formulation comes from Pearl (1988), the text that Russell and 
Norvig (2010, p. 557) identify as the single most important publication of the ‘resurgence of 
probability’ in artif icial intelligence research.
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thesaurus-based transformations or enrichments that anchor heftier hooks 
in the meat of meaning. And moving from taking single terms as features 
to co-occurring word-pairs, often referred to as ‘bi-grams’, can introduce 
relative word location into the mix without explicit dependency modeling on 
the level of the classif ication technique. There rarely is a singular technical 
locus in software, and the spaces of possible variation are considerable.
Personalization and Recommendation
Fifth, as already mentioned, Bayes classif iers are ideal for personalization, 
since they can easily turn user interactions into acts of labeling to construct 
or adapt a decision model specif ically for that user. It should come as no 
surprise that one of the f irst attempts to personalize information retrieval 
for individuals and not just categories of ‘typical’ users (novice, expert, 
etc.) relied on a probabilistic method close to the one described above. 
Drawing on explicit input in the form of initial self-descriptions and on 
implicit feedback based on the idea that ‘[o]ne of the simplest ways to derive 
information about a user is to look at the way he uses the system’ (Rich, 
1983, p. 205), Elaine Rich’s personalized f iction literature recommender 
system built a ‘user model’ along a number of culturally and psychologi-
cally salient facets, such as ‘interests’ (e.g., ‘sports’), ‘politics’ (e.g., ‘liberal’), 
or ‘tolerate-violence’ (expressed as numerical value). These facets served 
as the features of a user vector that was then compared to the manually 
attributed book vectors in the collection.10 As the system begins to suggest 
book titles and users provide feedback on recommendations, their profiles 
are updated accordingly. While Rich’s use of probabilistic inference spans 
different stages, this last step can be understood as a single-class Bayes 
classif ier, where the relevance number (or posterior probability) for that 
class is used to rank the books to recommend.
Personalization, understood as the process of adapting a service to indi-
vidual users, is not an algorithmic technique, but a gesture or application that 
may draw on very different technical procedures. One such technique, often 
used in recommender systems, eschews actual content features altogether11 
and relies on ‘collaborative filtering’, an approach that operates on the intuition 
that ‘a good way to f ind interesting content is to f ind other people who have 
10 Rich’s system is actually a little more complicated since it uses ‘stereotypes’, such as ‘intel-
lectual’ or ‘feminist’, as intermediate categories.
11 Many systems use hybrid approaches that combine both content-based and collaborative 
f iltering. For an early example, see Balabanović and Shoham (1997).
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similar interests, and then recommend titles that those similar users like’ 
(Breese, Heckerman, and Kadie, 1998, p. 43). This idea can inform a technique 
that starts from user models in the form of feature vectors taking songs ‘liked’ 
or listened to as dimensions. Similarity between users is then computed 
exactly the same way as described in the previous chapter, using, for example, 
cosine similarity or the Pearson correlation coefficient. The system can then 
suggest new songs listened to by similar users. User profiles and content 
features are simply two types of entities that can be funneled into a vector 
space and gestures like ‘personalization’, ‘recommendation’, or ‘retrieval’ are 
merely different ways of arranging similar operations into interface outputs.
While a system based on collaborative f iltering could work for spam 
triage to a certain degree, emails have too much variation and are too 
specif ic to individual users to work as dimensions in a vector. Here, the 
specif ic features of the machine learning approach come as an advantage. 
Using content features as input for a Bayes classif ier and user feedback as 
learning mechanism allows for the creation of fully individualized decision 
models that take the features of an incoming item as carriers of meaning and 
interpret them from the vantage point of past interactions. This highlights a 
crucial aspect that holds for most supervised machine learning techniques: 
the learning algorithm orchestrates and governs the construction of a 
decision model, but the actual mapping between input and output is based 
on the encounter between data and supervision. This has far-reaching 
consequences, which I will address in more depth in the next section.
Interested Readings
Bayes classifiers and other machine learning techniques arrange information 
ordering and decision-making in ways that are profoundly different from the 
common framing of algorithms as set formulas executing a stable sequence of 
operations. Even in academic publications, a common conception still seems 
to imagine a group of developers enumerating variables to take into account 
and specifying how to couple and weight them. The makers of Facebook, for 
example, would brood over the criteria for News Feed filtering, meticulously 
arranging metrics such as aff inity between users, post engagement, and 
some function of time to produce a clear decision recipe that is guarded like 
a precious secret. Intense reflection about the application domain is certainly 
part of the practice, but this conception is increasingly outdated. Supervised 
machine learning techniques such as Bayes classif iers constitute means to 
derive decision models from the encounter between a purpose, data, and a 
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mechanism that provides the ‘correct’ interpretation for at least some of these 
data, for example, through initial labeling or continuous feedback. This echoes 
Shera’s vision from 1952 that ‘classification of knowledge will not be a f ixed 
and unalterable pattern, […] but a series of quite widely varying schematisms, 
each constructed for a specific purpose’ (Shera, 1952, p. 17). What changes here 
is the way classification and purpose come together. In coordinate indexing, 
the technique serving as the backdrop to Shera’s argument, purpose guides the 
process of creating and attributing an indexing vocabulary and informs every 
act of searching. In the case of Bayesian spam filtering, nobody has to manually 
compile a list of ‘spammy’ words and there is also no query. The purpose is 
expressed through the definition of classes, for example, ‘spam’ and ‘not-spam’ 
for sorting emails. When a user begins to label messages, the probability 
relationships between words and classes are generated automatically from 
the message content, producing a basis for distinction- and decision-making 
that is not a clear-cut formula, but an adaptive statistical model containing 
potentially millions of features. If the word ‘Viagra’ appears often in mails 
marked as spam and rarely in others, it will become a strong indicator or 
clue. But every word that has not been discarded by f iltering or weighting 
will acquire meaning that way, and the final score for an incoming message is 
based on all of these ‘small and individually ambiguous clues’ (Spärck Jones, 
1999, p. 227f.), making it hard to create a simple causal narrative.
The assessment that machine ‘[l]earning is more like farming, which lets 
nature do most of the work’ (Domingos, 2012, p. 81) is clearly incomplete. Even 
if it is certainly not wrong to say that ‘[m]achine learning systems automati-
cally learn programs from data’ (Domingos, 2012, p. 81), this ‘program’ – or 
decision model – sits among a whole range of other programs, that is, things 
that are not ‘nature’ or ‘the world’. Machine learning systems themselves 
have two essential technical components, a training engine that learns 
from examples and an inference engine that applies the learned model (the 
mapping between input features and output categories or target variables) 
to incoming data. But further upstream we have other interfaces, infra-
structures, programs, or manual gestures like data cleaning that formalize 
and f ilter the world into a neat queue of well-behaved feature vectors and 
submit them to a labeling process.12 Techniques like A/B/N testing, where 
two or more versions of the same content or application are submitted 
12 While Mackenzie (2017a) dives deep into the mathematical dimension of machine learning, 
he remains remarkably silent on the origin of training data, on the role and orchestration of 
labeling, and on the embedding of both of these things into the vast digital infrastructures I 
have addressed with the term ‘computerization’.
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to random samples of users, create such feedback situations as part of an 
ongoing process of development and optimization. Google’s Experiments 
architecture, part of Google Analytics, describes its purpose as providing 
a framework that ‘enables you to test almost any change or variation to a 
website or app to see how it performs in optimizing for a specific goal’.13 Such 
goals may range from product design and improvement to the more specif ic 
forms of behavior modif ication Zuboff (2019) describes as ‘surveillance 
capitalism’. Built on a Bayesian statistical engine,14 Google’s framework 
permits developers unfamiliar with statistical learning to integrate empirical 
decision processes into their design and development methodology. But 
even if the practice draws on actual user behavior, the whole setup of these 
experimental situations is clearly not accidental or ‘natural’ in any sense of 
the word. When Domingos states that machine learning is like farming, he 
wants to stress its inductive character, but – inadvertently or not – positions 
it as an activity that is not a ‘disinterestedness’ pursuit. Agriculture is not 
biology and its goal is to grow crops, not to understand the world.
And, indeed, no deep understanding of the application domain is required 
to produce a model. When a payday lender uses Facebook data to decide 
whether an applicant is likely to pay back a loan (cf. Deville, 2013), there is no 
need for a Bourdieusian sociologist who tags every possible profile element 
as an indicator of class or socioeconomic potential. This is precisely why 
Andrejevic (2013) calls data mining a ‘post-comprehension’ (p. 41) strategy: no 
‘theory’ of the social needs to intervene, no framework that ties the myriad 
data traces associated with ‘the “diversif ication” and individualization of 
lifestyles and ways of life’ (Beck, 1992, p. 91) back into a neat description of 
society. It is enough to have some users who have already labeled their own 
prof iles by the act of paying back or defaulting on their loans to generate 
a model where every single profile item becomes f irst a feature in a vector 
and then an indicator for ‘creditworthiness’. This is what ‘generalizing from 
examples’ (Domingos, 2012, p. 78) means and it should give us an idea how 
engines of order can ‘automate inequality’ (Eubanks, 2018) if every small 
act or preference can be examined in relation to its economic signif icance. 
This goes beyond the encoding of ‘human prejudice, misunderstanding, and 
bias into the software systems that increasingly [manage] our lives’ (O’Neil, 
2016, p. 3) toward an ever-expanding capacity to read and assess the world 
in relation to a purpose (Rieder, 2016).
13 https://developers.google.com/analytics/solutions/experiments, accessed 11 January 2019.
14 https://support.google.com/analytics/answer/2844870?hl=en&ref_topic=1745207, accessed 
11 January 2019.
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Bayes classif iers and similar techniques are neither static recipes for 
decision-making nor theories engaged in ontological attribution; they 
are methods for making data signify in relation to a particular desire to 
distinguish, to establish differences, and to operate on them; they are devices 
for the automated production of interested readings of empirical reality.15 
Maron’s goal was not to say anything deep about the relationship between 
text and meaning but to design a system that produces ‘good’ results in 
the domain of its application. I thus use the term ‘interested’ to emphasize 
that the epistemic process is not just tainted by some unavowed bias16 
but fully designed around an explicit goal or purpose that trumps any 
epistemological or ontological qualms one may have. Just as Desrosières’s 
(2001) notion of accounting realism suggests and Lyotard (1984) emphasizes 
further, ‘the goal is no longer truth, but performativity – that is, the best 
possible input/output equation’ (p. 46). This means that the def inition of 
the desired outcome becomes the central locus of normativity.
One of the central narratives that – often implicitly – informs and justi-
f ies the empiricist organization of information ordering around behavioral 
feedback and clickstream data is the notion of ‘revealed preference’. In 1938, 
the economist Paul Samuelson was voicing his dissatisfaction with recent 
developments around the notion of ‘utility’, which was central to the idea 
of consumer choice, he argued, but had been complicated to the point of 
removing ‘the assumption of the measurability of utility’ (p. 61). It could 
therefore no longer support forms of economic theory revolving mostly 
around mathematical modeling. In its place, Samuelson (1948) put what 
was to become the idea of ‘revealed preference’, which basically anchors the 
notion of utility or preference not in some elaborate psychological theory 
but in the observable fact that a purchase has been made: ‘the individual 
guinea-pig, by his market behaviour, reveals his preference pattern’ (p. 243). 
This conceptual gesture ‘opened up the way for empirical studies of prefer-
ences based on observed market behaviour’ (Sen, 1973, p. 242). The process of 
purification at work here is similar to other empirical definitions that do not 
really provide an actual critique of what they seek to replace but axiomatically 
bind the concept to a particular form of measurement rather than a theoretical 
construct. This is precisely what makes the notion of revealed preference so 
15 Berry (2008, p. 365) talks about network models as constituting particular ‘readings of 
reality’.
16 Although it may very well be. This is not the focus of the more conceptual approach taken 
in this book, but there is much research on bias and discrimination in data mining, for example, 
Custers et al. (2013). More explicitly on the technique discussed here, see Calders and Verwer 
(2010).
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attractive in the context of information ordering. If behavior reveals preference 
and preference is the guiding principle for designing systems that espouse 
dynamic perspectivism to liberate ‘the territory subjugated by classification’ 
(Weinberger, 2008, p. 92), behavioral data can simply become another form 
of query, another expression of an information need or desire. From this 
perspective, everything falls into place, since optimization criteria such as 
time on site or click rate become expressions of user preference. What users 
do is what they want and what they want is what they shall receive. How 
could it be otherwise? Incidentally, this also justif ies the quest to increase 
click rates and time on site, framing the process as a win-win situation: in 
the context of a music-streaming service, for example, a recommendation 
is doubly ‘successful’ if a user actually listens to the track, because it both 
satisf ies the user’s revealed preference and increases the use of the service. 
Machine learning, in particular, thrives on this circular logic. Grammatized 
infrastructures facilitate disassembly into intermediary forms and algorithmic 
techniques instantiate dynamic reassembly through learning or optimization 
processes designed around operational goals.
In the battle for users’ time, attention, and money, such forms of optimiza-
tion move to the center of business processes. Plasticity and modularity 
in software may imply creativity and expression, but they also enable 
companies driven by prof it motives to constantly analyze, optimize, and 
experiment with orderings and their effects on the bottom line. Engaged 
in both representing and intervening, algorithmic techniques become both 
‘machineries of knowing’ (Knorr Cetina, 1999, p. 5) and engines of order that 
create direct and indirect feedback loops between knowledge and power in 
ways that are hard to overstate. Facebook can tune its Newsfeed f iltering 
engine in a way that something like ‘time on site’ or ‘ad click probability’ 
becomes the target variable for determining the optimal traits of content 
items for each user, individually. Instead of selecting and weighting variables 
manually, the classif ier derives – or ‘learns’ – the relevant features from the 
relationship between data (posts and their different properties), feedback 
(users’ engagement with these posts), and purpose (to increase engagement). 
The system is then able to execute the following command: ‘show to the 
user the posts similar to those that previously led to high engagement’. In 
a recent interview (Klein, 2018), Mark Zuckerberg describes a setup that 
shows how easily the technical principles can be arranged to accommodate 
different value narratives. Responding to ambient criticism, the company 
apparently decided to move away from directly monetizable target variables 
and invited panels of users to rank actual contents in terms of what seemed 
most ‘meaningful’ to them. We can thus imagine an arrangement where 
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the feedback gathered this way becomes the labeling input for a classif ier 
that is then generalized to the entire user population. ‘Meaningfulness’ is 
submitted to the vague and empiricist treatment we are already familiar 
with. In an earlier post, Zuckerberg had already announced that Facebook 
would increasingly seek to optimize for ‘time well spent’, which may have 
the effect that ‘the time people spend on Facebook and some measures of 
engagement will go down’. But shareholders should not worry, since this 
‘will be good for our community and our business over the long term too’ 
(Zuckerberg, 2018, n.p.). Similarly, YouTube argues that they are not simply 
optimizing for watchtime but for user ‘satisfaction’ (Lewis, 2018). And the 
different content-flagging tools on social media sites clearly serve as input for 
classif iers seeking to identify illegal, harmful, or other ‘unwanted’ content or 
behavior. The question, then, is how these ‘target values’ are being decided 
on, how they are being operationalized, and how they f ind expression in 
technical terms. Any working system is a practical answer to these questions 
and normative commitments are being made at each step of the way.
This does not mean that machine learning is not an academic discipline, 
but rather that most of its operational reality occurs outside of institutional 
settings subscribing to Mertonian norms of science. Merton argues that ‘disin-
terestedness’ is a central tenet of scientific inquiry and that ‘disinterestedness 
has a firm basis in the public and testable character of science’ (Merton, 1973, 
p. 276). But the work some of machine learning’s most famous scholars do at 
Baidu (Andrew Ng), Facebook (Yann LeCun), or Google (Geoffrey Hinton, Peter 
Norvig) gets sucked into infrastructures of operation that are far removed 
from public scrutiny. This tension characterizes, at least to a degree, any 
discipline that produce highly applicable knowledge. And it is certainly true 
that algorithmic techniques do not determine the specific performativity of 
the resulting algorithm. The Bayes classifier provides the capacity for making 
interested readings and decisions but specifies neither the purpose nor the 
way an engine of order projects its output back into the world. Facebook can 
decide to train its News Feed engine based on any criterion the company could 
come up with. It may not be easy to find measures for concepts like diversity, 
plurality, or ‘meaningfulness’, which are heavily context-dependent and con-
tested when pressed a little harder. But this is a question worthy of additional 
research and one that would, more broadly, benefit from a perspective more 
hesitant to locate political salience in singular instances of technicity rather 
than the larger systems or infrastructures technology forms. ‘Implementation’ 
of complex human values are not problems to be solved but ongoing struggles 
that require forms of ‘cooperative responsibility’ engaging multiple actors 
and institutions into forms of ‘dynamic interaction’ (Helberger et al., 2018).
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Does the emphasis on optimization targets make Bayes classif iers neutral 
tools that could be used to further any kind of cause? The problem is more 
complicated than terms like ‘neutrality’ and ‘objectivity’ suggest. Mackenzie 
(2015) argues that ‘as machine learning is generalized, the forms of value 
that circulate in the form of commodities alter’ (p. 444), emphasizing that 
the different technical ‘styles’ of processing ‘entail different kinds of value’ 
(p. 436). In his most recent take on the subject, he further describes machine 
learning as ‘a new enunciative mode that disperses patterns as the visible 
form of difference into a less visible but highly operational space’, where 
algorithmic techniques ‘def ine possibilities of grouping and assembling 
differences’ (Mackenzie, 2017a, p. 149). To better understand what this 
means, one can appreciate how the spaces constituted by coordinate 
indexing, the relational model for database management, vectorization, 
and other modes of formalization into intermediate forms indeed give rise 
to what Deleuze described as the ‘f ini-unlimited’, where a ‘f inite number 
of components yields a practically unlimited diversity of combinations’ 
(Deleuze, 1988, p. 131). Any suff iciently complex dataset – and especially 
sets with high numbers of dimensions – can be cut, sliced, and put into 
sequence in many, many different ways, whether this is done through a set 
of search results, a statistical description, or an inductive learning process. 
This enables new forms of knowing that enter into complex relationships 
with existing practices and, in particular, with the goal-oriented processes 
we f ind in management and governance. My point, here, is that we need to 
take Mackenzie’s (2017a) assessment that the ‘optics’ of machine learning 
are always ‘partial’ (p. 80) in both senses of the word: partial as incomplete 
or fragmentary; and partial as skewed, biased, or – preferably – interested.
One could argue that data mining techniques embody forms of cognition 
or enunciation that are, on the one side, nonanthropomorphic in the sense 
that they consist of procedures that can only be enacted by fast computing 
machinery and, on the other side, thoroughly entangled in operational 
arrangements. To speak with Virilio (1994), we could say that they are ‘vision 
machines’ to which we are ‘delegating the analysis of objective reality’ (p. 59) 
and argue that there is ‘a “subjective” optical interpretation of observed 
phenomena and not just “objective” information’ (p. 75). On the level of 
signif ication, machine learning and other techniques attribute meaning to 
every variable in relation to a purpose; on the level of performativity, the 
move to increasingly integrated digital infrastructures means that every 
classif icatory decision can be pushed back into the world instantly, showing 
a specif ic ad, hiding a specif ic post, refusing a loan to a specif ic applicant, 
setting the price of a product to a specif ic level, and so forth. No data point 
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remains innocent. Standing in for the wider category of information ordering 
techniques, Bayes classif iers entangle meaning – and not just the meaning 
of texts – in complex and often very direct ways with decision-making 
informed by specif ic objectives and purposes. In a sense, Bacon’s famous 
distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ disappears into a form of description that 
is built, from the ground up, on a prescriptive horizon. We no longer decide 
based on what we know; we know based on the decision we want to make.
What makes algorithmic techniques far from ‘neutral’, then, is not some 
intrinsic bias or allegiance to a specif ic political model but the fact that 
these new ‘levers on “reality”’ (Goody, 1977, p. 109) are distributed throughout 
social domains in specif ic ways, which has the potential to profoundly 
reconfigure power in contemporary societies. When looking at power as 
‘techniques’ or ‘functionings’, as a ‘network of relations, always in tension’ 
(Foucault, 1995, p. 26), we can appreciate how algorithmic information 
ordering delivers specif ic ways to continuously establish, organize, and 
modulate the relationships between datafied entities in service of strategic 
goals. And if the ‘exercise of power consists in “conducting conduct” and 
in adjusting the probabilities of possible outcomes’ (Foucault, 1982, p. 789, 
translation amended), machine learning indeed provides concrete technical 
means to do so, informing the varieties of ‘automated management’ Kitchin 
and Dodge discuss in Code/Space (2011). Although Bayes classif iers do not 
determine how their results are used at the interface level and beyond, 
they stand for a new set of techniques that have the capacity to generate 
interested forms of knowledge used to make myriad of small and large 
decisions with concrete effects. They introduce a ‘micro-physics’17 that may 
well affect how power operates in signif icant ways. And the term ‘operate’ 
needs to be taken seriously, here. The computerized infrastructures human 
activities are increasingly entangled with imply forms of semiosis that take 
effect not like signs, but also, with loose reference to Lessig (1999), like 
walls, encroaching on conduct through modif ications of the visible and 
navigable environment.
Information Retrieval as Trading Zone
This chapter discussed the Bayes classif ier both as an example for the broad 
category of machine learning techniques and as a means to demonstrate how 
17 Foucault (1995, p. 26) introduces the term to address the many subtle, diffuse, and productive 
technologies of power that operate on bodies in various ways.
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the intermediate forms presented in previous chapters open onto spaces of 
technical expression and plasticity that introduce different epistemological 
and operational gestures into the arsenal of software-makers and, by exten-
sion, into the professional and institutional settings they are embedded in. 
While the f ield of machine learning comprises a whole range of historical 
trajectories, Maron’s experiments in information retrieval again show that 
text documents are ideal test cases for techniques that, on the one side, deal 
with the complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty of human endeavors and, 
on the other, set out to produce operationally viable results rather than 
scientif ic models of language or deep emulations of human thinking. The 
use of statistical techniques implies forms of cognition and learning that are 
fundamentally caught up in the utility equations of specif ic task domains.
The Bayes classif ier demonstrates how, in Maron’s (1963) own terms, 
‘methods, approaches, clues, tricks, heuristics’ (p. 141) can inform intricate 
epistemological and operational engines functioning on top of basic com-
putation. We again observe how algorithmic techniques enable complex 
and compound behavior based on the computer’s capacity to perform very 
large numbers of simple operations. Maron’s collection of 405 scientif ic 
abstracts, tiny by today’s standards, already contained thousands of in-
dividual words and not even Roberto Busa’s Jesuit colleagues would have 
been easily convinced to perform the mindless counting and calculating 
work necessary to classify even a single document.
The entanglement with operational concerns and the willingness to 
combine approaches from different f ields make it problematic to consider 
these techniques simply as ‘applied statistics’ and we should not overestimate 
their relationship with disciplinary developments in statistics.18 While I do 
not want to generalize too far from the small group of individuals I have 
mentioned by name over the last chapters, it bears mentioning that the 
educational background and thematic interest of early information retrieval 
researchers was not very close to the f ields and preoccupations ‘traditional’ 
statistics were concerned with, such as the study of biological patterns of 
inheritance or ‘the measurement of people and populations’ (Beer, 2016, p. 9). 
Luhn was an engineer, Maron a physicist turned philosopher of science, and 
Salton one of the earliest ‘genuine’ computer scientists. Spärck Jones came to 
information retrieval through her PhD research in linguistics. They all had 
the education and capacity to use statistical techniques with ease but were 
18 ‘Despite the obvious connections between data mining and statistical data analysis, most 
of the methodologies used in Data Mining have so far originated in f ields other than Statistics’ 
(Friedman, 1998, p. 3).
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hardly interested in disciplinary debates around the nature of probability 
or the difference between its Bayesian and frequentist interpretations. 
And unlike Codd, who constructed the relational model on the basis of a 
strong mathematical formalism, even Salton was more concerned with in 
situ experimentation and testing than theoretical elaboration.
The point I want to make is that statistical concepts and techniques 
enter information retrieval as technical elements, detached from their 
origins and ready-to-hand for integration into techniques that draw on 
a variety of trajectories and, crucially, enter into ongoing dialog with the 
computational machinery of the day. The information retrieval setting and 
its pragmatic, output- and performance-focused attitude encouraged and 
justif ied experimentation, supporting an epistemological outlook that, at 
least to one commentator, yielded only ‘relatively disappointing progress […] 
to develop as a coherent and f irmly based empirical discipline’ (Ellis, 1998, 
p. 225) and favored approaches that ‘lack a full paradigmatic identity’ (Ellis, 
1998, p. 239). Salton himself lamented the ‘absence of basic theories, and the 
largely experimental nature of the information science f ield’ (Salton, 1973, 
p. 220). This should not minimize achievements but rather emphasize that 
information retrieval and, by extension, the larger space of contemporary 
information ordering is best understood as a ‘trading zone’ (Galison, 1996), 
where statistics and other areas of mathematics intermingle with ideas about 
language, information, and knowledge as well as computing machinery, 
systems design, and the concrete and imaginary requirements of ‘knowledge 
workers’ and ‘decision-makers’. Certainly, similar to what Galison f inds in 
his analysis of Monte Carlo simulations, the pidgin languages we encounter 
in the earliest texts solidify into ‘a full-f ledged Creole: the language of a 
self-supporting subculture with enough structure and interest to support 
a research life without being an annex of another discipline’ (Galison, 1996, 
p. 153). This stabilization is achieved through metanarratives concerning 
information needs and information overload, through concepts and metrics 
like recall and precision, through formal models such as the VSM, and 
through accepted knowledge rituals coming in the form of comparative 
experiments and competitions. Yet there is no common paradigm, no f irm 
ontology, and not even a shared diagnosis what the ‘library problem’ really 
consists of. But again with Galison (1996), the different epistemological 
cultures begin to develop a ‘common activity centered around the computer’ 
(p. 153), despite serious internal doubts (cf. Taube, 1965) and despite the 
general reluctance of librarians, who felt like victims of colonization rather 
than partners (cf. Wasserman, 1965, p. 10) and retain an ambiguous relation-
ship with the information retrieval trading zone to this day. The way the 
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computer serves as a center should not be understood primarily through 
notions like quantif ication, formalization, or unif ication around a central 
paradigmatic reference like Shannon’s information theory or logic-based 
computationalism. These elements are far from irrelevant, but, as the history 
of information retrieval shows, the computer’s capacity to connect and to 
compel stems primarily from its capacity to function.
As mentioned earlier, Agre (1997b) build his critique of artif icial intel-
ligence on the assessment that ‘AI people, by and large, insist that nothing 
is understood until it has been made into a working computer system’ (p. 12) 
and argues that this constrains the space of ideas and styles of reasoning 
that are admitted into the discipline, hampering its creative and intel-
lectual potential. Seen from another side, however, we can speculate that 
the normative force of a running system also relaxes, at least to a point, 
the demand for actual understanding. The Bayes classif ier becomes a vi-
able technique because it can be shown to work and, indeed, to work well. 
Knowing why a technique works well is not a fundamental requirement, even 
if the question prompts intense follow-up research that has the potential 
to push the discipline forward in terms of genuine understanding. The 
testing of classif ication performance on preclassif ied corpora is therefore 
not an entertaining sideshow but lies at the center of information retrieval 
and adjacent f ields. For Spärck Jones, this has a profound effect on their 
epistemological makeup:
[T]he role of experiments in AI is to try out designs for engineering 
artefacts, to see how well some system will meet some need. […] This 
implies a performance measure related to the system’s purpose, which 
may be more or less easy to f ind. But it is a measure of acceptability not 
of truth. (Spärck Jones, 1990, p. 281)
Experiments and competitions establish the working system and at least a 
partial appreciation of its capacities in the public arena, but they also frame 
the terms of what constitutes ‘acceptability’. We can see a similar logic play 
out more recently around neural networks. The famous ImageNet corpus and 
the annual ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge, to name a 
concrete example, take part in def ining what ‘visual recognition’ actually 
means, what constitutes ‘success’, ‘failure’, and so forth. The epistemological 
logic that drives the focus on the running system and its purpose-driven 
performance indeed constitutes an ‘attitude to reality’ (Desrosières, 2001, 
p. 339) that prepares and facilitates the transfer of techniques into the 
operational domains of business and government.
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Machine learning, taken together with the techniques discussed in 
the previous two chapters, demonstrates how a variety of algorithmic 
techniques can build on the same intermediate forms and these are 
not simply different approaches to doing the same thing: the canonical 
query-response situation we know from coordinate indexing does not 
imply the same epistemological and operational setup as document 
clustering with the help of unsupervised machine learning, as item recom-
mendation via collaborative f iltering, or as training a classif ier through 
examples and feedback. The difference between an explicit request for 
information and the implicit observation of use patterns that drives much 
of personalization captures only part of these variations. In the following 
chapter, I will initially leave the domain of information retrieval only to 
come back with new ‘material’ to integrate into algorithmic information 
ordering. Looking at the long and illustrious prehistory of the PageRank 
algorithm, which I take as a stand-in for the larger f ield of network 
analysis, I want to widen the perspective and show how contemporary 
information ordering draws on domains beyond document processing, 
encountering different modes of valuation and building on intermediate 
forms other than feature vectors.
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7. Calculating Networks: 
From Sociometry to PageRank
Abstract
This chapter ventures into the f ield of network algorithms, using the 
prehistory of Google’s PageRank algorithm to discuss yet another way to 
think about information ordering. The chapter shows how algorithmic 
ordering techniques exploit and integrate knowledge from areas other 
than information retrieval – in particular the social sciences and citation 
analysis – and demonstrates how the ‘politics’ of an algorithm can depend 
on small variations that lead to radically different outcomes. The context 
of web search means that the various techniques covered in the second 
part of the book are brought together into a shared application space, 
allowing for a more concrete return to earlier discussions of variation 
and combination in software.
Keywords: PageRank, recursive status index, graph theory, sociometry, 
citation analysis
While many of the algorithmic techniques behind ordering gestures such 
as ranking, f iltering, or recommending have indeed been pioneered in the 
context of information retrieval, there are other sites of inception that inform 
technical and conceptual trajectories. This chapter traces the development 
of network algorithms and the application of graph theory to information 
ordering through the f ields of sociometry and citation analysis and then 
explains how these elements made their way into information retrieval, 
becoming part of Google’s emblematic search engine.
Network analysis has seen a stellar rise over the last two decades: network 
visualizations have become a common sight in and beyond academia, social 
network analysis has found its way into the core curriculum of the social 
sciences, and certain scholars have gone as far as to declare the advent 
of a ‘new science of networks’ (Barabási, 2002; Watts, 2004). Powerful but 
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easy-to-use software packages such as Gephi (Bastian, Heymann, and 
Jacomy, 2009) have been highly successful in promoting network analysis, 
making the approach a mainstay in areas ranging from epidemiology to 
marketing. These tools incorporate sophisticated forms of calculation 
and visualization, and they have popularized concepts and techniques 
from graph theory beyond specialist circles. They enable and facilitate the 
analysis and mapping of relationships between websites using hyperlinks, 
between user accounts or content items on social media, or between words 
that co-occur in the same tweet or sentence. This popularity of network 
analysis as analytical tool has made it easier to talk about other domains 
where algorithmic techniques based on graph theory have proliferated.
Indeed, online platforms and services employ similar techniques to 
differentiate, rank, f ilter, connect, or group information items. A social 
scientist may use a network metric to identify ‘opinion leaders’ or to 
investigate power structures in a population of human beings more gener-
ally, but a social media site may use the exact same technique to decide 
which accounts to promote or which messages to discard from a content 
stream. While machine learning techniques are particularly competent 
at performing fast and self-adapting classif ication tasks and the relational 
database model is well suited for making complex and precise enquiries 
into data collections, network algorithms are especially apt when it comes 
to differentiating entities and ensembles in large-scale interaction systems. 
Unlike the empirical techniques discussed in the previous two chapters, 
which establish and operate on distributions or vectors describing objects 
and their properties, they channel descriptions and formalizations of 
pairwise relations between objects into another important intermediate 
form. In the context of web search, for example, a network perspective 
moves the focus of attention from the content of documents to the hyper-
links between them. This precise shift sits at the heart of the story behind 
Google Search, the company’s web search engine, whose success is often 
attributed to PageRank, the most famous of all network algorithms and 
the focus of this chapter.
Using the algorithm’s prehistory as an entry point into the large and 
complex f ield of network analysis, I will focus on what could be called 
‘evaluative metrics’, techniques that, once again, seek to assess culturally 
embedded notions such as importance, relevance, authority, or quality 
through iterative calculations that attribute a value to each of the items 
under consideration. These metrics have come to play a signif icant role in 
a growing number of settings, and Google Search is just the tip of a much 
larger iceberg.
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Even if this chapter takes a particular algorithm and its self-proclaimed 
mission of ‘bringing order to the web’ (Page et al., 1999) as its telos and spends 
more time on conceptual embeddings, I will still emphasize variation and 
technical coupling over singular logics and paradigmatic purity. Focusing 
on PageRank has the advantage of dealing with a contemporary algorithm 
that is well documented in two research papers (Brin and Page, 1998; Page 
et al., 1999) as well as two US patents (Page 2001, 2004) that, remarkably, 
are more thorough in their citation practices than the academic publica-
tions. Additionally, RageRank is one of the few algorithms venturing into 
deeply mathematical territory that has not only been studied extensively 
by mathematicians and computer scientists (Langville and Meyer, 2004; 
Bianchini, Gori, and Scarselli, 2005), but is also regularly commented on by 
scholars in the humanities and social sciences (Introna, 2007; Diaz, 2008; 
Rieder, 2009). This relative familiarity with the concept and its application 
in web search will hopefully make certain aspects of my argument more 
vivid and provide grounding material for the more abstract technicities I 
will address.
This chapter relates more explicitly to contemporary f ields such as ‘web 
search studies’ (Zimmer, 2010) than earlier ones, but the intellectual geneal-
ogy of the models and techniques in question here can be traced back to at 
least the 1930s. It leads to another important trading zone, one that primarily 
involves mathematics and the social sciences but remains largely distinct 
from the well-documented history of statistics (Hacking, 1990; Stigler, 1999). 
In the f irst part of this chapter, I will reconstruct the historical context, 
focusing on the particular idea that one can measure the ‘authority’ of a 
node in a (social) network recursively, that is, by taking into account not 
only the number of connected nodes but also their respective status.1 This 
idea has often been presented as a core innovation in PageRank: when 
calculating the ‘importance’ of a web page, a link from a highly ranked site 
is ‘worth’ more than a link from a site with a low rank. The second part of 
the chapter examines PageRank more concretely, f irst by comparing it to 
the very similar HITS algorithm (Kleinberg, 1999), and second by closely 
scrutinizing the damping factor α with the help of the sociometric texts 
that f irst introduced such a parameter into recursive status calculations. 
The argument begins with a closer look at the history of graph theory and 
its close relationship with the social sciences.
1 For the wider historical and conceptual background of the methods discussed here, see 
Mayer (2009).
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Social Theory, Graph Theory
In the introduction to his Theorie der endlichen und unendlichen Graphen 
(Theory of f inite and inf inite graphs) from 1936, the f irst textbook on 
graph theory, the Hungarian mathematician Dénes Kőnig (1936) wrote that 
‘[p]erhaps even more than to the contact between mankind and nature, 
graph theory owes to the contact of human beings between each other’ 
(n.p.), pointing to the often overlooked fact that modern graph theory 
developed, perhaps even more so than statistics, in close contact with 
the social sciences. Rather than being imported into these disciplines as 
a ready-made mathematical toolkit, graph theory was shaped in no small 
part by the measuring fever in the f ield of ‘small group’ research, founded 
by Kurt Lewin and Jacob L. Moreno. Even the mathematician Frank Harary, 
the central f igure in the development, application, and standardization 
of graph theory in the second half of the twentieth century, f irst came 
into contact with his future f ield of specialization at the Research Center 
for Group Dynamics, established by Lewin in 1948 at the University of 
Michigan (Harary, 1969, p. 6). This close relationship warrants further 
investigation.
The Development of Graph Theory in Relation to the Social Sciences
Despite its enormous success in recent decades, graph theory – ‘a math-
ematical model for any system involving a binary2 relation’ (Harary, 1969, 
p. v) – has historically not been considered a noble endeavor. Although 
prominent names such as Leonhard Euler, Gustav Kirchhoff, Arthur Cayley, 
and William Hamilton are attached to its history, it is only in the second 
half of the twentieth century that graph theory emerges from what J. H. C. 
Whitehead called the ‘slums of topology’ (cit. in Erdős, 1977, p. 3). The Journal 
of Graph Theory was founded only in 1977, which further testif ies to a lack 
of interest from (pure) mathematicians. But besides the growing number 
of practical applications in chemistry, physics, and engineering, it is in the 
social sciences, and specif ically in social psychology, that a problem space 
appears that proves particularly fertile for the development of a mathematics 
concerned with structure. Unlike the ‘library problem’, which is intrinsically 
tied to the pragmatics of institutions having a clear utilitarian mission, 
whether that mission is public education or the support for knowledge 
2 In graph theory, a connection always runs between exactly two individual elements, with 
the exception of a ‘loop’, that is, a node that links to itself.
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work and decision-making, this particular space revolves around the more 
open-ended problems of scientif ic inquiry.
A f irst line of development can be traced to Jacob L. Moreno’s (1934) book 
Who Shall Survive?, an original and idiosyncratic volume that launched the 
f ield of sociometry as ‘the mathematical study of psychological properties 
of populations’ (p. 432). Developed out of group psychotherapy, sociometry 
was essentially organized around the sociometric test, a questionnaire 
distributed in small- and mid-sized groups – schools, factories, etc. – that 
asked people to choose the individuals they liked best, admired most, 
had the most contact with, or similar questions. The resulting pairwise 
(network) data was thought to reveal the ‘psychological structure of society’ 
(p. 9) and was displayed and analyzed as a sociogram, a manually ar-
ranged point-and-line diagram that would nowadays be called a ‘network 
visualization’. But while Moreno indeed spearheaded the visual display 
of the network data produced by the sociometric test, his ‘mathematical 
study’ was underdeveloped in terms of actual mathematical method, 
which prompted criticism ‘for lack of the methodological stringency 
appropriate to science’ (Mayer, 2009, p. 60). Moreno’s work still garnered 
signif icant interest and the journal Sociometry, founded in 1937, attracted 
a number of contributors with mathematical skill, who started to work on 
the peculiarly rich and complex data produced by a remarkably simple 
questionnaire.
In 1946, Forsyth and Katz made a critical step toward mathematization 
by proposing to replace the networks drawn in a process of trial and error 
with a square matrix, often referred to as ‘adjacency matrix’, in order to 
‘present sociometric data more objectively’ (p. 341). While the goal was 
to display a graph3 in a way that was less confusing than the hand-drawn 
sociograms, the authors also produced a quasi-algorithmic technique to 
manipulate the matrix simply by reordering rows and columns in a way 
that subgroups would become visible. The shift in mode of representation 
also opened the door for the application of relatively simple but powerful 
methods from matrix algebra (Festinger, 1949).
3 While the terms ‘network’ and ‘graph’ are frequently used synonymously, it should be noted 
that mathematicians often make a distinction based on levels of abstraction and formalization: 
‘There are hierarchies of mathematical models. A network is a model for empirical f lows. A 
graph or digraph is a model for a network – it serves as a f irst approximation to a network with 
numerical or other values on its edges (or arcs) and maybe on its vertices. For a graph or digraph 
captures the structure of a network while suppressing the additional numerical information’ 
(Harary, 1983, p. 355).
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node 1 node 2 node 3 …
node 1 0 1 0
node 2 1 0 1
node 3 0 1 0
…
a generic adjacency matrix describing an (undirected) graph. this square matrix uses binary 
values, but numerical values are often used as well if the data includes some measure of frequency 
or intensity for the relations between nodes.
Just like statistics provides a number of (standardized) techniques, for 
example, to establish a correlation coeff icient between two variables, the 
matrix constitutes an intermediate form that points directly toward different 
operations that rely on linear algebra to produce ‘views’ on sociometric 
data, structural measures that are essentially ‘order from order’ (Chun, 2011, 
p. 101ff.), transformations of numbers into other numbers. We should not 
make the mistake, however, to dismiss such calculations as tautological, as 
essentially expressing the same thing as the original input; each calculation 
reveals some aspect of the data. In this sense, they are further examples 
for mechanical reasoning, transformations that become ‘interpretations’, 
ways of reading and making sense of the world in terms that are simultane-
ously reductionist (phenomena are reduced to a point-and-line model) and 
endlessly generative (the number of possible transformations is potentially 
inf inite). Although Gerard Salton’s work dealt with a different problem 
space and used the somewhat different term-document matrices, it was 
able to draw on the same space of mathematical technique, highlighting 
one of many (possible) intersections between trajectories.
Furthermore, the matrix approach made it possible to connect the work on 
sociometric data to a second line of development in the mathematization of 
social structure. During the 1940s, Bavelas (1948) had developed an innova-
tive sketch for the mathematical expression of group structures, building 
on Kurt Lewin’s Principles of Topological Psychology (1936). Using mostly 
geometric methods, he introduced such concepts as ‘geodesic distance’ and 
‘centrality’ into the social network vocabulary. Unlike notions of statistical 
similarity (or distance), these measures were built on the idea of ‘stepping’ 
from one ‘cell’ (node) to the next. The distance between two nodes is thus 
the number of steps it takes to get from one to the other. As Festinger argued, 
the matrix approach proved useful here, because it could be directly applied 
to ‘such concepts as diameter of [topological structures] and distance from 
one part of the structure to another’ (Festinger, 1949, p. 157). The shift from 
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the point-and-line diagram to the matrix representation thus reinforced the 
idea that social structure could become fully calculable and encouraged 
the import of techniques from algebra and geometry.
According to Barnes and Harary, the ‘f irst indisputable application of 
graph theory to network analysis did not come until 1953’ (Barnes and 
Harary, 1983, p. 237) when Harary and Norman’s short volume Graph Theory 
as a Mathematical Model in Social Science (1953) was published. It marks a 
shift in disciplinary background similar to what we have seen in informa-
tion retrieval: so far, most of the attempts at constructing mathematical 
methods for expressing and analyzing sociometric data had come from 
sociologists and psychologists with an interest in mathematics – with the 
notable exception of the statistician Leo Katz. But this was the work of two 
mathematicians with an interest in the social sciences. Frank Harary in 
particular established himself as the key f igure in the ‘mathematization’ of 
sociometry, even before the publication of his seminal Graph Theory (1969), 
which not only standardized concepts, vocabulary, and methods, but also 
presented them in a pedagogical, applicable way that was crucial for the 
spread of graph theory and associated techniques.
While the more rigorous mathematical approach did not mean that ties 
with the social sciences were severed – Harary regularly collaborated with 
social scientists throughout his long career – there were nonetheless three 
important consequences. First, pictorial representations of networks and 
visual forms of analysis faded into the background. Network diagrams were 
still used, but rather as teaching aids in textbooks than as research tools in 
empirical work. Only the spread of graphical user interfaces in the 1990s 
and the development of layout algorithms, based for example, on force 
simulations, lead to a true renaissance of the now so familiar point-and-line 
diagrams. Second, network metrics and methods for mathematical analysis 
proliferated and became both conceptually and computationally more 
demanding, sometimes to a point where their empirical applicability became 
technically forbidding and methodologically questionable, even to scholars 
sympathetic to the general approach (cf. Granovetter, 1973, p. 1361). Third, 
although exchange between the mathematical methods of graph theory 
and empirical work in the social sciences has remained strong over the 
last decades, the movement toward abstraction and ‘purif ication’ implied 
by mathematization has led to a certain demarcation between the two. On 
the one side, graph theory has turned more and more into an ‘immutable 
mobile’ (Latour, 1986), an inscription that can travel from one setting to 
another without losing its shape. Stripped of the marks of their origin, these 
techniques – packaged in handbooks or software programs – are ready to be 
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applied wherever a network can be found or formalized. On the other side, 
there has been a certain tendency, especially in less quantitative circles of 
sociology and social theory, to use the network model as an ontological con-
cept rather than an analytical one, and to endow it with certain properties, 
for example, decentralization, uncontrollability, opposition to hierarchies, 
and so on.4 This is largely at odds with the epistemological commitment that 
underpins the application of graph theory to social phenomena, which is not 
a commitment to the network as a positive empirical entity but primarily 
to concepts and methods for studying empirical phenomena that can be 
modeled as networks. Consider the following quote:
As we have seen, the basic terms of digraph theory are point and line. 
Thus, if an appropriate coordination is made so that each entity of an 
empirical system is identif ied with a point and each relationship is identi-
f ied with a line, then for all true statements about structural properties 
of the obtained digraph there are corresponding true statements about 
structural properties of the empirical system. (Harary, Norman, and 
Cartwright, 1965, p. 22)
What takes shape over these lines is a separation between the empirical and 
the analytical that is characteristic to quantitative empirical research and 
shifts the full epistemological weight onto the shoulders of ‘formalization’, that 
is, onto the ‘appropriate coordination’ between the two levels. I do not want 
to contest this separation in philosophical terms here, but rather put forward 
the much simpler critique that in order to produce a formalization of social 
phenomena that can be mapped unto the axioms of graph theory, a commit-
ment has to be made, not to the network as an ontological category, but rather 
to a ‘theory of the social’ that supports and substantiates the formalization 
process, much like lay theories of language justif ied the representation of 
documents as term vectors in previous chapters. In Moreno’s (1934) case, we 
f ind a theory of psychological ‘attractions and repulsions’ between ‘social 
atoms’ that bears the epistemological weight of formalization in the sense 
that it justif ies the mapping of a relationship between two people onto two 
points and a line by conceiving ‘the social’ as a primarily dyadic affair.
4 This tendency has been particularly strong in media studies and adjacent f ields where 
communication and computer networks proliferate. While these particular networks may indeed 
have very specif ic properties, graph theory does not imply a theory of the nature of empirical 
networks. This would seem obvious to a mathematician, but when reviewing three titles in 
media studies, Berry has to explicitly remind his readers that the ‘network is not ontological it 
is analytical’ (Berry, 2008, p. 365).
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Computerization conveniently transforms this process from a matter of 
theoretical elaboration into one of design. The grammatization of operational 
entities, which spans data models, program logic, and interface elements, 
indeed ‘produces’ atomized entities and their relations: social media services, 
to use a recognizable example, do not describe empirical systems, but fabricate 
them by building communicative infrastructures where user profiles interact 
with each other in a variety of ways. Just like early information retrieval 
pioneers were comfortable processing language without more than a rudimen-
tary theory of language, the treatment of accounts as nodes and friendship 
connections as links requires little in terms of epistemological commitment. 
The ‘appropriate coordination’ mentioned above, which keeps social scientists 
awake at night, comes easy when digital objects are no longer formalizations 
of something else, but ‘natively’ (Rogers, 2013, p. 1) digital objects that are 
already fabricated axiomatic entities, conveniently transposable into basic 
intermediate forms. I will come back to this question further down, after 
having looked at the historic development of a specific type of measure that 
develops against the backdrop I have just outlined: the recursive status index.
Recursive Status in Sociometry
While social theorists (Castells, 1996; Benkler, 2006) have regularly opposed 
network forms of social organization to hierarchies over the last decades, 
the empirical-analytical approach followed by small-group research makes 
no such opposition; quite to the contrary, graph theory is seen as a means 
to detect and to measure social hierarchies of different kinds. As already 
mentioned, despite the def inition of sociometry as mathematical study, 
Moreno’s mathematical toolkit was rudimentary. But the sociometric test 
yielded such rich and unconventional data that even basic counting could 
lead to curious discoveries, for example, concerning the distribution of 
interpersonal attraction. When asking people whom they liked best, had the 
most contact with, or admired the most, the resulting distribution would be 
invariably skewed. Transposing such a ‘choice distribution’ from the New 
York State Training School for Girls,5 which Moreno used as his empirical 
playground, to New York City, he made an interesting observation:
For New York, with a population of 7,000,000, the above percentages [taken 
from the Training School for Girls] would be after the 1st choice, 3,200,000 
5 Gießmann (2009, p. 274) describes this reeducation camp for young girls, where Moreno 
worked, as a ‘Dogville in the US of the 1930s’.
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individuals unchosen; after the 2nd choice, 2,100,000 unchosen; after the 3rd 
choice, 1,400,000 unchosen; after the 4th choice, 1,200,000 unchosen; and 
after the 5th choice, 1,050,000 unchosen. These calculations suggest that 
mankind is divided not only into races and nations, religions and states, 
but into socionomic divisions. There is produced a socionomic hierarchy 
due to the differences in attraction of particular individuals and groups 
for other particular individuals and groups. (Moreno, 1934, p. 250f.)
The idea that social structure is hierarchic, even in the absence of explicit, 
institutional modes of hierarchical organization, and that a network ap-
proach can identify these stratif ications is recognizable in this passage, 
80 years before a ‘new’ science of networks (Watts, 2004) began to f ind 
power-law distributions for connectivity in most of the places it looked. 
But Moreno’s ‘socionomic hierarchy’ is only the beginning of a long-lasting 
relationship between applied network mathematics and rankings of various 
kind. The search for a social pecking order can indeed be seen as the central 
goal of sociometry and from the 1950s onward, new techniques based on 
structural measures were introduced at a regular pace.
A formal analysis of differences in ‘status’, ‘authority’, and ‘influence’, 
the three terms used most frequently – and often interchangeably – in this 
context, developed in line with the matrix approach outlined above. One of 
the techniques Festinger (1949) put forward consisted of simply squaring a 
matrix (multiplying it by itself), which results in a new matrix where each 
entry shows the number of two-step connections between two nodes. 
Cubing the matrix would get the numbers for three step paths, and so on. 
If applied to data from a sociometric test asking participants to indicate the 
persons whose opinion they valued most, this technique would show ‘who 
influences the greatest number of people in less than a specif ied number 
of steps’ (Festinger, 1949, p. 156). The question of social power becomes a 
matter of calculation.
Here, a specific paper, cited in both PageRank patents, stands out: in 1953, 
Leo Katz published ‘A New Status Index Derived from Sociometric Analysis’ 
in the journal Psychometrika and introduced the notion of a ‘recursive’ or 
‘cumulative’ status index. Building on his earlier work on matrix representa-
tions of data collected by Moreno (Forsyth and Katz, 1946), Katz proposed a 
‘new method of computation’ (Katz, 1953, p. 39) for calculating social status. 
Status measures were already common in studies using the sociometric test, 
but they were essentially based on simple counting, as seen in Moreno’s 
discussion of socionomic hierarchies. Katz explicitly rejected this method 
and argued that ‘most serious investigators […] have been dissatisf ied with 
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the ordinary indices of “status,” of the popularity contest type’ because this 
‘balloting’ of ‘votes’ would ultimately not allow to ‘pick out the real leaders’ 
(p. 39). His goal was not to measure popularity but social power, even if the 
latter term was not explicitly used. Therefore, Katz proposed a new index 
that takes into account ‘who chooses as well as how many choose’ (p. 39), 
which means that votes from ‘small fry’ (p. 42) would simply count less. 
This shift rests on the idea that status is cumulative in the sense that the 
topology of a social network reflects a latent socionomic hierarchy, to stick 
with Moreno’s term, in which the status of an individual largely depends 
on the status of her network neighborhood. Who you are is who you know.
Katz proposes a technically simple but conceptually challenging 
technique that transforms the initial sociometric choice matrix by f irst 
computing all paths between all nodes, then attributing a lower weight to 
longer paths through ‘damping’, and f inally calculating a metric for every 
node based on the combined weight of their connections to all other nodes 
(Katz, 1953; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). An individual that can reach far 
into the network in only a few steps will thus receive a higher status number 
than an individual that has a lot of immediate connections that do not lead 
deeper into the network. Similar measures to what is today known as ‘Katz 
centrality’ abound in the following decades and they are not only used for 
status measuring but also for other things, for example, to identify cliques 
(Hubbell, 1965). The contribution by the mathematical sociologist Phillip 
Bonacich (1972) is worth noting, because it consists of a metric based on 
the eigenvectors of a matrix, which means that not all paths between nodes 
are taken into account like in Katz’s case, but only the shortest paths.6 
This makes the metric less dependent on local properties of networks and 
consequently more diff icult to ‘cheat’ by adding nodes and connections 
locally. This resistance to what could be called ‘link spam’ is probably the 
reason why PageRank is a variant of eigenvector centrality rather than 
Katz centrality, although references to Bonacich’s work are conspicuously 
absent from the patents.
Citation Analysis
A second arena where concrete techniques for the mathematical exploration 
and measurement of networks were pioneered – and directly applied to 
decision-making – is citation analysis, a f ield that shares a focus on scientif ic 
6 For a deeper discussion of the various calculations and their differences, see Hanneman 
and Riddle (2005), Chapter 10.
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literature with information retrieval. In 1963, the Institute for Scientif ic 
Information, founded by Eugene Garf ield, printed the f irst edition of the 
Science Citation Index (SCI), an index of citations from 613 journal volumes 
published in 1961, manually extracted and sorted by computer (Garf ield, 
1963). With the f irst edition storing already 1.4 million citations on magnetic 
tape, this index was perhaps the f irst ‘big data’ network f ile available in 
the social sciences and several researchers used it over the following years 
to test different computational methods. One of these methods illustrates 
the considerable generativity of the graph representation: Henry Small’s 
co-citation technique creates a new network on top of the citation data 
by looking not at direct references, but at ‘the frequency with which two 
documents are cited together’ (Small, 1973, p. 265), that is, cited in the same 
article. The technique thus creates a graph with variable link strength, since 
two papers may be cited together an arbitrary number of times, introducing 
a level of nuance that the underlying data lacks. Although Small knew Gerard 
Salton’s work and, indeed, proposed co-citation as a measure of ‘subject 
similarity’, the relationship between information retrieval and citation 
analysis remained hesitant. Salton himself was aware of Garfield’s index (cf. 
Salton, 1963), but his own experiments with citation data did not draw on 
the SCI, which was conceived as a commercial product from the beginning.
Garfield’s initial strategy (1955) was to promote the SCI f irst and foremost 
as an ‘association-of-ideas index’, a tool for f inding scientif ic literature 
that addressed the same problem space as information retrieval and again 
presented itself explicitly as an alternative to traditional subject headings 
and classif ications. But it quickly became obvious that a series of evalua-
tive metrics could be derived from the SCI without much effort. Thus, in 
1972, Garf ield presented a fleshed-out version of a concept he had initially 
introduced as a tool for the historiographical study of science, the (in)famous 
‘impact factor’, claiming that ‘[p]erhaps the most important application 
of citation analysis is in studies of science policy and research evaluation’ 
(Garf ield, 1972, p. 478). When taking into account that the f irst attempt at 
citation ranking by Gross and Gross (1927) was designed to help university 
libraries decide which chemical journals they should subscribe to, it becomes 
clear that any evaluative metric would instantly face considerable normative 
and institutional entanglement, much more so than the mostly descriptive 
sociometry.
Highly applicable to questions concerning resource allocation, citation 
analysis – and all of scientometrics for that matter – oscillates between 
disinterested forms of metrological realism and the accounting realism 
of science management. The impact factor and its many variants provide 
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measures of scientif ic recognition or success that resonate perfectly with 
contemporary ‘audit cultures’ that ‘present themselves as rational, objec-
tive and neutral, based on sound principles of eff icient management’ 
(Shore and Wright, 2000, p. 61). Even if the ‘engine of order’ concept focuses 
primarily on integrated forms of performativity that revolve around 
computerization, digital infrastructures, and the tight coupling of data, 
analysis, decision, and application, citation analysis is one of many settings 
where we can observe how other kinds of ‘operational assemblages’, such as 
bureaucracies, produce their own forms of ordering based on calculation. 
As Burrows remarks, the performative character of ‘quantitative control’ 
has reached the point where ‘academic metric assemblages are at the 
cusp of being transformed from a set of measures able to mimic market 
processes to ones that are able to enact market processes’ (Burrows, 2012, 
p. 368). Another example is a particularly unexpected and mildly insidious 
application of social network analysis for a very literal form of ordering or 
arrangement: researchers used students’ Facebook friendship networks, 
retrieved with the Netvizz application (Rieder, 2013), to break up the 
seating order during university exams to minimize cheating – with some 
success, apparently (Topîrceanu, 2017). Engines of order can be built out 
of various materialities.
The impact factor, calculated for scientif ic journals, is an extremely basic 
measure: it takes the number of citations the last two volumes of a journal 
received the following year and divides it by the number of articles published 
in these two volumes. This division highlights an important question – and 
certainly a central reason why literature from the citation analysis f ield is 
cited in the PageRank patents – that is not addressed in sociometry, namely 
the problem of size. If a journal publishes a large number of articles it is well 
positioned to receive more citations than a journal that publishes fewer; 
purely counting citations without taking publication volume into account 
would therefore be misleading and this is why the impact factor divides by 
the number of articles published (Garf ield, 1972).
A 1976 paper by Pinski and Narin pushed things signif icantly further by 
pointing out two problems with Garf ield’s measure. First, citations have 
equal value in the impact factor scheme, although ‘it seems more reasonable 
to give higher weight to a citation from a prestigious journal than to a 
citation from a peripheral one’ (p. 298). Pinski and Narin therefore proposed 
a recursive index for importance, based on the same eigenvector calcula-
tions we found in Bonacich’s work, although the authors were apparently 
not aware of sociometric techniques. Second, Pinski and Narin argued 
that the impact factor attributed disproportional importance to review 
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journals that are referenced a lot for convenience rather than scientif ic 
contribution, and ‘can therefore not be used to establish a “pecking order” 
for journal prestige’ (p. 298). Again, they propose a solution by including an 
‘input-output’ measure into their calculations (p. 300) where the ‘influence 








this formula basically states that the ‘influence weight’ (W) of a document should be the sum of 
the weight of the citations it receives, divided by the number of outgoing citations. If a document 
cites a lot of other sources (S = large), the ‘value’ it passes on to each of those sources will be 
lowered.
This means that the more papers an article cites, the lower the value 
‘transferred’ to each of them. Review journals, which are not only cited 
a lot but also heavy citers themselves, are therefore no longer favored as 
brokers of influence. The exact same principle is at work in PageRank: the 
more outgoing links a site has, the lower the value of each link. This small 
twist shows how malleable these metrics are and how they react and adapt 
to new problems along the way. If we were to introduce a damping factor 
into this model, such as Katz’s connection weight reduction scheme, in 
order to attenuate the ‘free flow of citations in the referencing marketplace’ 













PageRank basically applies a damping factor α (more on that further down) to Pinski and Narin’s 
formula: r(A) is the weight to be calculated (equivalent of Wi in Pinski & Narin), r(Bn) stands for the 
weight of incoming links (WkCki above) and |Bn| for the number of outgoing links they have (Si 
above).
While Pinski and Narin do not quote the work of economist Wassily Leontief, 
unlike Hubbell (1965), who acknowledges this source of inspiration in his 
sociometric clique identif ication scheme, there is reason to believe that 
their version of an input-output model was equally inspired by economic 
thinking, in particular if we take into account that Pinski and Narin’s metric 
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was intended for a ‘funding agency with its need to allocate scarce resources’ 
(Pinski and Narin, 1976, p. 312).
This is one of many instances where we can observe clear aff inities 
between algorithmic information ordering and market models. In their 
analysis of the effects of both the computer and the associated information 
concept on the discipline of economics, Mirowski and Nik-Khah (2017) 
indeed argue that ‘what it meant to “know the truth” changed dramatically 
and irreversibly after World War II’ (p. 1). They describe an epistemological 
nexus where concepts like ‘equilibrium’ or ‘emergence’ receive a decidedly 
computational interpretation: neoclassical economics, in particular, frame 
the market as ‘the greatest information processor known to humankind’ 
in the sense that it ‘effectively winnows and validates the truth from a glut 
of information’ (p. 7). While this book cannot provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the complex relationship between modern economics and 
algorithmic information ordering, the integration of economic thinking 
into the conceptual horizon can also be observed in sociometry and this 
merits closer attention.
From Sociometry to Social Exchange Theory
While the sociometric test was generally lauded for producing valuable data, 
Moreno’s socio-psychological theory of attraction and repulsion between 
social atoms (Moreno, 1934, p. 6) was based on contested psychoanalytical 
assumptions and his goal to develop a ‘technique of freedom’ that reorganizes 
society by training individuals to transcend their social prejudices in order 
to liberate the forces of ‘spontaneous attraction’ did not go well with the 
sober and pragmatic mindset of most empirical sociologists. The sociometric 
papers working with Moreno’s data therefore mostly subscribed to a vague 
version of the same atomistic and dyadic view of society, which enabled and 
justif ied the point-and-line formalization needed to apply graph theoretical 
methods, but they shunned the deeper aspects of the theoretical horizon 
behind it. Concepts like influence, status, importance, prestige, and so on 
f illed the void, but they were defined in experimental terms reminiscent of 
Paul Lazarsfeld’s empirical work7 rather than as parts of robust theoretical 
frameworks. Influence, for example, if defined at all, was generally conceived 
as the capacity of an individual to change somebody else’s ‘opinion’, as 
measured, for example, through voting in political elections. Even Kurt 
7 Gitlin’s (1978) critique of the ‘dominant paradigm’ in communications research can therefore 
be productively applied to sociometric concepts as well.
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Lewin explicitly acknowledged that the goal of mathematization overruled 
other considerations:
We have tried to avoid developing elaborate ‘models’; instead we have 
tried to represent the dynamic relations between the psychological facts 
by mathematical constructs at a suff icient level of generality. (Lewin, 
1964, p. 21)
And Kurt Lewin was certainly the sociometric scholar with the most 
substantial theoretical ambitions. Mullins (1973) squarely attributes the 
demise of small-group theory to the intellectual and theoretical vacuum left 
by Lewin’s death in 1947. Granovetter’s famous ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’ 
likewise ponders how ‘[s]ociometry, the precursor of network analysis, has 
always been curiously peripheral – invisible, really – in sociological theory’ 
(Granovetter, 1973, p. 1360) and blames this not only on the diff iculty to 
adapt methods to larger group sizes, but also on a lack of theoretical detail 
combined with ‘a level of technical complexity appropriate to such forbidding 
sources as the Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics’ (Granovetter, 1973, p. 1361).
However, a glance at Granovetter’s own work indicates where the f ield 
turned to f ind a new and more concise conceptual horizon: to social 
exchange theory, an approach that ‘might be described, for simplicity, as 
the economic analysis of non economic social situations’ (Emerson, 1976, 
p. 336). Here, power is no longer def ined in vague psychological terms 
but in a serious, ‘hard-knuckled’ way as access to resources for economic 
advancement, to information on jobs, prices, opportunities, and so on. 
Since social exchange theory still relies on an atomistic and dyadic concep-
tion of social relations, it can accommodate graph theoretic models just 
as easily as attraction and repulsion did before. Having been turned into 
immutable mobiles by Harary and others, the mathematical concepts, 
methods, and metrics traveled effortlessly into the new conceptual space.8 
What in Moreno’s view had to be produced through ‘spontaneity training’, 
namely the free association of individuals, now conveniently becomes a 
basic property of individuals conceived as free agents engaged in the rational 
choice of utility maximization.9 While Mayer (2009) rightfully points to 
8 As Emerson argues, social exchange theory is not a so much a theory, but ‘a frame of reference 
within which many theories – some micro and some more macro – can speak to one another, 
whether in argument or in mutual support’ (Emerson, 1976, p. 336).
9 ‘One answer, which we call “social atomism,” suggests that social order is brought about 
through the free negotiations of autonomous individuals seeking to advance private interests. 
This view of social order is expressed in the ‘social contract’ theory associated with Hobbes, 
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the sociometric heritage of contemporary search engine metrics and its 
closeness with cybernetics and operations research, I would argue that this 
economic trajectory constitutes an equally important lineage. It supplied a 
rich new space for conceptual inspiration, similar to the already mentioned 
input-output model, and it provided a new home for the mathematical 
metrics and methods pioneered in sociometry.
It is a core paradox of mathematical network analysis that it affords pow-
erful tools for examining concrete power relations empirically, which holds 
considerable critical potential, while also allowing to apply the measured 
hierarchies as operative mechanisms to allocate resources such as vis-
ibility or research funding. What the different strands I have discussed here 
furnish – and this is fundamental for any form of normative and operational 
application of evaluative metrics, whether in citation ranking or in web 
search – is a narrative that sustains what could be called ‘the innocence of 
the link’: whether it is spontaneous attraction, rational choice, or simply an 
inspirational account of scientif ic citation as solely based on intellectual 
merit, the application of the metrics to actual ranking, with concrete and 
tangible consequences, can only be justif ied if the link is kept reasonably 
‘pure’. Like the theory of ‘revealed preference’ in the last chapter, these 
narratives seek to ‘protect’ the integrity of behavioral data as indicators for 
contested concepts such as relevance, authority, or impact. In this context, 
the main enemies are therefore the ‘deceitful linkers’, whether they come 
as scientif ic citation cartels or their contemporary cousins, link farms. 
It is not surprising that a central argument against citation analysis as a 
means for research evaluation builds on a critique of the purity of actual 
citation practices.
Despite these resemblances, we must recognize that there is not a 
singular blueprint underpinning formalization. Theoretical and meth-
odological frameworks, grammatization through technical forms, or 
simply exploration and experimentation can inform the identif ication 
and demarcation of entities and relationships that become materials for 
algorithmic treatment. Ideas from various f ields, from mathematics and 
engineering to the social sciences, economics, and business management, 
can inspire the operational makeup of these algorithmic procedures. 
And there is little reason to believe that commonsense reasoning, tacit 
knowledge, and learning from practice and experience cannot play a 
Locke, Rousseau, Spencer, and others. Contemporary variations of social atomism include 
types of social psychological theory, especially economic-type exchange theory’ (Lewis and 
Weigert, 1985, p. 455).
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central role in stirring the conceptual and technical imaginaries that 
inform technical creation.
So far, I have tried to sketch the historical background for certain core 
ideas present in PageRank in order to provide the material or ‘re-sources’ 
(Chun, 2011, p. 20) for contextualizing this evaluative metric conceptually, in 
the sense that a critical reading of formulas or source code not only requires 
a capacity to understand technical languages but also interpretive ammuni-
tion to ‘ref ill’ computational artifacts that have most often been cleansed 
from easily accessible markers of context and origin. Historical investigation 
is indeed one way to reduce the opacity of software. If epistemological and 
methodological concepts such as the network model suggest a ‘reading of 
reality’ (Berry, 2008, p. 367), a historical approach can provide the material 
for an analysis of technicity that connects operation to a wider space of 
technical and nontechnical ideas. Such an analysis could seek to describe 
more general characteristics of the network approach, for example, the 
tendency to highlight ‘the synchronic dispersal over the diachronic unfold-
ing’ (Berry, 2008, p. 367); it could situate it in relation to certain theories 
of the social and to specif ic mathematical methods, as I have tried to do 
in this section; but it could also attempt to home in further on technicity, 
which is the objective of the next section.
Two Moments of Commitment
To focus on the technical dimension of PageRank, I will develop two axes of 
mechanological interpretation, a comparative approach and a ‘close reading’ 
of a particular parameter, both organized around the question of how an 
understanding of metrics as ‘descriptions’ can help us apprehend how they 
become operative ‘prescriptions’ as engines of order. While citation metrics 
like the impact factor have quickly crossed the threshold between ‘is’ and 
‘ought’, their use in ‘science policy and research evaluation’ (Garf ield, 1972, 
p. 478) is hardly automated. Much like other statistical indicators before 
them, they have come to play an essential role in bureaucracies where 
ideals of so-called evidence-based governance privilege mathematical 
means of decision-making ‘so constraining that the desires and biases of 
individuals are screened out’, seeking to guarantee ‘the rule of law, not of 
men’ (Porter, 1995, p. 74). But even as integral parts of bureaucratic processes, 
these metrics retain both a certain visibility, which makes them amendable 
to critique, and margins of discretion in terms of how they are used. The 
rendering of graph theoretical methods in software is certainly signif icant 
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on the descriptive side of things – just consider how SPSS10 plays as role in 
orienting research practices in the social sciences (Uprichard, Burrows, 
and Byrne, 2008) – but prescriptive power is particularly enhanced when 
metrics are sunk into the system and become both invisible and inevitable, 
in the sense that margins of discretion are def ined by the system itself. 
This is how algorithmic techniques inform engines of order in a very direct 
sense, ‘conducting conduct’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 186) by means of modulating 
what can be seen and what can be done in an online environment. When 
using Google Search, neither the ranking principles, nor their parameters 
are amendable to user intervention. We may change the query and apply 
certain f ilters, but the way the result list is put into sequence remains out 
of our hand.
This begs the question of how the concepts and metrics outlined above 
found their way into computing and became part of how the web is ordered. 
In 1992, Botafogo, Rivlin, and Shneiderman f irst explored the transposi-
tion – or ‘freezing’ – of sociometric methods into a navigational software 
environment as a means to solve the ‘lost in hyperspace’ problem, that is, 
the disorientation users often experience when navigating in a hypertext. 
Building on a paper by Harary (1959), the authors formalized hypertexts as 
directed graphs and began calculating metrics for the purpose of ‘recovering 
lost hierarchies and f inding new ones’ (Botafogo, Rivlin, and Shneiderman, 
1992, p. 143). The goal was not to identify the most important nodes for 
document retrieval but rather to assist hypertext authors in designing the 
structure of their text networks more explicitly, based on the idea ‘that 
structure does ref lect semantic information’ (p. 148). Hierarchies were 
seen as helpful navigational devices and status metrics would help building 
them into the hypertext’s topology. Interestingly, Botafogo, Rivlin, and 
Shneiderman explicitly argued that software would make it easy to imple-
ment different network metrics and thereby provide more than one view 
on the hypertext, granting ‘the ability to view knowledge from different 
perspectives’ (p. 148). Once again, we encounter the idea that algorithmic 
information ordering can provide the means for ‘f ini-unlimited’ permutation, 
where the latent structures present in the network are modulated and 
arranged at will.
Taking the work in sociometry, citation analysis, and hypertext navigation 
together, one could argue that all the ‘ingredients’ for PageRank were avail-
able from the middle of the 1990s and all one had to do was to combine them. 
10 SPSS (formerly Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) is one of the most commonly used 
tools for statistical analysis in the social sciences.
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It is not the purpose of this chapter to judge the originality of Page and Brin’s 
work but to show how network metrics were developed in different contexts 
and with different purposes in mind, and that they were indeed made 
operational in different ways and with different forms of performativity. 
This is where it is useful to connect back to Foucault’s notion of the archive, 
understood not as a coherent ‘paradigm’ in Kuhn’s (1962) sense, but as a wider 
‘conceptual f ield’ (Foucault, 2002, p. 142) that allows for signif icant diversity 
and variation as well as regularity and ‘transversal standardization’ in the 
sense that similar metrics are applied in different domains.
The various metrics discussed over these last pages indeed define more 
general techniques for differentiation and distinction, but concrete cal-
culative procedures and orchestrations can lead to very specif ic outputs. 
This means that an overarching critique of the reductionist and atomistic 
perspective espoused by the network model runs the risk of losing sight 
of the considerable margins for choice and expression available inside the 
conceptual space examined here. We therefore need to be attentive not 
only to moments of totalization, homogenization, and imposition but also 
to vectors of cumulative construction, heterogeneity, and fermentation. 
If algorithmic measurement increasingly means that ‘authority no longer 
rests in the [social] relationships and instead migrates toward the measur-
ing instrument’ (Mayer, 2009, p. 68), the question of how we can better 
understand the way authority is concretely configured once it has migrated 
becomes virulent. Engaging PageRank as a model as well as an algorithmic 
technique can bring us closer to an answer. But this requires that we do 
more than capture its spirit; we have to examine its technical schema.
Flatlands and Two Ways to Make Hills
It is rather remarkable that, despite being initially conceived as a technique 
for f inding scientif ic literature, citation analysis was not combined more 
thoroughly with existing techniques from information retrieval before the 
1990s. The SCI’s proprietary nature may have been a factor here, but it is safe to 
argue that the web, this gigantic and unruly mass of hyperlinked documents, 
played a signif icant role as catalyst in bringing together f ields and methods 
that were largely separate until that point. Much like computerization and 
its different dimensions – including data availability, computing capability, 
and commercial opportunity – have informed the resurgence of information 
retrieval and its intermingling with artif icial intelligence, the sheer size and 
complexity of the fledgling online spheres suggested that only algorithmic 
techniques would be capable of ‘bringing order to the web’ (Page et al., 1999).
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The f irst f ifteen years of web history essentially play through the earlier 
‘information wars’ in fast forward: manually assembled catalogs like the 
commercial Yahoo! Directory (closed in 2014) or the volunteer project DMOZ 
(closed in 2017) used elaborate hierarchical classif ication systems – or 
‘hierarchical ontologies’ in contemporary vocabulary – to provide searchers 
with well-ordered maps covering the masses of documents. The criticism 
leveled against these efforts is virtually the same as almost 50 years earlier:
Human maintained lists cover popular topics effectively but are subjective, 
expensive to build and maintain, slow to improve, and cannot cover all 
esoteric topics. (Brin and Page, 1998, p. 117)
Automated search engines are presented as the answer, even if they have 
to deal with (partially) new problems, such as spamming and other forms 
of manipulation. Google Search has become almost synonymous with 
this automated approach. At f irst glance, it can be seen as a canonical 
information retrieval system that takes a query as input, searches through 
a (very large) document collection, and spits out a list of results. One could 
even make a legitimate comparison with coordinate indexing and argue 
that adding words to a query performs a Boolean AND and excluding words 
with the ‘-’ operator a Boolean NOT. There is little reason to believe that 
Google’s retrieval engine was initially all that different from the systems 
that Luhn and others had already experimented with in the late 1950s: word 
frequency counts, processing of document structure to identify ‘privileged’ 
text in titles or subheadings, statistical term-weighting schemes, and 
other techniques were well-known strategies for probabilistic, content-
based indexing and already commonly used in web search. Put simply, 
the shift in perspective associated with Google Search did not concern 
retrieval techniques as such but rather the way the collection itself was 
conceptualized.
Indeed, PageRank is sometimes presented as an example for the f ield 
of unsupervised machine learning (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman, 
2009, p. 576), a set of techniques briefly discussed in Chapter 5 that are 
often used to ‘map out’ a dataset, either through forms of classif ication or 
through attribution of some numerical value to individual items. In this 
case, PageRank is the mechanism by which the web is no longer treated 
exclusively as a document repository, but additionally as a social system 
that is riddled with the very ‘socionomic hierarchies’ Moreno described. 
By applying a recursive status index inspired by sociometry and citation 
analysis to the index of web pages, every document in the corpus can be 
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located in the stratif ied network/society and ranked according to its ‘status’ 
before searching even begins. Attributing an ‘importance score’ (Page et al., 
1999, p. 3) to every document ‘independent of the page content’ (Bianchini, 
Gori, and Scarselli, 2005, p. 94) fundamentally means giving up the idea 
of a ‘f lat corpus’ (Chakrabarti, 2003) of documents where relevance is only 
determined in relation to a query. While information retrieval generally 
conceives relevance with regard to a specif ic ‘informational need’, the 
socio- and scientometric attributions of status, influence, or impact are 
much closer to forms of aggregate description like mapping or clustering. As 
an unsupervised machine learning technique that tries to f ind an optimal 
description for specif ic aspects of a dataset, PageRank establishes a global 
‘pecking order’ for the web. More precisely, because linking is framed as a 
form of citation and thus as rational attribution of importance by document 
authors, the hyperlink network can become a singular, universal network 
of ‘authority’ that the search system can combine with traditional ranking 
mechanisms to calculate a f inal score during the search process. This quote 
from the initial research paper on PageRank highlights this two-prone 
approach:
The importance of a Web page is an inherently subjective matter, which 
depends on the readers interests, knowledge and attitudes. But there is 
still much that can be said objectively about the relative importance of 
Web pages. (Page et al., 1999, p. 1)
But how does this universalist component resonate with the larger argument 
for variation and perspectivism I have constructed over the last chapters? 
Comparing Google’s algorithm to a close sibling points to moments of 
differentiation.
Just like PageRank, Jon Kleinberg’s HITS (Hyperlink-Induced Topic Search) 
is an eigenvector-based evaluative metric that was introduced at nearly 
the same time as its more famous cousin (Kleinberg, 1999). Its virtually 
identical goal was to formulate ‘a notion of authority’ by processing the 
‘considerable amount of latent human judgment’ encoded in hyperlinks, 
in order to solve the ‘abundance problem’ (p. 606) faced by web users. But 
there are two major differences.
First, HITS actually provides two eigenvector metrics, one for ‘hubness’ 
and another for ‘authority’. Building on the idea ‘that good hubs point to 
good authorities and good authorities are pointed to by good hubs’ (Langville 
and Meyer, 2005, p. 136), Kleinberg makes a conceptual differentiation, 
entirely based on structural properties of the graph, resulting in a typology 
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of nodes that, if implemented through an interface, could allow users to 
specify the type they are looking for. While metrics can indeed totalize 
and commensurate (Espeland and Stevens, 1998), there are many technical 
means to introduce differentiation and variation. In the domain of the 
f ini-unlimited, one can not only calculate singular scores in countess ways 
but there is also no necessity to limit calculation to a singular score in the 
f irst place.
Second, HITS inverts the temporal sequence of authority ranking and 
document retrieval. Rather than calculate a universal or a priori landscape 
of authority like PageRank, documents matching a query are retrieved f irst 
and authority is calculated only second, taking only the link structure 
between found documents into account and not the full corpus. This means 
that in the HITS perspective, authority is dependent on a subject domain 
delineated through a query and a page that receives a high authority score 
for one search term may well get a much lower score for another. While 
this obviously does not abolish the notion of authority by any means, the 
concept is reconfigured, contextualized, and contained in the sense that 
HITS is less subject to what Barry and Browne (2006) euphemistically call 
‘topic drift’ (p. 84), that is, the dominance of high-authority sites over a 
wide range of topics.
Algorithmic techniques do not exist in a disembodied state but become 
part of running systems where operations form (potentially recursive) 
sequences; simply rearranging these sequences may yield signif icant differ-
ences in terms of output. But being part of a running system also means that 
ideas compete on more than the merit of their results. Even if we may want to 
argue that the HITS perspective holds significant advantages over PageRank, 
the argument clashes with the fact that the computational requirements for 
HITS are much higher than for PageRank. While the latter can recalculate its 
universal landscape of authority at a set interval – before it fell silent on the 
topic, Google indicated a number of about once a month – the former would 
have to make an authority computation for every single search request. 
Certainly, the scores for the most popular queries could be calculated in 
advance, but a large disadvantage persists when it comes to both speed 
and cost. And the found documents for a given query may not even form 
a hyperlink network in the f irst place, reducing the system to traditional 
information retrieval metrics.
But even when looking inside the PageRank formula, we f ind space 
for variation and choice. In the next section, I will show how a single pa-
rameter encodes a signif icant theoretical and, consequently, operational 
commitment.
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Objet petit α11
Just like Katz’s (1953) ‘status index’, PageRank not only ‘recursively 
propagate[s] weights through the link structure of the Web’ (Brin and Page, 
1998, p. 108), but includes ‘a damping factor that limits the extent to which a 
document’s rank can be inherited by children documents’ (Page, 2004, p. 7). 
The question is how far through the network authority should propagate. 
The rationale put forward by Page et al. (1999) to explain rank ‘decay’ (p. 4) 
in PageRank is twofold: f irst, the actual problem in the context of a web 
search engine is that without damping, a ‘rank sink’ in the form of a closed 
loop between two or more pages could excessively accumulate rank at each 
pass of the iterative method used to compute the metric, the usual approach 
to calculation in absence of an analytical solution. Damping eliminates 
those undesired artifacts. Second, an ‘intuitive basis’ (p. 5) in the form of 
the model of a random surfer is introduced, where the damping factor α 
‘models the fact that users typically jump to a different place in the web 
after following a few links’ (Page, 2004, p. 7). While PageRank is presented 
as ‘an attempt to see how good an approximation to “importance” can be 
obtained just from the link structure’ (Page et al., 1999, p. 4), neither the 
‘rank sink’ nor the ‘random walk’ justif ication really account for damping 
in respect to the question of importance. The f irst justif ication concerns a 
technical problem arising from the particular computational solution used 
and the second fails to elaborate how a model of random user behavior 
actually relates to the calculation of an importance score. While PageRank 
can indeed be read as a scoring of the ‘reachability’ of a node in a graph, in 
the sense that more central sites would be stumbled upon more frequently 
if somebody was randomly following links, the transfer from dampened 
reachability to importance remains unexplained. It is not surprising that 
Google nowadays prefers the term ‘useful’ to ‘important’.12
Much like the admittedly diff icult question of how language and meaning 
relate, which received surprisingly little attention in early information 
retrieval, the move from socio- and scientometrics to the web correlates 
with a dramatic loss of interest in considerations that could be described 
as ‘domain theoretic’. These considerations, which inform and justify the 
11 In Lacan’s psychoanalysis, the ‘objet petit a’ stands for an object of desire that remains forever 
unattainable, elusive. Žižek (1992) argues that it ‘is not a positive entity existing in space, it is 
ultimately nothing but a certain curvature of the space itself which causes us to make a bend 
precisely when we want to get directly at the object’ (p. 48).
12 https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/algorithms/, accessed 22 February 2017.
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‘appropriate coordination’ between an empirical system and its formalization 
in the context of scientif ic description, are little more than inconveniences 
on the way toward computation. Terms like ‘intuitive basis’ signal the ex-
change of robust theoretical involvement for little more than commonsense 
reasoning, and this is really quite common in computing disciplines. We 
can, however, develop a line of mechanological interpretation that considers 
the explanations given by Katz and Bonacich for the inclusion of a damping 
factor into their own metrics.
Katz introduces the α factor as a means to adapt the calculation of his 
status index to ‘both the group and the context’ (Katz, 1953, p. 41) and 
provides an expressive example from the domain of information diffusion:
For example, the information that the new high-school principal is 
unmarried and handsome might occasion a violent reaction in a ladies’ 
garden club and hardly a ripple of interest in a luncheon group of the local 
chamber of commerce. On the other hand, the luncheon group might 
be anything but apathetic in its response to information concerning a 
fractional change in credit buying restrictions announced by the federal 
government. (Katz, 1953, p. 41)
One way Katz (1953) interprets α is as an estimate of the ‘probability of 
effectiveness of a single link’ (p. 41) for relaying information and he argues 
that this is highly dependent on context and, in particular, on the fit between 
the social setting and the message in question. In this sense, α encodes 
the probability that a piece of information is passed on from one person 
to the next and a researcher should choose an appropriate level based 
on her appreciation of the situation. A high level of damping means that 
information will not spread very far, even if high status individuals are 
involved. The ‘conductivity’ is considered to be low and status does not reach 
very far into the network. In contrast, if one looks at a military command 
structure, for example, conductivity can be considered to be very high 
since orders are generally followed from top to bottom. In this case, status 
would be strongly cumulative since a powerful individual like a general has 
full control over what happens further down the network hierarchy. If α 
is small, control over others is considered low and status ranking actually 
approaches the ‘balloting’ Katz criticized as dissatisfying, because status no 
longer propagates and the simple number of votes a person receives becomes 
the determining factor. Because already small differences in the factor can 
lead to signif icant variation in outcomes, the commitment to a particular 
estimation of the conductivity of a network – we must not forget that α is 
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a manually set constant – has substantial consequences on the calculated 
hierarchies. Indeed, Bianchini, Gori, and Scarselli discuss α in PageRank 
in similar terms as the factor deciding how far the structure of a network 
should influence the status of a node:
PageRank deeply depends on parameter [α]. When [α] is small, only the 
nearest relatives give an actual contribution to [PageRank], whereas, as 
[α] → 1, far ancestors are also signif icant for the evaluation of [PageRank]. 
(Bianchini, Gori, and Scarselli, 2005, p. 125)
The conceptual entanglements this modulation implies clears up further 
when examining the arguments behind Bonacich’s (1987) decision to add a 
damping factor to his own ‘power centrality’ metric. In order to account for 
the results of an empirical study by Cook et al. (1983), which had shown a 
disjunction between network centrality and power in a bargaining network, 
Bonacich proposes a parameter β, which regulates the depth of influence 
in a very similar fashion to α by def ining ‘a radius within which power or 
centrality is being assessed’ (Bonacich, 1987, p. 1174). What makes Bonacich’s 
piece so interesting is his reflection on how β becomes a way to implement 
varying conceptions of what constitutes power in different social networks. 
The full quote is instructive:
To some, the measure may seem hopelessly ambiguous; [power centrality] 
can give radically different rankings on centrality, depending on the value 
of β. However, the measure accentuates an inherent ambiguity in the 
concept of centrality. There are different types of centrality, depending on 
the degrees to which local and global structures should be weighted in a 
particular study and whether that weight should be positive or negative. 
When communication is typically over long distances, position in the 
global structure should count more than when all communication is 
local. In an organized hierarchy in which power is transitive, the power of 
those one has power over should be weighted more highly in determining 
overall power than when all relations are dyadic. (Bonacich, 1987, p. 1181)
We notice again that a single parameter is seen as encoding a fundamen-
tal appreciation of how influence or power operate in a given situation. 
Bonacich’s β actually goes beyond α, because it is designed to work with 
negative values as well, so that connections to high status nodes are actu-
ally detrimental to rank. This allows the model to account for bargaining 
networks, where exchange theory considers it beneficial to be connected 
calculatING NEt wORkS: FROM SOcIOMEtRY tO PaGERaNk 291
to a large number of low status nodes that can be more easily exploited 
because they lack information, for example, about prices. In this situation, 
‘power comes from being connected to those who are powerless’ (p. 1171). 
Because β and α are set manually, they express a true commitment to a 
theory about the real-world properties of the network in question, even 
if that commitment is made with little consideration for its implications.
When applying this discussion to PageRank, two very different notions 
of status, authority, and importance emerge: with α → 0, the web is indeed 
conceived as a ‘one person, one vote’ type democracy13 and collecting incom-
ing links, no matter from where, would be the principal means of gaining 
rank; in a α → 1 setting, the web becomes a very different place – opaque, 
complex, and potentially Machiavellian, where success comes from either 
patronage by the already powerful or the patient and costly construction of 
large and spread-out strategic networks. While we have to keep in mind that 
this is a scale and not a binary decision, the f irst vision puts an emphasis 
on the local properties of the graph and makes it therefore possible for 
local changes, if signif icant in number, to affect the overall ranking of the 
system; the second builds on the global structure of the graph and local 
changes therefore have negligible effects on overall rankings. If we keep 
with the image of a social system, the respective models of transformation 
are ‘populist/revolutionary’ and ‘conservative/reformatory’. While purely 
descriptive metrics make an epistemological commitment to a theory of 
power to represent social status, the prescriptive mode of PageRank as an 
engine of order in a technical system makes an operational commitment 
to reproduce and reinforce, in very practical terms, the hierarchy of social 
status it detects. The value Google usually communicated for α was 0.85 
(Brin and Page, 1998, p. 110) and at this level, the often-heard interpretation 
of PageRank as essentially an expression of popularity (Diaz, 2008; Rieder, 
2009) misses the target. While sheer numbers certainly do play a role, the 
idea that PageRank interprets the web as ‘a gigantic popularity contest’ 
(Roush, 2004, n.p.) does not capture how it ‘brings order to the web’. At a 
level of 0.85, power is highly cumulative and an inlink from a high-status 
node will be much more valuable than from a site with lower status.
If we consider Google Search as a central site of power negotiation and 
arbitrage for the web, an analysis focusing on PageRank, which in practice 
13 Whether voting is necessarily a core principle of democratic government is debatable, 
however. As Bernard Manin (1997) has shown, up to the French revolution, elections were 
generally associated with aristocracy and selection by lottery was seen as the truly democratic 
mode of assigning off ice.
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is certainly insuff icient, would have to conclude that its authority-ranking 
mechanism applies, in a universal fashion, a largely conservative14 vision of 
society to the document graph, one that picks out ‘the real leaders’ (Katz, 
14 The term is used here in a rather literal sense as favoring the maintenance of the status quo. 
The diff iculty to apply traditional concepts from political theory becomes evident when we 
take into account that the ‘revolutionary masses’ PageRank is set to defend against are mostly 
spammers and search engine optimizers.
a network generated randomly with Gephi. Node sizes represent the number of inlinks and color 
represents PageRank (α = 0.85), going from light to dark grey. we instantly notice that n1 has a 
high PR although it only receives a single inlink. this link comes from the highest status node 
(n34), however, and since that node links nowhere else, n1 receives a lot (85 percent) of its status.
label PR (α=0.85) PR (α=0.7) PR (α=0.55) PR (α=0.4) In-Degree Out-Degree Degree
n34 0.0944 0.0743 0.0584 0.0460 4 1 5
n1 0.0867 0.0617 0.0450 0.0345 1 2 3
n17 0.0668 0.0521 0.0423 0.0355 2 1 3
n39 0.0663 0.0541 0.0453 0.0388 5 1 6
n22 0.0619 0.0506 0.0441 0.0393 5 1 6
n27 0.0591 0.0451 0.0371 0.0318 1 0 1
n38 0.0522 0.0561 0.0542 0.0486 6 0 6
n11 0.0492 0.0372 0.0306 0.0274 3 1 4
a table of eight nodes from the same network as above, selected and ordered based on the 
highest values for PageRank (α = 0.85). Four PageRank rankings were calculated. Note how n1 with 
just a single inlinks slips with lower values for α and n38 rises to the top of the ranking.
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1953, p. 39) and distributes visibility to them. Rather than showing us the 
popular it shows us the authoritative, or, to connect back to citation analysis, 
the canonical (Introna, 2007, p. 18). If we consider the link indeed as ‘in-
nocent’, as a valid indicator of disinterested human judgment, PageRank 
shows us a meritocracy; if we take the link to be fully caught up in economic 
forces, however, we receive the map of a plutocracy. In either case, the search 
engine as an engine of order will accentuate the difference between high 
and low rank over time since pages with higher status will be more visible 
and thus have a greater chance of receiving further links.
Similar to the Bayesian classif ier, computer scientists have studied the 
effects of α in great detail (Langville and Meyer, 2004, 2005; Bianchini, Gori, 
and Scarselli, 2005). But the above figure and table show the effects of changes 
in the value for α on a simple and actually rather ‘egalitarian’ network in 
a hopefully more accessible form than the papers written by specialists. 
While we cannot make any far-reaching generalizations based on a limited 
experiment, it is in line with the general finding that small variations in α can 
lead to signif icant changes in ranking. It also confirms that at high values 
for α the quality of inlinks is much more relevant than their number; a single 
link from a page with a high rank can be extremely valuable, especially if that 
page does not link anywhere else. When lowering α and thus adding more 
damping, the hierarchy shifts in favor of nodes with many inlinks. Although 
this is only a sketch, approaches involving tinkering or ‘screwing around’ 
(Ramsay, 2010) with algorithms should be considered as ways of studying 
them as ‘beings that function’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 151) in their natural habitat: 
eating numbers and spewing out different numbers at the rear end.
But again, computational requirements add an interesting caveat. While 
the level set for α has important conceptual and potentially political con-
sequences, it also implies a cost factor, since a higher value means that the 
calculation will require a larger number of iterations to converge.15 Langville 
and Meyer capture the dilemma:
Consequently, Google engineers are forced to perform a delicate balancing 
act. The smaller α is, the faster the convergence, but the smaller α is, the 
less the true hyperlink structure of the web is used to determine webpage 
importance. And slightly different values for α can produce very different 
PageRanks. (Langville and Meyer, 2004, p. 346)
15 In the iterative power method for calculating PageRank, only an approximation to the 
eigenvector solution is calculated. The loop stops when the changes from one iteration to the 
next fall below a set level.
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This means that a local theory of power is computationally and, because 
computation costs money, economically cheaper than a theory where status 
is based on global structural properties. In this case, the menace from spam 
apparently appeared as suff iciently substantial to convince Google that a 
larger radius of influence – and consequently a reduced capacity for local 
changes to affect global structure – was well worth the additional cost.
Variation and Combination
This chapter set out to examine what is ‘in’ the PageRank algorithm and 
it proceeded in two ways: It f irst situated this evaluative metric in a larger 
archive of statements, that is, of ideas, concepts, theories, methods, and 
techniques that developed in and around sociometry, citation analysis, 
social exchange theory, and hypertext navigation. This conceptual space 
constitutes, at least to a certain extent, the place of emergence from where 
PageRank became ‘sayable’ (cf. Foucault, 2002, p. 146). The fact that many of 
the papers discussed here are cited in the relevant patents adds concreteness 
and plausibility to this idea. The chapter deviated from the preceding ones by 
taking a contemporary technique as its narrative telos. Although an implicit 
focus on the present has guided my selections in earlier examples as well, 
there is a more specif ic reason for this choice: while information retrieval 
revolves around the conceptual and operational possibilities of comput-
ing machinery from the beginning and takes earlier work in information 
ordering mainly as negative inspiration, PageRank epitomizes a moment 
when a long and illustrious trajectory of calculative techniques f inds a place 
and raison d’être in an information infrastructure supported by networked 
computing. Certainly, both sociometry and citation analysis were using 
computing machinery from the 1960s on and the latter, in particular, has 
been operating as an engine of order entangled in research evaluation and 
resource allocation almost from the beginning. But the shift from these 
‘ancestral’ domains into document retrieval and ranking is much more 
abrupt that the rather steady accumulation of techniques discussed in 
previous chapters. These differences between trajectories indicate that 
algorithmic techniques are characterized by variation not only in terms 
of technicity and conceptual content, but also in terms of invention and 
evolution. If ‘[w]hat resides in the machines is human reality, human gesture 
f ixed and crystallized in working structures’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 18), there is 
no single way this ‘f ixing and crystallizing’ happens, no canonical sequence 
of steps, and no singular discipline or materiality that holds everything 
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together. PageRank illustrates how a heterogeneous archive of statements 
and practices f inds expression in the particular form of an algorithmic 
technique, becoming ready-to-hand not only for software developers that 
want to use it in their own programs, but also for users engaged in the 
mapping practices mentioned at the beginning of this chapter: using a graph 
analysis toolkit like Gephi, PageRank becomes applicable to any network 
at the click of a button. Unsurprisingly, it asks its users to set a value for α, 
somewhere between 0 and 1.
Second, by comparing the algorithm to a close cousin and by examining 
a particular parameter in the model, the chapter tried to show that the 
concrete schema – the algorithmic technique, not the search engine – does 
not simply follow from the historical a priori. There are thousands of graph 
theoretical algorithms documented and hundreds of variants of the recursive 
status metrics I have focused on. Are they all based on a reductionist and 
atomistic vision of social relations? Quite possibly. Do they all encode the 
same logic, produce the same rankings, and commit to the same politics? 
Certainly not. There is variation and it is significant: even a single parameter 
can have extraordinary consequences for the actual ordering performed.
While my discussion of PageRank was more technical than earlier 
examples, the goal was to show how deeply entangled with social and 
cultural questions technicity can become, in particular when let loose into 
concrete application settings. Although Larry Page’s proposition is basically 
just a way to transform one set of numbers into another set, what is actually 
expressed are not only mathematical functions but quite fundamental 
ideas about authority, importance, relevance, and so forth. Technicity, 
indeed, draws on different forms of imagination, even if the expression as 
a technical idea requires a capacity to function. The language used may be 
that of mathematics and code, but the expressed technical schema captures 
the outside world and, by becoming operational as part of a search engine, 
shows us that world in particular ways. Information retrieval’s reluctance 
to formulate more elaborate theories of language, meaning, or knowledge 
does not prevent actual systems to enact operational interpretations of 
these things, simply by doing what they do. The orderings most of us are 
confronted with several times a day when querying Google Search are as 
much deliberate outcomes as the tree of knowledge Diderot and D’Alembert 
organized the Encyclopédie around. But the ways in which these outcomes 
come about could not be more different.
Like the techniques discussed in earlier chapters, network algorithms 
start from a common way of representing data as a graph, an intermediate 
form that implies a particular formalization of the empirical realities they 
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target. While the feature vector ‘sees’ the world as sets of objects having 
certain properties, the graph frames objects in terms of their connections. We 
f ind a similar capacity for generalization and generativity: if a phenomenon 
can be f itted into an adjacency matrix, a large number of readily available 
techniques can be applied at will. While this chapter was mainly concerned 
with the various ways hierarchies of authority, influence, status, and so 
forth can be measured, this is only one of many things network algorithms 
can be used for. One could write a similar story for the detection of so-
called ‘cliques’, for example, densely connected groups of friends in social 
networks, scientif ic disciplines or paradigms in citation networks, or sets of 
products that are bought together frequently. Or a story covering the various 
measures of ‘betweenness’ (Freeman, 1977) that seek to detect nodes that are 
‘bridging’16 subgroups and can therefore not only access a potentially wider 
set of resources but also control the information flow between different 
parts of the network. The excitement around a science of networks that 
attempts to consider common aspects of networks across domains is indeed 
nourished by the fact that so many different phenomena can be productively 
modeled as graphs. We thus f ind the same ordering techniques applied to 
phenomena ranging from molecular interactions to collaborations between 
movie actors. But in all of these cases, mathematical transformations are 
coordinated with domain-specif ic interpretations in some way and the 
same metric will not necessarily express the same idea when applied to two 
different types of network, opening a space for interpretation and critique.
It should come as no surprise that the graph and the feature vector are not 
competing or mutually exclusive paradigmatic forms, but ‘merely’ pivotal 
instances in malleable spaces of technical expression. Ultimately, there is 
parallelism and abundant potential for connection in the field of algorithmic 
techniques and moving from one form or technique to another often requires 
little more than a change in perspective. The hyperlink network does not 
have to be treated strictly as a graph. We could, for example, consider a web 
document as a feature vector comprised not of words, but of the entities it 
links to. Akin to Henry Small’s co-link analysis, we could then use Salton’s 
similarity calculations to f ind pages that are ‘related’ because they link to 
similar places but are not directly connected. But the statistical technique 
does not really tell us what ‘related’ would actually mean here. Would we 
16 Putnam (2000) distinguishes between two types of social capital: bonding capital is high 
for individuals that are central in a tightly knit group; bridging capital is high for those that 
connect disparate groups or circles. Many different algorithms have tried to formalize and 
calculate these ideas.
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be able to f ind a theoretical framework to support and justify our idea or 
would we simply create and evaluate an experimental setup to demonstrate 
the capacity and utility of our system? Combining trajectories in the other 
direction, we could follow Luhn’s idea and formalize co-occurrences of 
words in a text as a graph, submitting the resulting network to any number 
of centrality metrics, in the hope of f inding the most ‘important’ words in 
the document. This technique, co-word analysis, is indeed quite common 
and we may rightfully ask what kind of ‘capture’ of language and meaning 
it implies. The functional forms of signif ication such operations may deploy 
in specif ic settings is not culturally neutral but also not easily aligned with 
cultural categories and dependent on the data under scrutiny.
While these are somewhat arbitrary examples, technical plasticity can 
be engaged more proactively and with a critical mindset. Connecting back 
to the discussion of software-making in Chapter 3, we can recognize that 
the plasticity software affords is not distributed equally, turning it into a 
site of political struggle. An example from my own work can illustrate what 
I mean. Almost f ifteen years ago, I called for developer access to Google’s 
search index, based on the idea that the enormous trust users place in the 
company should give rise to a ‘symmetry of confidence’ (Rieder, 2005) in the 
form of increased openness to (programmed) interaction with its products 
and infrastructures. To give concrete meaning to this proposal, I built a small 
web mashup on the basis of Yahoo!’s now defunct BOSS (Build your own 
Search Service) Web API. TermCloud Search would get 500 search results, 
each pretagged with a set of keywords, and then generate a word cloud based 
on these keywords. The cloud was meant to break with the linear hierarchy 
of the result list, to map the result space by providing an overview, and to 
furnish a visual representation that could be used to navigate the results 
by clicking on words. It was a basically a coordinate indexing system sitting 
on top of ranked search results. Multiple terms could be selected to create 
an AND query and the tool used simple keyword co-occurrence to show 
which terms appeared most commonly together.
This rather basic example is meant to show how engaging technicity 
does not require a deep dive into mathematical principles but may well 
begin with attentiveness to broad techniques, end-user functionalities, 
and interface arrangements. TermCloud Search can be understood as an 
attempt at critical contribution, in the form of an object, to the debate around 
the specif ic rationales information retrieval systems should implement. 
While Google Search generally emphasizes the capacity to deliver the right 
‘answer’ to a ‘question’ in the least amount of time, my mashup considered 
the query not so much as a question, but as a way to evoke a potentially 
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multifaceted or contested topic, and the result not as an answer, but as a 
crude overview and navigational interface into the different dimensions 
that topic may have. While this certainly overstates the conceptual reach 
of such a small experiment, one could say that the design objective was to 
induce a sensitivity for the plurality and composite character of an issue 
as well as to practically facilitate its exploration.
While the playful combination of techniques becomes clearly visible 
in this example, (almost) all software is a hybrid when looking behind the 
interface, even if design goals can certainly be less benign. Could we imagine 
a machine learning setup that sets α in PageRank dynamically, based on 
feedback, in order to delegate the inconvenient moment of human judgment 
and theoretical commitment to an empirical machine? If our goal is to 
deliver the ‘best’ results, we could very well calculate PageRank at different 
levels of α and submit each level to a randomly selected subset of our user 
base. In line with the notion of revealed preference, we may take it as a 
positive signal when a user actually clicks on the f irst link. If users select 
lower ranked links, we take this as negative feedback. The level of α with 
the interface of termcloud Search, showing results for the query [bp]. clicking on the term ‘oil 
spill’ would show the results tagged with that term and highlight the terms that co-occurred most 
often with it.
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the highest percentage of positive signals wins and the problem is solved. 
Imagine similar games not for a single instance of algorithmic ordering, but 
for many: some concerning the formalization of document content, some 
concerning link structure, some concerning implicit or explicit feedback; 
others slicing users by location, by device form factor, or by movement 
speed in physical space; yet others personalizing based on use history or 
similarity with other users. If we imagine this huge network of possible 
factors and techniques – and probably a more complex appreciation of 
what success means – and we end up with a more accurate, albeit still 
superf icial, appreciation of how systems like Google Search actually work 
and evolve over time. Google almost certainly scores on the basis of some 
intricate and adaptive combination of relevance (information retrieval), 
authority (network analysis), and feedback (machine learning) techniques, 
combining the different technical trajectories discussed in this book into 
a complex technical ensemble. Because each of the technical elements in 
play is complex and their (possible) interactions even more so, thousands 
of people with PhDs work at Google, not merely a few. As Peter Norvig, 
now Director of Research at Google, has recently argued, ‘the competi-
tive advantage really comes from the hard work of what you do with the 
algorithm and all the processes around making a product, not from the 
core algorithm itself ’ (r/Science and AAAS-AMA, 2018, n.p.). Technology 
is created from technical elements, but their arrangement and connection 
with the world increasingly relies on empirical processes that tie design, use, 
and evaluation tightly together into an object that is never entirely f inished 
and therefore never fully ‘detaches’ from its producer the way Simondon 
describes (Simondon, 2014, p. 27). The study of algorithmic techniques 
gives us a handle on the vocabulary of functional expression, but the way 
technology is actually ‘spoken’ is increasingly hard to decipher.
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 Conclusion: Toward Technical Culture
Abstract
The conclusion synthesizes algorithmic information ordering into a 
typology of ordering gestures, paying particular attention to the modes 
of disassembly and reassembly that inform the underlying techniques. 
The attempt to distill an operational epistemology from the cacophony of 
techniques begs the question whether we are witnessing the emergence 
of a new épistémè (Foucault, 2005), a far-reaching set of regularities that 
characterize order is understood and operationalized. Furthermore, the 
chapter addresses the more immediately pressing need to understand 
how the capacity to algorithmically arrange individuals, populations, 
and everything in-between in dynamic and goal-oriented ways relates 
to contemporary forms of capitalism. To face this challenge, the chapter 
comes back to Simondon’s mechanology and its broader cousin, technical 
culture, as a means to promote a ‘widening’ of technical imagination and 
appropriation.
Keywords: épistémè, operational epistemology, technical imagination, 
technical wisdom
Over the preceding chapters, I have attempted to develop a perspective on 
algorithmic information ordering that takes technicity as its main focus 
and considers ordering techniques as means for producing specif ic forms 
of function or behavior dealing with the ‘arrangement and disposition’ of 
data items that stand, more often than not, for something meaningful to 
human practice. While the chosen historical trajectories often dealt with 
books, articles, or other documents, I have argued that these techniques 
can be applied to any item that can be f itted into a common intermediate 
form like a feature vector or a graph. Other than that, little adaptation is 
required to transfer ordering gestures to new domains: calculating the 
similarity between user prof iles on a dating site is hardly different from 
comparing text documents and deciding whether an applicant should 
Rieder, B., Engines of Order: A Mechanology of Algorithmic Techniques. Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
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receive credit can be handled the same way as spam f iltering. Terms like 
‘computerization’, ‘dataf ication’, or – at a lower level – ‘formalization’ all 
refer to processes that end up funneling different aspects of the world into 
the domain of algorithmic information ordering.
Technical objects, including online infrastructures, are built ‘from ele-
ments that are already technical’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 74) and algorithmic 
techniques constitute vocabularies of possible function that enable operation 
and serve as horizons for technical imagination. The notion of algorithmic 
technique indeed seeks to distinguish fundamental technical schemas 
from the arrangements and design choices they are embedded in. Even 
if technical objects are ‘invented, thought and willed, taken up [assumé] 
by a human subject’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 252), they depend on the objective 
technicities available at a particular stage of technical evolution. Their 
objectal integration into economic, social, and psychosocial relations occurs 
on the basis of their operational capabilities. An online music service can 
only make ‘good’ automated recommendations if there are techniques 
capable of producing outputs that match some standard of quality, for 
example, user satisfaction. The current debates around algorithms and 
artif icial intelligence are stimulated by an expansion of actually attainable 
behavior. The widening of ‘what computers can do’ relies on the formulation 
of new algorithmic techniques, but practical applications also depend on 
factors like the proliferation of computerized task environments capturing 
human practice, continuously growing computational power, business 
models that take advantage of new opportunities, and forms of social interest 
or demand. One could easily imagine versions of this book that focus on 
these dimensions. My objective, however, was to address a small subset 
of the technical substance that lurks behind terms like ‘algorithm’ and to 
analyze it in ways that are attentive to specif icity, variation, and relational 
embedding.
Seen from the perspective of techniques, software-making is neither an 
enactment of an autonomous technical telos nor a simple transposition 
of nontechnical ideas into technical form. It is the creation of a coherent 
system from disparate elements, a system that has internal consistency 
yet remains open to the world to a variable degree. If technical creation 
is indeed a form of communication as Simondon suggests, the ‘message’ a 
technical object carries is the operational substance it introduces into the 
networks that surround it, adding to and transforming them in the process. 
Mechanology is the hermeneutics of that message.
In this concluding chapter, I will attempt to give a clearer picture where 
a mechanology of algorithmic techniques may lead, f irst by distilling the 
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epistemological dimension of algorithmic information ordering into a slightly 
more general classif ication of ordering gestures, second, by coming back 
to the question of how engines of order are tied to the social and economic 
logics of the present, and third by arguing that Simondon’s notion of a 
‘technical culture’ is a necessary correlate for societies that have made 
technology the very center of their mode of existence.
From Order to Ordering
One of the arguments I developed in the second part of this book held that 
traditional systems for bibliographic control like library classif ications 
and subject headings were designed to further Enlightenment values such 
as universal education, while the special libraries and documentation 
centers multiplying after WWII reframed information as a resource for 
decision-making in business and government. These ‘cultural’ differences 
clearly played an important role in the story, but my main goal was to isolate 
elements of what could be called an ‘operational epistemology’ that emerges 
from the actual ‘techniques involved in operationalizing distinctions in 
the real’ (Siegert, 2013, p. 14) in these two settings. This project revolved 
around the notion of ‘order’, even if I worked with a broad def inition that 
largely stuck to the OED’s proposition as ‘the arrangement or disposition of 
people or things in relation to each other according to a particular sequence, 
pattern, or method’.
As a means to discuss changing understandings of order, I set out from 
Deleuze’s (1988) reading of Foucault’s The Order of Things (2005), wondering 
whether we are witnessing the emergence of a new épistémè. In the classic 
épistémè, order was thought as pregiven, transcendental, and inf inite, a 
‘perfect’ or ‘God’ form (Deleuze, 1988, p. 125f.) where the variation of con-
cretely existing things unfolds on a plane def ined by eternal, unchanging 
principles. The scholar takes inventory of the regularities that characterize a 
world ‘offered to representation without interruption’ (Foucault, 2005, p. 224). 
This yields series of two-dimensional tables capturing and representing the 
order of things by positioning them with regard to their similarities and 
differences. The modern épistémè, however, trades idealism for empiricism. 
Order becomes the concrete result of contingent historical forces, namely 
the intrinsic processes of life, work, and language. Darwin’s tree of life 
begins with a single organism and the myriad species that develop from it 
are the product of the mechanisms of mutation and selection playing out 
in geographies and ecologies where certain traits prime over others. Life 
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is no longer an inf inite variation of perfect forms but the outcome of the 
complicated yet f inite evolution of contingent processes. We see a similar 
shift in economics: whereas the value of an item was previously based on 
the assessment of similarities and differences with other items, Smith and 
Ricardo now identify the hours of work necessary to produce something 
as the ‘true’ foundation of its value.
Deleuze’s candidate for a new épistémè no longer revolves around tran-
scendental grids or historical becoming, but around configurations where 
‘a f inite number of components yields a practically unlimited diversity of 
combinations’ (Deleuze, 1988, p. 131). Such a ‘f ini-unlimited’ understand-
ing of order would move from singular descriptions to ‘kaleidoscopically 
transmuted tables whose expansion and open margins afford many formula-
tions of similarity and difference’ (Mackenzie, 2017a, p. 58), harbingers, as 
Dreyfus (2009) laments, of ‘a postmodern, protean being ready to be opened 
up to ever new horizons’ (p. 12). These formulations certainly resonate 
with the arguments presented in Chapter 4, where I measured the static 
and universalist ordering schemes of the nineteenth century against the 
combinatorial and perspectivist character of coordinate indexing that no 
longer attributes a f ixed conceptual location to documents but retrieves 
and ranks them in response to a query that def ines a conceptual location 
through the combination of search terms.
While distilling algorithmic ordering techniques into a single, idealized 
epistemological core can be useful, one risks losing sight of the operational 
dimension and its many specificities. I will therefore hold the f ini-unlimited 
épistémè at bay for the moment and synthesize the previous chapters around 
two broad gestures I have mentioned numerous times: disassembly and 
reassembly. In both cases, the techniques involved cover considerable 
spaces of variation, even if shared intermediate forms play a pivotal role.
Disassembly
Moving the references in library catalogs from books onto cards arranged in 
f iling cabinets already implied a gesture of detachment and atomization that 
prepared and enabled more fluid forms of reassembly. But disassembly was 
f irst a merely practical means for keeping a complete and up-to-date catalog, 
a boon to library management and knowledge access as collections grew. 
Since cards could be easily standardized and exchanged between libraries, 
the move actually furthered universalization rather than perspectivism. 
The uses of f iling cabinets and other ‘paper machines’ (Krajewski, 2011) in 
business and government bureaucracies were more ambitious in terms of 
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ordering and flowed directly into applications of digital database systems 
(cf. Gardey, 2008), but in libraries, the card catalog’s potential for multiplying 
perspectives was hardly realized beyond the coexistence of subject head-
ings, hierarchical classif ication, and alphabetical order. Disassembly and 
atomization were to serve political and epistemological universalism, not 
to challenge it. Indeed, while Paul Otlet envisioned a ‘telematic cultural 
technique’ (Hartmann, 2015, n.p.) where knowledge and information are 
chopped into fragments that users can combine and consult from a distance, 
his vision remained attached to stable and universal classif ication. Disas-
sembly did not (yet) herald an understanding of order as a f lexible process 
of ordering but served as a vehicle for access, transmission, and personal 
appropriation.
The information retrieval techniques taking aim at library practices were 
much more sensitive to the expressive power disassembly and reassembly 
afford. The advocates of coordinate indexing criticized hierarchical clas-
sif ication and precoordinated subject indexes for their practical complexity 
and for not taking full advantage of language’s compositional qualities: 
words were combined too ‘early’ into compound concepts, they argued. 
Moving to single, disjointed keywords that are only ‘coordinated’ at query 
time would yield a whole range of benefits. Uniterms or descriptors, possibly 
taken from the documents themselves, would be faster, cheaper, and less 
subjective, that is, less exposed to human judgment and discretion. The 
idea that postcoordination reduces the biased influence of individuals on 
knowledge organization and retrieval is central, and this ‘dispossession’ is 
realized by eliminating syntactic possibilities from the indexing language. In 
coordinate indexing, the individual keyword is neither part of a classificatory 
hierarchy, nor capable of entering into precoordinated relationships with 
other terms. Even the order of keywords must be irrelevant. While the 
resulting intermediate form may resemble a list, the keywords attributed 
to a document are actually a set of unordered, detached items that can be 
intersected and queried through Boolean operators. Unlike a list, table, or 
tree, a coordinate index holds a latent form of order that only yields a specific 
arrangement when a query is made. However, as a versatile technique, it 
remains agnostic to the question of how keywords are selected, and we 
could easily imagine coordinate indexes that follow any of Hjørland’s (2010, 
p. 74) four theories of knowledge, accommodating rationalist, empiricist, 
hermeneutical, or critical attitudes when creating a queryable keyword space.
In the context of the relational model for database management, the 
narrative concerning subjectivity persists on some level (Date, 2004, p. 401), 
but in organizational settings where records are continuously updated and 
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data models can be expanded or changed, data integrity becomes the main 
objective. At least initially, normalization through decomposition and 
elimination of redundancy primarily serves this goal. But the outcome is 
similar. The fundamental restriction to the relation as intermediate form 
again installs a latent informational grid where each item is located in an 
unordered array of variables. Relations look like tables, but like sets, they 
are more abstract constructs. Syntactic purif ication once again assures the 
creation of homogenized data objects def ined by independent attributes, 
even if these attributes can now be chosen from a larger variety of types. The 
goal is independence: from the hardware, the underlying storage systems, 
the larger organization of the database, and even the particularities of 
specif ic ‘patterns of activity’ (Codd, 1970, p. 379). The normative insist-
ence on deduplication and decomposition through consecutive stages 
of normalization envisions the data-modeling process as an ‘elimination 
procedure’ (p. 381) that produces a space defined by atomized information 
coordinates, making the stored information ready for ad hoc ordering. The 
considerable ‘linguistic power’ (p. 381) of simple query languages based on 
f irst-order predicate calculus depends on the relation as intermediate form 
and on the adherence to these normalization principles. Database literature 
thus generally promotes a rationalist and analytico-synthetic perspective 
that is ‘concerned with what the data is’ (Date, 2004, p. 330) and commits to 
dissecting data into their smallest components. At the same time, however, 
relational database management systems like MySQL are not tied to these 
prescriptions and can be used as information stores without strict adherence 
to normalization. Concrete systems are again suff iciently general and 
flexible to accommodate data models that reflect various epistemological 
sensitivities. The technique is more inclusive than the conceptual horizon 
that drove its invention.
In areas dealing with full text or other types of ‘unstructured’ data, that 
is, data that are already digital but have not been f itted into a specif ic 
intermediate form or data model, the f irst question is how to disassemble 
them algorithmically. The early experiments performed by Luhn and 
Maron were, in fact, attempts to automate the construction of coordinate 
indexes to further reduce human influence. Both were aware that counting 
words in documents is a rather imperfect way to capture meaning, but 
the limitations of computing hardware and the encouraging results from 
working systems justif ied the approach. Coordinate indexing had already 
demonstrated how the description of items as sets of independent terms 
can yield considerable combinatorial power, but the experiments with 
full text showed that signals or measurements taken from the ‘world’ itself 
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could be treated as variables or ‘features’ in similar fashion. Disassembly 
thus becomes an algorithmic process that selects or creates the attributes 
describing a group of items and funnels them into an intermediate form. 
Luhn and Maron arrive at almost the same point as Salton’s more heavily 
formalized vector space model: documents are represented as unordered 
lists (sets) of terms and how often they occur. While names like ‘frequency 
distribution’ or ‘feature vector’ point to different mathematical f ields 
and associated manipulation techniques, they basically refer to the same 
thing. From here, the selection or extraction of the attributes describing 
each item can expand in various directions: more elaborate features 
based on word-pairs, sentence structure, or document formatting can 
supplement word frequencies; various forms of propositional knowledge, 
from dictionaries to domain ontologies, can enhance feature quality; 
and weighting systems like tf-idf can assess their statistical specif icity 
by calculating feature distribution over the full collection. These and 
many other possibilities show how formalization is rarely a mere effect 
of digitization but involves complex processes of delineation, selection, 
and (de)composition. Different techniques and rationales can inform the 
construction of feature vectors and the rather basic theories of language 
and meaning encountered over the last chapters do not preclude deeper 
engagement with the objects under scrutiny. Finally, if the relational model 
suggests a rationalist approach to disassembly, the statistical techniques 
dominating information retrieval favor an empiricist attitude, where 
informational grids are not modeled in advance but extracted from the 
world through iterative experimentation and optimization under the 
auspices of practical objectives.
In the context of network algorithms, lastly, the pathways toward disas-
sembly and formalization are remarkable in at least two respects. First, while 
sociometric work is clearly focused on measuring and method, it draws 
more explicitly on domain theorization: Moreno’s psychoanalytical ideas, 
social exchange theory, and the various brands of social network theory 
describe society as a collection of individuals and reduce social structure 
to the patterns of interaction between these social atoms. This may not be 
a particularly extravagant model, but it shows how formalization can be 
guided by more explicit forms of domain theorization. Rodgers’s (2011) ‘age of 
fracture’, which is closely related to theories building on ‘microfoundations’ 
in economics, political science, and sociology, can thus be seen as providing 
the intellectual fuel that drives this particular vector of atomization. Second, 
the network model introduces an intermediate form tied to graph theo-
retic concepts and computations, adding to already available set-theoretic, 
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statistical, and algebraic techniques. Constructs like (geodesic) distance and 
centrality draw directly on the underlying shift in representation, even if 
graphs can also be treated as sets, vectors, or distributions. The network 
perspective adds relationships between items as ‘material’ but sticks to the 
familiar logic of syntactic reduction: links rarely carry more information 
than direction and connection strength. The broad calculative potential 
again depends on this reduction.
In summary, there are different ways to capture application domains 
into information granules and intermediate formalizations. More deliber-
ate approaches to modeling contrast with more empirical methods that 
instantiate heavily mediated forms of ‘listening to the world’. All of them 
serve to get the world into the computer in ways that facilitate subsequent 
reassembly gestures. Disassembly draws on these different processes to 
produce forms of raw data, understood not as found or untreated, a notion 
that has been rightfully criticized (cf. Gitelman, 2013), but raw like the 
cleaned, peeled, and chopped vegetables in supermarkets that have been 
prepared as ingredients ready to be submitted to one of many available 
recipes. For Foucault (2005), classif ication inescapably entails the creation 
of ‘a common ground’ and we can think about formalization as a means 
to produce such a ‘mute ground upon which it is possible for entities to be 
juxtaposed’ (p. xviii). This already involves forms of interpretation, even if 
they can seem purely mechanical, haphazard, or dispersed. While disas-
sembly may occur as a contained gesture, deliberately applied by some actor 
at some point in time, maybe in the context of experimentation, research, 
or decision-making, its contemporary cultural signif icance draws on the 
observation that human life increasingly revolves around infrastructures 
built from the ground on up atomized units and decomposed data granules. 
One could argue that formalization in computerized environments already 
begins at the earliest stages of systems design, when primary functionalities 
and data models are mapped out. The basic setup of Facebook as a series of 
user prof iles that connect through friendship relations and communicate 
through messages already defines and prepares the raw material available 
for algorithmic information ordering to latch onto.
Reassembly
Intermediate forms such as feature vectors or graphs thus point in two direc-
tions. On the one side, they connect with the ‘world’ and the different ways 
application domains can be funneled into computation. On the other side, 
they highlight the considerable calculative potential that is unlocked when 
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data are made ready for algorithmic ordering. The techniques for reassembly 
again differ in both what they do and how they do it. On a very general level, 
they are held together by a broad allegiance to the f ini-unlimited: when 
applied to large collections of multidimensional data, all of the techniques 
discussed in this book allow for almost endless recombination. Order is no 
longer a stable structure but dissolves into instances of ordering that generate 
perspectives on the data items under scrutiny and, by extension, on the 
world they capture. Even if we consider that machines consist of ‘human 
gesture f ixed and crystallized in working structures’ (Simondon, 2017, 
p. 18), the ways these perspectives are produced have become increasingly 
nonanthropomorphic, simply because the sheer number of small steps 
even simple techniques entail can no longer be handled by human beings.
Instead of rehashing my chapter outline, I propose to synthesize the 
almost limitless number of techniques and interface arrangements around 
three fundamental ordering gestures. The borders between these gestures 
are not clear-cut, but a broader systematization can inform a perspective 
that sits between the sprawling park of algorithmic techniques and their 
far-reaching idealization as a f ini-unlimited épistémè. This middle ground 
may, in turn, facilitate the conceptual coordination between techniques 
and their application domains.
The f irst gesture is the aggregate description of populations of items. 
Traditionally the core domain of statistics, I have dedicated little space to 
notions such as averages or correlations between variables in a dataset, since 
my main interest was information ordering understood as arrangement of 
items. Certain overall descriptions of datasets did seep in, however. Tf-idf 
and similar weighting procedures use statistical horizons to decide whether 
a given attribute is more or less specif ic and therefore a good signal or ‘clue’. 
And unsupervised machine learning techniques such as PageRank or the 
k-means algorithm briefly mentioned in Chapter 5 seek to provide some 
overall assessment of a dataset, even if their main target is the individual 
item. One could add techniques that I have not discussed at all, for example, 
generative statistical models like Latent Dirichlet Allocation (Blei, Ng, and 
Jordan, 2003), used in text mining to detect ‘topics’ in document collec-
tions. But I mainly mention aggregate description to remind us that the 
information retrieval island is part of a much larger archipelago of concepts 
and techniques that it connects with in myriad ways. One could easily use 
a coordinate index for descriptive purposes, for example, by counting the 
most common terms in a given collection to get an overview of the subjects 
covered. One could also map the topic space with a network representation 
on the basis that two keywords should be linked if they are attributed to 
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the same item. Luhn’s ‘lattice of word-pair linkages’, discussed in Chapter 5, 
applied a similar principle to ‘map’ the content of a document. Much of 
the power of the relational model in organizational settings comes from 
the capacity to summarize, to establish relationships between attributes 
or variables, and to trace change over time. Even if these practices are 
not necessarily ordering in the sense of ranking or classifying items, they 
imply an appreciation of patterns in a population and can thus form the 
basis for decision-making. Once information has been formalized into 
intermediate forms, it can certainly be retrieved in various ways, but it also 
becomes part of a broader ‘avalanche of numbers’ (Hacking, 1990, p. 2) and 
thus susceptible to the analytical gestures and ways of knowing that have 
been developed in statistics since the eighteenth century. And the specif ic 
forms of algorithmic intervention that permeate digital infrastructures and 
interfaces necessarily imply moments of representation where some kind 
of description is established (cf. Hacking, 1983).
The second gesture I want to address, grouping, moves more clearly 
toward direct action on the items under scrutiny. Grouping can be under-
stood as a form of distinction- or border-making that may rely on various 
techniques. Logic-based systems like coordinate indexing and the relational 
model allow for the deliberate specif ication of criteria to make selections 
of items. In fact, any intermediate form that frames items as objects and 
properties can be subjected to such ‘hard’ forms of border-making. We 
can distinguish different logical or set-theoretic formulations, but what 
is important here is that information ordering often implies moments 
where criteria for inclusion and exclusion are set without any kind of 
iterative processing or complex transformation. If a document does not 
have any of the keywords given in a query, it is not retrieved. If an entry 
in a database table does correspond to a variably complex condition, it 
is not part of the result set. If two nodes in a friendship network are not 
connected, they are not able to interact or access each other’s prof iles. 
The pruning of information through clearly def ined criteria is certainly 
not a new practice; but detailed, multidimensional data and powerful 
query languages allow for the expression of exceedingly complex rules 
for drawing such lines. That said, dynamic and interactive settings make 
it easy to change queries on the f ly and, as Luhn and Salton have shown, 
borders can be shifted automatically, for example, by extending a query 
along similarity pathways if the number of results is too small. Further 
into that direction, we encounter techniques like machine learning as 
a means to make probabilistic distinctions in situations where criteria 
cannot be easily specif ied. In the case of supervised machine learning, 
cONcluSION: tOwaRD tEchNIcal cultuRE 315
exemplif ied by the Bayes classif ier, an already labeled training set or 
continuous feedback data can serve as the guiding input a system uses to 
derive the ‘rules’ that def ine borders by linking each feature or attribute 
probabilistically to each class or target variable. Unsupervised machine 
learning techniques, on the other hand, generate classes through iterative 
calculations looking for optimal distributions of differences and similarities. 
While the deliberate forms of selection we f ind in logic-based systems rests 
on some theory or understanding of the underlying criteria or process, these 
forms of inductive classif ication focus on desired outcomes and delegate 
the generation of the selection mechanism to the algorithmic process. In 
the end, grouping is a gesture that can be seen in descriptive terms but 
often prepares differential treatment: certain documents are retrieved, 
certain emails are discarded as spam, certain users are held at the border, 
certain applicants are invited for an interview, certain ads are shown to 
certain user groups, and so forth. Depending on how information ordering 
is embedded in bureaucratic or technical systems, grouping can inform 
decision-making processes or automate them entirely.
The third gesture is attribution and involves the assignment of a rank 
or numerical value to items or relationships. This could, for example, be a 
calculation of relevance numbers for documents in a collection in relation 
to a specif ic query. It could concern the degree of similarity between two 
documents. It could also refer to the attribution of an authority measure like 
PageRank to each node in a social, citation, or hyperlink network. It could 
simply mean putting a list in alphabetical order or along some numerical 
variable. A typical output would be a ranked list that establishes a specif ic 
sequence. But it could also mean positioning on a numerical scale. The 
frontier between attribution and different forms of grouping is clearly porose, 
in particular from a technical perspective, not only because classes could be 
based on numerical intervals, but also because probabilistic classif ication 
can be seen as a multidimensional attribution process where each item 
receives a relevance number for each class and ends up receiving the label of 
the class with the highest value. Numerical cutoffs constitute clear instances 
where deliberate design choices shape algorithmic behavior and the decision 
to ignore the lowest frequency words in a document collection, to divide 
search results into pages of ten, to flag content as copyright infringement or 
terrorist propaganda above a certain detection threshold, or to deny credit 
or parole to people receiving a certain probability assessment shows how 
attribution can be used to set hard group boundaries. Document search is 
traditionally a combination of grouping and ranking. However, distinguish-
ing the two gestures serves as a reminder that the particular operational 
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embedding of techniques is far from irrelevant, that the same outputs for 
an algorithmic process can be arranged into decisions in various ways.
These three gestures and the many ways they are implemented and 
combined in actual technical systems can work on individuals, populations, 
and anything in between, making scale a factor that can be manipulated 
freely. And one could add other gestures to the list. Although I have not 
specif ically talked about forecasting in this book, it is clearly relevant. 
Techniques concerned with prediction over time indeed point toward 
their own intermediate forms, such as time-series data. But description, 
grouping, and attribution are already gestures concerned with ‘the future’ 
if orchestrated in specif ic ways. Techniques necessarily work on the basis of 
available data, and in a statistical context the term ‘prediction’ merely signals 
that some inference is being made. This ambiguity shows how techniques, 
understood as computational transformations, do not necessarily map neatly 
onto ordering gestures, highlighting the diff iculty of aligning technical 
operation with common cultural categories.
The fuzziness of my taxonomy of gestures is also an effect of the great 
variability, malleability, and diversity in application domains information 
ordering has come to know. If we uphold the parallel between technicity 
and language as two means of expression, the identif ication of basic ‘speech 
acts’ of information ordering can hardly capture the complex realities of 
local arrangements. What broadly runs through the different techniques, 
however, are forms of apprehension or formalization that frame the world 
as a series of atomized items defined by loose properties or relationships. 
Instead of placing them into an a priori system of order, they are kept in 
an intermediate state: already captured and transformed, but suff iciently 
mobile to support dynamic and multifaceted forms of reassembly, operations 
on differences and similarities that become descriptions, groupings, and 
attributions that can then be pushed back into the domains they cover.
Operational Epistemology
While the purpose of this book was not to funnel the jagged terrain of 
algorithmic techniques into broad idealizations, both Simondon’s framing 
of technology as mode of existence and the cultural techniques tradition 
suggest that technological change can have profound effects on the makeup 
of human reality. If we paraphrase Siegert (2013, p. 57) and argue that order 
as such does not exist independently of ordering techniques, we must expect 
the developments I have examined over the last chapters to have far-reaching 
consequences. The following passage from The Order of Things hints at the 
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deeper repercussions information orderings’ operational epistemology 
may carry:
Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given in things as their 
inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront 
one another, and also that which has no existence except in the grid 
created by a view, an attention, a language; and it is only in the blank 
spaces of this grid that order manifests itself in depth as though already 
there, waiting in silence for the moment of its expression. (Foucault, 2005, 
p. xxi, translation amended)
Leaving the obvious Kantian undertones (cf. Djaballah, 2008) aside, Fou-
cault’s point, here, is to argue that any épistémè or discursive formation 
carries a view, attention, and language containing certain preconceptions 
concerning the ‘inner law’ of things. If we substitute the more idealistic 
notion of ‘view’ with that of ‘technique’, we can indeed ask how algorithmic 
information ordering makes the world ‘manifest itself’ in broader terms. The 
question has been asked many times in other areas, for example, around 
statistics. The common saying that ‘correlation does not imply causation’ 
expresses skepticism about the statistical method, but also confidence in 
a world operating according to causal principles. Causes exist, the saying 
claims implicitly, even if statistics may not suff ice to uncover them. But, 
as Hacking (1990) argues, for statisticians as illustrious as Karl Pearson 
himself, correlation may well have ‘destroyed causes’ (p. 188) and not just 
our means to observe them. Conceptions of reality are at stake in debates 
concerning method and technique. Box’s famous assertion that ‘all models 
are wrong but some are useful’1 can be read as a pragmatic response, where 
the ‘whole truth’ is no longer to be had, but good approximations can still 
yield advantageous results in practical applications.
Similar debates occur in and around computing. In his rebuttal of Chom-
sky, Norvig not only puts forward the ‘engineering success’ of statistical 
machine translation but argues that ‘[m]any phenomena in science are 
stochastic’ (Norvig, 2015, n.p.), that is, random. This is clearly an assessment 
of the nature of reality itself, and one that evokes the much longer ‘erosion 
of determinism’ that Hacking (1990) links to the emergence of statistics in 
the nineteenth century. Extreme forms of computationalism, like Stephen 
1 Followed by this longer explanation: ‘Now it would be very remarkable if any system existing 
in the real world could be exactly represented by any simple model. However, cunningly chosen 
parsimonious models often do provide remarkably useful approximations’ (Box, 1979, p. 205).
318 ENGINES OF ORDER
Wolfram’s (2002) principle of ‘computational equivalence’, which holds 
that ‘any process whatsoever can be viewed as a computation’ (p. 716), 
are examples of the blurring between technique and ontology. And I have 
already mentioned the work of Mirowski and Nik-Khah (2017), who argue 
that the neoclassical idea that ‘truth is the output of the greatest information 
processor known to humankind – namely, The Market’ (p. 7) could not have 
been envisaged without the computer and the associated understanding of 
information as computable resource.
Contemporary life in economically developed societies is indeed organized 
around digital devices and environments that grammatize, formalize, and 
capture activities, yielding masses of granular data in the process. This has the 
practical effect that the world is increasingly revealed through computational 
methods combing through these data troves. If, as Burrows (2009) argues, 
social ‘associations and interactions are now not only mediated by software 
and code, they are becoming constituted by it’ (p. 488), one result is an overflow 
of data as an obvious resource to draw on, feeding a powerful drive toward 
machinic modes of analysis and action. Computerization has become a self-
reinforcing process where data generated by some kind of machine require 
other machines to make sense of them. Much like the increase in documentary 
production – f irst in libraries, information centers, and bureaucracies and 
then on the web – has fueled the ‘information overload’ narrative, paving the 
way for algorithmic information ordering, the explosive production of data in 
almost every domain makes broad swaths of the world appear as intrinsically 
‘multifaceted’ (Weinberger, 2008, p. 82) and ‘too big to know’ (Weinberger, 
2012), continuously expanding the utility and allure of techniques that are 
designed to combine ‘many small and individually ambiguous clues’ (Spärck 
Jones, 1999, p. 277f.) into useful descriptions and decisions.
This feeds directly into Floridi’s assessment that our ever-expanding 
‘infosphere’ has the epistemological effect that ‘the world itself […] will be 
increasingly understood informationally’ (Floridi, 2014, p. 50). Techniques 
and experiences associated with computing trickle into the ‘view, attention, 
and language’ of our time. We f ind an interesting parallel in Foucault’s 
later work on the art of governing, where the emergence of the problem of 
the population (Foucault, 2009, p. 29ff.) mirrors the shift from the classic 
to the modern épistémè. Through the study of epidemics and spirals in 
economic production, in particular the regular nutrition shortages during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth century, mercantilist theorizations of the 
state modeled on the household appeared as no longer viable. The notion of 
‘population’ consequently emerged as a conceptual entity with a specif icity 
of its own, that is, with its own irreducible laws, regularities, and forces. 
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Foucault attributes this ‘discovery’ of the population to physiocrats like 
Quesnay and Turgot but also singles out the nascent discipline of statistics as 
crucial to the conceptualization of the newly identif ied entity: the modes of 
aggregate description and analysis that statistics provides make the popula-
tions’ particular character visible and amendable to scientif ic investigation.
While the term ‘population’ remains with us in statistical language to 
designate any set of items or cases, what increasingly separates us from the 
modern épistémè is a declining belief that there are irreducible ‘social forces’ 
driving history in the making. We f ind clear indications of such a shift in 
the social sciences. In Latour’s (2005) full-f ledged attack on the very idea 
of ‘social force’ – appropriately named Reassembling the Social – he writes 
that the ‘“social” is not some glue that could f ix everything including what 
the other glues cannot f ix; it is what is glued together by many other types 
of connectors’ (p. 5). The social, in this reading, is seen ‘not as a special 
domain, a specif ic realm, or a particular sort of thing, but only as a very 
peculiar movement of re-association and reassembling’ (p. 5). Society is 
no longer a specif ic sphere characterized by specif ic forces, but rather the 
outcome of networks connecting ‘heterogeneous elements’, ‘actors’, or ‘atoms’ 
(p. 217). It is not surprising that such a perspective would be interested in the 
f ini-unlimited possibilities of information ordering, where computation can 
do much more than describe coherent wholes. The goal is no longer to ‘go 
from the particular to the general, but from particular to more particulars’ 
(Latour et al., 2012, p. 599) by ‘aggregating and disaggregating according to 
different variables’ (p. 607). Methodology and ontology once again entwine:
‘Specif ic’ and ‘general’, ‘individual’ and ‘collective’, ‘actor’ and ‘system’ 
are not essential realities but provisional terms that depend rather on 
the ease with which it is possible to navigate through prof iles. (Latour 
et al., 2012, p. 593)
Is there a parallel between the discovery of the population through the 
lens of statistical aggregation and its conceptual dissolution through ‘the 
practical experience of navigating through data sets’ (Latour et al., 2012, 
p. 602)? The analytical expressivity and plasticity that computational tools 
for data analysis confer is certainly highly suggestive. Is this the end of one 
way of ‘thinking’, of one view, attention, and language, and the beginning 
of another? The cultural techniques perspective cautions against hasty 
periodization but leaves little doubt that transformations in dominant 
techniques will have critical consequences, in particular if we consider 
Lash’s (2006) argument that the information paradigm heralds a ‘collapse 
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of ontology and epistemology’ where ‘modes of knowing are increasingly 
also modes of being’ (p. 581). New épistémè or not, the world changes in front 
of our eyes and everywhere we look, we f ind computers.
Engines of Order
These more speculative epistemological considerations are important in 
their own right, but I have situated my inquiry in the particular technicities 
of software and software-making, which endow algorithmic information 
ordering with a particular kind of performativity. Software allows for 
the formulation of techniques that could not exist without the iterative 
capacities of computing machinery. And software def ines the digital en-
vironments where information ordering serves as a means of production 
for the generation of economic value, as a mechanism for ‘programmed 
coordination’ (Bratton, 2015, p. 41), and – in extremis – as a technology of 
power, that is, a way to ‘conduct conducts’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 186). While 
Simondon suggests that we think of technical evolution as a combination 
of invention and concretization that is largely independent from economic 
or social considerations (cf. Bontems, 2009), he writes at a time where the 
‘coating’ of consumer capitalism is still thin and the endless proliferation of 
small variations drawing on the same technicities is not yet the dominant 
form of technical creation. He also writes long before pervasive online 
infrastructures allow for much tighter integration between design, deploy-
ment, and empirical evaluation, transforming the process of technical 
creation – at least in certain areas – into an ongoing practice that never 
releases anything like a ‘f inal’ product. I certainly kept with the idea that 
the objective dimension of technicity, which concerns the accumulation 
of new technical schemas, is not a mere manifestation of external forces, 
but I also argued that technical creation carries deeply into the objectal, 
for example, when business logics are modeled with standard components. 
Due to its artisanal character, software remains open to context, which 
means that the specif ic ways operation is arranged can reflect social and 
cultural embeddings to a high degree. The orchestration of techniques into 
a technical object or ‘product’ is crucial.
Orchestration
Frozen into ready-to-hand code modules or programmed from scratch, 
algorithmic ordering techniques can be arranged and combined in countless 
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ways. Many software packages will implement more than one ordering 
gesture: any relational database management system, for example, already 
incorporates features for description, grouping, and attribution. A single 
library like the Natural Language Toolkit for Python will provide access to 
tens or hundreds of techniques that can be integrated into larger programs. 
Google Search combines an information retrieval mechanism scoring some 
query-related form of relevance with a network algorithm trying to express 
a notion of authority and a learning system that relies on user feedback 
for optimization. And Google Search incorporates many other instances 
of technicity, from web crawlers to data center architectures and device-
specif ic user interfaces. The actual process of ordering concrete items in 
concrete task settings is never just the ‘application’ of a singular algorithmic 
technique to some disembodied dataset. It is the connection between a 
particular domain of practice, particular forms of capture, particular data 
representations, particular implementations of particular techniques, and 
particular dispositions of outputs that may directly reach back into the 
realities data were initially gleaned from. Technical individuals or ensembles 
necessarily imply specif ic orchestrations of disparate elements.
Consider the following example: A researcher working with social media 
data may want to analyze some form of online interaction, for example, 
‘mentioning’ on Twitter. Her dataset is based on a keyword search submit-
ted to a particular web API that shapes data in certain ways and imposes 
certain access limits. The data was collected with the help of a software 
package such as DMI-TCAT (Borra and Rieder, 2014), which adds its own 
idiosyncrasies to the chain when the collected data is parsed to represent 
users and their interactions as a network f ile. The researcher opens the f ile 
in a graph analysis program like Gephi (Bastian, Heymann, and Jacomy, 
2009) to examine and visualize its contents. Since she is interested in social 
hierarchies and thematic authority, she applies Gephi’s implementation of 
PageRank (leaving α at the default level of 0.85), which adds a variable to each 
node. She uses the new variable to color nodes in a network visualization, a 
form of output that relies not only on the full battery of technicity behind 
contemporary GUI-based software and on the specif ic forms and functions 
Gephi provides, but also on algorithmic techniques for transforming the 
multidimensional graph into a two-dimensional point-and-line diagram 
that reveals some aspect of its structure. This orchestration of PageRank as 
part of a research method is obviously very different from the algorithm’s 
integration into the vast technical ensemble we encounter when searching 
on google.com, but even this rather contained practice is fully caught up in 
large networks of operation that afford and require many choices to be made.
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This is one of several reasons why computing cannot be suff iciently 
described as ‘applied logic’ and subfields like machine learning are not simply 
‘applied statistics’. Algorithmic techniques, seen as elements, def ine the 
objective possibilities for software behavior but do not determine the objectal 
variations emerging trough orchestration into individuals and ensembles 
in concrete settings. The term ‘applied’ hides the myriad connections and 
decisions that inevitably emerge, and it sterilizes the ‘qualculative’ (Cochoy, 
2008) injunction of judgment into calculation. The notion of algorithmic 
technique and its characterization as a technical element is indeed de-
signed to battle the tendency to singularize ‘algorithms’ into a monolithic 
cultural form, trivializing the variability, complexity, and depth of modern 
technology. As Bogost (2015) plainly, states, ‘[c]oncepts like “algorithm” have 
become sloppy shorthands, slang terms for the act of mistaking multipart 
complex systems for simple, singular ones’ (n.p.), further cementing us in 
a culture that has little patience for the technical principles informing the 
infrastructures and environments that constitute our real.
If there are indeed so many possibilities for orchestration and design and 
so many choices to be made, how can we better understand the choices that 
are being made? As I have argued, a system’s makeup is tied to its purpose and 
since information ordering has become part of many different application 
domains, a large variety of purposes inform concrete arrangements. Starting 
from the traditional information retrieval setup, where a searcher tries to 
extract references or documents from a collection, we can see more clearly 
where things have been heading. Bearing in mind Shera’s idea, echoed f ive 
decades later by commentators like Weinberger,2 that future classif ications 
of knowledge would imply ‘widely varying schematisms, each constructed 
for a specif ic purpose […] in accordance with a particular point of view or 
philosophic orientation’ (Shera, 1952, p. 17), one could indeed argue that local 
schematisms have become the norm as information ordering has moved 
beyond public libraries. Coordinate indexing made it easy to formulate 
site-specific vocabularies, possibly taken from the data themselves. This basic 
setup has since widened from the familiar bibliographic mission to ‘connect 
the right information with the right users at the right time’ to forms of data 
processing that ‘help users analyze and digest information and facilitate 
decision making’ (Aggarwal and Zhai, 2012, p. 2). A wide variety of datasets 
now regularly meets an equally broad diversity of algorithmic techniques. 
2 Referring to mapmakers’ decisions what to include and exclude, Weinberger argues: ‘The 
line between the implicit and the explicit isn’t drawn by the intellect. It’s drawn by purpose 
and thus by what matters to us’ (Weinberger, 2008, p. 158).
cONcluSION: tOwaRD tEchNIcal cultuRE 323
While ‘data’ used to mean ‘text documents’ and ordering was mainly retrieval, 
we now see a much wider range of datafied domains and a much larger set 
of techniques that inform different gestures at the level of the interface. 
Orchestrations into concrete application arrangements vary heavily. Although 
Bowker’s (2005) call to build databases and information systems with ‘a view 
to designing for maximum flexibility and allowing as much as possible for 
an emergent polyphony and polychrony’ (p. 184) has been largely realized 
if we consider the masses of atomized data collected in relational databases 
and elsewhere, access to the facilities for reassembly, which define the actual 
flexibility available to end-user, is a different matter entirely.
Expert users now have impressive tools for retrieval and analysis at their 
f ingertips, boosting their capacity to multiply analytical perspectives at 
will, but the instances of information ordering integrated into online en-
vironments and platforms point in a different direction. Starting from the 
introduction of statistical ranking, based on frequency or specificity of terms, 
there has been a tendency to reduce expressivity at the query level, or at least 
to add modes of processing that are not user amendable. Google’s dominant 
web search engine, for example, continues to provide considerable end-user 
expressivity through free-form queries, some basic syntactic possibilities, 
and a (small) set of accessible parameters, but it also relies on a large number 
of intractable techniques that affect the result set and sequence. Authority-
based document scoring, learning through feedback, personalization, and 
localization imply moments of ordering that are neither clearly identif iable, 
nor easily influenced from the outside. If we look at recommender systems 
or other instances of automatic modulation, there is even less explicit user 
input and influence. The canonical application example for machine learning, 
spam f iltering, initially relied on explicit, proactive labeling by users and 
sometimes mail clients even provided access to the derived model. But 
much of this work has been moved into the server architectures of email 
providers, who employ a whole battery of techniques in the background. The 
orchestration of algorithmic techniques in contemporary infrastructures is 
increasingly arranged around forms of implicit feedback that basically take 
user behavior as revealed preference, that is, as a stand-in for an interest or 
desire previously expressed through a query or other explicit gesture. Who 
is the real user of information ordering in these contexts?
Digital Capitalism
The capacity to orchestrate technical elements around different application 
logics, to funnel digital items interchangeably into intermediate forms, and 
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to connect interfaces to algorithmic ordering in various ways means that 
software has become an important means of production for generating 
economic value in the massive, marked-based interaction infrastructures 
discussed at the beginning of this book. While people continue to search 
for contents or pieces of information, relying on algorithmic techniques 
to retrieve or analyze, human beings and their practices have themselves 
become ‘documents like any other’ (Ertzscheid, 2009), disassembled into 
databases and reassembled at will. The capacity to examine and order a 
datafied ‘social’ in myriad ways fascinates not only academic researchers but 
also commercial and governmental users that have the resources to exploit 
these data much more thoroughly to further their operational goals. In 1949, 
Heidegger (1977) analyzed technology as a mode of ‘revealing’ (Entbergen) 
and claimed that the essence of modern technology consisted in revealing 
nature exclusively as a resource, as a stock of energy and raw material. He 
claimed that ‘[u]nlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching 
about are ways of revealing’ (p. 16). While I have tried to argue that there 
is no intrinsic or necessary connection between computing and the logic 
of Gestell, it is hard to ignore how computerization and dataf ication have 
turned human life into a resource that can be arranged and exploited in 
various ways, from aggregations of the ‘free labour’ (Terranova, 2004) of 
Internet users into knowledge products to the general framing of practice 
and experience ‘as free raw material for translation into behavioral data’ 
that generates ‘a proprietary behavioral surplus’ (Zuboff, 2019, p. 8). One 
cannot talk about software-making without naming the economic order 
it is embedded in. An analysis of software as technology of power requires 
constant attention to both objective and objectal dimensions and Zuboff’s 
(2019) recent take on ‘surveillance capitalism’ indeed traces a particularly 
scathing trajectory into the ‘fusion of digital capabilities and capitalist 
ambitions’ (p. 27).
In this context, the capacity for constant empirical adaptation to feedback 
signals certainly stands out: the automation of interested readings of reality 
opens various directions for interested forms of optimization that range 
from personalization to iterative product development via A/B/N testing. 
Integrated digital infrastructures facilitate the ‘transition to market-based 
relationships’ (Agre, 1994, p. 120) where algorithmic information ordering 
serves as coordination mechanism, but they also affect production processes 
overall, tying the quest for economic value ever more closely to algorithmic 
articulations of data streams. Some of these articulations may indeed take 
the form of automated optimization through machine learning, but the 
logistical functions we encountered around the card catalog and the role 
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of the relational model as a broad instrument for all kinds of ‘business 
intelligence’ practices should remind us that the different gestures for 
description and ordering can be applied to value chains in a variety of ways. 
Algorithmic techniques affect existing products and services, inform the 
creation of entirely new product categories, such as self-driving cars or voice 
assistants, and play various roles in the managerial quest for competitive 
advantage.
In line with Simondon’s insistence that technical evolution is mainly 
driven by intrinsic factors, I have been hesitant to use concepts like ideology 
to explain how algorithmic techniques are invented, even if my account 
included ‘culturalist’ factors such as the pessimism about human reason 
(Heyck, 2012, p. 100) and the alleged pragmatism of individuals and insti-
tutions subscribing to accounting realism (Desrosières, 2001). Whether 
one emphasizes technicity or ideology, it is clear that computing has been 
deeply caught up in the emergence of what Thrift (2005) calls ‘knowing 
capitalism’, which revolves around forms of analysis, modulation, and 
commodif ication of everyday life that are intrinsically tied to software as 
‘analytical procedures’, ‘templates for decision-making’, and a ‘key tech-
nology of government for both the state and commerce’ (p. 172). While 
some readers may have hoped for more attention given to the cultural and 
ideological connotations of information ordering, Thrift’s emphasis on the 
constitutional capacities of software leaves room for a radical argument: 
What if the arrow of causality, to put it simply, points from technicity to 
ideology and not the other way around? If techniques are indeed ‘always 
older than the concepts that are generated from them’ (Macho, 2003, p. 179), 
we may have to reconsider how we investigate and describe the formation 
of culture. Is Wiener’s idea of feedback a ‘concept’ with serious substance 
before it gets implemented in physical machinery? Is the transgression of 
ontological domains Thrift (2005, p. 13) ascribes to cybernetics an actual 
‘idea’ before concrete techniques for the description and, crucially, the 
mechanical production of teleological behavior are developed? Is the advent 
of Rodgers’s (2011) ‘age of fracture’ f irst and foremost a transformation in 
modes of thinking or is it, on the contrary, an effect of techniques based on 
analytical disassembly and synthetic reassembly? Does digital capitalism 
create a ‘favorable environment’ or a ‘demand’ for information ordering or 
should we see phenomena like information overload and the extension of 
market forms as consequences of computerization that create new economic 
opportunities?
Even if we do not install the computer as the root cause for epistemological 
perspectivism and knowing capitalism, we can clearly see how algorithmic 
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techniques give concrete operational meaning to notions like modulation, 
optimization, and emergent coordination. Whether we consider ‘ideas’ or 
‘techniques’ to come f irst, or subscribe, as I would suggest, to a relational 
perspective that emphasizes contingent composition over idealization, there 
are clearly aff inities, resemblance, and synergies between the ‘spirit’ of 
contemporary capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005) and the technical 
schemas discussed over the last chapters.
Orchestration binds objective technical potential into objectal relations 
and thus into social, economic, or political arrangements, transforming them 
in the process. The relational model, for example, is indeed a highly flexible 
means to organize information in such a way that it can be queried and 
ordered at will, but its broad potential for epistemic pluralism is constrained 
in actual databases, f irst by the chosen data model and then by the larger 
processes and practices it connects with. The human subject registered in 
such a database would hardly care whether their bureaucratic existence 
is governed by a navigational or a relational database, but for the designer 
and manager, the compositional qualities of a well-normalized database 
provide the means to interrogate, aggregate, discover, and optimize. The 
structural openness of software is certainly an opportunity for critical 
experimentation, but also a means to align digital tools and infrastructures 
with operational objectives and managerial practices. My emphasis on 
expression, plasticity, and variation in technical creation may seem to 
contradict a perspective sensitive to larger societal power relations and 
modes of economic organization. I have indeed argued that software, due 
to its modular character and effortless reproducibility, remains linked to 
artisanal forms of production, resulting in artifacts that have a high degree 
of ‘internal contingency’ and leave ‘the path open for new possibilities’ 
(Simondon, 2017, p. 29). But expression in the medium of function concerns, 
f irst and foremost, those who make software. Commentators often associate 
the creative aspects of software-making with phenomena like free and 
open-source software, artistic experimentation, civic technology, or even 
startup culture. Experimental design and code sprints show how quickly 
impressive and innovative pieces of software can be stitched together out of 
rich layers of abstracted and modularized function. While these examples 
are relevant, it should be clear that plasticity is no less available to (large) 
companies or governmental entities, even if more restrictive management 
structures may well reduce some of its spontaneity.
Building on Moor’s (1978) relational demarcation between hardware and 
software, where the latter is ‘those programs […] which contain instructions 
the person can change’ (p. 215) and ‘[w]hat is considered hardware by one 
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person can be regarded as software by another’ (p. 216), I have argued that the 
capacity to build is largely a question of resources. Software allows a single 
developer to do astonishing things, but a company with many competent 
employees, sizable server farms, robust technical foundations, and lots of 
user data can do much more. The means of production necessary to build 
an online platform capable of hosting thousands of interactions per second 
are daunting. This is the main reason I approached algorithmic techniques 
in close connection with the concept of ‘engine’. The latter only emerges 
in its full sense when a program grows into an infrastructure for human 
practice, when an element integrates into a technical individual or ensemble 
and, through it, becomes ‘an active force transforming its environment, not 
a camera passively recording it’ (MacKenzie, 2006, p. 12). In this moment, 
the plasticity of software is fully caught up in the exercise of power, which 
‘is an ensemble of actions on possible actions: it operates on the f ield of 
possibility where the behavior of acting subjects is inscribed: it incites, it 
induces, it diverts, it makes easier or more diff icult, it broadens or limits, it 
renders more or less probable; in the most extreme, it constrains or prevents 
absolutely’ (Foucault, 1982, p. 789, translation amended). PageRank can be 
used by researchers to analyze power relations in interaction networks, but 
as part of Google Search, it affects the navigational practices of billions of 
users and distributes visibility and economic opportunity on a global scale. 
While Morozov (2019) rightfully points out that the ‘behavior modification’ 
at the heart of Zuboff’s surveillance capitalism is only one of many different 
ways capitalism can draw on computing to generate surplus, algorithmic 
techniques most clearly become technologies of power when they begin to 
modulate navigational distances, access to information and resources, or 
groupings that affect the possibilities and probabilities of concrete practice. 
Software-makers design ‘rules of conduct able to be applied to determinate 
situations’ (Thrift, 2005, p. 172) by putting in place forms and functions, 
including the margins of indetermination that allow for articulation and ad-
aptation during use. Information ordering and other algorithmic techniques 
have significantly extended what these rules of conduct can look like, moving 
from static grammars of action to adaptive structures that enable ‘soft’ forms 
of control (cf. Cheney-Lippold, 2011). Online platforms, in particular, act as 
engines of order when algorithmic techniques engage in the programmed 
coordination of large numbers of participants, enabling, capturing, and 
steering interactions in ways that promote specif ic operational goals, in 
particular those of the platform itself. This is what Bratton (2015) means 
when he argues that ‘it is far less important how the machine represents 
a politics than how “politics” physically is that machinic system’ (p. 44).
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How well actors are able to integrate computing into their search 
for prof it and power has already become a central factor for success. 
At the end of 2018, the f ive largest companies in the world, measured 
by market capitalization, are Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, and 
Tencent, with Facebook and Alibaba not far behind. While my foray into 
software-making and algorithmic techniques has focused on technicity, 
it is a mark of contemporary computing that its sprawling reservoirs of 
technique and knowledge have been funneled very successfully into 
business endeavors, to a point where Andreessen’s (2011) assessment 
that ‘software is eating the world’ receives a somewhat darker meaning. 
Looking at these large IT companies, we notice that most of them have 
been engaging in ‘concentric diversif ication’, a business strategy ‘where 
the f irm seeks to move into activities which mesh to some degree with 
the present product line, technological expertise, customer base, or 
distribution channels’ (Thompson and Strickland, 1978, p. 69). Software 
plays a role here. Stucke and Grunes (2016) have convincingly argued that 
both monopolization and expansion into new sectors are supported by 
the cross-market utility of collected data, and I would suggest that the 
generalizability and transferability of algorithmic techniques has similar 
effects. Computerization and dataf ication bring ever more practices into 
the scope of computation, allowing for the application of similar techniques 
to very different task domains. Artif icial intelligence and automation 
are currently the two terms that evoke this process most clearly, and the 
companies that master the computational means of production have good 
chances to extend their domination to new sectors at a brisk pace. Both 
the plasticity of software and the role of purpose or interest in information 
ordering appear quite differently when we move from Latour’s research lab 
to the economic and governmental spheres that rely heavily on computing 
in their core activities.
What we have been witnessing over the last 70 years is the progressive 
emergence of a new ‘technical system’ (Gille, 1986), an expanding sphere of 
interoperability built around computing as core technology that generates 
self-stabilizing synergies and affects social and economic organization more 
generally, pushing for further waves of computerization and datafication in 
the process. Algorithmic information ordering emerges as a central means 
to know and to act in this system, providing advantages to those who master 
its design and application. These developments manifest themselves in 
various ways through many larger and smaller ‘problems’ or ‘issues’, but their 
broader repercussions demand that we interrogate the modes of thinking 
required to develop adequate responses.
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Among Machines
Over the preceding chapters, I have tried to develop a perspective on technic-
ity that is intentionally irreverent with regard to disciplinary conventions. 
Rather than narrate the history of algorithmic information ordering as a 
scientif ic f ield, I have presented the various techniques as technical ideas 
and artifacts that end up in the hands of programmers applying them with 
little regard to where they came from. Information scientists may have 
been appalled with my treatment of their discipline. Why did I not provide 
an overview of the canonical set-theoretic, algebraic, and probabilistic 
models for information retrieval f irst and then walk through each of them 
systematically? Why did I mention the concept of ‘information need’, the 
very foundation of the f ield, only in passing? In the introduction of this book, 
I have argued that I would engage with algorithmic techniques as a software 
developer interested in functional possibilities, not as an information scien-
tist invested in paradigmatic coherence, nor a historian of science retracing 
the emergence of a discipline. The developer who encounters techniques 
through software libraries indeed does not have to care whether a quantified 
list of properties is understood as frequency distribution or feature vector 
as long as the proposed function solves their specif ic problem. As a media 
scholar interested in the ‘levers on “reality”’ (Goody, 1977, p. 109) techniques 
provide, I sought to align myself with a form of technical practice that has 
a pragmatic interest in operation f irst and foremost. This alignment clearly 
did not result in a textbook for programmers but inspired an appropriation 
of algorithmic techniques that followed its own intellectual agenda.
In Turkle and Papert’s (1990) classic study on ‘styles and voices within 
the computer culture’ the authors observe an ‘epistemological pluralism’ 
when groups of students begin to program, a diversity of approaches that 
is progressively funneled into a (gendered) ‘canonical style’ based on for-
malization, which is then imposed as the correct and superior way of doing 
things. One of the goals of this book was to f ind a form of engagement with 
technicity that not only emphasizes variation and pluralism but actively 
promotes a perspective that does not bind itself to the epistemological 
horizon of the computing disciplines while remaining close to the technical 
substances at hand. I have tried to demarcate a level of analysis that is 
suff iciently technical to capture the core of the discussed techniques and 
suff iciently anchored in a media theoretical perspective to connect these 
technicities to broader and more speculative questions concerning cultural 
ramifications and signif icance. This approach has largely been inspired by 
Simondon’s mechanology and the cultural techniques tradition, which both 
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eschew foundationalist idealizations and instead focus on operation and 
on the contingency and promiscuity of ontic coupling. The present state of 
technicity, in this perspective, is the result of sedimentation and layering, of 
continuous contingent construction and widening of functional possibilities 
rather than the effect of straightforward scientif ic progress or of singular 
incursions that determine what comes afterwards.
But the desire to break through the ‘canonical style’ of presenting and 
discussing technical matters is not simply a question of intellectual coquet-
terie. Running through this project is the question of how to move beyond 
the alienation that characterizes a technological society marked by an 
‘ignorance or resentment’ of the machine, by ‘non-knowledge of its nature 
and its essence’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 15f.). One could indeed argue that the 
objective dimension of technology has been handed over to specialized 
disciplines and only its objectal integration f igures as subject of larger social 
debates. The often-lamented ‘autonomy’ of technology can then be seen as 
a consequence of its reduction to some utility or ‘social effect’. Simondon 
argued that solving the problem of alienation would require reconciliation 
between ‘culture’ and ‘technology’, including the recognition that technical 
objects are expressions that have meaning independent of their use. A 
‘technical culture’ or ‘technical wisdom’ (Simondon, 2017, p. 159) would 
be sensitive to technicity in a way that is not limited to the hic et nunc of 
technical work but attuned to its historical and relational becoming. To 
create such an awareness is one of the tasks of mechanology. Debates about 
‘digital skills’ and programming courses for humanities scholars certainly 
have their place, but my hope was to sketch a mechanological approach to 
software that mobilizes its own view, attention, and language. My relatively 
gentle entrance into the meandering roads of algorithmic information 
ordering discussed rather simple operations on words in documents and 
indexes, basic elements of Boolean logic, forms of counting and comparing, 
some calculations on networks, and the general setup of feedback going into 
a learning machine. Yes, one could go much deeper into these techniques 
and I have certainly glossed over many details and nuances. But these are 
nonetheless the broad elements that a system as complex as Google Search 
is made of.
I have taken care not to present a singular line through information 
retrieval, machine learning, and network algorithms, but to conceive 
techniques and their variations as elements, as building blocks of concrete 
systems. A document search engine may build on manually created indexes, 
implement collaborative tagging, or extract word frequencies from text 
contents, taking into account document structure, word co-occurrence, 
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or formatting. It could use a term-weighting scheme like tf-idf to add dis-
criminatory power. It could model a query language using Boolean or more 
intricate parameters, or it could sway into another direction and attempt to 
map the document space using something like PageRank or even a clustering 
technique that provides an overview to users rather than a ranking. The 
system could incorporate a feedback loop, use personalization, take into 
account location, device type, or time of day as means to differentiate. And 
each one of these things could be done in many different ways. To recognize 
these spaces of variation and choice is startling, because it means that 
technologies like computing or even algorithmic information ordering can-
not be totalized into a singular logic, as convenient as that would be. There 
are myriad systems composed of disparate elements performing myriad 
tasks in myriad settings. But in early 2019, popular media and scholarly 
publications are full of anxieties and far-reaching proclamations about 
‘algorithms’, including worries concerning their power, their effects, their 
opacity, their nonaccountability, their biases, their ideologies. Over the 
f inal pages of this book I want to come back to this problem space through 
the lens of the preceding chapters, not to formulate a short-term action 
plan, but to think more broadly about technical culture and the role of the 
humanities in societies where life is increasingly lived ‘among machines’ 
(Simondon, 2017, p. 12).
There have certainly been promising efforts to ‘study the algorithm’ (Lazer 
et al., 2014, p. 1205). Journalists have adapted their ‘traditional watchdog-
ging [to] algorithmic accountability reporting’ (Diakopoulos, 2015) and 
use reverse engineering techniques to reconstruct decision procedures, 
for example, those involved in adaptive pricing on web shops. Sandvig 
and colleagues (2014) have proposed a classif ication of different empirical 
approaches, including code auditing, interface scraping, or crowdsourced 
collection of outputs. Due to various legal, economic, and technical fac-
tors, these approaches have important limitations (Ananny and Crawford, 
2017), one of them stemming from the recognition that actual outcomes 
are distributed accomplishments that include multilayered technicities, 
disparate use practices, and large, complex data streams (Rieder et al., 2018). 
But, as Manovich points out, another part of the conundrum concerns the 
adequate level and detail of technical description:
As more and more of our cultural experiences, social interactions, and 
decision making are governed by large-scale software systems, the ability 
of nonexperts to discuss how these systems work becomes crucial. If we 
reduce each complex system to a one-page description of its algorithm, 
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will we capture enough of software behavior? Or will the nuances of 
particular decisions made by software in every particular case be lost? 
(Manovich, 2013a, n.p.)
What constitutes ‘enough’ will of course depend on the system under scru-
tiny, but any answer will require at least a somewhat robust understanding 
of algorithmic techniques and systems design. The empirical approaches 
currently being proposed to make sense of actual working systems crucially 
depend on our capacity to create adequate conceptual representations 
of the objects under scrutiny. We cannot study the makeup of a techni-
cal system if we lack the capacity to imagine how such a system could be 
constructed. Which techniques could have been used and how could they 
have been adapted and combined? What was the range of choices that had 
to be made? My attempt to highlight plasticity and variation served this 
very goal; comparing PageRank with HITS and looking at the α parameter 
were just two ways of probing, but one could easily multiply such attempts 
at counterfactual thinking, moving down into crawling and indexing or 
up to the level of the interface. If there is any hope of ever gaining some-
thing resembling a suff icient understanding of things like Google Search, 
Facebook’s News Feed, or much more contained systems used in hiring, 
credit assessment, or criminal justice, there needs to be a real vocabulary 
of technical possibility, which means knowledge of elements and their 
potential arrangements. Only a perspective that recognizes the moments of 
plasticity and choice developers – and by extension the organizations they 
report to – regularly face will be able to articulate the political dimension 
of technology.
The consolidation of efforts to detect, for example, unacceptable forms of 
discrimination and to create accountability for algorithmic decision-making 
are indeed breaking necessary new ground, and there is much to learn 
from such attempts to study concrete empirical objects. It is particularly 
encouraging that approaches currently being developed and tested often 
focus on entire systems and their specif ic embeddings. Attention is paid 
to data inputs, to the technical dimension of processing and ordering, 
and to the generation, presentation, and application of outputs, including, 
for example, discussions of cutoff points that transform probabilistic as-
sessments into binary classif ications. Intellectual investment in making 
algorithmic techniques more broadly intelligible can help deepen these 
efforts not only in terms of general technical literacy, but more specif ically 
when it comes to the questions to ask and the possibilities to consider. A 
sense of technicity, a ‘knowing one’s way in something’ (sichauskennen) to 
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use Heidegger’s (1989, p. 14) term, is necessary to overcome the persistent rift 
between ‘technical’ and ‘social’ approaches. Broader cultural understand-
ing of algorithmic techniques in both objective and objectal terms would 
allow for a deeper appreciation of the fundamental operationality specif ic 
technical trajectories are introducing into the fabric of life.
As computing continues to penetrate into human practice, the border 
with other domains crumbles. Are real-time auction models, like the one 
Google uses to sell ad space, or pricing mechanisms, like Uber’s surge pricing, 
applications of economic theory or a particular kind of ‘computer solution’ 
(Muniesa, 2011)? Such distinctions look increasingly undecidable as software 
becomes the preferred mode of expression for operational concepts and 
ideas. This means that there is dire need for interpretations that either 
bring these techniques back into more familiar territory or help us move 
closer to their vernaculars. Recent work by scholars like Burrell (2016) and 
Mackenzie (2015, 2017a) has indeed begun to flesh out ways to analyze and 
describe how specific techniques ‘think’, that is, how they construct complex 
forms of ‘cognitive’ behavior out of iterative executions of small steps or 
calculations. In addition to providing a framework for an understanding 
of software-making as the assembly of techniques into larger systems, this 
book sought to make its own contribution to these efforts.
On a broad level, describing the forms of cognition algorithmic techniques 
instantiate as (variably) ‘nonanthropomorphic’ means recognizing that a 
statistical bias is something very different than the prejudice or partiality 
the term implies when applied to humans, even when it has similar outcomes 
or effects. The former demands a different critique and different remedies, 
which requires that we develop forms of moral and political reasoning 
capable of operating within the modes of ordering algorithmic techniques 
deploy. And these modes may well remain strange to us. Just like Foucault’s 
(1995, p. 36f.) reminder that half-proofs could lead to half-punishments 
in legal proceedings until the Renaissance rings profoundly alien today, 
new forms of normative reasoning may not necessarily appear intuitively 
consistent from the start. It is increasingly clear, for example, that concepts 
like ‘fairness’ do not easily map onto algorithmic techniques, not because 
computers have some inherent limitation, but because fairness is an unstable 
and contested outcome of highly contextualized attempts at balancing social 
trade-offs (cf. Kleinberg et al., 2016). Technological solutions can render moral 
commitments invisible by sinking them into digital tools and infrastructures, 
but they hardly disappear. How competing conceptions of justice prevail 
in contemporary societies may increasingly become a question of design 
and the humanities have the capacity and responsibility to investigate how 
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algorithmic techniques affect how such matters are framed and resolved. 
This must include an interest for the many different practices involved in 
the making of technical artifacts: indeed, if decision-making is relegated 
to design and control practices, the whole lifecycle of a program or service 
becomes relevant for its analysis.
A study of algorithmic techniques is clearly not enough to capture 
the broader infrastructural qualities and the normative thrust technical 
individuals and ensembles exercise when they combine these elements 
into the specif ic forms and functions of working systems. A critical reading 
of PageRank is by no means suff icient for getting a grip on the technical 
makeup of Google Search and the way it orders the web. An analysis of 
Facebook’s News Feed f iltering mechanism cannot account for the service’s 
pervasive role as infrastructure for sociability. Since algorithmic informa-
tion ordering has come to play a pivotal role in these systems, however, it 
requires special attention and can constitute an entry point into broader 
forms of analysis that cover grammatization, value creation, and other 
aspects. The challenge is to connect the objective technical makeup of 
a system to its objectal embedding, using one ‘side’ to shed light on the 
other. In my analysis of PageRank, I have proposed a reinterpretation of the 
functional principles at work that operated in a similar discursive register 
as Google’s ‘voting’ narrative, even if my conclusions were quite different. 
Such reinterpretations take operational mechanisms as crystallized human 
gesture and read them as such. While these readings can take more abstract 
directions, they benefit from localized or at least application-specif ic focus 
since cultural dimensions tend to become clearer when technicity is bound 
into working systems.
Nourished with technical imagination, we would be prepared to probe the 
character of algorithmic techniques more thoroughly, in particular around 
the tensions between technique and application domain. Investigations into 
biases can call attention to certain social effects of machine behavior, but the 
normative thrust of algorithmic techniques is not simply oscillating between 
‘neutrality’ and ‘bias’. Norms and values are often domain-specif ic and 
behavior that is deemed desirable in one area may be considered problematic 
in another. What constitutes a ‘good’ recommendation in the context of a 
music service may produce troubling effects when applied to politically 
salient content: the same capacity to drill deeper and deeper into specialized 
genres may yield hidden gems on Spotify but lay pathways to increasingly 
radicalized political positions on YouTube. Content f iltering optimized for 
user engagement may produce benign results in one kind of context but stir 
violence in another. As Grimmelmann (2009) has argued, the search terms 
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‘Jew’ and ‘gerbil’ do not have the same cultural signif icance and handling 
them with the exact same retrieval and ranking mechanisms is bound to 
produce trouble.
Indeed, in the technical publications I have cited over the last chapters 
and the many more I have consulted during my research, the lack of ‘domain 
theorization’ stands out. Terms like ‘aboutness’ and ‘intuitive basis’, but 
also the recurring use of the qualif ier ‘reasonable’ to justify ad hoc deci-
sions, signal how commonsense and largely unexamined arguments flow 
into algorithmic techniques. There is extensive research going into the 
invention, development, understanding, implementation, and application 
of algorithmic techniques, but even concrete experiments often refrain 
from entering into a more substantial dialogue with the domain space 
they target. The process of formalization into intermediate forms is often 
almost disappointingly lacking in theoretical elaboration. This does not 
mean that all algorithmic techniques eschew more intricate attempts to 
conceptualize the world they operate on, but even PageRank, which explicitly 
draws on decades of research in sociometry and citation analysis, makes 
a clear epistemological break with these disciplinary spaces and prefers 
to emphasize the crude model of a random user clicking on links. Hans 
Peter Luhn, who almost single-handedly invented the f ield of text mining, 
was neither a linguist with a deep interest in the structure of language, 
nor a cybernetician pursuing a computational theory of meaning, but an 
engineer equipped with a mix of capability, curiosity, and the resources 
of IBM. He was someone with ‘sensitivity to technicity’ (Simondon, 2017, 
p. 74) who conveniently worked at the center of a ‘technical system’ (Gille, 
1986) getting ready to begin its march toward domination. He looked at the 
library problem through the lens of that system and mobilized the existing 
reservoirs of knowledge and technique to the fullest, further adding to 
them in the process. My point is that all of this requires surprisingly little 
in terms of belief or ontological labor.
The humanities and social sciences have the capacity to play a more 
proactive role in these settings than merely pointing out the insuff icien-
cies, limitations, and blind spots of computing. Broader conceptual or 
domain-specif ic contributions to technical imaginaries are within the 
realm of possibility and my irreverence to disciplinary conventions indeed 
tried to convey a sense of possibility that is not immediately neutered by 
the forbidding complexity of formal notation and jargon. Making actual 
contributions to invention and adaptation is certainly easier said than done 
but attempts to intensify technical speculation and active engagement 
could draw on existing spheres in the humanities and social sciences where 
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scholars are involved in the making of technical objects. Fields like digital 
methods and the digital humanities should not be afraid to translate their 
own burgeoning technical expertise into ‘critical technical practice’ (Agre, 
1997b) – propositions that go beyond the domain of research methodology 
and drive a ‘widening’ of technical imagination. The work of scholars like 
Johanna Drucker (2011, 2013), for example, is not only suited to complicate 
visual displays of quantitative information in humanistic projects but 
could be extended to the question of how interfaces can show and capture 
nuance, doubt, or the probabilistic assessments that often underlie binary 
outcomes. The recognition that technical work is generally ‘qualculation’, an 
entanglement of calculation and judgment, indeed creates a huge opening 
both for critique and contribution. What kind of domain knowledge could 
be integrated into algorithmic techniques? Which kind of nuances could 
one specify? Are there alternatives to atomization that are not painstaking 
forms of logical description? More generally, can we pick up on Agre’s (1997a) 
critique, which holds that f ields like artif icial intelligence limit, exclude, 
and stifle themselves by requiring that every idea must be ‘proven’ in the 
form of a working system, to build the conditions for more open-ended 
technical conversation and speculation? The contingent and constructive 
accumulation of techniques will not come to an end any time soon and the 
concept of path dependence should remind us that existing trajectories were 
not inevitable at one point in time and new directions can be still forged, 
as diff icult as that may be.
A life ‘among machines’ demands that we connect analytical capacities 
more tightly to forms of normative reasoning that do not eschew prescrip-
tive arguments. Referring to Benjamin’s recognition of technology’s social 
potential, Bunz remarks:
[O]ur questioning of technology (and our social relationship to it) has 
become worse over time. Today, we mostly ask technology for prof itable 
business, but not for a better society. […] It seems that ensuring a distance 
between man and technology is the ideology of our time. (Bunz, 2014, p. 61)
Interestingly, technical artifacts or services are often described and justif ied 
by their creators with reference to moral values or social benefits. Facebook’s 
mission statement to ‘give people the power to build community and bring 
the world closer together’ (Zuckerberg, 2017) is a particular far-reaching 
example, but we regularly f ind broadly emancipatory narratives next to 
‘obvious’ perks like user-friendliness, convenience, or security. User privacy 
is quickly becoming a value companies can hardly ignore, at least in their 
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rhetoric. Google continues to liken links to votes3 and used to underscore 
the ‘uniquely democratic nature of the web’4 to justify link counting, even if 
PageRank’s core objective is to attribute differential value to each vote. Terms 
like ‘disruption’ or ‘disintermediation’ are often used to frame new tools or 
services as attacks on vested interests or expert governance, echoing the 
attempts to delegitimize librarians we encountered over the last chapters.
It is easy to dismiss such claims as cynical or naive, but they signal that 
there is an opportunity for narrating technical artifacts in cultural terms. 
Following Spärck Jones’s (1990) argument that information retrieval and 
artif icial intelligence experiments evaluate a technique’s capacity to satisfy 
specif ic needs or purposes, thus delivering ‘measures of acceptability not of 
truth’ (p. 281), the notion of ‘acceptability’ stands out as a way to interrogate 
the real and potential performativity that arises in concrete situations. This 
opens a larger register for critique than potentially limited and limiting 
concepts such as truthfulness or bias, which capture only a part of what is at 
stake. Commercial actors playing a dominant role in defining the emerging 
infosphere certainly use various strategies to present their products as 
acceptable and current debates about the power of algorithms, platforms, 
and data practices already invoke counternarratives that include questions 
of technical design. What are the conditions of acceptability one can put 
toward something like Google Search? Can we formulate normative elements 
that are not simply the revealed preference of market behavior? How can 
they f ind expression in the form of algorithmic techniques? Should they? 
These efforts can prof it from a conceptual frame that makes technicity 
addressable in these terms and points toward forms of contribution that 
include experimentation and creation. Critical investigations into potential 
biases in datasets (cf. O’Neil, 2016) and broader social effects (cf. Eubanks, 
2018) could then be seen as starting points for concrete design-oriented 
reflections, from designing for ‘auditability’ (Sandvig et al., 2014) to explicitly 
domain- and value-sensitive methodologies for software-making.
An exclusively reactive stance is not enough when it comes to dealing not 
only with individual techniques, but with pervasive technical infrastructures 
that function as globe-spanning ‘agencies of order’ (Peters, 2015, p. 1). The 
idea that we can hope for little more than to detect and (maybe) correct 
the practical or moral ‘mistakes’ of all-powerful companies and institutions 
leaves us stuck in a situation where alternative arrangements seem always 
3 https://support.google.com/webmasters/answer/40349?hl=en, accessed 22 February 2017.
4 https://web.archive.org/web/20001109080600/http://www.google.com/technology/index.
html, accessed 22 February 2017.
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further out of reach. It is certainly not surprising that mostly defensive norms 
like transparency, accountability, and privacy take the center stage when 
always larger parts of our digital environments are dominated by a handful 
of actors. The sheer economic power of these large companies is alarming, 
their technological prowess is intimidating, and their seemingly inescapable 
monopoly positions make it hard to envisage other scenarios. But critical 
work must not confine itself to a reactive position that thinks exclusively 
in terms of freedom from, not freedom to. Search engines that function just 
like Google, social networks looking just like Facebook or Twitter, a little less 
capable and convenient maybe but with respect for users’ privacy – this is 
hardly inspiring. Is there a space for some form of technological utopianism 
that is neither Silicon Valley solutionism (Morozov, 2013) nor a retreat into 
a kind of liberal minimalism where technology is to be tamed rather than 
molded with ambition? Can we envision a mandate for computing that 
mirror’s the public library’s commitment to Enlightenment values? Can 
we ask technology for more than we are currently getting?
My emphasis on the plasticity of technicity, on functional abstraction 
as opportunity, and on epistemological pluralism indeed has a normative, 
prescriptive component: while domination of and through technicity can 
hardly be ignored, a widening of technical imagination is necessary to 
combat a further reduction of what we ask of technology. An appreciation of 
algorithmic techniques and how they are assembled into working systems 
can hopefully inspire and substantiate forms of contribution to technical 
creation that range from participation in design processes to the speculative 
generation of ideas. Despite its entanglement with globe-spanning corporate 
infrastructures, the domain of software remains a fertile playground for 
all kinds of critical and creative engagement seeking to reclaim plasticity. 
Simondon’s philosophy indeed envisages technical culture and imagination 
as a balance between artisanal and industrial modes of creation, drawing 
on the powerful engine of concretization while making sure that technical 
objects remain open and sensitive to local circumstances. Human beings 
would act as coordinators and inventors that are ‘among machines’ rather 
than above or below them (Simondon, 2017, p. 18). This does not boil down 
to generalized technical training but starts from the recognition of the 
inescapable centrality of technology to human life and asks for a deeper 
involvement with current arrangements of technicity. Because Simondon 
would certainly caution us that the mere exchange of one set of values 
or f inalities for another would again keep technology ‘small’, ignoring its 
specif ic substance and capacity for expression. But from artistic experi-
mentation to civic technologies, from open-source software to algorithmic 
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accountability efforts, there are many examples where people are asking 
more from technology while embracing its unique potential. These efforts 
deserve much more visibility and support. And they may well include mo-
ments of outright refusal. But even here, technical culture is an asset and 
not a liability: as prolif ic hacker Maxigas (2017) states, ‘[t]echnical expertise 
is essential for mounting a challenge to technological innovation’ (p. 850).
If we agree with Latour (1991) that ‘technology is society made durable’, 
we cannot limit ourselves to quick f ixes but need to question much more 
thoroughly how this process of ‘making durable’ can be governed in ways that 
are more inclusive, ambitious, and born out of debate. As scholars critiquing 
YouTube’s recommendation system, for example, we cannot merely ask for 
some vague value change that implements ‘plurality’ and keeps users from 
spiraling into radicalization, shifting the burden of far-reaching design 
decisions to actors that have acquired quasi-governmental forms of power. 
Dare we ask the question of how YouTube should work, from interface to 
recommender system? Or at least how it could work differently? Can we 
imagine forms of ‘cooperative responsibility’ for organizational and design 
decisions concerning large online platforms? (cf. Helberger et al., 2018) What 
would this look like, which institutions, forms of deliberation, and modes of 
application would be suitable? Taking technicity seriously would require more 
technical acculturation, yes, but also the realization that we are designing 
and negotiating increasingly fundamental operating mechanisms of society.
When technical systems become social systems and vice versa, technical 
critique and social critique increasingly depend on each other. The discussion 
of algorithms in criminal justice, for example, is right to address the real and 
potential effects of concrete technical practices on particular populations, 
but it cannot stop short of interrogating the broader goals criminal justice 
systems pursue. We can isolate instances of decision-making and analyze 
their procedural component, but the question of justice is necessarily much 
larger. What makes biases in domains like criminal sentencing or parole 
so fraught with anger and anxiety is that we ultimately know that these 
decisions are part of larger systems of injustice, where individuals are taken 
out of circumstances marked by social and economic inequality and put into 
carceral structures that further destroy their chances to participate meaning-
fully in society. How would a critique of technicity look like that builds on 
Angela Davis’s (2003) foundational denunciation of mass incarceration? Or, 
put differently, how could algorithmic techniques contribute to a criminal 
justice system that had rehabilitation as its central focus? Could machine 
learning be used to identify the most effective resources for reintegrating 
an offender into society rather than to operationalize the contestable notion 
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of recidivism? These speculations may seem far-fetched, but my insistence 
on the notion of ‘purpose’ and ‘interest’ ultimately means that algorithmic 
information ordering cannot be detached from the larger power structures 
it is embedded in.
Make no mistake, the positive view of technicity and technical creation I 
have defended over the course of this book does not mean that I ignore the 
highly problematic role technology has come to play. At the present moment, 
engines of order are instrumental in tightening the ‘“iron cage” of consumer-
ism’ (Jackson, 2009) and in making ‘surveillance capitalism’ (Zuboff, 2019) a 
concrete reality. What I believe, however, is that this is not an inevitability. The 
redefinition of existing modes of knowing and acting can be an opportunity, 
if seized upon. If technical work is indeed qualculative, we need to develop an 
understanding of technicity that does not try to eliminate the part of judgment, 
but makes it visible, debatable, and amendable to change. Although calculation 
is still often seen as a guardrail against the capriciousness of human judgment, 
I hope that this book has clearly shown that the myriad moments of choice 
render algorithmic operation riddled and wrought with ideas and values that 
are far from uncontested. If technology is human gesture, how could it be 
otherwise? Instead of seeking to eliminate judgment from technicity, we must 
invest more in our normative capacities as they intersect with technicity. The 
most important contribution the humanities can make to our technological 
society is to articulate how human judgment, expressed as technical artifact 
or not, can bloom in ways that do not fall back into structures of domination. 
Technological societies that have self-optimizing infrastructures and tech-
niques for dynamic and fine-grained distinction-making at their disposal will 
have to combine knowledge of machines with political and moral sensitivity. 
What is the ‘glue’ (Latour, 2005) that holds societies together when every 
little data point can become a variable in techniques whose very purpose is 
to differentiate? That challenge requires more than technical imagination; it 
requires political imagination capable of integrating technicity into visions 
of society that seek deliberation, cooperation, and justice.
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